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INTRODUCTION1 
The present collection of articles reflects the different stages of my research 
originally started in 1997. It has been guided by one central interest: my lasting 
fascination with Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky’s Devils (1871) and the 
numerous reinterpretations it underwent in both Russian and English Modernism 
through its consistent rewritings. In the last fifteen years I have published over 
thirty studies in Hungary, other Central European countries, Great Britain and 
France, most of which are at least loosely related to this focal point. The present 
ten articles – three concerned with Dostoevsky’s text and seven with English 
Modernism – have been selected from these. Though except for the Huxley paper 
none of them are consistently comparative in nature, the collection – I hope – 
gives a clear view of the dialogue the novelistic texts discussed continue with 
each other.  
Such a long period inevitably must bring about major changes in one’s ideas 
and critical interests, just as it must produce essential new material in the 
literature of one’s field. The story of interpretation these articles outline is 
subject to the inevitable fate of all narratives: it can be read only backwards, 
from its end – from the moment when its object-cause is revealed to have always 
been there, shaping the (de)tours of interpretation which has lead to its 
emergence (cf. P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 10–24; Žižek, “The Truth Arises 
from Misrecognition” passim). Accordingly, it has evolved gradually through 
textual analysis, and what seems to be a more or less coherent story now, did not 
– could not – seem to be such while it was being formulated. Consequently, the 
present arrangement of the articles – which follows the chronological order of 
the novels’ release – does not correspond to the order of the articles’ first 
publication and to the consecutive stages in the development of the ideas 
shaping them. These facts have necessitated both a thorough revision of the 
original texts – including updated references – and the addition of a new 
introduction for the present volume. The latter aims at the clarification of the 
critical concepts informing my readings, which were rather sketchy but involved 
an inconvenient number of repetitions in the journal articles due to the specifics 
of the genre. With this in view, the theoretical comments in the articles have 
been limited to short references and footnotes. 
The central idea governing my research, in hindsight, has been a concern 
with the interrelationship of two seemingly contradictory mythemes – those of 
                                                     
1
 Special thanks to Charles Somerville for the careful linguistic editing of this section. 
12 
the Golden Age and Narcissus
2
 – shaping narrative identity
3
, that is, the subject’s 
coming into being through and as language (cf. Kristeva, Desire in Language 
124–47). Thus, the Narcissus narrative is both the beginning and the end of my 
interpretative quest: inspired by Dostoevsky’s novel, which implicitly identifies 
the Narcissus myth
4
 as a fundamental shaping factor of desire, identity and 
narrative, my research has resulted in readings of the novels as comments on the 
narcissistic nature of subjectivity
5
. It was both provoked and theoretically 
                                                     
2
 For an interpretation of the mytheme of the Golden Age as a totality, a synthesis of otherwise 
mutually exclusive binary oppositions see (Kroó, “From Plato’s Myth of the Golden Age” 355–
70). On the interpenetration of the narcissistic model and the mytheme of the Golden Age in the 
pastoral tradition see (S. Horváth passim). The latter study is especially revealing, because it 
demonstrates how mirroring and narcissistic self-reflection became inherent elements in the 
paradisiacal nature-descriptions of the pastoral tradition. These, in turn, found there way into the 
highly intertextual spaces of Rousseau’s and Dostoevsky’s writings – later important models for 
Conrad and Powys. As S. Horváth emphasises following Paul de Man’s train of thought in his 
reading of Rousseau, in the French writer’s texts the mytheme of the Golden Age is primarily an 
imaginative/imaginary space in which the subject could fictionalise and theatricalise itself, rather 
than a signifier of any metaphysical quest. 
3
 One of the fundamental assumptions behind my readings is formulated by Peter Brooks. Relying 
on Lacan’s ideas, he argues in Reading for the Plot that the “question of identity […] can be 
thought only in narrative terms” (33), whereas “it is in essence the desire to be heard, 
recognised, understood, which, never wholly satisfied or indeed satisfiable, continues to generate 
the desire to tell, the effort to enunciate a significant version of the life story in order to captivate 
a possible listener” (54). Thus, the “engine” of both story and story-telling is desire: the longing 
to reach the object of one’s desire, in general, on the one hand, and the desire to formulate a 
meaningful and therefore “transmissible” version of one’s life(-story), on the other. The prime 
mover of narratives is the object-cause of desire – a lack (37–61). Accordingly, prematurely 
fulfilled desire – such as finding the object at home by incest – short-circuits desire and brings an 
untimely closure to the narrative, making all further story(-telling) impossible (103–9). It does so 
by restraining the potential hero of the story from leaving home, from passing over the limits of 
the closed space of fulfilled desire – by excluding the possibility of any further transgression 
essential for narratives (85–9). 
4
 Cf. (Ovid III 339–508). In accordance with Gray Kochhar-Lindgren’s and Julia Kristeva’s 
approach, throughout the present collection I will treat the different discourses (mythical, 
psychoanalytic and critical) related to the Narcissus narrative as one indivisible intertextual 
complex. The constants of this amalgam include mirroring, infinite self-reflexion, anxiety of 
death and an inability to acknowledge the other as an entity independent from the self (2–5).  
5
 Following Lawrence Cahoone and agreeing with Kristeva, Kochhar-Lindgren points out that 
Western subjectivity is fundamentally narcissistic in nature, that is, based on self-reflection, and 
therefore on a gap between self and other. He highlights this element in Western philosophical 
thought from the period starting with Cartesian cogito, but identifies the roots of the 
phenomenon in Platonic idealism. Relying on Cahoone’s views, he sees the model feasible as 
long as there is a third term – God, nature, logos, etc. – to stabilise it by putting an end to 
otherwise infinite self-reflection. He also contends that narcissistic subjectivity without this third 
element – the Derridean transcendental signified – is a “depthless surface”, which is basically 
what the post-structuralist subject is (2–18).  
 Consequently, in literary criticism the notions of the textual subject and the different versions of 
mirroring and reflexion are inseparable from the Narcissus narrative. These include, among 
13 
resolved by Julia Kristeva’s impulsive but sketchy reading of Devils as a 
landmark in European literature: a novel ushering in the unstoppable flow of 
Modernist texts reflecting abjection
6
, a crisis of narcissistic subjectivity (Powers 
of Horror 2–18).  
Kristeva’s vision opens up new theoretical vistas in two directions. On the 
one hand, her concept of the abject is genealogically related to Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s theory of the carnival
7
, which, originally formulated with François 
                                                                                                                                   
others, the desire for the impossible merger with the (almost) same, incest, and bisexuality, 
which are explicit even in the mythical versions of the narrative. In the best-known one, Ovid’s, 
Narcissus is desired by both male and female lovers, but he coldly rejects all of them. As a 
punishment for his heartlessness, he comes to know himself – falls in love with his mirror-image 
in the water, thus seemingly prioritising homosexual love over heterosexual attractions. The 
metaphorical incest also implied here (son of a water-nymph, Narcissus in his longing to merge 
with his fluid image wants the impossible fusion with the mother) is explicit in other versions, in 
which the unreachable lover is Narcissus’s (twin) sister. Falling in love with an image – treating 
it as a living human being – also highlights another concept inseparable from the Narcissus 
narrative: the discourse of the double. As for his actions, Narcissus is associated with mechanical 
repetition: longing for the impossible merger with the maternal element, but also knowing that it 
equals death, he keeps oscillating between identification and separation, like an automaton 
(Kochhar-Lindgren 2–44). Cf. (Ovid III 339–508; Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts 53–
64). Mirroring, the (living) image and the double are closely related to the text-within-the-text 
and the infinity of space and mirroring associated with the mise en abyme (cf. Szekeres161–71). 
6 Instead of the essayistic and lengthy description of the abject in Kristeva’s Powers of Horror let 
me quote the following brief definition for the disambiguation of the term:  
Every social order defines itself as opposed to the non-signified, the non-structured [...]. 
[T]he marginalised segments and elements are under the laws of prohibition and taboo: 
the filthy, the disgusting, the dirty, the perverse, the heterogeneous. The term abject 
includes all these elements that are not fixed symbolically, which are hardly encodable 
and are menacing for culture. The abject is the most archaic experience of the subject, 
which is neither an object nor the subject, but already articulates separation by marking 
the future space of the subject in relation to the disgusting, to the heterogeneous, and to 
the terrifying. [...] [I]t threatens symbolic fixation and the formation of identity. The 
aspect of the abject most imminently and constantly threatening the subject is the very 
existence and feeling of the body: it is this uncontrollable structure full of streams and 
flows that language, the word, and discourse must totally cover so that the subject can 
feel her/himself a homogeneous monad. (Kiss 19–20; my thanks to Nóra Séllei for this 
translation) 
 Here and in the rest of the volume italics in quotes are as in the original, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
7
 Bakhtin’s concept emerged in his Rabelais and His World (especially 1–58) and was later 
incorporated into Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (101–80). Let me note here that the first 
version of the Dostoevsky monograph, published in 1929 as Проблемы творчества 
Достоевского did not involve any references to the carnival – a concept formulated much later, 
during the writing of the volume on Rabelais, which was finished in 1940, but could be 
published only in 1965. In the meantime, the Dostoevsky monograph was thoroughly rewritten, 
to come out in 1963 in the form that became a landmark in Dostoevsky studies (Проблемы 
14 
Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel in mind, was later to provide a context of 
historical poetics for his reading of Dostoevsky’s texts as polyphonic
8
. 
Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, in which she coins the term abject, discusses 
phenomena which would be called carnivalesque in Bakhtinian terminology, as 
is evident for example from Michael André Bernstein’s rereading of the 
carnivalesque in Dostoevsky in terms of the abject, to be detailed below. On the 
other hand, her earlier introduction of the concept of intertextuality is 
acknowledgedly rooted in the Bakhtinian notion of the dialogue
9
. Both 
directions of her development of Bakhtinian thought are heavily indebted to 
Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, more particularly to Jacques Lacan’s view of 
the subject
10
. Thus there is an almost straight line leading from Dostoevsky 
                                                                                                                                   
поэтики Достоевского). That version already involves carnival as the most important shaping 
factor of the historical poetics of the polyphonic novel: 
Carnival itself [...] is a syncretic pageantry of a ritualistic sort. As a form it is very 
complex and varied. [...] Carnival has worked out an entire language of symbolic 
concretely sensuous forms. [...] This language [...] gave expression to a unified (but 
complex) carnival sense of the world, permeating all its forms. [...] It cannot be 
translated in any full or adequate way into a verbal language, and much less into a 
language of abstract concepts, but [...] it can be transposed into the language of literature. 
We are calling this transposition of carnival into the language of literature the 
carnivalisation of literature. (Bakhtin, Problems 122) 
 Kristeva does not refer to Bakhtin in Powers of Horror, but the connection is rather obvious. 
Especially when taking into account the fact that it was Kristeva who introduced Bakhtinian 
ideas into Western literary thought, including the ideas of carnival and the carnivalisation of 
literature (cf. Томсон passim).  
8
 Cf. Bakhtin’s own definition of polyphony: 
A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine 
polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels. 
What unfolds in his works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective 
world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a plurality of 
consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, combine but are not 
merged in the unity of the event. Dostoevsky’s major heroes are, by the very nature of 
his creative design, not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own 
directly signifying discourse. (Problems 6–7) 
9
 Cf. “Word, Dialogue, and Novel” (Kristeva, Desire in Language 64–91; Томсон passim). 
10
 In the poststructuralist notion of the subject, based on Jacques Lacan’s ideas, the psychological 
phenomenon of narcissism plays a central role: primary narcissism is associated with the so-
called mirror-stage, the emergence of the Imaginary I (moi, roughly equivalent to the ego or self) 
at the sight of one’s mirror-image (imago) through imaginary identification with it. The mirror-
stage also ushers in the entry into the Symbolic (Language, Law, the realm of the Father, the 
dialectics of desire) through the Oedipal stage. This period ends with the acceptance of 
castration (the paternal metaphor of the Name of the Father), which would allow the subject (je) 
to sublimate its frustrated desire (an element of the Real, the Lacanian version of the id) in 
language – to come into being. At the same time, it ends the dyadic union of mother and child, 
which is associated with narcissism and parallels the phenomenon of maternal mirroring in the 
15 
through Bakhtin to Kristeva and the concepts of the abject, the speaking subject 
and intertextuality. Following this path reveals Dostoevsky to be what he has 
always been: a writer who has fundamentally and more or less directly shaped 
not only twentieth-century European literature, but also contemporary literary 
criticism and the ways post-structuralism – both as literary criticism and art 
psychology – sees the (textual) subject.  
Kristeva’s view of literature after Dostoevsky assigns a very specific role to 
myth in general: in the permanent narcissistic crisis she envisions myth supplies 
the discourse in the context of which the subject can redraw – reestablish – its 
insecure limits, which have been obliterated due to the weakening of the position 
of the Other, the transcendental signified. However, as Michael Bell’s analysis 
of Modernist mythopoeia reveals, a “genuinely” Modernist approach to myth 
handles it as a purely aesthetic sublimating discourse of the abject (cf. Kristeva, 
Powers 7) – with the ironic awareness that in a multiverse of truths myth must 
always remain personal, though an absolute necessity for the survival of the 
subject dispersed in language (Bell 9–38; 121). This vision of myth in 
Modernism goes hand in hand with Paul Riceour’s hermeneutical approach to 
myth and Eric Gould’s myth-critical re-evaluation of mythopoeia in accordance 
with the post-structuralist view of the subject and language. Both of them assert 
that myth functions as an exemplary act of interpretation that attempts to close 
an ontological gap, but with each attempt all it can demonstrate is the 
impossibility of such a closure and the absolute necessity of the effort (Riceour 
5–6; Gould 6–34; cf. Kochhar-Lindgren 10–11). Thus, though the articles in the 
present volume are concerned with myth and apply the terms of structuralist 
Myth Criticism as reference points, they do so with myth as a purely aesthetic 
and highly productive discourse in view – in short, they focus on what Gould 
terms mythicity (34; cf. Kochhar-Lindgren 10–11) instead of myth as a discourse 
of the numenous. It is in this context that the vicissitudes of both the myth of the 
Golden Age and the Narcissus narrative are examined. 
In this respect certain aspects of Dostoevsky criticism serve as fundamental 
assumptions for the studies in the collection. Malcolm V. Jones’s book-length 
study, which is probably the most comprehensive post-Bakhtinian assessment of 
Dostoevskian realism, names one of these: the conspicuously (post)modernist 
features in Dostoevsky’s texts. As he points out, a most curious and baffling 
aspect of Dostoevsky’s works is that “independently of a specifically 
deconstructionist theory, [... his] apparently ‘realist’ texts behave like modernist 
or post-modernist ones [...] and [...] in spite of his modernism or post-
modernism, Dostoevsky may still be read as a latter-day Christian or humanist” 
(xvi).  
                                                                                                                                   
clinical experience related to narcissism (empathic emotional reactions on the part of the mother 
that lead to the emergence of the child’s self, literally in the eyes of the mother). Cf. (Lacan, 
“The Mirror Stage” passim; Boothby 21–46; Ignusz passim). 
16 
This specific feature is closely related to the debate surrounding the notion of 
polyphony, which surfaces in Jones’s monograph as a concern with the nature of 
Dostoevsky’s “fantastic realism”. Jones uses the phrase to characterise 
Dostoevskian texts and emphasises that although the notion originates in 
Dostoevsky’s own description of his art, it is a contested one: 
There is [...] a difference in opinion between prominent Western 
critics about whether fantastic realism designates a higher spiritual or 
poetic reality and if so what kind of realm this is; whether, for instance, 
it is a higher religious realm in which the multivoicedness of human 
discourse (Bakhtin’s heteroglossia) finds unity in what Derrida calls a 
metaphysics of presence in which the transcendental signified finds a 
divine guarantee. (3, emphasis added) 
For his part, Jones insists that many characteristic features of Dostoevsky’s texts 
connect his “fantastic realism” to “a modernist or post-modernist perception of 
the various ways in which discourse breaks loose from the reality principle and 
suffers internal fracture” (28). Consequently, Jones defines “fantastic realism” in 
terms of polyphony, as a combination of three different discourses: those of 
“authority” (the voice of the father or literary precursor, constantly questioned, 
undermined, even deconstructed), “mystery” (uncanny effects, like the double, 
which seem to threaten structure and signification) and “miracle” (“an ideal 
event whose realisation would be inconsistent with the reality effect”) (191–9). 
If the most disconcerting effect of the uncanny
11
 is the disclosing of the abyss 
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 Freud’s “Unheimlich” rests on the notion of the return of the repressed, explained in his seminal 
essay entitled “The ‘Uncanny’”:  
In the first place, if psycho-analytic theory is correct in maintaining that every affect 
belonging to an emotional impulse, whatever its kind, is transformed, if it is repressed, 
into anxiety, then among instances of frightening things there must be one class in which 
the frightening element can be shown to be something repressed which recurs. This class 
of frightening things would then constitute the uncanny; and it must be a matter of 
indifference whether what is uncanny was itself originally frightening or whether it 
carried some other affect. In the second place, if this is indeed the secret nature of the 
uncanny, we can understand why linguistic usage has extended das Heimliche 
[‘homely’] into its opposite, das Unheimliche; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new 
or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has 
become alienated from it only through the process of repression. This reference to the 
factor of repression enables us, furthermore, to understand Schelling's definition of the 
uncanny as something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light. (240) 
 The Freudian term has generated much critical debate. It has been associated from its very birth 
with the ever-changing concept of the double or Doppelgänger (and by implication with 
narcissism), and also with the idea of the castration-complex – a phenomenon that has been 
fundamentally reinterpreted since, notably by Samuel Weber. For him the experience of the 
uncanny is inseparable from moments of castration in the epistemological sense of the word: 
17 
between the signifier and the signified, the “miracle” might imply just the 
opposite. And so, Jones writes, in Dostoevsky’s novels “the demand for miracle 
is ever present,” even though it “never happens” (199). To return to Bell’s vision 
of Modernist mythopoeia, Jones, just like Kristeva, allocates Dostoevsky’s place 
at the dividing line between different periods and approaches. The craving for 
the miracle Jones mentions clearly translates as an attempt to reinstate the 
metaphysical signified through myth, and identifies Dostoevsky as a religious 
writer, as opposed to genuine Modernists (cf. Bell 121–2). If one accepts Jones’s 
assumption that this craving is really never rewarded with an absolute revelation, 
Dostoevsky still remains a forerunner of the purely aesthetic sublimating 
discourse of the abject characteristic for Modernism: his resolution of the 
narcissistic crisis must always remain dubious. 
This leads on to another highly contested aspect of Bakhtinian criticism: his 
optimistic reading of the carnival versus the tragic implications of abjection as 
narcissistic crisis. According to Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s sense of the 
carnivalesque is mediated through the classical and Renaissance traditions and 
“the objective memory of the […] genre” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 121). 
He – apparently quite naively – reads carnival as an unambiguously liberating 
source of rebirth
12
. Scepticism about this axiom of Bakhtin’s has had far-
                                                                                                                                   
moments, when not exactly nothing happens, but something that fundamentally undermines the 
subject’s position by revealing the gap between the signifier and the signified and thereby 
shaking forever their trust in signification. It evokes a distrust in signification and representation, 
which can never be undone or dissolved, and therefore results in lasting epistemological and 
ontological insecurity (1111–12). 
 The other inseparably related term in Freud’s essay is the double: he identifies the theme of the 
Doppelgänger as one of the most frequently occurring instances of the uncanny. He works with 
literary material and recognises the great variety of the forms in which doubling – the “dividing 
and interchanging of the self,” “the repetition of the same character-traits,” or some hidden 
mental connection between two characters – can occur in fiction. He adopts Otto Rank’s theory 
and interprets the psychological phenomenon of the double as “originally an insurance against 
the destruction of the ego, an ‘energetic denial of the power of death’,” rooted in “self-love” 
(233–4). Thus he associates its emergence with primary narcissism and points out that once this 
stage of development is over, the double “becomes the uncanny harbinger of death”. The 
concept has been thoroughly reinterpreted in a Lacanian context. Mladen Dolar sees the double 
as a powerful mirror image in possession of the gaze, a rival who always enjoys (jouissance) at 
the cost of the subject and inevitably poses a lethal threat (passim). All in all, uncanny effects 
always mark the subject’s insecurity and foreshadow its disintegration. 
12 Cf. “The carnival sense of the world possesses a mighty life-creating and transforming power, 
an indestructible vitality” (Bakhtin, Problems 107). On the return of carnivalesque images as the 
repressed, as hysterical symptoms in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western consciousness 
cf. (White passim). Allon White contends that while medieval and renaissance carnivals worked 
as successful sublimating contexts for the grotesque body (i. e. the human body), with the 
gradual banning of these festivities such a possibility was annihilated, and the return of the 
carnivalesque in Modernist literature bears no comparison with the actual ritual as far as the 
effectiveness of sublimation is concerned. For a mild critique of Bakhtinian optimism cf. 
(Hutcheon 69–83). 
18 
reaching implications for the interpretation of the carnivalesque in Dostoevsky’s 
works. Here I agree with Bernstein’s insight, taken up and advanced by Borys 
Groys, to the effect that the carnivalesque as presented by Bakhtin can have 
sinister implications
13
. Bernstein argues that Dostoevsky’s carnival is not bound 
by the traditional time limits of the festival, and therefore becomes “a permanent 
inversion of all values” with “lethal” and “savage” consequences (20). Drawing 
rather heavily on Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, Bernstein goes on to claim that 
Dostoevsky’s texts give a “bitter” reading of carnival, for they represent it as the 
realm of the abject and abjection
14
.  
Bernstein’s reading of Dostoevsky also reveals the full potentials of 
Bakhtinian theory as far as irony – a direct consequence of multivoiced 
discourse – is concerned, though it also highlights the narcissistic nature of 
Dostoevskian infinite self-reflection. Combining his Bakhtinian-Kristevan 
interpretation with Harold Bloom’s notion of the anxiety of influence (106) and 
René Girard’s idea of “mimetic rivalry” (the doubling or imitative or mediated 
nature of novelistic desire [1–15]), Bernstein posits the typical Dostoevskian 
hero as caught up in infinite, vertiginous ironical self-reflection that makes 
narratives abysmally endless. Bernstein convincingly argues that the typical 
Dostoevskian hero – from the Underground Man to Ivan Karamazov – can be 
defined by the term “Abject Hero”. This is a particularly bitter version of the 
Saturnalian (carnivalesque) ironist who is outraged at his own belatedness, his 
lack of originality and his inability to break out from the already existing literary 
scenarios and motifs, even when he wants to define his identity through a 
narrative of his own (17–22). As Bernstein emphasises, the major irony of the 
situation is that the “Abject Hero” is bitterly conscious that “even his most 
‘personal’ longings are only commonplace quotations” (105); in other words, his 
characteristic state of mind is what Nietzsche so magnificently condemned as 
ressentiment (108). Bernstein focuses on the plight of the Underground Man and 
                                                     
13 For a summary of these arguments, see (Emerson 171–5). 
14
 Though the differences between Kristeva’s and Bernstein’s application of the term (reflecting 
their attitude to Bakhtinian thought) could be the subject of a separate study, for the purposes of 
this paper let me cite Bernstein’s redefinition of the Kristevan abject: 
[According to Kristeva] the abject [is] a universal psychological condition, a fissure in 
the relationship between consciousness and corporality that arises at the most elemental 
levels of human response to the facts of physical existence itself [...]. It undermines the 
conventional Freudian distinctions between conscious and unconscious [...]. Linked 
primordially to the body’s excretions, the abject ‘is something rejected from which one 
does not part,’ a horror that violates ‘identity, system, order.’ For Kristeva ‘The corpse, 
seen without God and outside science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting 
life.’ From my [Bernstein’s] perspective, abjection is a social and dialogic category, and 
its expression is always governed by the mapping of prior literary and cultural models. 
(28–9, emphasis added) 
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the clown figures in Dostoevsky’s texts, but one of the best examples is 
Stavrogin’s confession in Devils, which, instead of presenting an authentic 
narrative that would define Stavrogin’s identity, is only a rewriting of the 
Marion scene from Rousseau’s Confessions
15
.  
Bernstein’s insight sheds new light on Bakhtin’s interpretation of the 
confessional dialogue in Dostoevsky’s works as a site of the “vicious circle of 
self-consciousness with a sideward glance” (Problems 234): he implicitly 
reveals it as the staging of the subject’s narcissistic crisis. The “genre memory” 
of the ironic Saturnalian dialogue and the penchant of the Abject Hero for „self-
laceration” (93) as a definition of his identity seem to lead almost inevitably to a 
preference for the abject confession, the moving force behind which is an 
unhealable narcissistic scar. Among others, both Bernstein (90) and Peter Brooks 
(Troubling Confessions 46–60) point out how the (often abject) confession is a 
dominant element in Dostoevskian texts, and the latter clearly connects it to the 
lapse of faith, the weakening of the transcendental signified’s position. As Brooks 
argues, once “faith and grace” become highly problematic concepts, as they do in 
Dostoevsky’s novels, the “confessional discourse” might turn out to be sterile 
(Troubling 48–50), as in the case of the Underground Man or Stavrogin. 
Indeed, Dostoevsky’s treatment of narcissistic subjectivity in Devils, and in 
particular in “Stavrogin’s Confession,” is the reference point for all the other 
readings included in the present volume. Stavrogin’s confessional discourse 
retains at least traces of the central element in sacramental confession. As 
Riceour points out, the believer is raised to self-consciousness by confession 
exactly because in his discourse he evokes myth, that is, the transcendental 
signified, the Other, in whose eyes he can establish his identity through 
(confessional) language (25–47). In the Modernist novels, as already implied by 
Stavrogin’s narrative, this becomes strictly impossible: the narratives become 
obsessed with secular forms of confession (Joseph Conrad), involving the 
theatricalisation of identity (Aldous Huxley) or reflect claustrophobic 
consciousnesses, caught up in the obsessive attraction-repulsion that dominates 
the subject lured in the terrain of abjection in his otherwise mythical quest for 
his identity (John Cowper Powys). 
My exploration of the consistent rewritings of Devils in English Modernism 
is worth considering in the context of Peter Kaye’s insights concerning 
Dostoevsky’s reception, which show how much Dostoevsky himself is the 
metaphorical other – the abject? – of Western cultural thought. Kaye argues that 
the release of the first Constance Garnett translation (1912) provoked a cult-like 
fascination with the Russian classic among major English Modernists. This 
reception, however, shows curious similarities with Russian Dostoevsky 
                                                     
15 On Stavrogin’s use of Rousseau, see “The Marion motif: the whisper of the precursor” (Jones 
149–63) and (S. Horváth passim; Miller passim) 
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criticism, which was handicapped by what Bakhtin termed monologic readings – 
exactly up to the publication of his own groundbreaking monograph: 
The Russian author was acclaimed as mystic, prophet, psychologist, 
irrationalist, a chronicler of the perverse, and sometimes as a novelist. 
[…] To understand how the modern novelists in England responded to 
Dostoevsky, it is helpful to keep monsters in mind. Monsters resist 
classification and hence pose a threat of dissolution, for they combine 
what is normally kept separate and distinct – head of man and torso of 
beast become one. […] all viewed Dostoevsky as a writer who could 
not be classified or assimilated within the traditions of the novel; his 
works were assumed to be unshaped by artistic intent and unloosed 
from social restraints. […] By disengaging him from his literary 
heritage, misunderstanding was assured. (5–7, emphasis added) 
It is tempting to see the image of the abject – the ambiguous monster, the 
“enigma” that both resists classification and threatens order – as a master trope 
of English Dostoevsky-reception. Kaye’s scope involves the period between 
1900 and 1930, but of the authors discussed in this volume he deals only with 
Joseph Conrad. His reading of Under Western Eyes as a consistent rewriting of 
Crime and Punishment is highly inspiring, but, as I will suggest, Devils can have 
at least equal claims for the status of being the novel’s central Dostoevskian 
intertext. 
The articles in the present volume focus on a relatively small segment of the 
vicissitudes of Dostoevsky’s vision of narcissistic subjectivity. Their reference 
point is a reading of Devils explored in the first three studies: it contends that the 
Narcissus myth implicitly shaping Stavrogin’s confession is also indicative of 
the nature of the desire that shapes the whole narrative. I agree with Kristeva that 
the novel’s major concern is the redefinition of the subject’s – and text’s – 
borders after faith has been shaken in the transcendental signified. Stavrogin’s 
narrative and fate, however, make a comment on narcissistic subjectivity that 
leads to a dead-end, from which no life or story-telling seems to be possible. 
Joseph Conrad, Aldous Huxley and John Cowper Powys try to overcome this 
deadlock with varying success in their rewritings – and readings – of Devils, 
which plays a central role in their artistic self-definition. Conrad problematises 
the gaze that determines symbolic identification in Under Western Eyes (1911). 
While he practically deconstructs one particular ideological construct that can 
determine identification, he fundamentally repeats the bleak Dostoevskian 
comment of hopelessness. Huxley, in his turn, launches a rather malicious attack 
in Point Counter Point (1929) against Dostoevsky, whom he identifies with 
Stavrogin, and reads in terms of a diseased narcissistic consciousness. He tries to 
fight his “literary father” both by recreating his character as an inauthentic play-
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actor, and by countering what he interprets as the Dostoevskian stance with a 
version of D. H. Lawrence’s “philosophy”. His argument is rather weakened by 
the fact that Stavrogin’s – that is, Dostoevsky’s – narrative simply appropriates 
his novel.  
Powys’s reading of Dostoevsky evolves gradually in his so-called Wessex 
novels and therefore reveals its full implications if followed through. Thus, the 
studies included in this volume deal with three out of the four novels
16
. Wolf 
Solent (1929) raises the dilemma of narcissistic subjectivity through a dialogue 
with both The Brothers Karamazov and Devils. Its Bildung-like structure reveals 
the gradual emergence and the final promise of the acceptance of narcissistic 
subjectivity as part of the human condition through a Rabelaisian personal 
philosophy. In other words, Powys explicitly rereads the abject as carnivalesque, 
which enables him to accept the indefinite, fluid nature of subjectivity. This will 
remain a constant in the following two novels, though will acquire different 
shapes. In A Glastonbury Romance (1932) this personal philosophy appears as 
the mystical-revivalist element behind a newfangled commune. The story, which 
is the only consistent rewriting of Devils among the Wessex novels, repeats 
Dostoevsky’s fundamental strategy as far as myth, identity and narrative are 
concerned. Clearly motivated by the Saturnian quest, the narrative is just as 
explicitly the “pure Romance” of Narcissus with his only love – himself. Based 
on the Arthurian legends, just like T. S. Eliot’s Waste Land, it makes a highly 
ironic comment on Modernist mythopoeia as a discourse redefining the subject. 
If Modernist literature moves in the terrain of abjection, A Glastonbury Romance 
is a textbook case. But it is also a phase: by turning the promise of a Rabelaisian 
philosophy hinted at in Wolf Solent into fictional reality, it also poses the 
mythical/mystical sublimating discourse of the abject as a closure unacceptable 
for narcissistic subjectivity. Weymouth Sands (1934), which continues the 
Dostoevskian dialogue with a magnificent carnivalesque rewriting of 
Stavrogin’s vision of the Golden Age, transposes the Rabelaisian attitude 
advocated by the previous texts on the level of narration. Thereby it can be read 
as a fairly successful artistic (aesthetic) discourse of the abject, which – 
characteristically for Powys – involves in its multiverse of narcissitic 
(solipsistic) subjectivities its own metatext. A synopsis of a work on the 
philosophy of representation, this metafictional segment (88–9) indicates that 
English Modernism has run its full course as far as the interrelationship of myth, 
identity, narrative and desire are concerned: it suggests that every myth is born 
from human desire to come up with a meaningful version of existence. Powys 
here reaches a conclusion which is in accordance with the post-structuralist 
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 The fourth novel, Maiden Castle (1936), which completes the cycle, adds no significant new 
shade to this reading – in fact, it is a novel of rather modest artistic merits and in many ways a 
major step backwards. The conclusions of my reading would be rather fruitful in an analysis of 
Powys’s later, quasi-historical novels, which, however, should be subject to an individual study. 
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vision of subjectivity and myth: for him mythopoeia is born from the desire to 
close an ontological gap, but all it can demonstrate is both the necessity and the 
impossibility of doing so. 
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THE GOLDEN AGE AND NARCISSUS: THE 
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT MYTH IN 
STAVROGIN’S CONFESSION1 
Stavrogin’s confession, which is probably the most debated section of 
Dostoevsky’s Devils
2
, plays a crucial role in defining the main character’s 
enigmatic identity, since practically this is the only occasion when his silence is 
broken. The “confession” is Stavrogin’s first-person narrative of his own 
identity
3
, which retrospectively reinterprets all other narratives about him. 
Apparently, all the mysteries surrounding him are solved, Stavrogin’s “final” 
and “true” word stops the infinite shift of meanings and ends the signifying 
chain (Lacan, “The Insistence of the Letter” passim; cf. Gould 51–2). This 
“appearance”, however, is revealed as the “real” key to the understanding of the 
confession. On the one hand, it is the myth of the Golden Age which explicitly 
appears in it as a text literally shedding light on the story of Stavrogin and 
Matryosha in the moment of epiphany and thereby fulfilling its sacred 
interpretative function (cf. Gould 6). On the other hand, Stavrogin, the author of 
the confession, makes sure that the myth should definitely appear for the reader 
as the climax of the whole scene: he embeds it in multiple frames and separates 
it from the rest of the confession stylistically (Гроссман 611). What is covered 
up by this luminous appearance is the ultimate importance of appearance itself, 
the implicit myth of Narcissus: in the dialogic situation of the confession 
Stavrogin acts out the role of Narcissus looking at his own “appearance” – that 
is, reflection – in his text alienated from himself, just like in the eyes of his 
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 Originally a section of my doctoral thesis submitted in 2005 and entitled A szándék allegóriái – 
Az identitás mítoszai Dosztojevszkij örökében (Allegories of Intent – Myths of Identity in the 
Wake of Dostoevsky). First published as “The Golden Age and Narcissus – The Explicit and 
Implicit Myth in Stavrogin’s Confession,” Slavica XXXIV (2005), 147–64. Special thanks to 
Karin Macdonald for her careful linguistic editing of the English version. The preliminary 
research for the thesis was carried out with the assistance of the Eötvös Scholarship 
supplemented by a grant from the Hungarian Ministry of Education (OM). 
2
 The chapter entitled “At Tikhon’s” is a philologically problematic section of the novel, and this 
fact is also reflected in the critical reception of Devils. The present study is based on the 1996 
critical edition of the novel (Достоевский, Бесы), and adopts its editor’s standpoint, according 
to whom in the reception history of Devils the problematic chapter has become an unalienable 
part of the text in readers’ consciousness and for this reason it should be published in its original 
place, as Chapter 9 of Part 2 (Сараскина 459). The English quotations are all based on 
(Dostoevsky, Devils) and since no other Dostoevsky text is cited in the article, only the page 
numbers are indicated in the parentethical notes. 
3
 On different aspect of narrative identity – among them psychoanalytical, historical and literary – 
see (Rákai and Kovács passim). Cf. (P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 33–54). 
24 
experimental reader, Tikhon, and his imaginary would-be readers. The 
phenomenon of mirroring, a central metaphor of the Narcissus myth, is also 
characteristic of the interrelationship of the confessional situation and the 
confession related in the form of a printed pamphlet, of the four narratives 
included in the confession and of the multiple frames embedding the mythical 
narrative. Consequently, if the “confession” retrospectively reinterprets the 
earlier narratives of Stavrogin’s identity, it does so by oscillating between the 
paradigms and partly overlapping metaphors of the myth of the Golden Age and 
of Narcissus. 
The Golden Age 
Being embedded in the frame of a dream, the mythic vision forming the climax 
of the confession represents the universal myth of the Golden Age as Stavrogin’s 
personal myth and thereby makes it the key text of the narrative of his identity. 
Though Stavrogin’s direct references to both the Greek and the Christian 
versions of the myth (471) make it most explicit in the text, the mythic quality of 
the vision would be clearly recognisable even without them: with its “gentle blue 
waves, islands and cliffs, a luxuriant shore […] a beckoning, setting sun” and 
with its inhabitants, who are the “beautiful children” of the sun (471), it is 
obviously a world of total metaphor, the Golden Age (cf. Hesiod, Works and 
Days 106–68; Kirk 232–7), the Isles of the Blessed (Kirk 227–9) described 
through “apocalyptic imagery” (Frye, Anatomy of Criticism 141–6). Since the 
well-known myth, however, appears in the frame of a dream, its personal, 
psychological motivation is emphasised. On the one hand, the dream is 
externally and rationally motivated by Stavrogin’s reference to seeing Claude 
Lorrain’s painting, since the experiences of the previous days often leave their 
traces in the dream content (cf. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams 165–87). 
On the other hand, the image in the painting becomes an internalised and 
irrational mythic experience, having its roots in the – rather collective than 
personal – unconscious (cf. Jung 59–69; Freud, The Interpretation 541–82), 
when Stavrogin declares that “this picture […] appeared to me […] as if it were 
the real thing” (471). Thus, when Stavrogin strives to tell his dream, he makes an 
attempt at verbalising the unspeakable, an attempt at the historisation of a 
censored chapter of his unconscious, and thereby at defining his identity (Lacan, 
The Language of the Self 20–24). 
The dream and Stavrogin’s reaction to it realise a moment of epiphany in 
both Northrop Frye’s and James Joyce’s sense of the word. In Frye’s 
terminology it is “the point at which the undisplaced apocalyptic world and the 
cyclical world of nature come into alignment” and one of “its most common 
settings” is the island (Anatomy 203). Such a meeting of the mythic world of the 
paradisiac island in Stavrogin’s dream and of the natural world of the present 
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surrounding him is self-evident in the text. The connecting element between 
them is supplied by “the slanted rays of the setting sun” (472)
4
, which form a 
part of both Stavrogin’s dream and fictional reality, and consequently become 
the very metaphor of the epiphanic moment. In the context of the Golden Age 
the “setting sun’s bright, slanting rays, bathing [Stavrogin] in light” (472) evoke 
a vision of golden light, and gold is a central element in the apocalyptic, that is, 
undisplaced mythical world (Frye, Anatomy 146). This mythopoetic inter-
pretation can obviously be related to the theological one, according to which 
light – especially golden light – symbolises divine wisdom (cf. Флоренский 
592–6). The Joycean concept of epiphany follows the same train of thought: for 
him it is a sudden moment of insight resulting in the recognition of some hidden 
truth, an enlightenment, and consequently it often leads to a crucial turn in the 
character’s fate – a hardly secularised version of the theological concept (cf. 
Bowen, “Joyce and the Epiphany Concept: A New Approach” passim; 
McGowan passim).  
This sudden moment of insight is nothing but the understanding of Stavrogin 
and Matryosha’s “forgotten” story, which is also brought back by the slanting 
rays of the setting sun: 
I closed my eyes again quickly, as if yearning to recapture my 
passing dream, but suddenly, amidst the very bright sunlight, I noticed 
a very small spot. It acquired a shape, and all of a sudden I clearly saw 
a tiny red spider. At once I recalled the one on the geranium leaf, when 
the slanting rays of the setting sun were pouring down in the same 
way. Something seemed to pierce me, I raised myself and sat up in 
bed… (472) 
At this point the “slanting rays of the setting sun” come to connect three 
temporal dimensions – the mythic past or eternal present of the vision, 
Stavrogin’s present and his personal past – and correspondingly three 
psychological realms: the collective unconscious, the conscious and the personal 
unconscious. The latter is represented by the repressed events of Stavrogin and 
Matryosha’s story, which is brought back from oblivion by the joint 
contradictory images of the sunlight and the tiny red spider breaking it. The 
inseparable presence of these images reveals the fundamentally contradictory 
nature of the epiphanic moment of Stavrogin’s dream and of his memory – his 
personal unconscious. His cathartic reaction to the dream – as he says, “when I 
woke up and opened my eyes, for the first time in my life literally awash with 
tears. A feeling of happiness yet unknown to me invaded my heart until it hurt” 
(472) – turns into a highly emotional reaction to his hitherto repressed personal 
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 For a detailed analysis of this recurrent motif in Dostoevsky’s oeuvre see (Kovács 141–63). 
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past and culminates in his vision of the threatening Matryosha. The moment of 
epiphany is thus fully realised in both senses of the word: through the image of 
the golden rays of the setting sun not only the mythical and natural worlds are 
connected, but a sudden moment of insight into Stavrogin’s own unconscious is 
also represented. An element of his life which was meant to be repressed without 
interpretation is (literally) seen in a new light and becomes an object for 
interpretation through the cathartic experience of his mythic vision. 
Thus under the influence of the epiphanic moment Stavrogin is forced to 
interpret the action gratuite (Fehér 215–20) retrospectively: from the amoral 
standpoint of the intentional forgetting of the uninterpretable event through its 
interpretation as a (mythical) sin and the source of a possible sense of guilt he 
arrives at the masochism of intentional remembering. Stavrogin emphasises that 
Matryosha’s death, similarly to his other sins, initially left no trace in his 
memory – and on his conscience: 
I mention this precisely to show to what extent I could control my 
recollections and how indifferent I’d become towards them. I used to 
reject them all en masse, and they would obediently disappear each 
time en masse, as soon as I wanted. I always found it boring to 
recollect the past, and could never talk about it, as most other people 
do. As far as Matryosha is concerned, I even forgot her picture on the 
mantel. (471) 
Stavrogin claims no less than being a man without a past, which leads to 
significant psychological, narrative and ethical consequences. Firstly, forgetting 
means the repression of the traumatic moment into the unconscious without 
working through and exactly because it cannot be worked through (Freud, 
“Remembering, repeating and working-through” passim). Thus, by ironically 
forgetting Matryosha even twice Stavrogin testifies to the exact opposite of what 
he consciously seems to aim at: to how strongly his unconscious strives to hinder 
the repressed element from returning and to how unable he actually is to cope 
with it. Secondly, Stavrogin’s claim to be free from a need for the historisation 
of his past (Lacan, The Language 20–24) implies that he does not create 
narratives to define his identity and is also free from the desire to create a 
meaningful version of his life-story and find a listener (P. Brooks, Reading for 
the Plot 33). Thirdly, since in Christian thinking the issue of remembering and 
forgetting is inseparably tied to the ethical moment of forgiving (Weinrich 232–
49), Stavrogin’s statement also implies that for him making a confession, 
showing repentance and gaining absolution are completely unnecessary for 
being able to forget his sins. All in all, he is not only a man without a past, but 
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also a man without a history and identity
5
 standing outside moral norms. 
However, as Mikhail Bakhtin also points out (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
242–6), the confession, which aims at nothing but remembering and reminding 
(Janion 130), paradoxically undermines all these implications. 
Stavrogin’s move from forgetting to remembering and interpreting is effected 
by his mythic vision, whose interpretative function is fulfilled through the 
juxtaposition of the motifs of the dream and Matryosha’s story. The “tiny red 
spider”, which appears as a counterpoint to the slanting rays of the setting sun 
and evokes the girl’s story, is the starting point of a whole metaphorical chain: 
I stood on tiptoe and looked through the chink. At this very 
moment, standing on tiptoe, I recalled that as I was sitting by the 
window, staring at the red spider, and had dozed off, I had thought 
about how I’d stand on tiptoe and put my eye to the chink in the door. 
[…] I stared through the chink for some time; it was dark there, but not 
totally. At last I could discern what I needed to… I wanted to be 
completely sure. 
At last I decided I could leave and went down the stairs. (468–9) 
Firstly, the motif of the spider is related to Stavrogin’s desire, to the forepleasure 
(Freud, “The Creative Writer and Daydreaming” 33; cf. P. Brooks, 
Psychoanalysis and Storytelling 29–34) gained from imagining Matryosha’s 
death while he is waiting for her suicide like a spider in its web. Then, pleasure 
and desire are connected to the motifs of voyeurism and the chink – the gap – 
both literally and figuratively: Stavrogin, the peeper, cannot actually concretise 
either his presentiment about Matryosha or what he really discovers in the dark 
and therefore both his desire for seeing her dead and the fulfilment of his desire 
form a conspicuous gap in the text. The chain starting with the “tiny red spider” 
and ending in the unspeakable death of the child and Stavrogin’s unnameable 
and transgressive desire is all compressed into the “very small spot” (472) – 
another gap – which breaks the bright sunlight and shatters the dream of the 
Golden Age. Consequently, this breaking-point is the metaphorical equivalent of 
the moment of the loss of the “earthly paradise” (471), since Matryosha’s story 
is the re-enactment of the destruction of childlike innocence often associated 
with the Golden Age (Hajnády 267). Thus in the retrospective interpretation 
supplied by the mythic vision of the Golden Age the narrative of Stavrogin’s 
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 Cf. Léna Szilárd’s interpretation, according to whom Devils is “an encyclopaedia of an obsessive 
search for roles”, which is the consequence of the absence of real selfhood in the novel (25). 
Stavrogin’s action gratuite, on the other hand, is an attempt “to check his authenticity” (34), that 
is, to prove that he has an identity of his own. 
 Here and in the rest of the volume all translations from non-English sources are mine, unless 
indicated otherwise. 
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unnameable desire becomes the moment of his mythic fall, in which he himself 
plays the role of the snake or the mythic dragon representing chaos (Eliade 48; 
cf. Riceour 255). 
The epiphanic moment leads to an ethical turn in Stavrogin’s behaviour, 
which is most clearly embodied in his confession: to his forced remembrance. 
Though he rejects even the idea of repentance, and admits only a recollection of 
the events devoid of all their ethical content, his masochistic remembering of 
Matryosha’s vision as if it was his self-inflicted penance clearly shows that not 
only the psychological and narrative, but also the ethical aspects of Stavrogin’s 
identity are concerned in this reinterpretation: 
Perhaps it’s not the recollection of the act that I find so loathsome 
even now. Perhaps even now that recollection contains something that 
appeals to my passions. No – what I find intolerable is solely this 
image, namely, her in the doorway, threatening me with her raised fist, 
just her appearance at that moment, that one minute, that shake of her 
head. That’s what I can’t stand because that’s what I’ve been seeing 
ever since, almost every day. It doesn’t come of its own accord; I 
summon it and can’t help doing so, although I can’t live with it. […] 
I have other memories of the past that perhaps go one better than 
this one. […] But why doesn’t a single one of these memories make 
me feel anything similar? […] I know I could dismiss that little girl 
from my mind even now, if I wanted to. I’m in complete control of my 
own will, as always. But the whole point is that I never have wanted to 
do that, I don’t want to now, and I never will want to; I know that by 
now. So it’ll go on right up to the point where I go mad. (472–3) 
The inevitable return of the repressed thus turns into intentional recollection 
resulting in his desire for the historisation of the unconscious and the creation of 
a narrative of his identity. This is the very desire that urges him to write his 
confession. And here the circle is closed: the mythic vision leads to a narrative 
which verbalises Stavrogin’s identity explicitly in the language of total 
metaphor, as myth. However, his split consciousness is reflected in the 
emergence of a disunited, heterogeneous, self-contradictory narrative instead of 
a unified story which would resolve all the ambivalences of his identity: the 
traumatic nucleus of his unconscious is illuminated on the one hand in the vision 
of the Golden Age, on the other hand in Matryosha’s story, which is put in the 
mythic context of the fall and paradise lost by this self-same vision. Ultimately, 
the myth is meant to interpret the unspeakable – the unconscious, desire, death 
and nothing – but because the narrative, due to its heterogeneity, retains its 
ambivalence and is inevitably metaphorical, the issue of Stavrogin’s identity is 
still left open after the confession. 
29 
“Oh, Mirror, Mirror…” – The Myth of Narcissus 
If Stavrogin’s confession aims at the historisation of a censored chapter of his 
unconscious, the censoring does not occur without a trace at all: it is involved in 
his vision of the Golden Age, more precisely, in his renaming Claude Lorrain’s 
painting (cf. S. Horváth 292). Like a Freudian slip of the tongue, it reveals an 
attempt to hide behind the image and narrative of the Golden Age another 
mythical plot, the palimpsest-like narratives of Narcissus/Acis/Cyclops/Pyg-
malion. It is so because the original title of the painting, Acis and Galatea, 
evokes both the stories of Narcissus and Pygmalion, and posits Stavrogin’s 
vision as a paradigm of narcissistic (artistic) self-reflexion.  
The story of Acis and Galatea is that of a tragic love-triangle, in which 
Polyphemus, the Cyclops first peeps at the beautiful young lovers, then destroys 
his rival – the image he cannot be. The narrative parallels the Narcissus story in 
several ways. First and foremost, in this myth it is Polyphemus who looks in the 
mirror of the watery surface and, in an ironic echo of the fatal prophecy, 
exclaims: “Certainly, I know myself, for only recently I saw my own reflection 
pictured clear in limpid water, and my features pleased and charmed me when I 
saw it” (Ovid XIII 840–41). The central metaphor of his solar self-reflexion is 
the sign of his monstrosity, his only eye, which sheds light on his identity like 
the sun, and becomes an emblem of his “beauty” and power: “I have but one eye 
centred perfectly within my forehead, so it seems most like a mighty buckler. 
Ha! does not the Sun see everything from heaven? Yet it has but one eye” (Ovid 
XIII 851–3). His vision, nevertheless, is fatal, since the moment of perception 
signals the realisation of his narcissistic scar, the fact that for Galatea Acis is so 
much more beautiful than the Cyclops that she has united with him in love: “I 
see you and you never will again parade your love before me!” (Ovid XIII 874). 
Polyphemus strikes Acis to death by hurling a bulk of stone at him, but the blood 
streaming from under it turns into water, and Acis emerges reborn as the spirit of 
the river of the same name from “the hollow mouth in the great rock”. He is 
transformed, though: has newly-sprung horns and his face are all “azure” (Ovid 
XIII 887–97).  
This is the culminating point of the other major parallel between this 
narrative and the Narcissus story: the one between the two youths. Acis, just like 
Narcissus, is sixteen years of age, when his destiny is fulfilled. His mother is, 
just like Narcissus’s, a water-nymph. The most significant element of his beauty 
is that he is not manly yet, as opposed to the Cyclops. This Narcissus parallel is 
emphasised by the bitter outburst of the one-eyed monster: “let him [Acis] 
please himself” (Ovid XIII 861, emphasis added). Consequently, Acis’s union 
with Galatea, a Nereid, is reminiscent of the narcissistic – or the incestuous – 
union of the (almost) same, which is ended by the Cyclops, a father-figure of 
unlimited power. Thus Acis, when in his plight he turns for help to his water-
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nymph mother and lover to be resurrected as a river-spirit, fulfils Narcissus’s 
most elemental – and impossible – desire by reuniting forever in his death with 
his mother, lover, and himself. At the same time he becomes a looking-glass 
image and a watery mirror, since he acquires some of the specific features of the 
Cyclops looking into the stream: his horns are indicative both of his mature 
masculinity and his monstrosity, and his azure face is reminiscent not only of 
clear water but also of the body of the drowned, of his return from the dead. He 
is an image born from death: from the abject fluid of his own blood running 
from the mouth of the cleft rock. Lorrain’s painting, however, grasps an 
apparently idyllic moment before the tragedy: the lovers are united, the bleak 
future is indicated only by the hardly noticeable presence of the Cyclops on the 
hilltop. In view of the painting, for Stavrogin the idyll of the Golden Age means 
a narcissistic mirroring/union in sight of the Father. 
The crisis of narcissistic subjectivity is also highlighted by the other – much 
better known – mythical narrative the Acis and Galatea story evokes: the 
narrative of Pygmalion, who falls in love with his own creation, a beautiful 
statue. This myth, however – thanks to Aphrodite’s mercy on the unfortunate 
lover – ends happily, with the victorious fulfilment of narcissistic desire. The 
transformation is from death to life, and not the other way round, as in Acis’s 
case: the statue is brought to life by the goddess, and the artist can be united in 
his lifetime with his own alienated mirror-image (Ovid X 243–97). What is 
hidden by both the painting and the Galatea narratives is the tragic longing 
determining the fate of Narcissus in the more archetypal version: his frustrated 
desire to be united with his perfect image and his deathly fear of the same union, 
which can be resolved only in death. What is equally clear, though, is that 
Stavrogin’s version of the Golden Age involves the Narcissus myth from the 
moment of its emergence and thus from now on the term should refer to this 
specific amalgam of the otherwise contradictory mythical narratives. 
This implicit evocation of the narcissistic paradigm of subjectivity turns 
critical attention to phenomena related to it in “Stavrogin’s Confession.” Thus, 
in the chapter “At Tikhon’s” one can identify a special mixture of the literary 
traditions of the confessional genre, the confessional situation and the 
foreshadowing of the psychoanalytic situation. From the point of view of 
psychoanalytic literary criticism these components are related to the paradigm of 
the myth of Narcissus through such links as psychological narcissism (Holmes 
passim), the mirror stage (Lacan, „The Mirror Stage” passim) and the coming 
into being of the subject through its entry into the Symbolic (cf. Kristeva, 
„Nárcisz: az újfajta téboly” 51–2; Sarup 106; Wilden 172). The mirror and its 
metaphors have become the emblematic key metaphors of the myth and its 
versions in psychoanalytic discourse. And these are the metaphors which play a 
crucial structural role not only in “Stavrogin’s Confession” but also in the entire 
text of the Devils. In the confessional situation Stavrogin appears as Narcissus 
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looking at his own image in the mirror of the text he himself has created. 
Nevertheless, similarly to the beautiful youth, he must realise that the process of 
mirroring is infinite, the narrative of his identity can be terminated only by 
death. The madness of chiasmus and the death wish, which paradoxically 
appears as the only way to fixing his identity, are the only two (or rather one?) 
options left open by his confession, thus foreshadowing the resolution of the 
entire novel. 
Narcissus’ Confessions 
The special form of the “confession” in the strict sense of the word is related to 
three issues to be interpreted within the tradition of confessional literature: the 
implications of the confession as a printed “political pamphlet” (460); its 
stylistic features, including orthography; and the alternation of shame and 
exhibitionism. 
The format of the pamphlet is incongruous with the communicative situation 
of either the sacramental or the literary confession
6
, since, on the one hand, it 
places the confession in a political context, on the other hand, the very fact of 
printing undermines the spontaneity which is characteristic of oral confessions 
and whose illusion confessional literature strives to recreate with its special 
stylistic features (cf. S. Horváth 282). The narrator’s introduction makes the 
impression that Stavrogin’s text concerns the whole nation and it is so 
revolutionary that it must be hidden from the police:  
The print was indeed foreign – three small sheets of ordinary 
writing-paper, closely printed and stitched together. It must have been 
published secretly at some Russian printing press abroad, and at first 
glance the pages closely resembled a political pamphlet. The heading 
read: ‘From Stavrogin’. (460) 
The very heading implies partly that the writing is the embodiment of 
Stavrogin’s identity, partly that his personality is known nationwide and 
therefore his name is a sufficient title. As a result, similarly to the only other 
pamphlet in the novel, “The Noble Character” (371–2), which is Peter 
Verkhovensky’s self-created enlargement of his insignificant personality (402), 
“Stavrogin’s Confession” must be treated with some irony. Another problem 
related to the issue of identity also emerges from the temporal distance between 
the moments of its writing, printing and reading: the Stavrogin giving the 
confession to Tikhon and promising its publication cannot be identical with the 
author of the text, just as the author cannot be the same as the subject reflected in 
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the narrative (Lacan, “The Insistence” 312; cf. Žižek “The Truth Arises from 
Misrecognition” passim). Though the pamphlet is an attempt to define 
Stavrogin’s identity in a narrative with political significance, its form achieves 
exactly the opposite result. 
Since the subject emerges as a result of the entry into the Symbolic, through 
language, the linguistic features of the confession are of outstanding signi-
ficance. The narrator’s introduction highlights two related aspects, orthography 
and stylistics: 
I shall insert this document verbatim in the chronicle. […] I’ve 
allowed myself to correct only the rather numerous spelling errors, 
some indeed quite surprising, since the author was and educated man 
after all, and even well read (relatively speaking, of course). I’ve made 
no changes in the style, in spite of irregularities and even some 
obscurities. In any case it’s perfectly clear that the author was above all 
not a man of letters. (460) 
Concerning the spelling errors, which are nothing but the “slips of the tongue” of 
the unconscious (cf. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 158–68), 
their correction means that the narrator, though he promises to relate the 
confession “to the letter” [“буквально” (Достоевский, Бесы 266)], ultimately 
still rewrites Stavrogin’s only “authentic” self-definition. As for the stylistic 
features, the narrator here testifies to surprising blindness himself, since they 
reveal that “the author was above all a man of letters”. Both Leonid Grossman 
and Yeleazar Meletinsky analyse Stavrogin’s confession as an excellent 
specimen of the tradition of confessional literature, clearly in the wake of 
Rousseau. While Grossman emphasises the stylistic similarities (Гроссман 609–
13) and Meletinsky the psychological ones (Мелетинский 61), including the 
reminiscence of some elements of the plot of the Confessions, neither of them 
relate these features to Stavrogin’s identity. Stavrogin actually points out the 
literary model he follows by a direct reference and thereby emphasises that his 
text is a stylisation: “Having indulged until the age of sixteen with unusual 
immoderation in the vice to which Jean-Jacques Rousseau confessed, I ceased 
doing so at the age of seventeen, just as soon as I so decided” (462–3). The 
sentence reveals not only the similarity of a seemingly redundant detail of 
character, but also a more significant similarity of the narrative strategy of 
hiding and revealing applied in the two confessions: since Stavrogin still finds 
the practice of adolescent masturbation unnameable, he sends his readers to the 
famous literary forerunner, who actually also substitutes it with euphemisms 
(Rousseau III). The conscious following of Rousseau’s model means that 
Stavrogin reads himself in the context of an already existing literary text, and by 
producing a stylisation as the only authentic text of his identity he actually writes 
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himself “into” Rousseau’s text. His “confession” is only one of his potential 
“literary roles” (Szilárd 31–2), which he narcissistically performs for himself, 
his imaginary audience and Tikhon
7
. 
The similarities of “Stavrogin’s Confession” and Rousseau’s Confessions, 
especially the parallels between the scenes of stealing the penknife and the 
ribbon (Мелетинский 61; cf. Jones 149–64), call attention to the dialectic of 
hiding and revealing, that is, shame and exhibitionism, so central in the 
“Rousseau-like role”. Paul de Man points out two kinds of desire and two kinds 
of shame behind Rousseau’s “excuses” for his false charges against Marion: “As 
the ribbon changes hands it traces a circuit leading to the exposure of a hidden, 
censored desire” (Allegories of Reading 283). The first, most obvious one is 
related to possession, Rousseau’s desire for Marion. The second, more important 
one is the shameful “exposure of the desire to expose oneself” (Allegories 285), 
which actually generates the text – and more and more text:  
The more there is to expose, the more there is to be ashamed of; the 
more resistance to exposure, the more satisfying the scene, and 
especially, the more satisfying and eloquent the belated revelation, in 
the later narrative, of the inability to reveal. This desire is truly 
shameful, for it suggests that Marion was destroyed, not for the sake of 
Rousseau’s saving face […] but merely in order to provide him with a 
stage on which to parade his disgrace […]. (de Man, Allegories 285–6) 
In “Stavrogin’s Confession” the story of the penknife and Matryosha’s 
punishment is also centred on shame and desire, which is the more significant 
because it is a metaphorical foreshadowing of the scenes of her seduction and 
following suicide. There are, however, at least two major differences. On the one 
hand, Stavrogin is clearly conscious of his desire to create a shameful situation, 
he admits that he was even willing to lie in order to do so: “It occurred to me at 
once not to announce the discovery so the girl would be given a beating” 
(462).While telling how the girl suffered her punishment without a cry (461), he 
apparently digresses to relate how much pleasure he finds in shame, in “utterly 
disgraceful, immeasurably humiliating, despicable […] situation[s]” (462), 
revealing an ambivalent mixture of feelings which amounts to abjection of the 
self (cf. Kristeva, Powers of Horror 19–20). It is only then, that partly projecting 
his own feelings on Matryosha, he interprets her silence as a sign of her shame: 
“she must have felt some disgrace at having been punished that way with me 
there; she hadn’t screamed when she was hit, only sobbed, no doubt because I 
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 Mikhail Bakhtin also points out, that Tikhon’s words reveal his recognition of the dialogic nature 
of “Stavrogin’s Confession”, that is, that he has created his text for his imaginary would-be 
audience (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 244). For a thorough analysis of the role of the 
Rousseau intertext in “Stavrogin’s Confession” cf. (S. Horváth passim). 
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was standing there watching it all. But like a child she blamed only herself for 
her disgrace” (463). Since the phallic symbolism of the penknife (cf. Freud, The 
Interpretation 354) defines the scene as a foreshadowing of Matryosha’s 
seduction and suicide, the same motivation can be analogically applied to her 
silence and self-inflicted punishment then. Just like Marion, she has to be 
destroyed – and much more literally than the object of Rousseau’s desire – so 
that a desire for shameful exposure should be fulfilled, but Stavrogin exposes 
even this desire consciously.  
On the other hand, as opposed to Rousseau, Stavrogin makes no “excuses” 
for his crime; on the contrary, he wants to avoid all appearances of repentance 
and a need for absolution which could effect the forgetting of his crime. He is 
rather afraid of the possibility that his reader might find some fatal extenuative 
for him – like temporary madness in the case of his misdoings in his hometown 
– which would annihilate his crime and give it to oblivion, together with him. 
Since the only evidence of the crime is his confession, he stubbornly repeats his 
claims of sanity: he needs his crime to make his only “authentic” story narratable 
at all (cf. P. Brooks, Reading 108), so that this crime acquiring mythic 
dimensions through the interpretative context of the Golden Age should define 
his identity. In his case the mechanism of shame is based on the oscillation of his 
openly declared desire for exposure as such, including the exposure of crime and 
the annihilation of this crime resulting in the exposure of nothing. His utter 
shame would be the disintegration of his textual image – a mere appearance – in 
the moment of revelation, just like the disappearance of Narcissus’ reflection in 
the water. 
Narcissus, the Ridiculous Automaton 
The emphatic literariness of “Stavrogin’s Confession” makes it possible to read 
it as the dialogue of the author and his experimental – but most expert – 
audience, in which both the motivation of writing and the reaction of the reader 
are centred on narcissism, shame and laughter. Tikhon draws attention to 
Stavrogin’s paradoxical relationship to laughter, which also gives rise to the 
question of how a comic reading of Stavrogin’s story is possible. He reveals 
Stavrogin’s own self-reflexive reading strategy by giving a “comic” reading of 
his confession, which is problematic because “Stavrogin sometimes appears 
‘ridiculous’ only for himself, and not for the other characters of the novel or for 
the reader; for the latter he actually appears as a fully tragic hero” (Гессен 669). 
Using Bakhtin’s reading and Bergson’s theory of laughter as reference points, I 
will demonstrate how perfectly Stavrogin’s “comic” image complies with the 
concept of Narcissus as an automaton, a mechanical figure caught up in the 
eternal repetition of frustration (Kochhar-Lindgren 44; cf. Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts 53–64). His self-irony is also most fitting: Kristeva 
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suggests that in the narcissistic crisis laughter is a device of transposing the 
abject so that the subject can continue its wandering (Powers 7).  
Bakhtin draws attention to the facts that Tikhon not only recognises the 
dialogic nature of the confession, but also makes Stavrogin realise that shame – 
the shame of repentance (475) – and his fear of being laughed at hinder him 
from publishing the document and even if he does publish it, might make his 
plans fail (cf. Problems 242–6). Tikhon actually does much more than realising 
the heightened self-reflexive nature of the dialogic confession: he practically 
charges Stavrogin with narcissism. His claim that Stavrogin writes “as if [he] 
revels in [his] own psychology” (475) („вы как бы любуетесь психологией 
вашею” [Достоевский, Бесы 276]) contains the reflexive verb любоваться–
revel, which is etymologically related to the verb любить–love. Thus it also 
implies that he sees Stavrogin as Narcissus in love with his own psychology – 
his own self. Tikhon, behaving in a truly critical manner, proceeds to analyse the 
form and contents of the confession in terms of aesthetics and becomes the 
experimental reader on whom Stavrogin provokes the potential reaction of his 
confession and who realises his most hidden fear, the fear of being seen as the 
laughingstock of people: 
‘Enough. Show me precisely how I appear ridiculous in my 
manuscript. I know, but I’d like you to show me. And tell me very 
cynically […].’ 
‘Even the form you cast your great penance in has something 
ridiculous about it. […]’ 
‘So you think what’s ridiculous is just in the form, in the style?’ 
Stavrogin insisted. 
‘And in the substance. The ugliness will kill it,’ Tikhon whispered, 
lowering his eyes. 
‘What? The ugliness? What ugliness?’ 
‘Of the crime. There are genuinely ugly crimes. Crimes, whatever 
they are, the more blood and horror, the more impressive they are, the 
more they are, so to speak, picturesque. But there are crimes that are 
shameful and infamous beyond any horror, so to speak, too inelegant.’ 
(478) 
As an amateur theoretic of the comic, Tikhon traces the source of ridiculousness 
in the “ugliness” („некрасивость” [Достоевский, Бесы 278]) of the crime, that 
is, he expresses it as the lack of both aesthetic and moral beauty, thereby 
inflicting a truly narcissistic wound on Stavrogin. The emphasis is finally 
transposed on the aesthetic aspect of the crime with the use of the adjective 
“picturesque”, which puts appearance, the (painted) picture in the centre of 
attention. The crime and the text of the confession, which turns this crime into 
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the narrative of Stavrogin’s identity, metaphorically become Stavrogin’s ugly 
(mirror) images, and since he is moved by “the aesthetic drive” (Janion 129; cf. 
Szilárd 23–4) the implication of the lack of beauty has an utterly destructive 
power. Tikhon, as if giving a (deconstructive) critical interpretation of the 
confession within the novel, reveals Stavrogin’s narcissistic fear of being 
shattered by laughter, which is the exact opposite of his open claims of finding 
pleasure in becoming the laughingstock of people (462). 
Bakhtin’s comments on the comic aspect of Stavrogin’s character are highly 
revealing because they already focus on the mechanical repetition related to 
narcissistic desire – in fact, to the narcissistic wound. Bakhtin points out that 
though Stavrogin seems to be anything but comic, his situation still has much in 
common with that of the underground man, who, while he claims that he has no 
need for other people’s attention, does everything to attract that very attention 
(Problems 244–5). So, if after all Stavrogin is comic it is the result of a 
narcissistic wound. This realisation leads to extreme self-irony in his case, a 
form of “reduced” laughter, whose destructive nature is expressed even on the 
level of metaphors: in Stavrogin’s words, “Well, forgive my stupid joke […] 
since last night I’ve really felt like laughing all the time, a great deal, without 
stopping, for a long time, a great deal. It’s as if I were infected with laughter…” 
(310). The English “infected” can only partly convey the lethal implications of 
the Russian original, “заряжен” (Достоевский, Бесы 183), which literally 
means being charged like a weapon: Stavrogin’s laughter is destructive and 
suicidal. His vertiginous, unstoppable irony threatens with madness by 
undermining definite meanings and offers only death as a way out.  
From Bergson’s definitions of the comic the notions of the puppet, the 
deformed body, and the anticlimax seem to be applicable to Stavrogin’s story. 
Firstly, the comic nature of automatism and mechanic movements, such as those 
of a puppet (Bergson Ch. I Part IV) are associated by the repeated references to 
Stavrogin as a death-mask or a wax figure. Secondly, just like his indifference 
and immorality, these “deficiencies” cause his metaphorical deformity, however 
beautiful he otherwise is, and Bergson claims that the deformed – and ugly – 
body is one of the most frequent sources of the comic (Bergson Ch. I Part III). 
The metaphor of the cripple appears in Stavrogin’s printed confession. As he 
claims, when he “conceived the idea of crippling [his] life” (470), he did so by 
literalising the figurative expression and realising the morbid pun in a marriage 
with Marya Timofeevna – a cripple
8
. In addition, both Tikhon and Stavrogin 
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 This metaphor is carried on in the novel to characterise his other relationships with women. 
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characterise the latter’s life as basically anticlimactic, which, relying on Kant, 
without the actual use of the term Bergson also defines as one possible source of 
laughter, because it involves “a great effort for a result that is nil” (Bergson Ch. 
II Part I). Tikhon sees in Stavrogin’s crime a “great […] amount of idle energy 
intentionally wasted on filth” (475) and the dashed hopes of potential greatness 
because his efforts took the wrong direction
9
. All in all, in the Bergsonian 
context Stavrogin is both an indifferent spectator of the performance of his own 
life
10
, and happens to play the main part in it – not that of the potential hero 
fulfilling great expectations, but that of the both physically and mentally 
deformed lifeless petty puppet. 
This image goes well with Gray Kochhar-Lindgren’s description of Narcissus 
as a Lacanian automaton, caught up in the infinite repetition of his own 
frustrated desire (44). His self-irony is part and parcel of this mechanical 
repetition: it distances him from the desired image by shattering it, and thus 
makes redrawing the image – Narcissus’s further vegetation through empty 
speech – possible. His self-ironical laughter helps Narcissus, the automaton, to 
avoid accidentally bumping into the truth (Tuché) about himself, and thus to live 
on. But he can never allow others to laugh at him. And indeed, the Stavrogin 
puppet is a helpless automaton driven by most unextraordinary desires. As 
Tikhon points out: 
As for the crime itself, many other people sin the same way, but 
they live in peace and harmony with their consciences, regarding 
crimes of that sort as inevitable youthful peccadilloes. There are even 
elders of the church who sin the same way, even quite comfortably, 
frivolously. The whole world is filled with these horrors. (475–6) 
The unextraordinariness of Stavrogin’s desires and crimes is perfectly 
exemplified by Matryosha’s beating. The scene is actually nothing but the 
realisation of a most common wish-fulfilment fantasy described by Freud, in 
which “a child is being beaten” (“’A Child is Being Beaten’” passim). It gives 
options for multiple identifications with different roles and consequently is a 
source for both sadistic and masochistic pleasures, in which hidden incestuous 
and other sexual desires are fulfilled (cf. Easthope 127–129). Stavrogin, though 
                                                                                                                                   
concretises Stavrogin’s “illness” through metaphors of physical deformity: “Perhaps I really will 
become a nurse if I don’t manage to die this very day; but if so, it won’t be to nurse you, even 
though you deserve a nurse as much as any creature lacking arms and legs” (593). 
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 In his letter to Darya Pavlovna Stavrogin repeats the same idea when he himself characterises all 
his deeds as “trivial” (754) (“мелко” [Достоевский, Бесы 432]), which, especially in an 
emphatic opposition to “magnanimity” (754), refers to both ordinariness and literal smallness. 
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 Cf. Paul de Man’s explication of Baudelaire’s interpretation of the comic in “The Rhetoric of 
Temporality” (Blindness and Insight 211–17). 
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he openly takes the most sexualised position of the spectator (cf. Easthope 128), 
in his explication of the characters’ motivation reveals his emotional 
identification with both the ashamed girl, and the mother with an irrational 
desire for an excuse to punish the girl for anything. Since the scene is also the 
metaphorical foreshadowing of the seduction and the girl’s suicide, the 
motivations behind it can be analogically applied to those crucial elements of the 
narrative of Stavrogin’s identity. The same hyperconsciousness resulting from 
multiple identifications also characterises Stavrogin on his watch during the 
girl’s suicide: though he obviously is a spectator of the scene, he partly identifies 
with the girl, and also watches himself as a spectator. Consequently his 
perverted pleasure has sadistic, masochistic and narcissistic components, as well. 
Though Stavrogin stubbornly claims that he can perfectly control himself, that 
is, he is able to repress his desires, in these scenes he actually does appear as 
their plaything. What is more, since these desires seem to be shared by most 
people, only others can handle them more effectively, Stavrogin becomes 
“ridiculous” and “comic” in his own eyes not only because he is an automaton 
driven by desire but also because his conscience tortures him. 
In sum, laughter threatens Stavrogin with annihilating his crime and/or his 
identity, that is, with metaphorical death. Laughter is, on the one hand, desirable 
and can be spoken about: it is liberating and includes the component of rebirth. It 
promises, similarly to Narcissus’ death, the hope of finding his “true” identity by 
being unified with his admired image in the mirror (Kristeva, “Nárcisz” 55–8). 
This might be the reason for Kristeva’s claim that Stavrogin is saved from being 
totally abject by his narcissism and laughter (Powers 19). On the other hand, his 
fear of laughter (Fehér 213–14), of being comic is an unspeakable part of 
Stavrogin’s shame: he is afraid that laughter annihilates his crime and identity 
without any chance of rebirth, while eternalising the split in his consciousness 
and the contemplation of his own desired but unreachable mirror image it makes 
him living dead. As Maria Janion points out, paradoxically “being comic and 
ridiculous is both Stavrogin’s greatest temptation and greatest fear” (123). He 
makes use of the confessional situation to become ridiculous and to escape 
laughter at the same time, since the confessor cannot laugh: Tikhon explains 
why Stavrogin’s story is ridiculous without actually laughing at it. The 
oscillation between the desire for laughter and the fear of laughter results in the 
paradoxical confessional situation which combines speech and silence, writing 
and reading, laughter and its absence and, last but not least, literary and 
unliterary texts. 
Narcissus in Analysis 
Stavrogin and Tikhon’s dialogue, like all confessions, can be interpreted in the 
context of the psychoanalytic situation (cf. P. Brooks, Troubling Confessions 
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35), which puts such elements in the centre of attention as the roles of the 
analyst and analysand, the issue of transference and the mirror with its 
metaphors. The latter relates the issue directly to the notions of narcissism. Their 
analysis reveals that the confession given in the frame of the confessional 
situation and the narratives included in it function as an infinite labyrinth of 
mirrors, which results in constant shifts of meaning in Stavrogin’s narrative of 
his identity and ultimately in the phenomenon of chiasmus. 
“Stavrogin’s Confession” includes all the possible combinations of the roles 
of analyst and analysand played in the analytic situation. While his “voluntary” 
confession, the pamphlet handed over to Tikhon, casts the role of the analysand 
on Stavrogin, his much more interesting “involuntary” confession
11
 expressed by 
his behaviour in the confessional situation reveals his actual rejection of the 
analysis: 
‘Listen, I don’t like spies and psychologists, at least not the kind 
who pry into my soul. I don’t invite anyone into my soul; I don’t need 
any help; I can get along on my own. […] I want you to know that I 
won’t reveal anything to you, no secret all, because I have no need of 
you whatsoever.’ (459) 
While Stavrogin rejects the analysand’s role, the form of the confession makes it 
possible for him to usurp the analyst’s position, in relation to both himself and 
Tikhon. On the one hand, by objectifying his confession in a printed document, 
Stavrogin deprives it of all its metacommunicative elements and makes his 
textualised identity the object of their common analysis. On the other hand, 
relying on Tikhon’s analytic comments he starts to analyse Tikhon himself. In 
addition, Tikhon shows surprising similarities with Stavrogin: they both assign 
outstanding significance to the same Biblical quote and they are both able to 
give a comic reading of the confession. All in all, their mutual analysis and 
absolution and their mirror-like reflection of each other undermine the originally 
hierarchical power positions of the confessional/analytic situation and by 
subverting any authoritative interpretation prevent the closure of the potential 
meanings of the text. 
Transference, the emotional relationship characteristic of both confessional 
and analytic situations (P. Brooks, Troubling 35), appears in Stavrogin’s 
transferring all his affection towards his missing father, both biological and 
symbolic, on Tikhon, with all the ambivalences typical of this complex 
phenomenon. The fact that Stavrogin, behaving like all confessants and 
analysands, repeats a traumatic childhood experience and casts the role of a 
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parent on the analyst thereby hindering the analysis itself (cf. Lacan, The 
Seminar of Jacques Lacan 240–46), is shown by his calling Tikhon “Father” 
twice at the end of his confession (482). The metaphorical sense of the 
apostrophe is not neutralised by Tikhon’s priesthood, because if Stavrogin took 
it seriously, he would call him “Father” from the beginning of their dialogue. 
The elements of this ambivalent and complex emotional relationship are the 
simultaneous declaration and negation of Stavrogin’s love, the fulfilment and 
rejection of Tikhon’s presumable expectations, the casting of the roles of both 
the forgiving and the punishing father on Tikhon and finally the simultaneous 
declaration and negation of Stavrogin’s need for him. First, Stavrogin flatly 
declares that he “likes Tikhon very much” (458), then goes back on his word and 
by calling him a psychologist and a spy (459) he indirectly expresses his hatred 
for him. Second, Stavrogin refuses to reveal any of his secrets exactly because 
he supposes that this is what Tikhon expects him to do (459), and then a couple 
of sentences later he hands him over his pamphlet. Third, Stavrogin conforms to 
Tikhon’s assumable expectations with his words about absolution and his desire 
to forgive himself and at the same time casts the role of the forgiving father on 
Tikhon, which corresponds to the traditions of sacramental confession acting out 
the reacceptance of the repentant child into parental love through absolution (P. 
Brooks, Troubling 46). At the same time Stavrogin almost forces Tikhon to 
show him in a ridiculous light and thereby to act out the role of the judging and 
punishing father.  
All these ambivalences gain a special importance with respect to Tikhon as a 
potential avatar of the Symbolic Father, an embodiment of Law and Language 
(cf. Lacan, The Language 23) in Stavrogin’s eyes. Thus their dialogue 
metaphorically re-enacts the moment of the entry into the Symbolic, the moment 
of the emergence of the par excellence speaking subject, which at the same time 
is the annihilation of the transgressive incestuous symbiotic relationship with the 
mother. Tikhon’s affinity to Language is exemplified by his stylistic analysis of 
the confession, while his role as the Law is illustrated by his passing judgment 
on Stavrogin with the words of the Bible and becoming the voice of sacred 
divine law. It is according to his role as the Law restricting the incestuous 
desires of the child that Tikhon points out the transgressive unity of mother and 
son, Stavrogin’s “strong, inner, spiritual likeness” to his mother (454). Stavrogin 
refuses the idea “growing anxious again for no reason and insisting excessively 
without knowing why” (454, emphasis added), and it is this very disproportioned 
emotional reaction that implies the closeness of the neurotic nucleus. The 
identification Tikhon suggests is unacceptable because it means remaining 
outside the Symbolic and therefore the annihilation of any identity.  
Consequently, Stavrogin and Tikhon’s dialogue with the subversion of the 
analyst’s power position, with the transference of the ambivalent feelings for the 
father on Tikhon and with the probing of the limits of language itself so apparent 
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in the style of the confession becomes a simultaneous acceptance and rejection 
of the power of the Father. The moment of acceptance is necessary, since the 
subject ceases to exist outside Language and even transgression only makes 
sense because of the existence of the Law. However, “in the world of the Devils 
the role of the father is unplayable” (Szilárd 27): Tikhon ultimately does not, 
cannot undertake the role of the father, but sends Stavrogin on to an elder. This 
visit eventually does not take place, the events of the novel, as Tikhon 
prophetically foresees, are heading for Stavrogin’s unavoidable catastrophe: the 
crucial identification with the Symbolic Father is impossible, Stavrogin returns 





Since in Devils the identification with the Symbolic Father and thus the 
overcoming of the dialectics of “to be or not to be” in the phase of primary 
narcissism (cf. Lacan, “The Mirror Stage” 68; Boothby 21–46) proves to be 
impossible for Stavrogin, the text of the confession – and of the entire novel – 
becomes a labyrinth of metaphorical mirrors. These mirrors show Stavrogin’s 
alienated ego ideals, with whom he has a most ambivalent relationship: his 
feelings are characterised by a desire of both union and aggressive destruction at 
the same time. Strangely enough, actual mirrors are of little importance in the 
novel: playing the peacock in front of the looking-glass is allowed only to such 
half-comic characters as Stepan Trofimovich. The richer the novel is in 
metaphorical mirrors, out of which the confession highlights the text-within-the-
text, the painting (work of art), the frame, the look and voyeurism (the eye), the 
window and the double
13
. The framed confession is structured according to the 
principle of the text-within-the-text in several ways and includes narratives 
mirroring each other which are organised by different metaphors of the mirror. 
The interpretation of these metaphors is only possible within their own context, 
therefore the present analysis reveals their reoccurrence through the individual 
analysis of the narratives. The apparently undividable inner nucleus of the 
framed narratives is Stavrogin’s dream, which pretends to have the interpretative 
status of the sacred text and as such, can serve as the basis of a reading directed 
“outwards” and ending with the interpretation of the frame. Undermining this 
apparently linear reading, the metaphorical mirrors call attention to the 
interminable nature of not only analysis, but also of narrative identity (P. 
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Brooks, Troubling 53) and their effect is rather similar to Lévy-Strauss’s 
metaphorical room of mirrors representing mythical thinking (Gould 107). 
The dream forming the kernel of the confession does not close the 
phenomena of text-within-the-text and mirroring but rather makes them infinite 
with its metaphors. The vision of the Golden Age is embedded in multiple 
frames: those of the confessional situation, the chronicler’s short introduction, 
the text of the confession, within that the narrative of Stavrogin’s journey and 
finally the dream situation separating the vision from fictional reality. The 
apparent closure created by the myth, however, is undermined by several 
phenomena: on the one hand, frames themselves are blurred, on the other hand, 
the framed vision itself is a picture and a mirror, while picture and frame 
exchange positions.  
Firstly, the undermining of boundaries plays a crucial role in the narrative of 
the vision, since the dream situation in itself embodies the passage between life 
and death and the conscious and the unconscious, while Stavrogin also 
emphasises that his dream seemed to be reality and it apparently continued in 
reality. By connecting the outside and the inside, the present and the past, the 
natural and the apocalyptic worlds the metaphor of the rays of the setting sun 
washes away spatial and temporal boundaries
14
. The dream of the Golden Age is 
inseparable from Matryosha’s vision, which also undermines the binary 
oppositions of reality and imagination, life and death and the present and the 
past. Secondly, the myth of the Golden Age is also a picture transmitted through 
several reflections. The literary source of the myth, maybe originating in the 
collective unconscious (cf. Kirk 273–9), is the work of Hesiod. In Stavrogin’s 
consciousness an actual painting, Claude Lorrain’s Acis and Galatea is reflected 
as the image of this myth. However, the myth surfaces from his unconscious – 
triggered by the painting – to become an extended narrative. In addition, this 
mythic narrative, though it appears to be the nucleus of the confession, actually 
inverts hierarchical and spatial positions and plays the role of its external 
interpretative framework. This mythic interpretation of Stavrogin’s identity, in 
its turn, with its strong ethical strain through the intricate meanings of the 
metaphor of the sun(light) undermines the binary opposition of ethics and 
aesthetics embodied in the perfect beauty of the Golden Age. First the rays come 
to signify the eye of God, divine wisdom
15
, the luminous mirror
16
 shedding light 
on the narrative of Stavrogin’s identity, which appears as “a very small spot” 
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(472), takes the form of the “tiny red spider” (472), then evolves into 
Matryosha’s vision leading to the emergence of the confession. Paradoxically, 
the sun is also a metaphor of Stavrogin’s identity, since he appears as the source 
and spectator of the dream, that is, as an eye/mirror both reflecting light and 
pretending to be its source. Though Stavrogin is forced to accept Matryosha’s 
story as the narrative of his “real” identity, the vision of the Golden Age keeps 
haunting him as the narrative of his desire for another alienated identity, lost 
forever in the moment of the fall. Thus the sacred text of the myth fulfils its 
interpretative function rather by opening up the potential closures of 
interpretation, by undermining binary oppositions and including metaphorical 
shifts and mirror-like inversions. 
The three other narratives included in the confession appear as variations on 
some repeated motifs and thus mirror each other. Since the stories of Stavrogin’s 
theft and marriage emphasise some elements of the most elaborated narrative of 
Matryosha’s story, in itself structured on gradation and repetition, the narratives 
mutually read each other. The myth of the Golden Age retrospectively motivates 
the action gratuite apparent in all these narratives, that is, makes the narrative of 
identity transmittable and readable by plotting out its arbitrary metaphorical 
relationships as metonymies, logical connections in hindsight, reading from the 
end, from the moment of death (cf. P. Brooks, Reading 10–24). In Stavrogin’s 
reading it transforms Matryosha’s narrative into a mythical story of origins, the 
element closest to the neurotic nucleus and primal repression which can be 
revealed. Mythical thinking, magic causation come to dominate the narratives, 
which is indicated by the metaphorical connection of Matryosha’s three 
punishments and by the repetition of the magic number three in all Stavrogin’s 
deeds. This mythic interpretation is made necessary and possible by two obvious 
gaps in the narrative which make the unspeakable crimes of sexuality and death 
– and thus Stavrogin’s identity – a mystery to be solved for him. 
Stavrogin fills the gap left by unspeakable sexuality with three metaphors 
which are interpretable in the context of his marriage. The description of the 
seduction scene is quite similar to the – missing – representation of Matryosha’s 
dead body in that it leaves the central element untold: after describing 
Matryosha’s kisses and “rapture” Stavrogin starts a new paragraph and claims 
that “When it all was over she was very embarrassed” (465). He first borrows 
Matryosha’s metaphor of “killing God” (465) to fill this gap, which supports his 
own mythic-metaphysical reading. He applies the second metaphor, “immense 
abomination” (465) („беспредельное безобразие” [Достоевский, Бесы 270]) 
to it in the elaboration of this interpretation. The Russian original of the 
expression contains the noun “образ”, meaning picture, image, shape, (religious) 
icon, with a privative suffix: Stavrogin’s deed is literally shape-less, icon-less, 
existing without an archetype created by God, it combines the aesthetic and ethic 
senses of ugliness. This reading is underpinned by the almost exact return of the 
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word in connection with his marriage: he wants to marry Marya Timofeevna, 
because “It was impossible to imagine anything more hideous” (470), that is, 
„Безобранее нельзя было вообразить ничего” (Достоевский, Бесы 273). The 
Russian adjective, depending on the stress, means both ugly, revolting and 
unpoetic, shapeless, and repeats the combination of aesthetic and ethic censure 
(cf. Jackson 37; Фришман 584). The third metaphor establishes a relationship of 
crime and punishment following the law of talion between Matryosha’s story 
and Stavrogin’s marriage. When he “conceived the idea of crippling [his] life” 
(470) („искалечить жизнь” [Достоевский, Бесы 273]), and married Marya 
Timofeevna, carrying on the metaphor of shape-lessness he executed his own 
symbolic mutilation for life, which is a part of the rites of passage and a 
memento of the descent to the underworld included in them (cf. Eliade 181–8). 
The crime to this punishment is identified by the other meaning of the Russian 
verbs калечить–искалечить, which is to corrupt morally: after “corrupting”, 
“crippling” the child, as if to point out the causal relationship, Stavrogin inflicts 
the same sentence on himself. He does the same as Matryosha, who declares 
herself abject by committing suicide in “a tiny storeroom, no bigger than a 
chicken coop, next to the lavatory” (468, emphasis added) and executes the 
mythic punishment of expulsion from the human community on herself. Thus 
the reading reflected by the narrative of Stavrogin’s marriage elaborates the 
mythic reading shaped by the vision of the Golden Age, according to which 
Matryosha’s story is the moment of mythic fall, the metaphysical crime 
committed against God, for which the sinner should be punished eternally. 
The other gap, left by death, draws attention to the motif of voyeurism, which 
is a structuring principle in Stavrogin’s thefts. Since in the scene of Matryosha’s 
suicide Stavrogin appears as a passive voyeur peeping through doors, windows 
and gaps, and waiting for her death so that he could fulfil his desire, the 
metaphor of the eye plays a crucial role here. It is also a structuring principle 
both in the story of the penknife and the stealing of the civil servant’s salary, 
which is clearly motivated by Stavrogin’s pleasure gained from his image 
reflected in the helpless victim’s eyes: “Afterwards I enjoyed meeting his eye a 
few times in the corridor” (464). Stavrogin’s desire that as a voyeur he could see 
himself in the eyes of the other (the Other), from a perspective otherwise 
inaccessible for him (cf. Easthope 153) is finally fulfilled in the moment of the 
epiphany, when, as the metaphors of the sun–eye and small spot–tiny red spider 
show, he is present both as the beholder and the person looked at. In comparison 
with that, his watch during Matryosha’s suicide, which the vision of the Golden 
Age repeats metaphorically, is ominously bathetic: Stavrogin’s attempt to cross 
the mythic boundary of the sacred space of hierophany (cf. Eliade 14-28) by 
committing a crime fails to become an epiphany, partly because he fails to notice 
the golden rays of the sun then, partly because he forgets – represses – the whole 
scene. It is an incomplete story which he unconsciously and compulsively 
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repeats to achieve completion and make the traumatic event conscious (cf. 
Freud, “Remembering” passim) in his other attempts to experience a moment of 
“insight”: in his “all-night service at Mount Athos”, his visit to Egypt and 
Switzerland, his course sat through in Göttingen (470). The story only seems to 
become complete with the vision of Matryosha standing at his door and shaking 
her fist at him, but even that image is deceptive: depending on the stress it is 
both ви дение és виде ние (Достоевский, Бесы 274), seeing and envisioning, a 
scene undermining binary oppositions instead of fixing meanings. What it makes 
obvious, though, is that Stavrogin keeps looking at his own inverted mirror 
image, his anima (cf. Jung 149–62) in Matryosha: while he is constantly 
searching for his own image in the other, he cannot escape his own reflection 
embodied in Matryosha, which he finds both pleasurable and disgusting. Their 
story repeats that of Narcissus and Echo (Holmes 22–4; cf. Ovid III 339–508). 
All in all, Stavrogin’s voyeurism and narcissism transports Matryosha’s 
narrative from the paradigm of ethics into those of epistemology and ontology, 
the problematic of his identity and selfhood becomes an ontological issue at this 
point. 
The confessional situation framing the text of the printed confession repeats 
the metaphors of the text-within-the text, the double and the look (eye). The two 
Biblical quotations in the confessional situation form texts-within-the-text 
apparently with a similarly sacred interpretative function as the myth of the 
Golden Age and also inspiring a metaphorical reading of the narrative(s). 
Though both quotes repeat the ethical censure of Stavrogin’s deeds preceding 
and following the confession, respectively – “I will spue thee out of my mouth” 
(458) and “Whoso shall offend one of these little ones” (479) – their 
authoritative status is undermined by the fact that both of them are introduced by 
Stavrogin himself and thus they obviously reflect his own reading. The motif of 
the double (shadow) appears in Stavrogin’s visions of the devil and in his 
problematic relationship with Tikhon himself. On the one hand, Stavrogin’s 
devil fits perfectly well into his mythical interpretation of the narrative of his 
identity: itself an element of mythical thinking (Токарев et al. II/215–17), with 
its nightly visits starting approximately at the time of Stavrogin’s vision of the 
Golden Age, “[a]bout a year” (455) before the confession, this “apparition” 
(455) forms an antithesis of the Saturnine vision and as such, it is a demonic 
epiphany (cf. Frye, Anatomy 223). On the other hand, Stavrogin tries to 
rationalise his visions by interpreting the devil as his double – “It’s all myself in 
different aspects, nothing more” (455) – but then the result is such an image of 
himself as “a disgusting, scrofulous little devil with a head cold, one of the 
failures” (310), which can result from the comic reading of his mythic fall.  
In contrast, Tikhon and Stavrogin show so many similarities in the confessional 
situation and their relationship is characterised by mirroring so much that it is 
possible to treat them as doubles (cf. Криницын 220–22). This phenomenon can 
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explain partly their constant competition for the analyst’s role, partly Tikhon’s 
inability to overcome mirroring and to steer the confession/analysis to a successful 
end by getting beyond the phase of transference. The two doubles appearing in 
the confessional situation correspond to the shadow and the wise man (cf. Jung 
139–62), though the latter role, as mentioned above, is unplayable in the world 
of the Devils. The motif of voyeurism and the metaphor of the eye appear in the 
confessional situation as the rejection of Tikhon’s look and the fixing look of 
Stavrogin’s imaginary would-be audience. As Bakhtin points out, Stavrogin’s 
attitude to the look of others is almost comically ambivalent (Problems 244–5), 
which also becomes apparent in this situation. While he declares to Tikhon that 
“I have no need of you whatsoever” (459), Tikhon correctly recognises that the 
confession is actually a call for the others’ attention with its “Let them look at 
me” (475). Simultaneously, Stavrogin himself exists only as a look: “how will 
you look at them?” (475). All in all, in the confessional situation the 
epistemological and ontological issues focussed in Matryosha’s narrative are 
totalised in the vision of the other – the Other – as text, a mirror image and a 
look, thereby revealing the myth of Narcissus as the fundamental narrative of 
Stavrogin’s identity. 
 
Consequently, the myths of the Golden Age and Narcissus both have an 
interpretative and – via their central metaphors – a structuring function in the 
text of the confession. Based on mythical thinking, this fact makes the creation 
and reading of narrative identity problematic through the web of metaphors 
surrounding the motif of the mirror. As a result of the multiple reflections, the 
confession itself, which represents Stavrogin’s “voice” in the polyphony of the 
Devils, is revealed as a disunited, split collection of polyphonic “voices”. In this 
process of infinite reflection the undermining and inversion of binary 
oppositions and Stavrogin’s (self)irony resulting in a constant shift of meanings 
create a narrative which questions the possibility of the union of polyphonic 
voices and threatens with the possibility of chiasmus instead. 
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THE SOLAR HERO’S MYTH IN 
DOSTOEVSKY’S DEVILS1 
In Dostoevsky’s Devils the myth of the Golden Age serves as the basic 
interpretative paradigm for both Stavrogin’s character and the setting of the 
novel. As far as the first is concerned, the motif of the golden rays of the setting 
sun, which is established in Stavrogin’s confession as a central element of the 
myth of the Golden Age and therefore of Stavrogin’s narrative identity, is 
expanded into different versions of the solar hero’s myth in the rest of the novel. 
Such a development also corresponds to the general interrelationship of the two 
myths, which V. V. Ivanov also points out: the solar hero’s myth is connected to 
the myths of paradise, i.e. a version of the myth of the Golden Age, in many 
cultures. The traces of this relationship can also be found in Slavic fairy tales 
(Токарев et al. II/461–2). As far as the setting of the novel is concerned, it is also 
determined by elements of the solar myth: since the plot of the novel can be 
interpreted as the hero’s descent into the underworld (a metaphorical descent into his 
psychic hell) and disappearance, it determines the place of the action as a 
carnivalesque underworld, the inversion of the myth of the Golden Age. As opposed 
to the temporary and optimistic nature of the medieval carnival, however, a 
grotesque world celebrating metamorphosis and hybridity (cf. Bakhtin, Problems of 




From the point of view of the present analysis quite a number of features of 
the solar myth are relevant. Firstly, some of its versions identify the hero, among 
others, with the sun-god or with the son of the sun-god, who also is or becomes 
the earthly ruler. Consequently, the sun has become an attribute and symbol of 
the legitimate – rightful and sacred – king in many cultures (Токарев et al. 
II/461–2). Secondly, the solar hero is often a cultural hero as well, which 
connects the solar myth with hero myths in general, more particularly with the 
version featuring twin heroes (Токарев et al. II/461–2). Thus the myth might 
typically include two heroes: the (solar) hero and his demonic-comic dark twin 
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brother or double, a kind of trickster figure, who “clumsily imitates” him 
(Токарев et al. I/176; II/26). The straightforward division of appealing and 
repulsive characteristic traits between the two heroes marks this myth out as a 
source of the literary phenomenon of the Doppelgänger in mythic thought 
(Токарев et al. I/176; Мелетинский 53). 
Thirdly, the solar hero’s myth incorporates probably one of the most 
universal plots, as far as according to Northrop Frye it is the equivalent of the 
successful quest and as such, it is the mythos of romance. It has four aspects: 
“First, the agon or conflict itself. Second, the pathos or death, often the mutual 
death of hero and monster. Third, the disappearance of the hero, a theme which 
often takes the form of sparagmos or tearing to pieces. […] Fourth, the 
reappearance and recognition of the hero” or “anagnorisis” (Anatomy of 
Criticism 192). Indicating the close interrelationship of the two myths mentioned 
above, the aim of the solar hero’s quest is often the (re)establishment of some ideal 
state and society, it is a search for a lost Golden Age. This mythos is typically 
embodied for example in the myths of dying and reviving gods and in the Christian 
Easter (Anatomy 187). Just like Ivanov in the case of solar myths (Токарев et al. 
II/461–2), Frye also emphasises the central thematic importance of “dragon-killing” 
in the “quest-romance” and associates the monster with “winter, darkness, 
confusion, sterility, moribund life and old age, and the hero with spring, dawn, 
order, fertility, vigour, and youth” (Anatomy 187–9). The hero’s descent often forms 
a part of solar myths, since he “travels perilously through a dark labyrinthine 
underworld full of monsters between sunset and sunrise” (Anatomy 190).  
It is by creating different versions of this solar myth that several characters in 
Devils try to interpret Stavrogin. Though they do so with the intention of 
creating “sacred texts” – texts that would bring the endless chain of signification 
to a closure (Gould 44–55) – their creations are revealed as the texts of their own 
narcissism and desire. Thus, similarly to Stavrogin’s confession built on mythic 
narratives, the whole of the novel can be read as an attempt to bring the narrative 
of his identity to a closure in a mythic text, an attempt inevitably doomed to 
failure. It is this tragic overtone which is underpinned by the bleakly 
carnivalesque underworld of the setting in Devils. 
Stavrogin’s Identity: Versions of the Solar Hero 
The characters of Devils are almost obsessed with trying to solve the mystery of 
Stavrogin’s identity. At least six of them end up with narratives which can be 
read as different versions of the myth of the solar hero or the sun-god. It appears 
for Kirillov as the philosophy of the Nietzschean man-god, for Shatov as 
Slavophil ideology and imitatio Christi, for Lebyadkin as a comic inversion of 
the myth, for Marya Timofeevna as a Christianised version of the myth also 
interwoven with folklore elements, for Peter Verkhovensky as a political utopia 
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based on mythical logic, and last but not least for Liza it is myth displaced in 
literature as romance. In the course of the novel, however, all these narratives 
undermine their own authority and validity. 
A fairly similar approach is represented in a study by Ryszard Przybylski. He 
analyses the narratives created about Stavrogin in the context of the tsar’s 
“ideological myth” and also relies heavily on the central metaphor of the sun, 
however, without any reference to solar myths. Using cultural semiotics as a 
frame of reference, he interprets Stavrogin’s relationship with the characters 
surrounding him through the myth of the tsar as a divine person and the notion 
of proskinesis, a ritual in Byzantine culture which paid homage to the Emperor 
as a god. In the course of this ritual, which was later also introduced in the tsar’s 
court in a modified form, the subject who received audience “fell at the 
Emperor’s feet and kissed them” (“Sztavrogin” 97). Przybylski claims that both 
Shatov and Peter Verkhovensky carry out the ritual of proskinesis verbally and 
supports his view with the curiously recurrent metaphors of the insect/worm and 
the sun characterising their relationship and communication with Stavrogin. For 
Przybylski the metaphor of the sun is fundamentally “the symbol of supreme 
power” which evokes Eastern despots and “political cults” just as well as the 
Heavenly Kingdom of Jesus or “popular beliefs” about fertility and eternity 
(“Sztavrogin” 98). Przybylski also emphasises the mythic nature of the verbal 
gesture (“Sztavrogin” 101) and how much Stavrogin is a creature of the other 
characters’ mythically orientated imagination. For example, he claims that 
“Shatov and Peter [Verkhovensky] would want to push Stavrogin into the sphere 
of ideological myth” (“Sztavrogin” 104), while he is also “a plaything of 
Marya’s imagination” since “the holy fool […] exist[s] in mythic time” and her 
vision of Stavrogin is the product of an “untainted religious consciousness” 
(“Sztavrogin” 106). Though by the end of the novel “she notices that his 
inclusion in the sphere of religious myth was absolutely unfounded” and in the 
“epiphanic” moment of their meeting exorcises him, she remains within the 
realm of a mythic discourse and its versions sustained in folktales all through the 
text – only the symbols turn into their opposites, like mythic light and darkness, 
for instance (“Sztavrogin” 104–6). Przybylski’s excellent essay opens the way 
for further analysis in at least three directions: the exploration of the actual 
mythopoetic structure of these “ideological myths” and the related gesture of 
proskinesis, the possible inclusion of other “myth-makers” in the list and the 
deconstruction of these mythic narratives in Devils. 
Kirillov’s Nietzschean philosophy
3
, though in his case the gesture of 
proskinesis is impossible, can be interpreted as the application of the solar hero’s 
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 For a detailed analysis of Kirillov’s philosophy see Ryszard Przybylski’s other article (“Az 
Antikrisztus halála” passim). For a semantic analysis of Kirillov’s speech and his role in the 
development of Stavrogin’s narrative see (Кроо 229–33). 
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myth to himself. His narrative of man’s deification remains within the paradigm 
of the dying and reviving god
4
, which is a version of the same myth. However, 
the narrative, which represents its story-teller as a superman, was originally 
delivered by Stavrogin and therefore pertained to him. Kirillov, as a true double 
(cf. Bakhtin, Problems 128), has simply taken Stavrogin’s place as the main 
character of the story. He has become the signified of a “ready-made” narrative of 
identity, i.e. a signifier supplied by Stavrogin, thereby realising the apparently 
empty cliché he pronounces in the chapter “Night”: “Remember, Stavrogin, how 
much you’ve meant in my life” (252, emphasis added)
5
. Stavrogin has turned into 
a sign for him, into an image of his ideal I, with which he has seemingly identified.  
However, the unsatisfactory identification with the mythic identity 
represented by Stavrogin and therefore the instability of Kirillov’s status as a 
subject is indicated by several elements in the text. The first is his very speech, 
which is characterised by a conspicuous irregularity, originating in his absolutely 
individual word order and a kind of minimalism. The second is the scene of his 
death, which, instead of giving ultimate verification to his philosophy and 
identity, contains a series of subversive moments, such as his waiving his right 
to choose the time of his suicide, his so uncharacteristic sudden garrulousness 
and his suicide note dictated by Verkhovensky, with special reference to the 
signature. As Przybylski points out, Kirillov’s theory is fundamentally 
undermined by his relation to the organisation because he renounces in its favour 
the very role he wants to deserve by committing suicide: he “has renounced the 
time of his suicide on behalf of the organisation. Thus the moment of his death is 
appointed by a will which is transcendental in comparison with his own, as far 
as his person is concerned, it fulfils the function of God […]. He is aware that it 
is the biggest ass [sic!] he has ever known [Peter Verkhovensky] who measures 
out his life for him” (“Az Antikrisztus halála” 89, emphasis added). When 
Kirillov’s time is up, with a talkativeness quite unusual for him, he “want[s] to 
say everything” (695) and stops writing with the exclamation “Wait!” (695) 
several times – as if he still wanted to postpone the moment of his death, after 
all. Finally, by writing the suicide note, Kirillov gives in Verkhovensky’s hands 
not only his freedom, but also the right of saying the last word of the narrative of 
his identity, of determining the end from which the whole narrative will be read 
retrospectively (cf. P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 33) and actually lets 
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 In her study Edith Clowes comes to the conclusion that both Nietzsche and Dostoevsky work out 
a new, “Christian-Dionysian fabula”, which includes four phases: 1) moral rebellion 2) self-
sacrifice 3) being torn to pieces and suffering 4) rebirth and new consciousness with a will to 
live (Клюс 496–500). Her mythopoetic approach results in a scheme which is strikingly similar 
to Frye’s description of the quest myth. 
5
 The present study relies on the 1996 critical edition of Devils (Достоевский, Бесы). The English 
quotations are all based on (Dostoevsky, Devils) and for this reason only the page numbers are 
indicated in parentethical notes after them. 
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Verkhovensky deprive it from the mythic content he has always wanted to 
express by his death. Verkhovensky has really “trained” him (Szilárd 35): he has 
turned Kirillov into a puppet. That Kirillov is absolutely conscious of the 
absurdity of the situation is shown by his ecstatic and grotesque hilarity: he 
bursts out in laughter and, with a final carnivalesque inversion of his earlier 
enunciations, he wants “to draw a face at the top with its tongue sticking out” 
(695). He keeps changing his potential signatures and multiplies them as if he 
were not sure who exactly he is, and finally the only word in the letter which is 
actually “his own” is the slogan of the French Revolution – a cliché. As 
Przybylski comments, the myth of the superman vanishes into thin air well 
before Kirillov’s suicide turns into a parody (“Az Antikrisztus” 92). 
Shatov interprets Stavrogin as his “personal saviour” in the context of the 
solar hero’s myth and consequently “stands in” for him as victim in a series of 
profanised hierophanies. The mechanism of borrowing a “ready-made” narrative 
of identity seems to work in his case, just as well as in Kirillov’s, which is 
indicated by an almost literal repetition of the latter’s words: Shatov explains 
that he struck Stavrogin “because he meant so much to him in his life” (253). 
Having adopted Stavrogin’s Slavophil prophecies, Shatov repeatedly acts out the 
role of the victim in scenes which are profane versions of the Christian story of 
the dying and reviving god or the repetitions of pagan rites of sacrifice. For 
example, when Marya Ignatievna gives birth to Stavrogin’s child, Shatov 
becomes not only the child’s official, but also his spiritual father, thereby acting 
out the role of a modern Joseph for Stavrogin – the Father – in this profane Holy 
Family. The scene can be read with elevated pathos as a “mystery” (665) or with 
liberating laughter, as the midwife’s words reveal: “You’ve given me something 
to laugh at for the rest of my life. […] I’ll be laughing even in my sleep. I’ve 
never seen anything funnier than you last night” (666). The possibility of the two 
diametrically opposed readings depending on the beholder’s perspective evokes 
the figure of “the mocked Christ in the Passion” (Frye, Anatomy 221).  
Apart from the role of the Father, for Shatov Stavrogin, as his name also 
indicates
6
, embodies the role of the Son culminating in the ideal of voluntary 
self-sacrifice with equal force. For him Stavrogin is the Master to whom the 
disciple owes his rebirth, i.e. he is the realisation of the metaphors of “the way, 
the truth and the life” (John 14,6) expanded into narratives in Lazarus’ 
resurrection (John 11.1–44) and in the parable of the corn of wheat (John 12. 
24–33): “’Our’ conversation never took place: there was a teacher who uttered 
mighty words and a student who was raised from the dead. I was that student 
and you were that teacher” (261). This attitude explains Shatov’s reaction to 
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 Stavrogin’s name includes the Greek word for “cross”, which V. Ivanov interprets as the sign of 
being in possession of a mystical knowledge (Иванов 309–10), while in Léna Szilárd’s reading 
it is an unequivocal reference to Christ (36). 
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Stavrogin’s warning about the danger that threatens his life: “You are the one that 
matters, not me… I’m a man without talent and can only offer my blood and 
nothing more, just like any man without talent. And to hell with my blood!” (267)  
The scene of Shatov’s death and some events directly preceding it form the 
culmination of this fundamentally Christian narrative of self-sacrifice and 
combine it with elements of the ritual punishment of the scapegoat and the pagan 
building sacrifice. By doing so, they actually underline Shatov’s role as 
Stavrogin’s double (cf. Bakhtin, Problems 127), since this combination is in 
harmony with the dual metaphorical system evoked by Stavrogin’s name. Apart 
from a reference to the cross, it also includes the word „рог”, i.e. „horn”, which 
both identifies Stavrogin as a demonic figure and associates the Biblical serpent 
(Szilárd 36). It serves as the starting point of the metaphorical chain horn–devil–
serpent–dragon–chaos (cf. Eliade 47–50) which testifies to the fact that in 
Stavrogin’s name Christian and pagan mythical thinking is inseparably 
intertwined. Shatov realises the implications of this metaphorical system, i.e. 
Stavrogin’s defeat in his demonic role, first during the meeting of “our group”, 
which also features as a profane Last Supper: he lets himself to be 
excommunicated like a scapegoat and, similarly to Judas in the Biblical scene, 
leaves the meeting. His murder is “a ritual sacrifice” (Сараскина 449), as the 
mythic number of the murderers – after Shigalov leaves, six of them remain 
there, who kill the seventh –, Lyamshin’s scream “in a voice that was more 
animal than human” (678) and the murderers’ ecstatic state, in which “all of 
them seemed to have lost control of part of their faculties” (678), imply. The 
murder can be interpreted as the “tearing to pieces” of the dying and reviving 
god (Иванов 311), just as well as the carrying out of the ritual building sacrifice 
(cf. Eliade 52–8). The most important element of the latter is the metaphor of 
“cement” (439) for Shatov’s blood in the context of Peter Verkhovensky’s 
apocalyptic utopia: it would function as the cohesive force in the “stone 
structure” (448) of Peter Stepanovich’s new cosmos which he plans to form after 
bringing along the end of the present world. The rite is the repetition of the 
killing of the mythic serpent/dragon which symbolises chaos and it is also the 
source of the motif of the dragon guarding a hoard (Frye, Anatomy 192–3) – an 
element which clearly appears in the detail of the printing press Shatov has buried. 
Since on the level of metaphors Shatov plays the roles of the solar hero and the 
monster he has to kill simultaneously, as one of Stavrogin’s doubles he reveals the 
paradox of the solar hero’s role Nikolai Vsevolodovich is supposed to play. 
Lebyadkin formulates the parodistic version of the solar hero’s myth. Its 
parodistic quality partly derives from repetition itself (cf. Bergson Ch. I Part IV): 
in the continuation of the chapter “Night” segments of Stavrogin’s dialogues 
with Kirillov and Shatov are pronounced this time by Lebyadkin in a totally 
different context and consequently they sound comic. Conspicuously, he also 
repeats a key sentence referring to identification with Stavrogin’s model and 
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doubling, but in the context of carnivalesque clowning: “So what if they called 
me your Falstaff, from Shakespeare? You meant so much to me in my own life!” 
(278, emphasis added) He parodies the master–disciple relationship which is a 
central aspect of Kirillov and Shatov’s identification with Stavrogin as their 
ideal. It becomes apparent when he seemingly admires Stavrogin and expects 
him to “solve the mystery of life” (279) – read: to dissolve the misery of his life 
– though he can remember only one fashionable paradox from all his 
“teachings” in Petersburg. Since it is actually the garrulous captain who does 
most of the talking, just like in the past, when Stavrogin played the role of the 
grateful listener to his poetry, their communication also turns out to be a comic 
inversion of the master–disciple pattern which for Kirillov and Shatov forms a 
sacred mythic narrative. It does not hinder Lebyadkin, however, from echoing 
Shatov’s words about his resurrection owing to Stavrogin – in fact, he speaks of 
returning to Petersburg as if it meant regaining Paradise, a lost Golden Age: “I 
dream of Petersburg […] I dream of regeneration… Oh, my benefactor! Can I 
count on you not to refuse my money for the journey? I’ve waited for you all 
week as one waits for the sun” (281, emphasis added). His return to Petersburg 
acquires a mythic dimension through its association with rebirth. Since the 
fulfilment of his desire, however, depends on Stavrogin’s money, which, in turn, 
forms the basis for his comparison of Stavrogin with the sun, the myth of the 
Golden Age turns into its own parody, into a carnivalesque myth of material 
well-being, a myth of money. The food and drink Lebyadkin has prepared for 
Stavrogin – and from Stavrogin’s money – foreshadows this “earthly paradise”. 
It is money that could make Stavrogin Lebyadkin’s “benefactor”, the Messiah he 
has been waiting for a week, which is again a comic repetition of Kirillov and 
Shatov’s emphatic waiting over the years. 
That Lebyadkin is actually Stavrogin’s double is indicated by his 
graphomania and the metaphor of the serpent. Przybylski claims that all 
Lebyadkin’s texts – including his ordinary speech – are actually stylisations, and 
bad ones, at that: since their creator mean to be serious, it is he himself who 
becomes ridiculous and not the parodied originals. A very similar, though less 
transparent mechanism works behind Stavrogin’s “unliterary” confession
7
, 
therefore Przybylski interprets Lebyadkin’s graphomania as a comic version of 
Stavrogin’s literary ambitions and regards the two characters as doubles 
(“Sztavrogin” 107–8). Lebyadkin’s nostalgic remark about their days in 
Petersburg also indicates that their approaches to literary texts are not so 
dissimilar, after all: “I’ve even stopped writing poetry; at one time even you 
were amused by my verses, Nikolai Vsevolodovich, do you remember, over a 
bottle?” (280)  
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 For the full implications of Stavrogin’s confession as a Rousseau stylisation see (S. Horváth 
passim). 
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Lebyadkin’s efforts to emphasise the similarities between Stavrogin and 
himself can be best followed in the fate of the metaphor he himself finds for 
Stavrogin, that of the serpent. Originally it is Liputin who relates the fact that 
Lebyadkin called Stavrogin “a wise serpent” (106) (“премудрый змий” 
[Достоевский, Бесы 65]), and then the same expression reappears as the title of 
the closing chapter of the first part (168), which describes Stavrogin’s arrival 
and the scandal in his mother’s house. The archaic word in the Russian metaphor 
is used almost exclusively with reference to the Biblical serpent or the mythic 
dragon symbolising chaos, thus underlining the mythic nature of Stavrogin’s 
character in Lebyadkin’s interpretation. During the scandalous scenes of 
Stavrogin’s return the metaphor already appears in a downgraded, almost 
parodistic form: when Stavrogin enters the drawing-room “the captain shrank 
suddenly before him and froze on the spot, not taking his eyes off him, like a 
rabbit facing a boa constrictor [“удав” (Достоевский, Бесы 123)]” (205). The 
mythic serpent, a representation of archetypal evil, has turned into a horrifying, 
cold-blooded huge predatory animal. It is to this “demythologised” reptile that 
later Lebyadkin compares himself, claiming that he has been reborn and “grown 
a new skin like a snake [“змей” (Достоевский, Бесы 165)]” (279)
8
. When he 
applies the stylistically neutral “snake” to himself, he both downgrades the myth 
– what remains of the mythic quality is the power of rebirth – and reinforces the 
power positions implicated in the simile of the rabbit and the boa constrictor. 
Lebyadkin’s character emphasises the ambivalent nature of the whole 
metaphorical complex of the serpent (Токарев et al. I/468–71), since in the 
application related to him it is not only an embodiment of chaos and the 
underworld, but also of fertility and power. Thus its semantic domain partly 
forms a counterpoint to that of the solar hero, partly overlaps the meanings 
associated with the sun-god. All in all, through the comic double realised in 
Lebyadkin’s figure the mythic narratives associated with the sun and the serpent, 
which define Stavrogin’s identity, appear on a material level as a result of 
carnivalesque downgrading, inversion and intermixture of contradictory elements, 
which undermines any unambiguous interpretation of his character as a hero. 
Marya Timofeevna Lebyadkina’s version of the solar hero’s myth is a 
mixture of pre-Christian mythic, Christian and folkloristic elements. In the 
Symbolist mythopoetic reading originally formulated by V. Ivanov her figure is 
traditionally associated with the pagan and folkloristic Mother Earth (Иванов 
308–9; Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 103), the Eternal Feminine (Булгаков 495–6), 
the Mother of God or the Virgin (Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 103–4). Her religious 
consciousness is evidently inseparable from the concept of the holy fool, from 
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 Cf. Léna Szilárd’s reference to the multilayered symbolism of the „semantic row of премудрый 
змий–змий–гад–удав–червь” which, for example, allows Stavrogin to feature both as the 
mythic-folkloristic dragon and dragon-killer (35). 
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her „юродство” (Szilárd 28). This consciousness gains expression through the 
language of total metaphor (cf. Frye, Anatomy 141–4) with images borrowed 
from folklore. For example two of her metaphors for Stavrogin, the prince and 
the falcon flying towards the sun, can be clearly associated with the imagery of 
Russian folk-songs (Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 105). Even Lebyadkina’s name is 
connected to the folklore figure of the swan-bride (cf. Савушкина 180–83), 
which has totemic origins (Токарев et al. II/441) and emphasises that she 
belongs to a different – a mythic – world.  
For this mythic consciousness Stavrogin’s character can make sense only in 
mythic terms – either as the solar hero or as the demonic pretender to his role. 
As Przybylski also points out in his analysis quoted above, one of the central 
metaphors Marya Timofeevna uses to define Stavrogin’s identity is closely 
related to the motif of the sun. Continuing this train of thought, one can claim 
that it is Marya Timofeevna who, of all the characters in the novel, comes 
closest to literally carrying out proskinesis, the rite in tribute of the ruler revered 
as (sun-)god, before Stavrogin. The scene verging on grotesque takes place 
during their first meeting in Varvara Petrovna’s drawing-room. When Stavrogin 
goes up to Marya Timofeevna, she only wants to “fall on her knees before him” 
(194), and Stavrogin hinders her from doing so by rejecting the role of symbolic 
father figures – and of God: “Even though I’m your most devoted friend, I’m 
still a stranger, not your husband, nor your father, nor your fiancé” (194). When 
they are on the point of leaving, however, she has “a minor accident”: “she fell 
sideways on to the chair and if it hadn’t been there, she’d have fallen to the 
floor” (194, emphasis added). The outstanding importance of the scene is 
indicated by Marya Timofeevna’s later comment, in which she identifies it as the 
moment when Stavrogin was revealed as a “worm” for her: “When I saw your 
nasty face after I fell and you picked me up – it was as if a worm [“червь” 
(Достоевский, Бесы 173)] had crawled into my heart: it’s not he, I thought, not 
he! My falcon would never have been ashamed of me in front of any society 
lady!” (294) This “worm” clearly fits into the semantic row based on the motif 
of the serpent mentioned above (Szilárd 35). Similarly, the metaphors Marya 
Timofeevna uses for Stavrogin during their second, “epiphanic” meeting 
(Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 106) can easily be arranged into actually two 
diametrically opposed semantic rows based on the two fundamental metaphors 
of the sun and the serpent, which define Stavrogin’s dual identity: (sun)god—
(bright) falcon soaring, gazing at the sun—prince versus (blind) owl—
shopkeeper—worm—impostor/pretender
9
. The metaphor of the sun joins the 
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 In the Russian text the second group of synonyms is much richer: солнце–(ясный) сокол на 
солнце взирает–князь versus сова слепая–филин–сыч–купчишка–червь–самозванец. The 
adjective “ясный” (bright) is an epitheton ornans of the falcon in Russian folk-tales (cf. 
“Перышко Финиста, Ясна сокола” [Савушкина 153–9]) and it is a connecting element 
between the metaphors of the falcon and the sun. The word “самозванец” associates rather a 
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two rows into one, since, as Léna Szilárd points out relying on Boris Uspensky’s 
research, his followers called the pretender False Dmitry ”праведное солнце”, 
i.e. the “real sun” and “thereby endowed him with an attribute which is Christ’s 
due” (Szilárd 22). Thus Marya Timofeevna simultaneously identifies Stavrogin 
as the solar hero and the trickster, his own comic double or, in this case, rather 
shadow (cf. Jung 139–62). For her mythic consciousness existing in an eternal 
present the possibility of change in time does not even occur, she experiences 
contradictory meanings in a paradox unity, syncretically layered on each other. 
In Peter Verkhovensky’s case the solar hero’s myth turns into a political 
utopia
10
 with the incorporation of Ivan the Tsarevich’s legend
11
. In the chapter 
“Ivan the Tsarevich” Verkhovensky determines his own and Stavrogin’s identity 
through the metaphors of the sun and the worm: “You’re the leader, the sun, and 
I’m your worm” (444)
12
. However, he applies them in the utopistic context of 
bringing along an apocalypse in order to create “a brave new world”, a new 
cosmos: “We’ll spread fires…We’ll spread legends… […] Well, sir, then the 
trouble will begin! There’ll be an upheaval such as the world has never seen… 
Rus’ will be shrouded in mist and the land will weep for its old gods… Well, sir, 
then we’ll unleash… do you know who? […] Ivan the Tsarevich” (446–7). His 
utopia covers the full cycle of the quest myth complete with regaining a lost 
Golden Age at the cost of sacrificing the mythic dragon (Shatov), that is, 
establishing a new society with the solar hero as its “ruler”. 
Apart from Shatov’s murder it is Peter Verkhovensky’s figure that can be 
most directly associated with the dragon-killing motif of the solar myth on the 
plot level. Metaphorically Verkhovensky appears as the Biblical tempter and, as 
Léna Szilárd claims, the dragon of myths and folktales, in relation to whom 
Stavrogin actually plays the role of the “dragon-killer” (35). Conspicuously, in 
the chapter “The Wise Serpent” it is not Stavrogin but actually Verkhovensky 
who appears as a metaphorical snake, more exactly as the Biblical serpent which 
tempts Adam and Eve with his (far too smooth) words (Gen 3.1–5): 
He spoke quickly, hastily, but at the same time with certainty, and 
was never at a loss for words. […] His articulation was wonderfully 
clear […]. At first this was attractive, but later it became repulsive, 
precisely because of his excessively clear articulation, his stream of 
                                                                                                                                   
pretender – with its manifold echoes in Russian cultural semiotics (cf. Успенский 149–96) – 
than a simple impostor, but this is the word Katz uses (294). 
10
 About the relationship of political utopia with mythic thought cf. (Coupe 67–74). 
11
 For an overview of Ivan the Tsarevich’s legend see (Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 99–100). Ivan the 
Tsarevich is also a folklore figure and the archaic analogies of the tales about him are myths 
about the son of the sun-god (Токарев et al. II/442). 
12
 In Russian the word for “worm” is “червяк” (Достоевский, Бесы 258) here, which is not 
totally identical with Marya Timofeevna’s earlier metaphor, as in the English text. 
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ever-ready words. One began to imagine that the tongue in his mouth 
had a special shape, unusually long and thin, very red, with an 
extremely pointed tip, flickering constantly and involuntarily. (190)  
Since out of Stavrogin’s doubles Verkhovensky (cf. Bakhtin, Problems 127) is 
the one who shares only his negative qualities, he actually appears as Stavrogin’s 
shadow (Мелетинский 17; Szilárd 36) or the dark twin brother of the solar hero 
(Мелетинский 17). Verkhovensky’s demonic qualities and the Biblical context 
evoked by the snake metaphor allow for an interpretation of the “Ivan the 
Tsarevich” chapter as a restaging of Christ’s third temptation (Matt 4.8–9), in 
which Verkhovensky offers Stavrogin worldly power and the fulfilment of his 
personal desires for acting out the role that he, Verkhovensky has written for 
him. As Szilárd explains, Stavrogin resists temptation and gains victory over 
Verkhovensky both spiritually and physically when he “hurls him to the ground 
with all his might” (440). His refusal of Verkhovensky’s offer is the culmination 
of the series of “heroic” deeds consisting of his enduring Shatov’s slap, his 
warning and his strange duel with Gaganov (Szilárd 35–6). In the solar hero’s 
myth this moment corresponds to pathos or the death of the monster, i.e. with 
Verkhovensky’s (temporary) defeat the division line between the metaphorical 
domains of the sun and the serpent is apparently clarified and the paradoxical 
situation outlined in Shatov’s, Lebyadkin’s and Marya Timofeevna’s cases is 
eliminated. 
For Liza the solar hero’s myth appears in its literary form, displaced as 
romance. Frye comments on the special naivety of the genre that  
The romance is nearest of all literary forms to the wish-fulfilment 
dream, and for that reason it has socially a curiously paradoxical role. 
In every age the ruling social or intellectual class tends to project its 
ideals in some form of romance, where the virtuous heroes and 
beautiful heroines represent the ideals and the villains the threats to 
their ascendancy. (Anatomy 186) 
In Liza and Stavrogin’s plot literariness gains special emphasis: it surfaces in 
Liza’s reading her own life, including Stavrogin’s character in it, and shaping 
her wish-fulfilling fantasies according to models borrowed from romantic, 
sentimental, sometimes even melodramatic literature. This tendency culminates 
in the chapter relating her grand finale – her last scene with Stavrogin and her 
death. Even the title of the chapter, “The End of a Romance” (587), puts Liza 
and Stavrogin’s love story quite ironically in the context of a literary genre. It is 
in this chapter that not only does Stavrogin refer to her as “poor” Liza (591) but 
also she herself asks Stepan Trofimovich to commemorate her in his prayers by 
this name (608), thereby emphasising the relationship between her character and 
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the Russian sentimental tradition (Топоров 261; cf. S. Horváth 284–92). Liza’s 
own claims relegate the whole of their story to the realm of her “fantasy” (589), 
what is more, to a fantasy world rooted in melodramatic opera librettos: “I’m a 
young lady of the nobility; I was brought up on opera – that’s how it all started, 
that’s the whole explanation. [...] I’m a bad girl, capricious, seduced by that 
operatic boat” (591). In contrast to the other characters mentioned above, Liza 
and Stavrogin do not talk to each other in private apart from this final scene and 
consequently this wish-fulfilling romance-like plot, which is probably Liza and 
Stavrogin’s joint construction, is not known in detail. Therefore in Liza’s 
question “Where are we to go together? Somewhere ‘to be resurrected’ again?” 
(589) the expression in inverted commas, probably a quote from their earlier 
dialogues, is most revealing. Stavrogin’s earlier words actually promised rebirth, 
the anagnorisis of romance, and in the face of reality and Liza’s shattered 
dreams they cannot be cited without an irony which is incompatible with the 
genre. The same bitter irony culminates later in her exclamation: “I’ll be 
laughing at you for the rest of your life...” (592) 
Liza goes from one extreme to the other: if Stavrogin cannot feature in her 
romance as the perfect embodiment of social ideals, someone who can take her 
to Moscow and pay visits with her in high society, he must turn into the evil 
seducer of sentimental stories, or the villain of a typically romantic genre, the 
Gothic
13
. It is so even if it means that she must intentionally victimise herself 
and melodramatically “compress her entire life into one hour” (592). Since 
social compromise, which forms the denouement of romance, proves to be 
impracticable in Stavrogin’s case, the wish-fulfilment dream turns into a 
“nightmare” (590) and the hero into the highly sexualised monster of the Gothic. 
Stavrogin appears as a “vampire” (592) and as Bluebeard. The latter role is 
implied by the verb used for “revealing” his secrets (592): “открыть” 
(Достоевский, Бесы 340) means “to open”, at this point as a rather weak 
reference to the opening up of Bluebeard’s secret doors only to reveal dead 
women behind them. It becomes much more significant, however, in the context 
of Liza’s earlier slip, when she asks Stavrogin whether he has paid “for this new 
hope” “with his life or with someone else’s” (589). When on entering 
Stavrogin’s room Liza calls herself “a corpse” (588), she actually offers herself 
to this monster as a voluntary victim. In the last version of this subhuman 
monster she unconsciously recreates the metaphor of the fall – and at the same 
time Stavrogin’s own metaphor – formulated in his confession: the “tiny red 
spider” (472) reappears enlarged into the horror of “an enormous, man-sized evil 
spider” that they “would gaze at […] till the end of their lives” (593) if they 
were to live together. After all, both Liza’s readings – as romance and as a 
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 Meletinsky points to Stavrogin’s direct relationship with the Gothic villain via such figures as 
Charles Robert Maturin’s Melmoth (Мелетинский 48). 
59 
Gothic story – remain within the paradigm of Romanticism. An inversion similar 
to Marya Timofeevna’s takes place in her interpretation of Stavrogin’s character, 
but while the “holy fool” projects the two diametrically opposed versions 
synchronically on each other, for Liza the solar hero’s myth displaced as the 
wish-fulfilment fantasy of romance is superseded by the demonic hero’s equally 
mythic story. 
In conclusion, there is a general tendency in the novel to read Stavrogin’s 
character as a version of the solar hero’s mythic figure. Consequently, at least 
six characters of Devils create such mythic texts which, analogically to the myth 
of the Golden Age in Stavrogin’s dream and expanding its metaphorical system 
into narratives, are meant to function as narratives of his – and their – identity 
with the interpretative status of definitive, “sacred” texts. Stavrogin’s earlier 
narratives of identity become the signifiers for whose signified they would like 
to stand. Their versions of the solar hero’s myth, however, prove unmaintainable 
as narrative identities: they are subverted by carnivalesque inversion, by the 
coexistence of pathos and irony and by the actualisation of the potentials 
inherent in the ambivalences of the central metaphors related to the myth. 
Setting: Descent to Hell 
In the context of the solar myth the place of action in Devils is the space of the 
hero’s descent, a mythic underworld featuring as the antithesis of the earthly 
paradise represented in the vision of the Golden Age. The most characteristic 
elements of this world emerge as a result of carnivalesque inversion, to create “a 
carnivalesque underworld” which is extremely rich in motifs of “external 
carnivalisation” (Bakhtin, Problems 180 fn. 31). Hypothetically, they can be 
categorised into four major groups. Firstly, as an antithesis to the childlike 
innocence of the world of the Golden Age, the world of Devils is dominated by 
make-believe and theatricality, it is an anti-world in which the division line 
between the stage and the audience, between fiction and reality is washed away 
– in fact, in which fiction pretends to be reality. Secondly, instead of angelic 
creatures it is populated by devils featuring in the role of the “шут”, a character 
directly associated with carnivalesque clowning. Thirdly, as a result of 
carnivalisation the hierophanies embodied in the moments of Christ’s life appear 
in Devils in profaned and parodistic forms, as hybrid images. And, last but not 
least, the novel is full of apocalyptic elements, which, however, are not followed 
by a moment of rebirth
14
.  
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 The differentiation of the last two groups in itself might suffice to demonstrate how hypothetical in 
fact this categorisation is: apocalyptic motifs refer to hierophany and belong to carnivalesque 
imagery simultaneously. Several motifs listed below could be enumerated in more than one group. 
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In Devils make-believe comes to dominate everything, which results in the 
emergence of an anti-world. This, in turn, is traditionally related to the 
carnivalisation of the ideal world represented by the myth of the Golden Age in 
Russian cultural semiotics. Szilárd argues convincingly that in Devils “the motif 
of theatricality, make-believe […] appears as if it grew out of some creative 
impulse of the sjuzet”. She actually talks of “total make-believe” as the 
“metatheme” of the novel and uses Uspensky’s cultural semiotics as a frame of 
reference to demonstrate how a world that equals theatre can be nothing but an 
anti-world for the Russian consciousness (20–21). Applying the results of 
Bakhtin’s carnival theory to cultural semiotics, Dmitry Likhachov points out that 
in Russian culture the imagery of the anti-world is related to the inversion of the 
ideal world via laughter and therefore it testifies to the existence of the ideal 
world out of which it has been created (Лихачёв 452–6). In his opinion the 
unreal, illogical and chaotic anti-culture of laughter historically reached the 
status of “official culture” during the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the 
Great (Лихачёв 466). The reflection of the dominance of a carnivalesque anti-
world over “reality” has a long tradition of Russian literature, of which Devils is 
an outstanding piece. 
This anti-world is the realm of carnivalesque clowning, its characters are 
devils appearing in the form of the “шут”. In the world of the carnival, which is 
dominated by popular grotesque, devils are not fearful: they are “the gay 
ambivalent figure[s] expressing the unofficial pint of view, the material bodily 
stratum” (Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World 54). Probably a very similar view is 
reflected in the fact that in Russian one of the numerous popular euphemisms for 
the devil is the word “шут”, i.e. “clown” or “fool” (Токарев et al. II/625). The 
most important embodiments of this carnivalesque clowning in Devils are the 
“scoffers” or “mockers”, Semyon Yakovlevich as a “holy fool” and Stavrogin’s 
parodying doubles, with special reference to Peter Stepanovich. The “mockers” 
handle the nameless little town where the action of the novel takes place as a 
fundamentally carnivalesque space: borrowing the name from Mikhail Saltykov-
Shchedrin’s satire (764) they regard it as “Glupov” (337) or “Stupidville” (764). 
Their innocent – and not so innocent – tricks are all based on the foregrounding 
of the material-corporeal aspects of life and carnivalesque downgrading and 
inversion. These often result in the emergence of grotesque hybrid images. The 
list of the most prominent examples includes the “respectable” book-pedlar who 
produces “a bundle of suggestive and obscene photographs” instead of “sacred 
books” (339–40), the hybrid which emerges out of the “cross-breeding” of 
“Marseillaise” and “Mein Lieber Augustine” (340–41), the live mouse smuggled 
behind the glass cover of the icon of the Virgin (342), Lyamshin who plays the 
“jester” and induces the others practically to laugh at death at the sight of the 
youth who committed suicide (346–7) and the whole group of “mockers” who 
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behave in the presence of Semyon Yakovlevich, the “holy fool”, as if he were 
presenting a theatrical performance (348).  
The last scene deserves individual treatment as the second independent 
example of carnivalesque clowning in the novel, since the “mockers’” visit 
throws into relief only the inherently carnivalesque nature of Semyon 
Yakovlevich’s environment and figure. The room in which he receives his 
guests and which is “divided into two sections by a waist-high wooden latticed 
partition running from one wall to the other” (347) is actually a parody of 
Orthodox churches divided by a rood-screen – it is the scene of a comedy. 
Semyon Yakovlevich, who expresses his irrational and arbitrary judgements by 
handing out tea and sugar while he is having lunch, parodies divine judgement, 
and, what is more, he does so with the carnivalesque foregrounding of the 
materiality of life. His is “dressed in German style” (347), which in Russian 
culture definitely relates him to the world of masquerades and the traditional 
depiction of devils (Szilárd 21–2). All in all, presumably a “holy fool”, Semyon 
Yakovlevich is much more of a clown or pretender and in that sense the 
“mockers” are his most appropriate audience – the ones who treat him as a fraud. 
The third relevant aspect of the representation of carnivalesque clowning is 
the inclusion of Stavrogin’s parodying doubles in Devils. Bakhtin relates 
parodying doubles in general to the victory of carnivalesque laughter over death, 
since the parodied character both dies and revives in them. He identifies Shatov, 
Kirillov and Peter Verkhovensky as such doubles in relation to Stavrogin in 
Devils (Bakhtin, Problems 127–8), and out of them it is in Peter Verkhovensky 
that carnivalesque clowning gains a most straightforward expression: Stavrogin 
calls him his “pet monkey” and Peter Stepanovich consciously undertakes 
“playing the fool” for him (598). His figure, however, also calls attention to the 
fact that in Devils carnival is conspicuously devoid of ambivalent laughter which 
both destroys and revives: while the novel culminates practically in a mass 
murder and Stavrogin’s suicide, it is the most evil of his doubles, Verkhovensky, 
who stays alive and carries on as if nothing had happened. The bitter carnival 
associated with him and the mockers, a laughter which is not universal but 
restricted to certain individuals and therefore divides people into those who 
laugh and those who are laughed at, becomes permanent in the novel and 
questions the possibility of rebirth originally inherent in a carnivalesque attitude. 
It is also in relation to Stavrogin and his doubles that several scenes 
parodying and/or profaning crucial moments of Christ’s life, the central 
hierophany of Christianity, appear and form a typically carnivalesque aspect of 
the novel: the parody of sacred texts was the basis of several carnivalesque 
festivities in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance period (Bakhtin, Rabelais 
88–92). Quite a few of them have already been detailed above or in literature on 
Devils, such as the ambivalence of Stavrogin’s name, the meeting of “our group” 
as a profane Last Supper, Shatov as Joseph and Judas and Christ and the dragon, 
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Kirillov’s death “parodying Christ’s death on the cross” (Przybylski, “Az 
Antikrisztus” 92) and Stavrogin’s death, which is both an allusion to Judas’s 
suicide and “a travesty of the stations of the Cross” (Szilárd 36). Two other 
scenes, to which comparatively less attention has been devoted, might also 
belong to this group. The first is Marya Timofeevna’s rather comic and 
scandalous entry into the church. Bare-headed, with “an artificial rose” in her 
hair which is “used to decorate cherubs during the Holy Week” (161), she is a 
parodistic reminiscence of Christ’s entry into Jerusalem and Palm Sunday. The 
second is Stepan Trofimovich’s death, which can be read as a tragi(comi)c 
version of the events of the Holy Week (cf. Szilárd 7). Though it is possible to 
interpret the deathbed scene optimistically, as a resurrection
15
, Stepan 
Trofimovich’s fundamentally comic figure raises the reader’s doubts about any 
univocal reading. For example this is his third “death” – and “resurrection” – in 
the novel. The first of the previous occasions is related to his roles as a citizen 
and a man of science: when “someone published a notice that he was dead and 
promised his obituary”, he “was immediately resurrected and more dignified 
than before” (19). The second, no less comic occasion follows the fiasco in 
Petersburg when he goes abroad “for a rest” – and to “revive” (24). All in all, 
these ambivalent and grotesque parodies of hierophanic moments naturally do 
not discredit the sanctity of Biblical texts since, following Old Russian traditions 
(Лихачёв 452–3), they hold up to ridicule the situations depicted in the 
parodying text and not the parodied one. Nevertheless, they also stress that in the 
carnivalesque anti-world of the novel it is impossible to follow Christ’s example, 
and thus the moment of rebirth, so central both in Christianity and in the notion 
of carnival (Bakhtin, Rabelais 99), becomes emphatically bracketed in Devils. 
There are quite a number of apocalyptic elements in the novel, which are 
significant not only because they refer to a fundamental hierophany of 
Christianity, but also because they form a crucial element of carnivalesque 
imagery. Just like in the Bible, the metaphorical apocalypse taking place at the 
end of carnivals is inseparable from rebirth and revival (Bakhtin, Rabelais 90–
91). In Devils there are such “classical” elements of the Biblical Apocalypse as 
natural disasters (perpetual rain and fires), epidemics (cholera and cattle-plague), 
the onset of chaos (Мелетинский 13) and the fire after the fête as metaphors of 
the end of the world, (bloody) murders corresponding to rivers of blood (Rev 
16.4), the Antichrist, the dragon (Rev 12.1–9) and even the Woman Clothed 
with the Sun (Rev 12.1–6) on the level of metaphors. Several of them appear in a 
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 Cf. Tatyana Kasatkina’s analysis of Dostoevsky’s major novels in the context of Orthodox 
iconography. She claims that Stepan Trofimovich’s deathbed scene realises one of the most 
important icons of the Holy Week, “The Myrrhbearing Women at the Tomb of Christ” 
(Касаткина 68), which is an equivalent of “Resurrection”, traditionally not depicted in Orthodox 
iconography (Касаткина 92). Unfortunately, she totally neglects the comic elements of the 
novelistic scene, though. 
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carnivalised form, though, which is most obvious in the case of Yulia 
Mikhailovna’s fête turning into absolute chaos. The complete irrationality of the 
events taking place there is probably best summarised by the chronicler’s terse 
expression: he compares the night of the fête to “a hideous nightmare” (568). 
The masked figures of the “literary quadrille” (574) are carnivalesque enough 
even without “the publisher of the ‘formidable periodical published outside 
Petersburg’” suddenly starting to walk on his hands “to represent how [it] 
constantly turned good common sense on its head” (577). Von Lembke obviously 
goes mad in the course of the evening, he actually wants to have his own wife 
arrested, who faints in her turn: the events correspond to the ritualistic exposure 
and death of the Carnival King or Fool King at the end of carnivals (cf. Bakhtin, 
Rabelais 197; Problems 124–5). At that point the chronicler simply calls the fête 
an “inferno” (579). As Meletinsky points out, the carnivalesque description of 
the fête lacks all positive qualities, even its “hilarity” acquires a “demonic-
chaotic” tone (Мелетинский 128). The same holds true in respect of the whole 
conclusion of the novel. Such unmirthful demonic elements are, for instance, 
Stavrogin and Kirillov’s appearance as pretenders or the Antichrist (Przybylski, 
“Az Antikrisztus” 88). In the scene of Marya Ignatievna’s labour the ambivalent 
metaphor of the serpent evokes rather the dragon of the Revelation, while she 
herself corresponds to the Woman Clothed with the Sun. The hopelessness of 
apocalypse in Devils is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the “Woman 
Clothed with the Sun” – traditionally a symbolic representation of Russia’s role 
as a God-bearing nation for Dostoevsky (Hajnády 251) – dies together with her 
son, the embodiment of the new Word. Though the hell of carnivals, like mother 
earth, can turn into a horn of plenty any time (Bakhtin, Rabelais 90–91), it is not 
the case here: even the modest optimism of Stepan Trofimovich’s “resurrection” 
is overshadowed by the closing image of Devils, Stavrogin’s dead body. 
This interpretation of the setting of Devils as a (carnivalesque) underworld 
defines the plot of the novel as Stavrogin’s metaphorical descent to hell, which 
corresponds to a descent into his psychic space
16
. The metaphorical elements of 
his psychic journey turn this “compulsory” element of the quest cycle more 
specifically into descending by a “downward spiral” vertically and into 
wandering in a “labyrinth” horizontally. Thus realising the most pessimistic 
versions of the journey metaphor, Devils outlines a world of total metaphor 
which is nothing but the suicidal space of madness, Stavrogin’s “personal hell”. 
 
In conclusion, the carnivalesque underworld represented in Devils, which is 
also the projection of the chaos and madness in the characters’ psychic spaces, 
appears as the anti-thesis of the myth of the Golden Age appearing in 
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 About the metaphor of the journey, more specifically the metaphors of descent and ascent cf. 
(Frye, Myth and Metaphor 216–22). 
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Stavrogin’s confession as far as its imagery is concerned, and therefore remains 
within the same mythic paradigm. Just as well as in the confession, myth appears 
in the course of the whole novel as a sacred interpretative text, but the 
emphatically metaphorical potentials of language work against the closing of the 
interpretative process by establishing any “definitive” meaning – most 
fundamentally, a definitive reading of Stavrogin’s character and identity. In the 
more and more chaotic world of the novel it leads to tragic consequences: the 
apparently funny little carnivalesque devils, who can assume power in the world 
of the novel exactly because of the weakened status of sacred texts, bring along a 
death and apocalypse far too serious to be mirthful. The regenerating power of 
carnivalesque laughter is also brought to a minimum; it is limited to the “reduced 
laughter” implied by the chronicler’s ironic tone (Bakhtin, Problems 164–6). 
Ambivalence and polysemy create a world threatening with madness, in which 
the subject might easily get lost exactly because of the metaphorical nature of 
language: the language of epiphany and demonic epiphany (cf. Frye, Anatomy 
203–6, 223) can hardly be separated here from each other. In Stavrogin’s 
descent to hell the apparently upward spiral of his journey paradoxically turns 
out to be identical with the downward spiral all of a sudden, while the apparently 
defeated mythic monsters of the underworld are not only identical with the hero, 
but they also seem to grow a new head for each one they lose, like the Hydra of 




THE TRAGEDY OF NARCISSUS: DESIRE, 
IDENTITY AND NARRATIVE IN 
DOSTOEVSKY'S DEVILS1 
The phenomenon of endless mirroring, which is so characteristic of “Stavrogin’s 
Confession”, is not limited to that relatively short section of Dostoevsky’s 
Devils. Originally a central metaphor of the Narcissus myth, it comes to function 
in Stavrogin’s self-narrative as a structural equivalent of the character’s 
narcissism, and as such, it reappears in various forms throughout the entire 
novel
2
. On the one hand, it surfaces in two phenomena related to psychological 
narcissism: in the emphatic malfunctioning of the mother mirror in Stavrogin’s 
“case study”
3
 and in the extended network of doubles surrounding him. 
Analysed in the context of the mirror stage, both Stavrogin’s image reflected in 
the mother mirror and in the doubles’ (and lovers’) mythic narratives about his 
identity appear to be fundamentally rooted in the beholders’ desire. On the other 
hand, the metaphorical mirrors realised structurally in the multiple frames and 
“texts-within-the-text” (Лотман 112–7) of the “Confession” re-appear in the 
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 Originally a section of my doctoral thesis submitted in 2005 and entitled A szándék allegóriái – 
Az identitás mítoszai Dosztojevszkij örökében (Allegories of Intent – Myths of Identity in the 
Wake of Dostoevsky). First published as “The Tragedy of Narcissus: Desire, Identity and 
Narrative in Dostoevsky’s Devils,” Slavica XXXVI (2007), 137–54. Special thanks to Charles 
Somerville for his careful linguistic editing of the English version. The preliminary research for 
the thesis was carried out with the assistance of the Eötvös Scholarship supplemented by a grant 
from the Hungarian Ministry of Education (OM). 
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 On the poetics of “narcissistic text-symptoms”, including mirroring as a structural element, see 
(Смирнов, „О нарцистическом тексте – Диахрония и психоанализ” passim). 
3
 As Meredith Skura’s monograph on psychoanalytic literary criticism demonstrates, treating texts 
as “case studies” is one of the traditional and rather discredited psychoanalytic approaches to 
literature (29–33; cf. Brooks, Psychoanalysis and Storytelling 21) – in fact, it is a special type of 
character study. Nevertheless, in the discussion of narcissism in literary texts it has such 
prominent representatives as Jeffrey Berman and dominates landmark volumes, for example the 
collection of articles edited by Lynne Layton and Barbara Ann Shapiro. As opposed to the 
Lacanian treatment of narcissism, this approach is informed predominantly by Heinz Kohut’s 
views on clinical narcissism. The present study, bearing in mind the conspicuous contradictions 
between Lacanian and Kohutian views, still incorporates some notions of the latter in its scope. 
The most obvious reason for this is the fact that the Kohutian analysis of narcissistic personality 
disorders, more specifically his description of transference types as models for the narcissistic 
types’ interpersonal relationships and his discussion of the disorder’s developmental causes can 
shed new light on the desire that structures narrative(s) in Dostoevsky’s text. It is in this context 
that references to Stavrogin’s “case study” are always given hypothetically, in quotation marks. 
Nothing could be further from the aims of the present paper than the reduction of Dostoevskian 
characters – or dilemmas, for that matter – into clinical cases.  
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mottoes and abundant allusions of the novel. While the former establish a set of 
metaphors which problematise the very nature of language and thus the 
definition of identity through narrative (cf. P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 33), 
the latter function as a means of “writing” and “reading” Stavrogin’s enigmatic 
identity for the characters of the novel – including the narrator. This intricate 
interrelationship of desire, mirror-image, language and narrative identity creates 
a textual world shaped along the patterns of the Narcissus myth, in which 
reaching authentic selfhood tragically, paradoxically and unavoidably equals the 
elimination of the self in death, the moment which alone can put an end to the 
endless chain of signification. 
The Mirrors of Narcissus 
According to Bakhtin, characters of Stavrogin’s type contemplate the reflection 
of their own psyche “in the mirror of the other’s consciousness” (Бахтин, 
„Дополнения и изменения к Достоевскому” 307). “Stavrogin’s Confession” 
quite neatly supports this claim. On the one hand, throughout the written 
confession he tortures himself with the observation of his textualised and 
therefore objectified and alienated self – to apply the terms of the mirror stage, 
his imago or ego ideal. On the other hand, in the frame situation of his visit to 
Tikhon he both presumes to recognise the Symbolic Father, an embodiment of 
Law and Language (cf. Lacan, The Language of the Self 23, cf. Wilden 172, 
Sarup 16; Füzesséry 56–57; Boothby 129–37) in his confessor and strives to 
project this image on him.  
This crucial moment of establishing one’s identity through entering the 
Imaginary via identification with a mirror image and later with the Symbolic 
Father is conspicuously repeated throughout Devils, though with an inverted 
scenario. It is Stavrogin, who becomes a mirror-image, the object of the others’ 
desire and the sign of their Ideal-I, with whom they desperately try to identify 
themselves. It is especially true with respect to his doubles, but since the 
mechanism of Symbolic identification follows the pattern of the primary 
narcissism related to the mirror stage (cf. Füzesséry 56–7; Žižek, The Sublime 
Object of Ideology 105), the phenomena of the mother mirror and Stavrogin’s 
“love affairs” also fit into this paradigm: Varvara Petrovna obviously 
contemplates herself in her son, just like Liza and Marya Timofeevna, who 
create stories about Stavrogin in which they can play a role that satisfies their 
desire. A crucial moment of this mechanism is the point at which they substitute 
the “real” – and unknowable – Stavrogin with a text born from their own desire, 
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so that they can cast the role of the Symbolic Father, the Other, on him and 
define their own identity with the help of his “mirror”
4
.  
In the case of the doubles this procedure leads to ironic contrasts: the mythic 
narratives functioning as the image of Kirillov’s, Shatov’s or Lebyadkin’s Ideal-
I obviously correspond to the signs of Stavrogin’s own earlier ideals, which he 
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 It is at this point that my interpretation of the mechanism of desire in the novel differs from 
earlier readings. Most treatments of the topic use personality models based on identification, 
without any mention of narcissism. Thus, René Girard’s groundbreaking study in the field 
(Deceit, Desire and the Novel) reads Devils as a textbook case of mediated desire, which he 
treats as the novelistic desire per se. Girard assumes that novelistic desire is triangular in nature; 
that is, between subject and object there is always a third element interpolated: a “mediator”, 
who can either be external – existing beyond the novelistic world – or internal, simply a 
novelistic character other than the subject. In his view, the latter is clearly the case in Devils. For 
Girard the mediator is basically a model, an example to be imitated – not far from being an idol. 
The subject can feel desire only for objects the mediator is longing for (or at least the subject 
thinks so), though this relationship never reaches its consciousness. Therefore, the subject views 
its own desire as a key to its originality, while, ironically, the one thing it secures is the 
establishment of a Doppelgänger relationship between subject and internal mediator. 
Consequently, the subject’s attitude to the mediator is highly ambivalent: the mediator is both an 
adored idol, a model for identification, and a hated rival (1–15). Needless to say, for Girard 
Stavrogin is such an internal mediator in the fictional world of Devils, whom all the other 
characters try to imitate especially in his originality, which actually precludes imitation (59–64). 
They desire what he desires, or what they think he desires. Girard emphasises that mediated 
desire leads to the hardly imaginable overvaluation of the desired object exactly because it is the 
object of the model’s, the idol’s desire – the subject’s view of it has in many cases nothing to do 
with its “real” qualities. 
 Among others, Jostein Boertnes has heavily criticised Girard’s reading of Devils along the lines 
above. From the perspective of the present study his most important counterargument is that 
Stavrogin is not a model for all the other characters in Devils. To substantiate his point, he 
analyses Varvara Petrovna and Stepan Trofivitch’s relationship, which is clearly analogous to 
the relationship between mother and son. He points out that the model in Varvara Petrovna’s 
case is not Stavrogin, but (the portrait of) Kukolnik – the woman’s (imaginary) childhood love 
object. Accordingly, Boertnes sees both him and Stepan Trofimovitch rather as mysterious 
objects of desire – objects that gain value through their actual or potential similarity to a real or 
imaginary model. By analogy, the other characters also see “the incarnation of [their] mental 
prototype” in Stavrogin. Though these prototypes are different, they are “in actual fact variants, 
positive and negative, of a single prototype” (54–63). 
 Though Léna Szilárd’s study is not focused on the dynamics of desire, the conclusions of her 
Jungian analytical approach are highly relevant to the issue. The more so, because her starting 
point – similarly to Boertnes’s argument – is also Varvara Petrovna and Stepan Trofimovitch’s 
relationship and her insights seem to support his views. Tracing down the mechanisms of 
idolisation in the novel, she comes to the conclusion that Stavrogin can be “the psychological 
centre of his environment”, “an object, on which the others’ unconscious attempts at 
compensation can be projected”, because he can cover with various masks the “emptiness” 
resulting from the “lack of selfhood”, “the missing centre of personality” (25–33). Meanwhile, 
she also asserts that Stavrogin’s scandals, role changes, and – last but not least – his suicide are 
“the outbursts of selfhood (самость)” (32). Cf. Girard’s comment on originality, quoted above, 
and Michael André Bernstein’s claim about the lack of originality characterising and plaguing 
the abject hero (105–8). 
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has alienated and shed as a snake sheds its skin
5
. In this sense Stavrogin’s 
doubles really are his “emanations” (Бердяев 519–20). By the time of the story, 
however, in the course of a multiple mirroring procedure the doubles have 
become both the frozen mirror-images of Stavrogin’s previous roles and 
beholders contemplating their own images in the mirror represented by 
Stavrogin. In comparison, Pyotr Verkhovensky’s case is much simpler: his text 
is undoubtedly created only by his own desire and the object of his desire is 
literally Stavrogin’s desire. Therefore his “idolisation” is much more reminiscent 
of Stavrogin’s entangled love relationships
6
 and endows Nikolai Vsevolodovich 
with Narcissus’ explicitly bisexual attraction (cf. Holmes 24). The whole stuffy 
atmosphere of Devils, permeated with eroticism, aggression, hidden desires and 
their scandalous outbreaks, also evokes the myth of Narcissus. Owing to the 
intricate procedures of mirroring, the “empty centre” or “void” represented by 
Stavrogin, which is traditionally subject to moral condemnation as a demonic 
phenomenon
7
, can also be interpreted as a tragic case of extreme self-reflexivity 
– the tragedy of Narcissus. 
Stavrogin’s “case study” involves a malfunctioning mother mirror and a 
dysfunctional surrogate father as the keys to the emergence of his narcissism, 
and thus parallels the actual clinical cases that Heinz Kohut describes as the 
outcome of a combined Oedipal
8
, and a much more important pre-Oedipal 
trauma (cf. Kohut 53). The latter is related to the mother mirror, which Iván 
                                                     
5
 Cf. Mikhail Bakhtin’s interpretation, according to which Stavrogin’s narrative identities 
physically embodied in Kirillov and Shatov are actually the products of his own desire:  
All of them [Shatov, Kirillov and Pyotr Verkhovensky] think that he spoke with 
them as a mentor speaks with a pupil; in actual fact he had made them participants in his 
own inescapable internal dialogue, in which he was trying to convince himself, not them. 
Now Stavrogin hears from each of them his own words, but with a firm and monologised 
accent. He himself can now repeat these words only with an accent of mockery, not 
conviction. He had not succeeded in convincing himself of anything, and it is painful for 
him to listen to people whom he has convinced. On this base Stavrogin’s dialogues are 
constructed with each of his three followers. (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 260)  
 Nevertheless, as Szilárd’s reading of Devils clearly indicates, this interpretation cannot be 
accepted without reservations in Pyotr Verkhovensky’s case (cf. 27–33).  
6
 Sergei Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdyaev seem to share the opinion that „all the [characters] of the 
novel, both men and women, are more or less in love” with Stavrogin (Булгаков 493; cf. Бердяев 
520). 
7
 The theologically based interpretation of Stavrogin as a demonic embodiment of non-being and 
emptiness is a crucial point of Dostoevsky’s critical assessment. Several authors have argued for 
it in a more or less sophisticated and direct manner since the turn of the century (cf. Бердяев 
521; Булгаков 492, 498; Долинин 549) and very often it can also be discovered as a pivotal 
point of contemporary readings (cf. Мелетинский 15–26; Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 110–17; 
Szilárd passim). 
8
 Cf. the Oedipal reading of Devils in (Смирнов, Психодиахронологика 120–30). 
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Ignusz describes in the following terms: its essence is that “the mother contains 
the emotions projected by the baby like a vessel and thus the process of thinking 
is started ‘about a thought without a thinker’”. It results in internalisation which 
leads to the emergence of “psychic contents” related to narcissism, “the self” or 
the “personal I”. The notion of the “self” comes into being from a meaning of 
the “I”, the sense that “we are personally ourselves and not someone else” (cf. 
Kohut 124). The malfunction of the mother mirror takes place when the mother, 
because of her “depressive personality, cannot reflect the feelings of her baby” 
and “no emotions appear on her face at all” or “she can express only her own 
emotions” (Ignusz 81–2; cf. Kohut 117–8). Kohut argues that the prime cause of 
narcissistic disorders is the parents’ – most importantly the mother’s – wounded 
narcissism, which can result in the behaviour patterns described above. He also 
adds that the effect of such traumatic experiences can be alleviated if the child 
can find shelter in the other parent – the father. A crucial condition of that 
beneficial influence is the possibility to idealise the father, which prevents 
repeated frustration and disappointment in the omnipotent object of the child’s 
love. If the resolution of the Oedipal conflict is unsatisfactory, if the idealisation 
of the father and identification with him become impossible, however, the child 
is left without any support to strengthen his own self – an Oedipal trauma is 
written over the hidden text of disappointment in the most archaic of objects, the 
mother (cf. 53–65). 
In Devils both kinds of malfunction are clearly detectable in the parental 
figures of Varvara Petrovna and Stepan Trofimovich. While the former is 
characterised by the lack of empathy that is the sure sign of a dysfunctional 
mother mirror, the surrogate father, who due to a reversal of power positions and 
gender roles
9
 behaves in an effeminate manner
10
, could not be further from an 
idealised object. In fact, with respect to Stepan Trofimovich, it is the child who 
is forced to show empathy and behave like a mirror of the other’s emotions. As 
to the mother-child interaction, the chronicler gives a description of the 
appallingly cold relationship between Stavrogin and Varvara Petrovna in his 
childhood: “The boy knew that his mother loved him very much, but he hardly 
loved her at all. She spoke to him very little and rarely interfered with him in any 
way, but somehow he was always morbidly aware of her intense gaze fixed on 
                                                     
 
9
 Cf. “Dostoevsky has X-rayed sexual, moral, and religious abjection, displaying it as collapse of 
paternal laws. Is not the world of The Possessed a world of fathers, who are either repudiated, 
bogus, or dead, where matriarchs lusting for power hold sway?” (Kristeva, Powers of Horror 20) 
10
 Stepan Trofimovich’s femininity is demonstrated most eloquently by his own hardly 
translatable blunder on the occasion of Varvara Petrovna’s proposal for him to marry Dasha: 
“я... я никогда не мог вообразить, что вы решитесь выдать меня... за другую... 
женщину!” (Достоевский, Бесы 48, emphasis added). To top it off, he simply faints from the 




. The mother’s gaze is like a blank mirror; it does not reflect or 
transmit emotions, which is clearly shown by the emphatic lack of 
communication between her and the child. Instead, her painfully scrutinising 
look is singularly directed at Stavrogin, who, in his turn, reacts with a slightly 
paranoid psychic condition verging on illness.  
In contrast, when “his mother entrusted his entire education and moral 
development to Stepan Trofimovich” (40), she gave an opportunity to 
Stavrogin’s tutor to pour all his emotions over the child, even in the dead of the 
night: “They’d throw themselves into each other’s arms and weep” over the 
man’s “wounded feelings” (40). This implies that the normal mirroring 
procedure is inverted and it is the child who reflects the adult’s emotions. 
Through this rather sickly internalisation of a grown man’s feelings – the 
chronicler actually assumes that “the tutor upset the pupil’s nerves to some 
extent” (40) – the youth prematurely experiences a strange form of desire:  
Stepan Trofimovich had succeeded in touching his young friend’s 
deepest heartstrings and evoking in him an initial intimation, as yet 
undefined, of that eternal, sacred yearning [„тоска” (Достоевский, 
Бесы 27)] which some chosen souls, once they’ve tasted and known it, 
never ever exchange for any cheap pleasure. (There are some devotees 
who value the yearning even more than the most radical satisfaction of 
it, if such a thing were to be believed). (40–41)  
Since this “yearning”, similarly to Narcissus’ desire for his own reflected self, is 
insatiable, it is also a source of perverse satisfaction. These phenomena imply 
that in Stavrogin’s case Varvara Petrovna and Stepan Trofimovich as parental 
figures exclude the possibility of the emergence of healthy narcissism, although 
it would be essential for the establishment of “good self-esteem” (Holmes 9–10; 
cf. Kohut 18–22).  
The malfunctioning mother mirror and father figure call for an interpretation 
of Stavrogin’s “case study” in terms of clinical narcissism. Most conspicuously, 
Stavrogin’s adult behaviour parallels the elements of two types of narcissism, 
which can be traced back to the combined traumatic experiences outlined above. 
In Jeremy Holmes’s interpretation the mythical Narcissus is a representation of a 
clinical form of narcissism: he is the “oblivious narcissist” who “appear[s] to 
have little understanding of others’ feelings and ride[s] roughshod with [his] 
arrogant and self-serving ruthlessness. [He is] grandiose and exhibitionistic” 
(23–4). Holmes traces the origins of this behaviour, which might “involve […] 
the absorption of some of the functions of the necessary Other into the self” (51), 
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 The English quotations from Dostoevsky’s novel are based on (Dostoevsky, Devils) and are 
indicated only by page numbers in parenthetical notes. 
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back to the “blank and unresponsive” mother mirror (48–9). The grown-up 
Stavrogin appears to be a classic example of this type: he experiments freely with 
other people’s feelings, he is incapable of emotional commitment, though he is an 
object of intense desire – for both men and women. The mentor’s role, which he 
undertakes in his relationship with Shatov and Kirillov, can be interpreted as the 
absorption of the function of the Other, even if he only tried to convince himself 
when verbalising his most contradictory teachings. The “unresponsive” mother 
mirror, the core of the problem, can be easily discovered in Varvara Petrovna’s 
face. 
Nevertheless, as Holmes also points out, there are no strict division lines 
between the “oblivious” narcissist and its inverse, the “hypervigilant” type, 
which is embodied in the myth by Echo. Her narcissism gains expression in her 
extreme “sensitivity to rejection or criticism”, her shyness and clinginess (19–
20), which implies that in her case the mother mirror reflected not the child’s, 
but the mother’s feelings. As opposed to Narcissus’s, Echo’s behaviour is 
centred around the “projection” of the Other’s role on the object of her clinging 
and caring (48–51)
 12
. In many respects Stavrogin, for whom Stepan Trofimovich 
acts out the role of a self-centred “mother figure” instead of a masculine father, 
also reveals the characteristic features of this hypervigilant type. As his 
“Confession” shows, at the core of his voyeurism there is a fundamental insecurity 
and a painful dependence on the gaze of the other (Other), while his exhibitionism 
is coupled with a horror of becoming a laughingstock. His self-assurance is 
disclosed as a mask (Szilárd 31) whose primary function is self-defence
13
.  
The roles established for Stavrogin through the parental models are twofold: 
he is to fulfil others’ narcissistic desires either by realising their dreams or by 
being their audience. Just like Stepan Trofimovich, who was also Varvara 
Petrovna’s “daydream” (13) earlier, he is to become everything she could not 
become: on his return from school “her son had now appeared before her almost in 
the guise of some new hope, or even in the aspect of some new dream. […] many 
times she’d stare at her Nicolas unnoticed, pondering, trying to comprehend 
something” (45). In the Russian text the descriptions of the early mother-child 
relationship, of Varvara Petrovna’s feelings for Stepan Trofimovich and of her 
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 Holmes’s typology is a relatively simple one, but it has the advantage of clearly paralleling the 
two major behavioural patterns Kohut has identified in clinical cases of narcissistic 
transference: the behaviour of the “oblivious” narcissist is characterised by the activation of the 
grandiose self (i. e. forms of mirror transference, Kohut 105–42), whereas the “hypervigilant” 
narcissist by the activation of the omnipotent object (i. e. casting the role of the Other on the 
analyst, idealisation, Kohut 37–73). 
13
 The mask-like quality of Stavrogin’s face, which is a recurrent argument for his demonic nature 
in Dostoevsky criticism, is far from being unambiguous. When Stavrogin, after four years of 
absence, returns to his hometown, the chronicler emphasises that his face can “no longer be 
said to resemble a mask”, perhaps because there is “some new idea gleaming in his eyes” (192). 
A little later, however, the famous “wax figure” (242) simile occurs. 
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new hopes related to Stavrogin are connected by exact textual repetitions: 
“мечта” (Достоевский, Бесы 12, 30) appears for both “daydream” and 
“dream”, whereas “пристально” (Достоевский, Бесы 27, 30) is the adjective 
characterising her gaze or stare in both cases. It implies that for Varvara 
Petrovna the same emotion – realising her desires through the agency of others – 
is at stake all three times. And probably it is because of the “narcissistic wound” 
(cf. Holmes 19) caused by her son’s failure in this respect that she declares even 
before his death that “she has no son” (743). Stepan Trofimovich’s “yearning”, 
just like his constant need to pour out his emotions and test their effect on others, 
is probably only a part of his generally rather narcissistic character, which (also) 
gains material expression in his playing the peacock in front of the mirror. In his 
one-man-show he needs an empathic (or empathic-looking) audience, a looking-
glass – and this is what Stavrogin learns to play. As the two roles outlined here 
are the ones which Stepan Trofimovich and Varvara Petrovna play for each 
other, the grown-up Stavrogin’s behaviour also shows traces of the compulsion 
to repeat the patterns they have established. It is not by chance that Varvara 
Petrovna – though at that point absolutely mistakenly, projecting her own 
feelings on him (Szilárd 29) – “recognises herself in Nicolas” (202) during the 
scandal on his return. The feature that they really share, though, is their 
narcissistic horror of laughter, since “There was nothing Varvara Petrovna 
feared as much as humour” (10). This might throw a new light on Tikhon’s 
claim that “there is strong inner, spiritual likeness” (454) between mother and 
son: Stavrogin’s mask-like face is exactly such a blank mirror as his mother’s, 
while his eyes only keep searching for his own image in the gaze of the other, 
like Stepan Trofimovich’s. 
It is not surprising, that Stavrogin’s manifestly narcissistic adult emotional 
relationships evolve along similar patterns. While he himself seems absolutely 
self-centred and self-sufficient on the surface, the narratives formulated by the 
women in love with him are variations on the theme of desire, more exactly the 
desire to become the object of his desire: they are fundamentally wish-fulfilment 
fantasies shaped by the women’s own narcissism. Marya Timofeevna’s constant 
daydreaming is certainly an expression of her narcissism
14
. Her often-mentioned 
little mirror and heavy make-up, which, what for her being a holy fool, really 
make her clown-like (Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 111), are all the most palpable 
signs of her femininity – and narcissism. She wants the prince of her dreams and 
thus the epiphanic scene in the chapter “Night” is also the staging of a major 
blow to her narcissism. Similarly to the Narcissus myth, whose plot revolves 
around eyes – an organ of erotic desire – and seeing the object of desire (cf. 
Kristeva, “Nárcisz: az újfajta téboly” 51–2), her meeting with Stavrogin is also 
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 “Marya Lebyadkina, who constantly remembers the moments she spent – or imagines to have spent 
– with ‘Prince Harry’, is the greatest example of narcissistic behaviour in Devils” (Fehér 449). 
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about eyes and looks: about Stavrogin’s “penetrating gaze”, which “perhaps 
expressed aversion” (288), and Marya Timofeevna’s “lowered eyes” and “swift, 
comprehensive glances” (289). She either does not dare to face the mirror image 
Stavrogin shows her and therefore forbids the other to look at her, or expressedly 
orders him to do so (289, 291). Even the antonym of her central metaphor for 
Stavrogin, the “falcon gazing at the sun”, must be a “blind owl” (293) – blind, 
because it cannot or does not desire to see Marya Timofeevna, or it does not see 
her the way Marya Timofeevna wants it to. Because Stavrogin feels only shame 
when the cripple almost falls flat on the floor. And because, although he makes a 
solemn promise to fulfil her desire and become her ideal listener (“every evening 
you can tell me stories as you did in Petersburg in those places you lived. I’ll 
read books to you, if you like” [292]), he cannot and does not want to fulfil her 
greatest desire: he cannot desire her. The severity of the narcissistic wound is 
implied by the fact that Marya Timofeevna identifies her fall in the drawing-
room and her noticing Stavrogin’s shame as the moment of revelation (294), 
when she recognised Stavrogin’s “real” character. The wound is only rubbed in 
when Stavrogin actually offers to hide her in Switzerland. 
It seems rather more astonishing that Stavrogin is also unable to commit 
himself to the charming Liza, just like Narcissus, who cannot be seduced even 
by his most beautiful admirers (Ovid III 357–8) – though at a closer look the 
scenario is just the same. She also casts the role of “Prince Charming” on 
Stavrogin, partly in the fatal wish-fulfilment fantasy of her “romance”, partly in 
its adaptation to contemporary high society circumstances: if Stavrogin cannot 
take her to visits in Moscow, if she cannot be a real high-society dame beside 
him, she does not need him at all. She had known all this, however, well before 
the fatal night, so it is highly probable that it is rather Stavrogin who finds the 
real reason for her desperate state in their final scene: “’Last night she guessed 
somehow that I don’t love her at all… it’s something she knew all along, of 
course’” (598). Liza’s disappointment is also rooted in her inability to become 
the object of Stavrogin’s desire – by the end of the novel, as she has 
foreshadowed in her hysterical scene in the drawing-room (208), she comes to 
share Marya Timofeevna’s fate, which is clearly implied in her metaphorical and 
literal “fall” (604).  
Darya Pavlovna is in manifest contrast with both other women, but only 
because her dream – a story of self-abnegation and self-sacrifice – is the only 
one which proposes for Stavrogin his only “authentic” role, the role of 
Narcissus. She almost becomes an apotheosis of silence in the novel, about 
whom Stavrogin claims that “he could never work out what she wanted” (309). 
Nevertheless, she still repeats one single desire of hers in their conversations: 
when all ends, Stavrogin should call her, and call her as soon as possible (308). 
Meanwhile, Stavrogin tramples on her self-esteem with the greatest ease, just 
like on her brother’s, or like Narcissus on Echo’s (cf. Ovid III 370–406), whose 
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role Darya Pavlovna is most likely to play (cf. Ovid III 494–508). As a modern 
version of the nymph echoing Narcissus’s words, she also functions as a mirror 
for Stavrogin, since “only in her presence could he speak about himself out 
loud” (753). Therefore Stavrogin, just like the mythic Narcissus, can call only 
her before his death, since the two other women’s narcissism clashes with his 
own “oblivious” narcissism. 





 – about him are also shaped, though indirectly, by their own 
narcissism and desire. Kirillov’s, Shatov’s, Lebyadkin’s and (with some 
reservations) Pyotr Verkhovensky’s cases may be interpreted as representations 
of the identification with the mirror image which takes place in the mirror stage. 
For them Stavrogin may be claimed to embody the Ideal-I they want to identify 
with, the person whose (earlier) narratives might be their means of self-
definition and entry into Language – ultimately, their means to establish 
themselves as subjects. However, similarly to the imago in the mirror, which is 
actually only the alienated reflection of the child, Stavrogin’s various narratives 
are also shaped in accordance with each double’s narcissistic desires.  
The term “negative narcissism”, which implies “a constant state of self-
dissatisfaction” and “self-hatred”, therefore the individual’s permanent 
preoccupation with himself or herself (Holmes 13), can be appropriately applied 
to Kirillov’s, Shatov’s and Lebyadkin’s behaviour. Kirillov’s 
political/philosophical suicide and Shatov’s self-destruction, realised through 
self-humiliation and self-sacrifice, fall quite neatly into this pattern of self-
hatred, actually the abjection of the self (cf. Kristeva, Powers of Horror 19–20). 
As Przybylski points out, “the fact that Kirillov takes on himself the sin of the 
organisation is rather of secondary importance. It only testifies to his exceptional 
self-hatred. What is more, Kirillov unconsciously also desires self-humiliation to 
a certain extent, because he considers mere existence an obscenity and absurd” 
(Przybylski, “Az Antikrisztus halála” 89). Shatov practically confesses his love 
for Stavrogin, as if he wanted to provoke the humiliating answer: “’I can’t tear 
you out of my heart, Nikolai Stavrogin!’ ‘I’m sorry that I’m unable to love you, 
Shatov,’ Nikolai Vsevolodovich said coldly” (269). As far as Shatov’s 
generosity to his unfaithful wife is concerned, the chronicler must remark that 
„[h]e was chaste and incredibly bashful; he considered himself a terrible 
monster; he hated his own face and character; he compared himself to a freak” 
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 Though the term “double” is another recurrent notion in Dostoevsky criticism, its use is far from 
being unanimous; moreover, it sometimes appears to be fairly confusing. Cf. (Bakhtin, 
Problems 127–8; Булгаков 501–4; Przybylski, “Sztavrogin” 106–10; V. Tóth 29; 50). Szilárd 
uses the related Jungian term of the “shadow” pertaining to Pyotr Verkhovensky (36) 
16
 The close (metaphorical) relationship between the mirror image and the double has been 
established in several contexts, e.g. in psychoanalysis (Wilden 162), ethnology (Beke 92) and 
cultural semiotics (Лотман 112–17). 
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(640). Taking this into consideration, it is not surprising at all that Shatov 
embraces so voluntarily Stavrogin’s Messianistic-Slavophile teachings with their 
underlying mythic narrative of Christian self-sacrifice. For Lebyadkin, the 
“poet”, Stavrogin could be the ideal audience in Petersburg who did not ruin his 
image of himself, because this image, similarly to Stavrogin’s character, also 
includes a desire for being laughed at: “He had immeasurable respect and 
admiration for his own poems, but also, because of a certain roguish duplicity in 
his nature, he also liked the idea that Nikolai Vsevolodovich was always amused 
by his verses and would laugh at them, sometimes splitting his sides” (280). In 
other words, he naturally accepts the Falstaffian role Stavrogin appoints for him. 
In general, these characters appropriate Stavrogin’s earlier narratives of identity 
and accept the roles defined in them because the stories reflect their own desires 
– they are actually created by these desires to a great extent. 
In contrast, Pyotr Verkhovensky consciously wants to create Stavrogin’s 
narrative – and identity – to make him play a role that Verkhovensky himself is 
unable to fulfil (Szilárd 35). It is his narrative which is most explicitly 
formulated by desire: while he is practically in love with the “idol” he has 
created, he wishes to make Stavrogin’s desire – literally – the object of his own 
desire. It is not only in the chapter “Ivan the Tsarevich” that he promises to fulfil 
Stavrogin’s most secret (and rather unknowable) desires (“Listen, tomorrow I’ll 
bring you Lizaveta Nikolaevna. Do you want her? No? Why don’t you answer? 
Tell me what you want and I’ll do it. Listen, I’ll give you Shatov if you like” 
[441]), but also on the fatal day following the festivities: “You’re a free widower 
and could marry her tomorrow, couldn’t you? She still doesn’t know – allow me, 
I’ll arrange everything for you” (597). As if Verkhovensky did not see that he is 
attempting the impossible: by that time Stavrogin’s desires are directed 
exclusively on himself. 
Since Stavrogin’s earlier narratives, which the pupils/doubles have 
appropriated, are also created by their own desires, by voicing them they tell 
their “authentic” stories, even if indirectly. Kirillov, Shatov, Lebyadkin and 
Pyotr Verkhovensky equally “dance around naked” (267) before Stavrogin, as 
Shatov does not fail to notice, since by reciting his teachings or telling their self-
created utopian dreams they reveal their most secret desires to him. However, 
Stavrogin does not or does not wholly acknowledge his earlier narratives as his 
own, and as for the role Verkhovensky offers to him, he refuses it twice. As his 
letter to Darya Pavlovna shows, he is “disgusted” by them (754), that is, in the 
process of his search for self-definition, he has cast out and alienated his earlier 
desires, which now fall under negation and are conceived as abject (cf. Kristeva, 
Powers 1–8). His doubles, like Narcissus, recognise themselves in the mirror 
images presented by Stavrogin, whereas he himself is unable to identify with his 
alienated images embodied in his doubles – and find himself. 
76 
In sum, the analysis of the phenomenon of the mother mirror, the lovers’ 
wish-fulfilment fantasies and the doubles’ narratives leads to the conclusion that 
most characters in Devils wish to interpret Stavrogin as the object of their desire 
and this results in the myths surrounding him. The formation of the individual 
variants, however, is crucially influenced by the characters’ own narcissism. For 
them Stavrogin, who appears in the “Confession” as Narcissus enchanted and 
enamoured with himself, functions rather as a silent and passive mirror. 
Textual Mirrors – Writing and Reading Stavrogin 
Since the characters of the novel primarily want – and suppose – to define their 
own identity through Stavrogin, they are almost obsessed with “reading” the 
cryptic text of Stavrogin’s identity, or actually with “writing” the text that would 
narrate it. Apart from the mythic stories most of them create, the former 
tendency also surfaces in the abundance of literary reminiscences related to 
Stavrogin. Allusiveness – one form of the “text-within-the-text” in Devils – 
evokes a work of art, maybe an entire genre as a frame of reference for 
interpreting him. The latter tendency is realised in “epidemic” graphomania, 
which results in the inclusion of texts written by a significant number of 
characters in the novel, that is, in the conspicuous presence of another form of 
the “text-within-the-text” in Devils. These narratives show how the attempt to 
draw Stavrogin’s portrait grows into an attempt to differentiate the nameless 
small town where most of the action takes place from the hundreds of similar 
settlements in Russia, and ultimately into an attempt to give an image of Russia 
herself – to define Russian national identity. Owing to the effects of the endless 
reflection produced by the numerous textual mirrors
17
 in Devils such an effort is 
inevitably doomed to failure. The novel, however, also demonstrates that the 
awareness of this futility is not an excuse for making no attempt at all: without the 
self-reflection embodied in the Narcissus myth consciousness itself cannot exist. 
The deciphering of Stavrogin’s identity is represented through the metaphors 
of reading and writing, which are associated with Shatov, Pyotr Verkhovensky 
and Varvara Petrovna. As for Shatov, in the chapter “Night” he metaphorically 
reads Stavrogin’s earlier teachings, that is, his narrative identity. “Allow me to 
repeat your own fundamental idea at that time… Oh, only ten more lines 
[“строка” (Достоевский, Бесы 156)] or so, only the conclusion” (263), he begs 
him before starting his summary. The words “line” and “conclusion” definitely 
refer to a narrative, moreover, a written narrative. More significantly, in Pyotr 
Verkhovensky’s case writing, more exactly the writing of fictitious narratives is 
the fundamental metaphor of speech itself, as Stavrogin’s words reveal:  
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 For a theoretical overview of the relationship between textual mirrors – the mise an abyme – 
intertextuality and the double see (Szekeres passim). 
77 
I guess what kind of tale he [Pyotr Stepanovich] composed for you 
here. Compose he does [“строчит” (Достоевский, Бесы 123)], when 
he tells a story; he keeps an entire record office in his head. Observe 
that as a realist he’s incapable of telling lies; truth is more important to 
him than the success of his tale… except, of course, for those particular 
circumstances when success is more important than truth. (206)  
The Russian word Stavrogin uses for his friend’s verbal activity is both 
etymologically related to Shatov’s “lines”, and has a similar, but rather 
pejorative meaning as the English “compose” – something like “scratch”.  
The implications of this trope are far-reaching: Pyotr Verkhovensky’s 
“artistic” creativity is a recurrent motif in the novel. Fedor the convict is the first 
to remark about the younger Verkhovensky that he “has an easy time of it 
because first he gets his own picture [“представит” (Достоевский, Бесы 162)] 
of a man and then that’s what he always sees” (274). This sentence, however, is 
later (intentionally?) misquoted by the chronicler, who uses the verb “сочинит” 
(Достоевский, Бесы 223), meaning “compose, write” instead of Fedka’s 
original, loosely standing for “represent, imagine”
18
. This is particularly 
interesting, because Fedka’s words are in quotation marks, so they are meant to 
be a literal quote. The use of this synonym results in a slight semantic shift in the 
direction of creation and writing (literary texts), since “сочинить” can equally 
mean “invent” or “compose a text or music”, though it is also used to mean 
“fib”, which relates it to the pejorative register associated with “строчить”. 
Therefore, it represents Pyotr Verkhovensky as an author, not so much picturing 
or visualising, but actually creating people. The same semantic field is activated 
by the word “выдумал” (Достоевский, Бесы 260), i.e. “make up, invent”, 
which Pyotr Verkhovensky himself uses in relation to Stavrogin: “I invented you 
when I was abroad; looking at you, I invented it all. If I hadn’t watched you 
from my corner, none of it would ever have come into my head!” (448). The 
verb “сочинить” also occurs in Verkhovensky’s own words, at a rather 
significant moment: before entering the meeting of “our group” he asks 
Stavrogin to “compose his countenance” (“Сочините-ка вашу физиономию” 
[239]
19
), and in explanation he adds that he always does so himself. This phrase 
clearly evokes Varvara Petrovna’s creative activity, who is, as Szilárd points out, 
Stepan Trofimovich’s metaphorical puppet-master, and “composed (’сочинила’) 
his suit and the interior of his room” (29). The implication is that in the world of 
Devils human faces, teachings, and ultimately identities are rather fictitious 
texts, which can be and on occasion definitely should be written – and read. 
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 In the English translation the two sentences (274, 383) are literally the same. 
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 The English text here includes the expression “compose yourself” (409), but the literal translation 
is much more suggestive, I think. 
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The writing and reading procedure, however, relies rather heavily on ready-
made texts, which is best exemplified in Stavrogin’s case. Other characters in 
Devils read his identity through numerous allusions
20
, which evoke not only 
particular literary texts, but in some cases also entire generic traditions. Varvara 
Petrovna and Stepan Trofimovich formulate readings, which, due to their rather 
specific relationship, cannot really be differentiated from each other. They evoke 
both Prince Harry (Shakespeare, Henry IV) and Hamlet as reference points
21
, 
just as well as the genre of the medieval romance, since on the basis of Pyotr 
Verkhovensky’s tale of Stavrogin’s relationship with Marya Timofeevna his 
mother characterises him as “an eccentric”, who is “always lofty in his 
sentiments, noble and chivalrous” (206). Stavrogin, in his turn, must also have 
read the story of his life in Petersburg in the context of Henry V, since – 
according to Verkhovensky – he used to refer to Lebyadkin “as his Falstaff” 
(196). Liputin mentions Stavrogin as one of “these lady-killers à la Pechorin” 
(108), and thereby places his character in the context of Lermontov’s A Hero of 
Our Time. The adjective “сердцеед” (Достоевский, Бесы 66), which literally 
means “heart-eater”, however, implies a rather vulgar reading of the demonic 
romantic hero, which focuses on his erotic, and probably also Gothic aspects
22
. 
Liza’s desperate attempts to conceptualise Stavrogin include references to 
different genres, such as the (medieval) romance, the Gothic and operatic 
melodrama, while Marya Timofeevna’s imagination is equally suffused with 
mythic and folklore-like plots. Her narratives of Stavrogin, nevertheless, are also 
related to medieval romance, as implied by the little booklet laid on her table, 
which is “a collection of light, edifying stories, for the most part set in the age of 
chivalry, intended as a Christmas present or for schoolchildren” (287).  
The allusions incorporated in the chronicler’s text deserve special attention 
because they seem to have an authoritative status as far as the interpretation of 
Stavrogin’s identity is concerned. Anton Lavrentyevitch actually highlights at 
least two reminiscences by putting them into the position of chapter heading: the 
Shakespearean “Prince Harry” (40) and the Biblical/mythic “wise serpent” 
(168), which – according to Liputin – is originally applied to Stavrogin by 
Lebyadkin (106). Alexandr Krinitsin argues convincingly that the former 
allusion reflects an attempt to interpret “the outrages Stavrogin commits as a 
foreshadowing of his future heroic deeds”. He also points out, however, that the 
source of the analogy, Stepan Trofimovich, is a comic character, and 
Stavrgogin’s acts ultimately disappoint the optimistic expectations implied in it. 
Therefore, the chronicler’s use of the reminiscence as a chapter title becomes 
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 Szilárd even speaks of “templates” and “clichés” with reference to the alternative role models 
appearing in the novel (31–2). 
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 About Shakespearean allusions in the novel cf. (Криницын 356–70). 
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 On the interrelationship of the Gothic and Romanticism in terms of the abject cf. (Williams 1–24). 
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inevitably ironic (Криницын 361). As far as the motif of the “wise serpent” is 
concerned, the inherently ambivalent metaphor and its related images feature in 
several narratives created about Stavrogin in Devils, to form the potential core of 
his practically deconstructive readings in criticism (cf. Szilárd 35).  
Apart from these two “prioritised” allusions, the chronicler repeatedly 
attempts to interpret Stavrogin in the context of literary texts and other 
phenomena of literary history. First of all, he represents him as a Romantic, 
demonic Byronic hero – partly to reinforce one metaphorical meaning associated 
with the “serpent” motif, that of the rebel against divine law and social norms
23
. 
On the one hand, Stavrogin shows some of the general features of this type, such 
as a powerful sex appeal, mysteriousness, the potential for transgression and 
unforgivable sins, and an ambivalent, but rather demonic, dark beauty:  
Our ladies were all mad about the new arrival. […] Some people 
were particularly fascinated by the idea that his soul might harbour a 
fatal secret; others positively relished the notion that he was a 
murderer. […] his bright eyes a bit too clear and serene, his 
complexion a bit too fair and delicate, his colour a bit too fresh and 
pure, his teeth like pearls, his lips like coral – he seemed to be a 
paragon of beauty, yet at the same time there was something repulsive 
about him. (43–4) 
On the other hand, the chronicler’s extended comparison of Stavrogin to L—n 
(216–7) evokes Lermontov’s figure directly, and A Hero of Our Time indirectly.  
Secondly, some elements of the Gothic, a typically Romantic genre, also 
feature in the chronicler’s text, just like in Liza’s reading. Thus, for example, the 
implied metaphor of the werewolf for Stavrogin’s character appears in such 
recurrent expressions as “bestial behaviour towards a woman of high society 
with whom he was having an affair” (41–2), “the wild beast suddenly 
unsheathed its claws” (44; 45)
24
, and finally “In another instant the poor old man 
would surely have died of fright, but the monster took pity and released his ear” 
(52). The excerpts above, as the last one most clearly shows, are predominantly 
related to the “impossible outrages” Stavrogin “perpetrated” (45) in the small 
town and the chronicler’s tone involves a fair share of irony in it. The same is 
implied by his bathetic story of Stavrogin’s furious outburst in the prison and its 
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 In the English Gothic/Romantic tradition, with which Dostoevsky was familiar through 
Melmoth the Wanderer, there is a straight line leading from Milton’s Satan – a hero of sublime 
failure – to the Gothic/Romantic villain, as Maggie Kilgour, among others, points out (40–41; 
cf. Мелетинский 48). 
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 While in the English text the same expression appears twice, originally it is a modified 
repetition: “вдруг зверь показал свои когти” (Достоевский, Бесы 29) and “зверь вдруг 
выпустил свои когти” (Достоевский, Бесы 30). 
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outcome: after such most pathetic descriptions as “with unnatural strength he 
wrenched off the iron grating”, suddenly “it turned out that he was suffering 
from an acute attack of brain fever. They took him home to his mother [“к 
мамаше” (Достоевский, Бесы 34, emphasis added)]” (52). Characteristically 
for the ambivalent world of the novel quite a number of the roles the characters’ 
and the chronicler’s allusions appoint for Stavrogin seem to converge in rather 
romantic images – that of the chivalrous knight, the repentant youthful prince 
promising a virtuous king, or the demonic Byronic hero – which, on the one 
hand, are mutually exclusive, on the other are also undermined by the narrator’s 
irony. Stavrogin’s mysterious identity seems to discredit any reading relying on 
prefabricated clichés – and any attempt to create a narrative identity along these 
lines, for that matter
25
. 
Most characters’ urge to tell their narrative results in an “infectious 
graphomania”, an almost universal obsession with writing (literature) in Devils, 
which reaches probably its most sophisticated form in the chronicler’s desire to 
write the novel itself. In Devils almost everybody has literary ambitions, or at 
least at crucial moments of their life they cannot resist a “compulsion” to write, 
an urge to turn from readers into authors. Reading and writing appears to be the 
same in the act of (self-)interpretation, most often it is a narcissistic moment of 
heightened self-reflection. For example, Stepan Trofimovich is not only 
“passionately fond of writing” (12), but his lengthy poem and all his letters are 
only segments of the unstoppable lifelong verbiage, which is the most obvious 
evidence of his constant narcissistic preoccupation with himself – his very 
essence. Lebyadkin’s poems offer just another most evident example, though, as 
the chronicler’s parody reveals, the texts created by Karamzin, the professional 
writer, also contain nothing but self-adulation. Lembke writes a novel (now that 
he is forbidden to make a miniature Scottish kirk), Shatov has written an 
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 Katalin Kroó’s analysis of Stavrogin’s relationship with his “pupils”, based on the exploration 
of the intertextual and metatextual levels of the text, arrives at a similar conclusion, though with 
a pronouncedly different evaluation of Stavrogin’s suicide. She treats the pupils’ characters as 
fundamentally textual phenomena, what is more, as a result of mistaken interpretative practices 
aimed at finishing Stavrogin’s unfinished old text and giving its “true” representation. The 
pupils’ failure is inevitable, since their interpretation, their representation does not have an 
“original”, on the one hand, and their philosophical/ideological interpretative practices are 
based on ellipsis, on the other. She suggests that Stavrogin’s – successful – attempts to round 
off his “old” story with a new ending are manifested in his “new”, “personal” and “artistic” 
word: in the text of his “Confession” and in his suicide. She draws the conclusion that while 
Dostoevsky’s novel demonstrates that the only escape from the suffocating enclosure of the 
“devil’s space” is narration, the artistic word, textuality itself, the crucial texts in this respect 
are always equally connected to the motifs of the devil and god, to the moments of 
transgressing the threshold between the devilish and divine spaces. Therefore the narrative 
repeatedly “washes away” and “firmly establishes” the border between them, setting into 
motion a practically endless game of meanings which also dominates the metatextual level of 
the novel (Кроо 227–61). 
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unreadably long letter to Stavrogin, Kirillov is overtaken by irresistible 
garrulousness when writing his suicide note – as if he, like Sheherezade, could 
remain alive only as long as he can narrate. Pyotr Verkhovensky forges a poem 
about himself in Herzen’s name, so that his “noble character” (371–2) can be 
attributed to a sufficiently authoritative author. Stavrogin prints off three 
hundred copies of his confessional narrative; what is more, he wants to get it 
published in the newspapers, though he says to Darya Pavlovna “in annoyance, 
almost in disgust” that he “can’t write” (308). The recurrent motif of “disgust” 
implies that for him writing, the desire for the textualisation and contemplation 
of his own alienated identity, has already become abject. 
The literary ambitions Liza wants to realise with Shatov’s help gain special 
significance because they outline the chronicler’s ars poetica (cf. Matlaw 38): as 
the consistent use of the genre of the chronicle shows, both Liza and the narrator 
of Devils aim to rewrite the (already discredited?) Grand Narrative of History 
(Cobley 187–9, 232) through their alternative historiography. The documentary 
nature of Liza’s project is rooted in the proposed technique: her annuals would 
be compiled from newspaper articles, i.e. they would be written in a manner 
which, similarly to the incorporation of generically fundamentally different texts 
in Menippean satire (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 13), would result 
in heterogeneous, “polyphonic” texts. The avoidance of any “tendentiousness” and 
insistence on “complete impartiality” (136) would vouchsafe for the equality of 
the individual “parts” or voices, though, as Shatov quite rightly points out, 
selection in itself is almost impossible without the suggestion of some tendency 
(136). All along, the aims of the “literary enterprise” are set in the metaphorical 
terms of drawing a portrait: it would “constitute an outline of Russian life”, 
“express[…] the personal, moral life of the people, the character of the Russian 
nation”, and it would be “a picture of the spiritual, moral and inner life of 
Russia” (135–6, emphasis added).  
This picture of Russia is actually embodied in the narrative of Devils as the 
picture of a typical – and therefore nameless – Russian small town, more 
particularly as Stavrogin’s personal portrait. Since the thematic scope of the 
novel practically corresponds to the one that Liza outlines – it includes “unusual 
incidents, fires, public subscriptions, all sorts of good and bad deeds, various 
pronouncements and speeches, perhaps reports about the flooding of rivers” 
(135) – Devils functions like a realisation of her plans. The “picture drawing” 
she envisions is carried out via the morphologically and etymologically 
established interrelationship of face, personality, being different and distinctive 
feature coded in the Russian language: the words expressing them (лик–
личность–отличаться–отличие) all have the same root. Faces – and identities – 
are created by establishing a difference within the sign system, by signs, by 
texts. Accordingly, the chronicler attempts nothing but the retelling of a 
significant story – the creation of a difference, a sign – for the insignificant little 
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town which is “completely undistinguished” (3) from the hundreds of similar 
settlements. That is, before Stavrogin disturbs its quiet life and introduces 
enough transgression and deviance into it to supply material for the creation of a 
plot (cf. P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 54). Therefore, it is Stavrogin’s 
(narrative) identity which supplies a face and difference (“лик” and “отличие”) 
for his “доселе ничем не отличавшийся город” (Достоевский, Бесы 7, 
emphasis added). By analogy, his narrative also becomes the text of the 
(undefinable) identity of Russia
26
.  
In contrast with official – presumably scientific and objective – historio-
graphy the impelling power of story-telling for both Liza and the chronicler 
seems to be desire itself. Liza’s “literary enterprise” may be only an excuse to 
approach Marya Timofeevna through Shatov. This, in turn, is obviously 
motivated by her desire to discover Stavrogin’s mysterious past, to test the 
“feasibility” of her own wish-fulfilment fantasies centred on him, and ultimately 
to put together the image of a coherent identity – both for him and herself. 
Similar motives might be hidden behind the chronicler’s enterprise, who tries to 
decipher and arrange into a meaningful story the mysterious events of the recent 
past to “work through” the unspeakable experience of the beloved woman’s 
death – and maybe even more significantly, to come to terms with the figure of 
his “victorious” rival after a major blow to his narcissism. The narrative of 
History is rewritten in Devils both as a compilation of journalistic pieces 
composed by a chronicler always lagging behind the events
27
, and as a 
fundamentally narcissistic project, a personal history focused on the 
“historisation” of the unconscious (Lacan, The Language 23) and desire. 
Therefore the narrative and the metaphorical chain of signification can be 
brought to a closure only by Stavrogin’s death – or maybe not even by that. Just 
like Narcissus, who keeps looking at himself even in the mirror of Styx, the river 
of the Underworld (Ovid III 494–508), Stavrogin also continues the process of 
endless reflection with his last words, his short suicide note. As an echo of the 
Narcissus myth, his short letter, in which he announces his suicide in his 
characteristically dry, ungrammatical and elliptical style, ends with the nuclear 
unit of solipsistic enclosure: ”я сам” (Достоевский, Бесы 433)
28
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 About the relationship of narrative, identity, and especially national identity cf. (Cobley 37–41). 
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 The parallel between the chronicler and a journalist is most convincingly established in 
(Карякин 243–319). Karyakin also suggests that Devils might have been written as “a 
conscious answer” to the publication of Tolstoy’s War and Peace in 1869 (Карякин 334). 
Though he goes on to explore the implications of this hypothesis in moral terms, with respect to 
the underground type, his idea actually inspires a reading of Devils as a conscious answer to the 
historical novel as embodied in War and Peace. The whole section of Karyakin’s essayistic 
book which is devoted to Devils and puts it in the context of reporting contemporary history 
(Карякин 201–342) actually suggests this idea. 
28
 The English translation, with a bit of pedantry that normally characterises the chronicler – but 
not Stavrogin – supplies the missing verb: “I did it myself” (756). 
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UNDER THE (IMPOSSIBLE) GAZE OF THE 
WEST: JOSEPH CONRAD’S VISION OF 
RUSSIANNESS1 
Joseph Conrad’s Under Western Eyes – a spy novel featuring, with the single 
exception of the anonymous English narrator, only Russian emigrants living in 
Switzerland – is unquestionably the Polish writer’s most Russian text as far its 
theme is concerned. More particularly, its focal point is the identity formation of 
the central character, Kyrilo Sidorovitch Razumov, which inevitably acquires a 
national and heavily politicised nature. As Razumov exclaims: “But Russia can’t 
disown me. She cannot! [...] I am it!” (Conrad 176)2. Thus the issue of 
Razumov’s identity equals the issue of Russian national identity: Russianness is 
superficially defined in a set of oppositions centred around East and West, as the 
title of the novel clearly implies. The same title, however, also emphasises the 
significance of eyes: as Andrew Long points out, “this novel is about looking”, 
about “Razumov’s search for the right ‘eyes’ to look at him, that is, for an 
appropriate subjectivising gaze” (498). An attempt to disentangle the bedazzling 
web of gazes influencing Razumov’s identity formation has led me to claim that 
though the novel represents Russian identity as determined by the ideological 
construct defining East and West, it also embodies a criticism of the self-same 
construction at two levels. On the one hand, it deconstructs the notions of 
“Eastern” and “Western” at the discursive level by revealing the untenable 
nature of the dichotomies it is built on; on the other hand, Conrad’s novel 
unmasks the fantasies this construct works with. 
East and West Gazing at Each Other: the Ideology of 
Russianness 
Under Western Eyes tries to define Russian national identity within the discourse 
of East and West, thereby relying on two heavily ideological discourses (the 
Enlightenment ethos of the West and Slavophil ideology) which mutually 
sustain each other. 
Russians are represented in the novel as the radically different Eastern Other 
of Western culture: they are shown as an exclusive diaspora in a setting 
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 First published as “Under the (Impossible) Gaze of the West – Joseph Conrad’s Vision of 
Russianness,” Slavica XXXIX–LX (2010–11), 247–65. Special thanks for his careful linguistic 
editing to Charles Somerville. 
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 All references to Under Western Eyes are based on (Conrad) and will be indicated in the article 
only by the parenthetical page numbers. 
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representative of the Enlightenment and by an allegedly incomprehensive 
English narrator. Much of the novel is set in Geneva, a city emblematic of the 
West (cf. Gilliam, “Russia and the West in Conrad’s Under Western Eyes” 224) 
and Enlightenment thought. The latter connection is emphasised through the 
figure of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Razumov even visits his statue to write under 
it. Russians are emphatically alien to this environment – they form a closed 
community into which, with the sole exception of the narrator, no Westerner is 
allowed. He is an elderly English language teacher, who, however, repeatedly 
warns readers that he is unable to understand the Russian temperament: from the 
perspective of Western rationality he sees it as paradoxical (Gilliam, “Russia” 
219–20)
3
 and incomprehensibly passionate
4
. From this point of view, as Gilliam 
demonstrates, Russian identity seems to be tied to the “Eastern” component in a 
series of dichotomies labelled as “Eastern” and “Western”. To name only a few: 
spirituality vs. materiality, simplicity vs. sophistication, “irrational union of 
extremes” vs. their “rational reconciliation” characterise Russians and Western 





-century Slavophil discourse of Russian identity is, 
however, also based on the opposition of East and West
5
. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that some of its major components are evidently present in Under 
Western Eyes
6
. First and foremost, Razumov, the fatherless and motherless 
student of philosophy, who following his betrayal of the anarchist assassin 
Haldin has to leave Russia for the West, fits into the Dostoevskian vision of the 
Russian intellectual as an uprooted, homeless wanderer (cf. Dostoevsky, “The 
Pushkin Speech” 44). Razumov’s telling name and his insistence on the power 
of Reason also confirm this image. In the Slavophils’ opinion the Russian 
intellectuals’ homelessness was caused by Peter the Great’s Western reforms 
(Hajnády 173); thus it is associated with the philosophy of the Enlightenment, 
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 According to Harriet Gilliam the central Russian feature for the narrator is “simplicity”, which 
means an ability to switch abruptly from one “extreme state” to its opposite (e.g. from 
emotionality to rationality, from animal-like behaviour to heightened spirituality). This is why 
for the narrator Russianness is characterised by “a series of paradoxes” (“Russia and the West in 
Conrad’s Under Western Eyes” 219–20). 
4
 Here I agree with Tom Rice’s conclusions. He asserts that although in Under Western Eyes the 
“key-word” the narrator applies to grasp the “mystery” of Russianness is “cynicism”, the term 
that really fulfils this function in the novel is “passion” (136–7). 
5
 On Slavophilism cf. (Hajnády 130–78). 
6
 Slavophilism emerged in the 1840s among Russian intellectuals and in the literary field. It 
reached one of its culminations in Dostoevsky’s famous “Pushkin Speech” delivered in 1880. 
Some of its elements were absorbed into mystical notions gaining ground in Russian political 
thought and arts at the turn of the century. Born in 1857, Conrad left behind Russian Poland at 
the age of seventeen. However, research surrounding the unfinished fragment The Sisters 
provides evidence that Conrad was familiar with Slavophil and Pan-Slavic ideology from his 
youth (P. Kaye 137). 
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with the belief in the supreme power of Reason, with the appearance in Russia of 
the Faustian hero questing for knowledge and longing for action (Хайнади 162). 
As Zoltán Hajnády emphasises, Russians see this mentality as diametrically 
opposed to the Russian ideal of sainthood, passivity and contemplation 
(Хайнади 177). Therefore, the Russian wanderer is often a demonic one 
(Хайнади 181) – a type Razumov with his overall appearance, his role of a spy 
and traitor and with his constant deceptions clearly conforms to. This association 
of the wanderer with Western cultural and philosophical influences might also 
explain why, as Harriet Gilliam notes, the narrator – and, let me add, the reader 
also – perceives Razumov as the most Western character among his compatriots 
(“Russia” 229). In addition, Razumov’s passionate negation of his being a 
revolutionary also reflects the same Slavophil ideology in its rhetoric, and 
ironically reveals how close to home Razumov feels the charge. Influenced by 
Western ideas, absorbed in philosophical thought, the young intellectual is only 
at one remove from the demonic and un-Russian anarchist: 
’I am reasonable. I am even – permit me to say – a thinker, though to 
be sure, this name nowadays seems to be the monopoly of hawkers of 
revolutionary wares, the slaves of some French or German thought – 
devil knows what foreign notions. But I am not an intellectual mongrel. 
I think like a Russian.’ (81, emphasis added) 
If Razumov, the male wanderer is one dominant image for Russia in the 
novel, there is also another, even more powerful, feminine imagery in the text, 
which is equally related to Slavophil discourse. The central idea of 
pochvennichestvo – a return to the Russian soil, the motherland as a key to 
spiritual and national revival –, which gains prominent expression, for instance, 
in Dostoevsky’s writings, also spectacularly features in Under Western Eyes. 
Thus, Razumov’s decision to inform on Haldin is made in a moment of “grace” 
inspired by his vision of the “passive”, “white”, “inert” and “sacred” land of 
Russia (35–6), which has been described earlier as “inanimate, cold, inert, like a 
sullen and tragic mother hiding her face under a winding-sheet – his native soil!” 
(34–5, emphasis added). The adjectives clearly refer to a Virgin Mary-like 
imagery, while the narratorial comments can be read as all but overt references 
to Slavophil thinkers, probably Dostoevsky as well:  
Razumov stood on the point of conversion. [...] In Russia, the land of 
spectral ideas and disembodied aspirations, many brave minds have 
turned [...] to the one great historical fact of the land. They turned to 
autocracy for the peace of their patriotic conscience [...]. Like other 
great Russians before him, Razumov, in conflict with himself, felt the 
touch of grace upon his forehead. (35–36) 
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In Dostoevsky’s vision the motherly image of the land is complemented by 
the “apotheosis of the Russian woman”, a counterpoint to the Russian wanderer. 
“A type of positive beauty” (Dostoevsky, “The Pushkin Speech” 48), she “has 
something solid and unshakeable upon which her soul may bear” – she is rooted 
in her past and her motherland (Dostoevsky, “The Pushkin Speech” 52). The 
close connection of the two images – the mother and the beautiful young woman – 
is indicated by the fact that the discourse of turn-of-the-century Russian 
Symbolism blurs them together: the reverence of Eternal Femininity is also the 
veneration of the Eternal Mother, the wet mother soil (Hajnády 254). This 
“apotheosis of the Russian woman” is no one else but Nathalie Haldin
7
, whose 
function in the novel is – in a somewhat superficial reading – to save Razumov 
from the moral corruption and disintegration his betrayal and homelessness entail: 
[Razumov] raised his face [...]. [T]hat look in his eyes of dull, absent 
obstinacy [...] began to pass away. It was as though he were coming to 
himself in the awakened consciousness of that marvellous harmony of 
feature, of lines, of glances, of voice, which made of the girl before 
him a being so rare, outside, and, as it were, above the common notion 
of beauty. (283, emphasis added) 
The third component I would like to mention is related to both conservative 
Slavophil thought and later anarchist, left-wing ideology: it is an emphatic turn 
to the people as the preserver of an authentic connection to the Russian land and 
therefore the bearer of authentic national identity (Hajnády 174). Accordingly, it 
features on both sides in Conrad’s text. As Andrew Long convincingly argues, 
Haldin’s anarchism is based on the Russian soul, “organically linked” to the 
motherland, and embodied in the sledge driver Ziemianitch (502). This “organic 
link” could gain no better expression than the very name of Haldin’s potential 
accomplice: it is derived from “земля”, the Russian word of feminine gender for 
“soil” (cf. Lewitter 658–9), therefore union with him is nothing but a union with 
the motherland. While Razumov can conceive Haldin’s pathetic mention of 
Ziemianitch as the ‘bright Russian soul’ only ironically (32–3), he also 
experiences “union” with the people through contact with Ziemianitch: 
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 To counterbalance this idealised image, Under Western Eyes is merciless with regard to Peter 
Ivanivitch’s “feminism”. His discourse of “the admirable Russian woman” (105) is satirically 
undercut by the great refugee’s treatment of Tekla, a real specimen. With all his high rhetoric, 
the “great feminist” allegedly does not restrain himself from either verbal or physical abuse of 
the weaker sex (142–3). While one is tempted to see Peter Ivanovitch as a parody of Dostoevsky 
in this respect, a case could also be made for the ironic, even satirical representation of the cult 
of Eternal Femininity in his ideas. 
87 
’Is not this my country? Have I not got forty million brothers?’ he 
[Razumov] asked himself [...]. And the fearful thrashing he had given 
the inanimate Ziemianitch seemed to him a sign of intimate union, a 
pathetically severe necessity of brotherly love. (36, emphasis added) 
This turn to the people in Slavophil ideology was part and parcel of rejecting 
the declining, mechanical civilisation of the West and expecting a renewal of 
culture through a return to the national core. The idea soon evolved into a vision 
of worldwide renewal with the lead of the Russian nation: the idea of the 
Messianistic mission of Russia emerged (Hajnády 174). In Conrad’s novel the 
anarchist Haldin’s rhetoric reproduces the same hardcore conservative train of 
thought: 
[The soul] works for itself – or else where would be the sense of self-
sacrifice, of martyrdom [...]? [... When I die] [m]y spirit shall go on 
warring in some Russian body till all falsehood is swept out of the 
world. The modern civilization is false, but a new revelation shall 
come out of Russia. [...] The Russian soul that lives in all of us. [...] It 
has a mission [...]. (25–6, emphasis added) 
However, as some of the above examples might have suggested, neither the 
Western, nor the Slavophil version of Russian identity bears close scrutiny in 
Conrad’s text. Not only are they heavily ideological but they also seem to be 
inseparable from the gaze of the Other as a structuring force of (national) 
identity. Therefore I find Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian explication of identification 
and his related criticism of ideology extremely fruitful in the interpretation of 
Conrad’s text. Žižek’s reading of the Lacanian graphs of desire describes a 
model of identification which ultimately allows for a comprehension of the key 
terms of any ideology as the “signifying representatives” (The Sublime Object of 
Ideology 96) of objet a, and ideologically determined identification as imaginary 
or symbolic identification influenced by the gaze of the Other (objet a). Žižek 
contrasts imaginary identification (mirror stage) and symbolic identification 
(identification with the Symbolic Father, formulation of the subject in language) 
as identification with the image and the gaze, respectively (The Sublime 105). 
Nevertheless, he also points out that imaginary identification is equally 
motivated by “a certain gaze in the Other” (The Sublime 106). Thus, for 
example, “hysterical theatre” in fact is nothing else but the subject’s “offering” 
of itself as the object of desire to the Other, that is, usually to “a masculine, 
paternal” subject who is the embodiment of the Other for the hysterical. In 
Žižek’s system the Other corresponds to ideology, which therefore is also 
sustained by a structuring lack, desire and jouissance. The object-cause of this 
desire (objet a, the gaze) belongs to the Real, therefore it is only through the 
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agency of a “pure signifier” (a signifier without a signified, a “rigid designator” 
[The Sublime 95]) that it can fulfil its structural function in ideology. While it 
apparently “gives unity and identity to our experience of historical reality” and 
“totalizes an ideology by bringing to a halt the metonymic sliding of its 
signified” (The Sublime 97–9), it does not actually serve as a fixed point of 
reference; in fact, it is only a signifier of difference. The desire of the Other is 
constituted in and masked by a fantasy (The Sublime 124). It follows from 
Žižek’s train of thought that the subject, while defining itself via identification 
with ideology, identifies with a signifier without a referent, with a marker of 
difference, with nothing. At the same time, as Žižek emphasises, the subject can 
only hope to enter the field of the Other’s desire (identify with its gaze) if it 
enters “the frame of [its constituting] fantasy” (The Sublime 119). However, “the 
phantasmic narrative always involves an impossible gaze, the gaze by means of 
which the subject is already present at the act of his/her own conception” (Žižek, 
The Plague of Fantasies 16). As Žižek’s examples reveal, “the impossible gaze” 
in an ideological context is the “gaze of the innocent observer” which is “in a 
way nonexistent, since this gaze is the impossible neutral gaze of someone who 
falsely exempts himself from his concrete historical existence” (The Plague 18). 
Žižek differentiates two interrelated ways or levels of criticising ideology – a 
deconstructive, “discursive” one based on detecting the totalising gaze of the 
Other and the pure signifiers of difference, which determine identification, and 
another one based on “inverting” the same gaze and revealing the fantasy 
masking its central lack and desire, “to detect, in a given ideological edifice, the 
element which represents within it its own impossibility” (The Sublime 125–7). 
In my reading, Conrad’s text realizes both interrelated forms of criticism. As 
for his discursive criticism, in Under Western Eyes the very words Western and 
Eastern prove to be signifiers of pure difference, which, however, are conceived 
as identity. The factors contributing to this effect – such as the issue of Conrad’s 
own national identity, the novelistic tradition that Conrad continues and the 
representation of the narrator and the main character as doubles – undermine the 
binary opposition of East and West by problematising the gaze on behalf of 
which symbolic identification takes place. 
The Impossible Gaze I: Conrad’s Western Eyes 
In trying to detect the “subjectivising gazes” offered to Razumov, the most 
obvious choice seems to be the gaze associated with the focalisation of the novel 
– the narrator’s “Western eyes”. By using the English professor of languages as 
a participant narrator, Conrad attaches the Western gaze to a character and 
thereby emphatically distances it from the authorial position. The step draws 
attention to the problematic nature of the “Western” textual subject Under 
Western Eyes creates: in contrast to the narrator’s apparently unproblematic 
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“Western” identity, Conrad’s own is fraught with controversies. The novel 
records an attempt to capture the birth of the Russian subject as the object of the 
impossible Western gaze of Joseph Conrad, an Easterner, thereby also 
deconstructing this basic dichotomy as far as the textual subject is concerned. 
The attempt to create a Western textual subject, an emphatically Western 
gaze giving focus to Conrad’s narrative parallels the writer’s lifelong and 
somewhat futile struggle to become an unquestionably English writer, even if it 
was constantly counteracted by the English audience’s reception of his works as 
those of a Slavic author and by his own obsession with Slavic themes. As Peter 
Kaye’s study demonstrates, Conrad went to great lengths in denying even his 
understanding of the Russian language and in insisting “that his work could only 
be understood within the proud lineage of the English language and French 
novelistic artistry” (124, emphasis added). That this is clearly not the case is 
attested not only by contemporary reviews comparing him to Dostoevsky and 
stressing his Slavic origins (P. Kaye 130), but also by the fact that Slavic themes 
and characters keep returning in his writings – like the repressed (cf. P. Kaye 
119) – and inspiring readings based on Russian intertexts or cultural-historical 
phenomena (cf. Gilliam, „Russia” passim; Lewitter passim). 
The same ambiguous relationship can be observed between the professor and 
his narrative: while English is his mother tongue and he has mastered the 
English literary tradition so much that he teaches English through reading it with 
Nathalie Haldin, he must retell a Russian narrative, Razumov’s story rendered in 
his Russian diary. Apparently he relies on his expertise in the Western literary 
tradition and targets a Western audience. The result, however, is a text which 
occasionally acquires an indeterminable identity in terms of language and 
culture, and seems to belong to both an Eastern and a Western textual subject – 
or neither. For example, the narrator – as a translator of Razumov’s text – 
reproduces the words of the watchman who chases away Haldin from a wood-
yard with the following attack: “Take yourself and your ugly eyes away” (23). 
The purely aesthetic reason for the watchman’s antipathy is so lame that it even 
requires an apparent reinforcement, Haldin’s forthcoming comment: “He did not 
like my eyes” (23). The words of the watchman gain much more sense if they 
are translated back into Russian
8
 as “дурной глаз”. It is an idiomatic phrase, 
which, though literally meaning ugly eyes, properly translates as “the evil eye”. 
The watchman’s fright is thus revealed to be much more profound than a dislike 
of uncomely features: he is afraid of a spell cast on him, of losing his self to a 
demonic power – the demonic gaze of the Other. In this light, the scene gains a 
totally different meaning: a pure man of the people, the watchman recognises the 
alien and demonic quality traditionally associated in Russian culture with the 
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 This approach is suggested by the glaring cases of Russicisms in the text, like the forms of 
address “little father” (батюшка) and “little pigeon” (голубчик). 
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anarchist and immediately rejects it. But who knows the Russian idiom and the 
ideology demonising the anarchist? Definitely not the narrator, who even 
mistranslates the phrase. This knowledge belongs to a textual subject which is 
neither exclusively Western, since it incorporates Slavic linguistic and cultural 
components into the text, nor exclusively Eastern, since it effaces them almost 
beyond recognition. 
The narrator’s Western gaze implies not only the impossible identification 
with the Western literary discourse, but also a necessary critical distance from 
the heavily ideological positions of the novel’s Russian characters. On account 
of Conrad’s well-known bias against Russians based on his family history and 
national identity, distancing this “neutral” observer’s gaze from the authorial 
position seems to be an absolute necessity: for Conrad this is an impossible gaze. 
His parents were involved in anti-Russian political activities, which resulted in 
their exile and untimely death, and ultimately in Conrad’s leaving his homeland 
behind for good (P. Kaye 118). In a wider context, anti-Russian feelings – fuelled 
by anti-Polish, imperialist Russian ideology – have constituted a large definitive 
segment of Polish national identity since the 1600s, which was intensified by the 
historical events of the 19
th
 century. Accordingly, Eloise Knapp Hay “locates the 
novel’s politics in Conrad’s experience with Polish nationalism” (qtd. in Long 
494). Therefore, the novel doubly undermines the idea of neutrality: on the plot 
level by discrediting the idea of the narrator’s “unbiased mind” (92) – being 
Razumov’s double
9
 and rival he cannot be neutral
10
 – while on the level of the 
textual subject through an ambiguous ideological debate with Dostoevsky. Let me 
address the latter issue first. 
The Impossible Gaze II: the Gaze of the Literary Father 
“But there was no tragedy there. This was a comedy of 
errors. It was as if the devil himself were playing a game 
with all of them in turn. First with him [Razumov], then 
with Ziemianitch, then with those revolutionists. The devil’s 
own game this...” (237) 
If it is problematic to unambiguously define Conrad’s text as Western (English) 
on the basis of its language and cultural background, it is equally so on the basis 
of the literary tradition it follows. Although Conrad’s rejection of Dostoevsky’s 
novels on an ideological basis (cf. P. Kaye 118–20) is legendary, Under Western 
                                                     
 
9
 This Doppelgänger relationship is a matter of critical consensus. Cf. (Gilliam, “Russia” 231; 
Levin 211–13; Rice 138; Szittya 819). 
10
 Cf. “The double is always a figure of jouissance: […] somebody who enjoys at the subject’s 
expense” (Dolar 13). 
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Eyes is the text most clearly connected to Dostoevsky’s oeuvre of all Conrad’s 
writings
11
. So much so, that for example Peter Kaye reads it as a systematic 
rewriting of Crime and Punishment (145–55). However, as far as the working of 
(national) ideology is concerned, I find the novel’s polemics with Devils
12
 even 
more revealing than the above parallels. Though Conrad insists on his status as a 
Western writer, his critique of the Slavophil discourse of Russian identity is 
realised as a rewriting and confirmation of Dostoevsky’s most dialogic version 
of this narrative formulated in Devils. If the Western gaze of the novel’s textual 
subject is an impossible one, it is partly owing to the fact that “the subjectivising 
gaze” determining its identity belongs to a Symbolic/literary father who 
apparently embodies the Slavophil discourse of Russian identity Conrad is 
fighting to refute. I would like to emphasise three major points of intersection 
here.  
Let me only briefly refer to the first and most obvious parallel: the two 
novels’ political intrigue – the unwinding of an anarchist plot featuring the 
murder/mutilation of a suspected or actual informer – is so similar that in terms 
of its politics Under Western Eyes seems to be much more a rewriting of Devils 
than of Crime and Punishment. More importantly, the representation of the 
anarchist circle in Conrad’s text, though updated to involve the mystical 
elements fashionable around the turn of the century, is just as satirical as in 
Devils. As L. R. Lewitter explains: 
Under Western Eyes indirectly (and perhaps gratuitously) dismisses as 
sheer Utopia of Stepan Trofimovich’s vision, in the last chapter of The 
Devils, of a Russia exorcised of the demon of revolution. […] The 
revolutionists depicted in Under Western Eyes, together with their 
beliefs, aims, and methods, bring to mind the atmosphere and 
villainous characters of The Devils even if Conrad’s material is 
supplemented by more up-to-date information derived from reading 
and personal observation of the political activities of expatriate 
Russians in London and Geneva. (661) 
I would like to argue, however, that Lewitter’s reading takes Stepan 
Trofimovich’s vision at face value and monologises Devils. It fails to consider 
that the major political intrigue of Devils is connected with Pyotr Verkhovensky, 
and he, of all the anarchists, leaves the scene after the destruction of half a town 
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 Peter Kaye mentions The Sisters, Nostromo, and The Secret Agent as clearly showing 
Dostoevskian influences, but for him “the writing of Under Western Eyes [is] the culmination 
of Conrad’s creative response to Dostoevsky” (120).  
12
 For example L. R. Lewitter lists a number of sporadic similarities between Devils and Under 
Western Eyes – notably a parallel between Razumov and both Stavrogin and Shatov (661) – but 
without interpreting the function of this Dostoevskian intertext in Conrad’s novel.  
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and the death of several people as if nothing had happened. Conrad’s depiction 
of the anarchists thus fully confirms Dostoevsky’s bleak vision, including the 
only saving grace: as Alexandr Etkind points out, in Devils the anarchists do not 
come from the people, leaving intact the Slavophil idea that their politics are 
alien from the nation (Эткинд 399). Under Western Eyes treats the Slavophil 
image of the nation with bitter irony: the only man of the people potentially 
involved in the anarchist activities of the novel, the “bright soul” Ziemianitch is 
represented as a beastly drunkard, suggesting that the anarchists live with an 
idealised image of the nation and their union with it is illusionary. This ironic 
treatment, however, does not change a major Dostoevskian point: whether it is a 
result of a conscious act of will or of an accident (drunken impotence), “the man 
of the people” (233) does not play an active role in the anarchist conspiracy. 
The second point I would like to make is that Conrad applies a narrator who 
is a strange combination of Dostoevsky’s incompetent chronicler and Stepan 
Trofimovich, the Rousseauesque father figure of Devils, a liberal. Thereby he 
merges in one dubious figure of authority Dostoevsky’s incompetent begetter of 
a literary narrative
13
 and his representative of the discourse of a weak ideology – 
the malfunctioning Symbolic Father. In my opinion the parallels between Anton 
Lavrentyevitch and Conrad’s anonymous narrator are fairly obvious: both of 
them minor characters, observers who like to think they are not involved in the 
events they relate, they write their narratives to come up with a coherent, 
transmittable version of the chaotic events they do not actually seem to 
understand. While doing so, they inevitably delude readers on one major point: 
apparently living in a permanent delusion themselves, they pretend not to know 
the outcome of their story, the end that interprets their whole narrative in 
hindsight, but feign to discover it together with readers, like self-appointed 
detectives
14
. In other words, they are not simply figures of authority, 
embodiments of the Other who is supposed to know (Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts 233–43; Žižek “The Truth Arises from Misrecognition” 
189), they actually possess information – Anton Lavrentyevitch is mysteriously 
in possession of Stavrogin’s confession presumably at the beginning of the 
writing process, while the professor is in possession of another key document, 
Razumov’s similarly confessional diary. Nevertheless, instead of assuming the 
position of the Other, they pretend not to know. This make-believe, staging the 
impossible gaze of the story-teller who does not know what he actually does, is 
of course part and parcel of the convention of the participant narrator. What I 
find more important is that Conrad, just like Dostoevsky, is not only reluctant to 
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 For summaries of recent critical views on the narrator’s figure in Devils cf. (Matlaw passim; 
Moore passim). 
14
 Cf. Alissa Hamilton’s comment on the narrator of Under Western Eyes who “plays the detective 
only to be deluded” (142). For a most insightful analysis of how duplicity works in the novel 
both at the level of narration and theme see (Szittya passim). 
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assume authority over a narrative of Russian identity, but goes out of his way to 
raise doubts in his readers: what if there is always a residue of meaning 
associated with this narrative that even a figure of authority giving its fullest 
possible account – the only one readers can have – cannot grasp? The Other, 
after all, is someone who is at best supposed to know. Can we do without this 
supposition? 
The answer to this question in both novels is clearly no: the father figures 
associated with Western thought, the heritage of the Enlightenment epitomised 
in Rousseau and the weak ideology of liberalism cannot represent the “proper 
subjectivising gaze” for either main character. These features are evident in 
Stepan Trofimovich’s character, the malfunctioning (surrogate) father of the 
whole younger generation in Devils. Conrad’s narrator as a minor character, 
however, fulfils an analogous function: also a teacher, by definition a Westerner, 
an advocate of Reason and a mild-voiced adversary to autocracy who lives in a 
town associated with Rousseau, he behaves like a self-appointed father figure 
first to Nathalie Haldin, then to Razumov. His show of selflessness, like Stepan 
Trofimovich’s meddling with Dasha and Stavrogin, is tainted by a love-interest 
from the very start. For Dostoevsky, Stepan Trofimovich’s failure as a Symbolic 
Father is rooted in his ideological convictions: in his Rousseauesque pose 
(Miller 80–6), in his being a liberal, in his failure to know, to give convincing 
solutions for the metaphysical queries of the younger generation. He is the 
reason why a whole generation end up as playthings for devils – “hawkers of 
revolutionary wares” (81). Similarly, Razumov rejects Conrad’s professor as a 
Symbolic Father straight away. This rejection takes place right at their first 
meeting on the grounds of questioning the professor’s authority, his cocksure 
insistence that he knows more than Razumov, that he is “in possession of 
something [Razumov] cannot be expected to understand!” (157, emphasis 
added). What at first seems to be an empty turn of phrase on Razumov’s part 
[Who the devil are you?” (158)], later evolves into a rejection of the professor 
not only on an epistemological, but also on a moral basis: “He [the professor] 
talked of you [Nathalie Haldin], of your lonely, helpless state, and every word of 
that friend of yours was egging me to the unpardonable sin of stealing a soul. 
Could he have been the devil himself in the shape of an old Englishman?” (296–
7) If Conrad’s text inverts the Russian novel’s cause-and-effect relationships 
here, it also presses the Dostoevskian point that the malfunctioning of this 
Symbolic Father is rooted in the weakness of Western ideology: in its mistaken 
reliance on human knowledge and the concomitant transgression of moral laws.  
Finally, the fate of Razumov, who can be read as a rewriting of Stavrogin’s 
figure, brings into relief at least two central elements of Russian identity as 
represented in Devils. One of these reinforces Slavophil ideology: it is the 
ideological uprootedness and insecure identity of the Russian intellectual 
embodied in the above-mentioned image of the wanderer. The other, however, is 
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a critique of the same discourse: both texts emphasise the untenable nature of 
identity formation for Russians through identification with any of the available 
ideological discourses – with any Symbolic Fathers – but neither offers the 
Slavophil solution, union with the motherland, as a viable option. In point of 
fact, for Razumov even more than for Stavrogin, it is realised as a castrating 
experience.  
The two main characters, Stavrogin and Razumov, share a large number of 
features which can be grouped together around the central image of the wanderer 
– the uprooted Russian intellectual existing in a permanent identity crisis. 
Firstly, both of them are young intellectuals whose apparently mysterious 
identity is a cover for their inability to define themselves by identifying with the 
available ideological discourses. This indeterminate identity is best expressed by 
silence: Stavrogin, though he professed diametrically opposing ideas 
simultaneously in the past, is characterised by conspicuous reticence in the 
present; Razumov, skipping the first stage, stays silent throughout the novel. The 
only exception to this rule in both novels is confession. The problem of both 
characters’ insecure identity is posed in the general context of masquerade, both 
narrative and thematic
15
. Complying with a central element in the literary 
interpretation of the wanderer, both “masked” characters are perceived as 
demonic: Razumov does not simply fall into the type of the demonic Byronic 
hero because of his appearance, just like Stavrogin – he is actually taken for the 
devil by Ziemianitch. Readers might hear a specifically Dostoevskian echo, 
though, when his face is compared “to a face modelled vigorously in wax” (13), 
evoking the famous “wax figure” simile (Dostoevsky, Devils 242) describing 
Stavrogin. What is even more striking, is the sameness of the other characters’ 
attitude to the “mystery” Stavrogin’s and Razumov’s hidden identity presents in 
the two novels: both of them are obsessively read like texts and misread as 
models for identification, Symbolic Fathers, embodiments of the powerful 
Other, bearers of the gaze and therefore irresistible objects of desire
16
. This is 
why Haldin seeks Razumov’s help, why “madcap Kostia” and the “red-nosed” 
anarchist bend backwards to fulfil his unspoken desires and why Nathalie feels 
irresistibly drawn to him. The representation of these insecure, questing 
characters involves a critique of Western Enlightenment thought, especially 
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 While Léna Szilárd in her seminal study speaks about masquerade and role-playing as the 
“metatheme” of Devils (20), Penn R. Szittya makes a very similar point about the “narrative 
masquerade” dominating Under Western Eyes (817–8). Both relate it to the insecurity of the 
main character’s identity (Szilárd 31–2; Szittya 826). 
16
 Razumov speaks about himself as a text continuously read and misread: “All these days you 
have been trying to read me, Peter Ivanovitch” (192, emphasis added). The phenomenon is so 
characteristic of the novel that it has allowed Szittya to reach the following conclusion: “The 
novel is a chronicle of interpretive failures; its epigraph might well be Razumov’s complaint to 
Mikulin, ‘I begin to think there is something about me which people don’t seem to be able to 
make out’” (830). 
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Rousseau, not only through their malfunctioning “father figures”, but also 
through the direct connection established between Rousseau and their respective 
confessions. For both Stavrogin and Razumov Rousseau is a model as far as 
writing is concerned
17
. The instability of their identity and their epistemological 
uncertainties are indicated by their having a number of doubles, including a 
ghostly or demonic one. While Stavrogin has his own petty devil, Razumov is 
persecuted by Haldin’s phantom, which increasingly becomes merged with the 
living sister, Nathalie Haldin
18
. As a reference to their intellectual and emotional 
deadlock, both Stavrogin and Razumov are characterised with terms of paralysis, 
stasis, even invalidity, which later culminates in the offer and acceptance/realisa-
tion of a castrating sexual relationship: these are the dominant motifs of 
Stavrogin’s relationship with Darya Pavlovna, just like Razumov’s with Tekla
19
. 
Neither can find a way out of this dead end: they both reach ultimate stasis in an 
openly or covertly suicidal manner
20
. 
Significantly, both texts represent the wanderer as narcissistically obsessed 
with himself: his insecure identity is reflected in a constant concern with being 
the object of the others’ look. “Stavrogin’s Confession,” the key text of his 
narrative identity clearly represents identity formation as dependent on the look of 
others – a view temptingly similar to the Lacanian concept (cf. Etkind passim). 
This phenomenon dominates the whole of Conrad’s text: practically every 
exchange of words Razumov is involved in is complemented by a similarly – if 
not more – significant exchange of looks, gazes. The representatives of the 
anarchist circle spectacularly refuse to look at Razumov: they cover their eyes to 
resist penetration (Haldin hides behind his hands; Peter Ivanovitch wears 
smoked spectacles), do not look at him (Madame de S- gives her “intense stare” 
to “something which was visible behind him” [189]), or give him a squinting 
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 Allan Hepburn emphasises “that the model for [Razumov’s] double writing [confession and 
spy-report] is Jean-Jacque Rousseau” (285). 
18
 Cf. (Szittya 818–9; Karl 316–8). Razumov, just like Stavrogin, is also absolutely conscious of 
an internal split: “He [Razumov] felt [...] as though another self, an independent sharer of his 
mind, had been able to view his whole person very distinctly indeed” (193). 
19
 Cf. (Szilárd 26). As far as Razumov is concerned, I find Gilliam’s and Julian B. Kaye’s 
comments particularly insightful. The former emphasises Razumov’s stasis, paralysis after 
Haldin’s intervention into his life (“Time in Conrad’s Under Western Eyes” 430–34). The latter 
characterises Razumov’s fate as a “return [...] to a state of infantile dependence on maternal 
care” with Tekla as “a foster mother to defeated adults” (63). 
20
 If Conrad’s novel is read through this Dostoevskian intertext, the sharp criticism addressed to its 
ending – for example Frederick R. Karl considers the second confession to the anarchists 
redundant and the whole ending “aesthetically destructive” (321) – becomes pointless. 
Razumov’s yearning to “perish”, emphasised by Gilliam and Tony Tanner, for example 
(Gilliam, “Time” 434), is an inevitable component of the Dostoevskian vision Conrad confirms. 
As a matter of fact, the “exact” repetition of Stavrogin’s suicide is carried out by Ziemianitch: 
he, too, hangs himself, like Judas, the archetypal traitor, and his act is pathetically misread by 
the anarchists as a re-enactment of the Biblical story. 
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look (Sophia Antonovna). Their denied “subjectivising gaze” is replaced by the 
hallucinatory “eye of the social revolution” – the eyes of not the real, but the 
phantom Haldin: 
The eye of the social revolution was on him, and Razumov for a 
moment felt an unnamed and despairing dread, mingled with an odious 
sense of hallucination. Was it possible that he no longer belonged to 
himself? [...]  
[...] he happened to glance towards the bed. He rushed at it, 
enraged, with a mental scream: ‘It’s you, crazy fanatic, who stands in 
the way!’ [...] Nothing there. And, turning away, he caught for an 
instant in the air, like a vivid detail in a dissolving view of two heads, 
the eyes of General T- and of Privy-Councillor Mikulin side by side 
fixed upon him, quite different in character, but with the same 
unflinching and weary and yet purposeful expression ... servants of the 
nation! (250–51, emphasis added) 
As the quote above implies, the eyes associated with the state power are also 
united in one gaze, this time clearly directed at Razumov and, as Andrew Long’s 
impressive Althusserian reading shows, apparently contributing to his successful 
subjectivisation (491–5). But only apparently: for the most important point about 
Razumov’s meetings with Councillor Mikulin is that they help rationalise his 
visions of his own phantom-double, Haldin – as if subjectivisation was nothing 
but curing a strange eye illness: 
Councillor Mikulin was the only person on earth with whom Razumov 
could talk, taking the Haldin adventure for granted. And Haldin, when 
once taken for granted, was no longer a haunting, falsehood-breeding 
spectre. [...] Razumov knew very well that at this oculist’s address he 
would be merely the hanged murderer of M. de P- and nothing more. 
(253, emphasis added) 
And in a way, it is: identification with the gaze of the Symbolic Father 
(Councillor Mikulin) is meant to cure the permanent blur in Razumov’s vision 
caused by the castrating experience of his union with the mother land. Razumov 
receives the call for this union – a call most clearly represented in the voice and 
tragic plot line associated with Marya Lebyadkina in Devils – when Haldin sends 
him to talk to Ziemianitch. The Freudian symbolism of the scene is rather obvious: 
he has to enter a dark underground stable, has to penetrate into a womb-like space 
to find the “prostrate”, completely inert and senseless, beastly drunk Ziemianitch 
there – a passive, therefore effeminate figurative representation of both the 
Russian nation and land. The scene implies that union with the nation and land 
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means deathlike stasis. Razumov himself later interprets his reaction to this sight 
– beating up Ziemianitch with a phallic symbol, a stick, to move him to action – 
as a rejection of this union and opting for identification with the state autocracy, 
with the powerful paternal figure of the “master”:  
Ziemianitch’s passionate surrender to sorrow and consolation had 
baffled him. That was the people. A true Russian man! Razumov was 
glad he had beaten that brute – the ‘bright soul’ of the other. Here they 
were: the people and the enthusiast. 
[...] 
It was a sort of terrible childishness. But children had their masters. 
‘Ah! the stick, the stick, the stern hand,’ thought Razumov, longing for 
power to hurt and to destroy. (33, emphasis added) 
However, Razumov is not allowed to have this choice: the stick breaks and 
Razumov comes to see Ziemianitch’s unseeing eyes. Both refer to a castrating 
experience, but the second is the cause of the permanent disturbance in 
Razumov’s own vision. Ziemianitch presents Razumov with a sight that is the 
scopic equivalent of the absence of the maternal phallus, and not only because 
being blind is traditionally read as the symbolic equivalent of being castrated: 
“His eyeballs blinked all white in the light once, twice – then the gleam went 
out” (33). Ziemianitch does not seem to have irises for a moment – Razumov 
both sees his eyes and does not. This is the moment of castration for Razumov as 
Samuel Weber specifies it in his rereading of Freud’s “The Uncanny”: it is a 
moment of “negative perception” which “confronts the subject with the fact that 
it will never again be able to believe its eyes, since what they have seen is 
neither simply visible nor wholly invisible” (1113). It is the core of uncanny 
experiences – “another repetition, the articulation of difference which is equally 
a dis-articulation, dis-locating and even dis-membering the subject” (1114).  
Therefore, it is quite understandable that Razumov’s experience with 
Ziemianitch, reinforced by his later sublime identification with the Russian land 
quoted above, marks the beginning of unstoppable repetitions in Under Western 
Eyes, in the course of which almost all the major characters start to appear as 
each others’ doubles. More specifically, this is the event that triggers off 
Razumov’s first vision of Haldin’s phantom – a vision of his own Doppelgänger: 
Suddenly, on the snow, stretched on his back right across his path, he 
saw Haldin, solid, distinct, real, with his inverted hands over his eyes 
[...]. He was lying out of the way a little, as though he had selected that 
place on purpose. The snow round him was untrodden. (38) 
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The image is a summary of all the clashing desires and anxieties influencing 
Razumov’s concept of his own identity. Haldin, like all doubles, is a rival who 
has something Razumov desires: lying in the snow, he is united with the 
motherland in an anaclytic, unbreakable bond indicated by the “untrodden” 
snow. Like all doubles, he is Razumov’s mirror image with a difference – with 
objet a, with the gaze, an unrepresentable element of the real (Dolar passim). 
However, his eyes are hidden as an expression of Razumov’s ocular anxiety, a 
concomitant of the castrating experience: he is afraid of seeing too much. 
Haldin’s “ugly eyes” are “the evil eye,” Razumov’s own gaze, the lost object, 
the lack, which must lack to “make it possible to deal with a coherent reality” 
(Dolar 13). Razumov’s fear is momentarily relieved when he identifies with 
Councillor Mikulin, tellingly not because his sight becomes clearer, but because 
it is obscured: “The dimness of Councillor Mikulin’s eyes seemed to spread all 
over his face and made it indistinct to Razumov’s sight” (85). Identifying with 
the paternal gaze saves Razumov from seeing too much, but only temporarily: 
the experience of castration entailed by a union with the mother(land) can never 
be erased, just as seeing one’s double is a sign of irreversible psychosis (Dolar 
11). Mikulin’s often-quoted question about where exactly Razumov wants to 
retire (89) in this context refers to one very specific location: the spot from 
which the double cannot be seen. And that spot is the exact location of the 
double, which can be taken only by identifying with him. This is the option that 
Razumov finally takes when he confesses to the anarchists, even if it involves 
self-mutilation. Tellingly, he starts his confession with the words “I am come 
here [...] to talk of an individual called Ziemianitch” (301). 
Thus, the haunting and resounding voice of the literary father is painfully 
clear in Conrad’s novel. Or, to be true to the spirit of the text, one can say that 
authorial identity is constructed under the most penetrating – and most 
“unwestern” – gaze of the literary father in Under Western Eyes. Just like 
Dostoevsky’s Devils, this text also reveals an abyss – political, metaphysical and 
psychological – looking into which shakes the (textual) subject at most 
fundamental levels. Similarly to the Russian writer, Conrad traces the origins of 
the main character’s most painful dilemma in the malfunctioning Symbolic 
Father, but that does not hinder him from trusting his text to exactly such a 
parent of doubtful authority – being a Modernist and facing the 20
th
 century 
human condition he has no other choice. Once the authority of the paternal 
figure is weakened, narcissistic crisis rears up its ugly head, just like in 
Stavrogin’s narrative: complete with failed identifications, unstoppable doubling 
and self-destruction, Razumov’s story is a memorable echo of the Dostoevskian 
identity crisis. 
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The Impossible Gaze III: East and West under the “Trustful 
Eyes” of the Androgyne 
Apart from the dubious Western identity of the textual subject, the dichotomy of 
East and West is also rendered meaningless by a thematic element in Conrad’s 
text: the depiction of the Western narrator and the Russian main character as 
doubles. While it obviously washes away the boundaries between Eastern and 
Western ideology
21
, this fact also results in a hitherto ignored phenomenon: 
narrator and character not only gaze at each other reciprocally, as Alissa 
Hamilton points out (139), but also formulate their identity on behalf of a third, 
equally impossible gaze: the androgynous, incestuous, ghostly and ideology-free 
gaze of Nathalie, the representative of a Russian identity which is neither 
Eastern nor Western. 
The language teacher and Razumov can see mirrored in each other their 
squinting look directed at a third person, their object of desire, Nathalie Haldin. 
She is like a blind spot in the text: though everyone wants her – both the narrator 
and Razumov declare their love for her; Peter Ivanovitch orders Razumov to 
seduce her into the anarchist circle – she is ignored once motivations are 
discussed. The narrator never reveals why he starts to write his story, but his 
love for Nathalie antedates his meeting with Razumov – he takes up an interest 
in the otherwise aggressively rejective young man only to fulfil Nathalie’s 
desire. The two men’s ambiguous first dialogue quoted above deserves a re-
reading in this context. Razumov’s angry outburst is also a declaration of 
jealousy, of his rage at the language teacher’s cocksure assertion of being “in 
possession” of an unnameable “object” – by implication Nathalie: “’Talking 
about an admirable Russian girl. [...] What are you at? What is your object?’” 
(157, emphasis added). “Talking about an admirable Russian girl” is exactly the 
narrator’s object: she, and not Razumov is what the story-teller aims to possess 
by turning her into a narrative. Similarly, Razumov’s declaration of love comes 
as a shock at the end of the novel – he does everything to prove the opposite, 
most significantly, he avoids seeing Nathalie as long as possible. As if no one 
dared to look at her directly, or name her as the object of desire – and writing. 
But why? The Doppelgänger relationship mentioned above offers one possible 
explanation: the sight of Nathalie, a woman, par excellence a reminder of 
castration, as Mladen Dolar emphasises, must be avoided by the anxious doubles 
obsessed with their own mirror image and gaze reflected in each other. She can 
only be the “sideshow” (cf. Weber 1121–2).  
Nathalie’s case, however, is somewhat more complicated: for the narrator she 
needs to be doubly castrated, because she is androgynous. The professor keeps 
                                                     
21
 Gilliam speaks about the “collapsing” of the dichotomy of the Eastern and Western in the novel 
(“Russia” 231). 
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emphasising that the otherwise beautiful Nathalie is different from other women: 
“Her voice was deep, almost harsh, and yet caressing in its harshness. [...] She 
gave the impression of strong vitality” (92). These masculine qualities are 
reinforced by the comment that she has “something else than the mere grace of 
femininity” (92) and then she is immediately compared to a “young man” with a 
“direct,” “trustful,” and, most importantly, “intrepid glance” (92). The narrator’s 
reaction to this (male?) gaze is that of renunciation (castration?). It is later 
repeated by Razumov: “He had responded, as no one could help responding, to 
the harmonious charm of her whole person, its strength, its grace, its tranquil 
frankness – and then he had turned his gaze away. He said to himself that all this 
was not for him” (143). Her masculinity is so emphatic that she is subjected to 
figurative castration at the moment of receiving the news of her brother’s death: “I 
did not imagine that a number of the Standard could have the effect of Medusa’s 
head. Her face went stony in a moment – her eyes – her limbs. The most terrible 
thing was that being stony she remained alive” (99, emphasis added).  
This interpretation on the narrator’s part implies an incestuous bonding 
between Nathalie and her brother and identifies her gaze with his – a reading 
Razumov confirms by not looking at Nathalie because for him she is Haldin’s 
haunting double: 
The most trustful eyes in the world – your brother said of you when he 
was as well as a dead man already. And when you stood before me 
with your hand extended, I remembered the very sound of his voice, 
and I looked into your eyes – and that was enough. […] Hate or no 
hate, I felt at once that, while shunning the sight of you, I could never 
succeed in driving away your image. I would say, addressing the dead 
man, ‘Is this the way you are going to haunt me?’ (296) 
Thus, between the two of them, the language teacher and Razumov construct 
Nathalie’s impossible gaze. First of all, it is the gaze of a “young man yet 
unspoiled by the world’s wise lessons,” but “capable of being roused by an idea” 
(93). In other words, it is a gaze yet ideologically indeterminate. Secondly, it is 
also a gaze determined by Haldin, as Nathalie’s reading of Razumov 
demonstrates. For her he is an “[u]nstained, lofty and solitary existence” (118) 
on the basis of her brother’s letter received well before ever meeting Razumov. 
Even in choosing Razumov as an object of desire she identifies on behalf of her 
brother’s gaze and with her brother’s gaze – Razumov is meant to be a substitute 
for her lost object. Thirdly, Razumov sees in her eyes Haldin’s gaze. Nathalie’s 
gaze is thus the impossible gaze of Haldin before his ideological identification 
with the anarchists; she is the impossible Russian subject who is not determined 
by any ideology.  
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Such a combination makes her strictly unreadable and unrepresentable, on 
the one hand, and identification with her gaze strictly impossible, on the other. It 
is reflected in Razumov’s reaction to seeing Nathalie during their last meeting as 
a result of her symbolic unveiling. This somewhat theatrical element needs to be 
understood together with its complementary scene, Razumov’s veiling of his 
diary-confession, his own narrative identity into Nathalie’s veil of mourning. 
Nathalie unveils herself while she is speaking about her peregrinations to find 
Razumov – the scene starts as a seductive revelation of female desire, Salome’s 
dance. The final dropping of the veil, however, corresponds to her mention of 
Haldin, more exactly the danger of her mother’s “seeing him” (287). As if she 
was suddenly transformed into the woman behind the veil in Gothic novels (cf. 
Kilgour 128–32): the sight of what is behind the veil – Haldin’s ghostly sight 
and gaze – evokes unimaginable horror in Razumov. The only way he can 
interpret it is the gaze of the phantom Haldin – and it demands self-sacrifice 
from him, it calls for his union with the mother land. Razumov succumbs to this 
imperative by becoming the woman behind the veil – by stealing Nathalie’s 
garment of mourning and wrapping his diary into it. The rest – his often 
criticised, redundant-looking confession to the anarchists, the bursting of his 
eardrums and the accident that leaves him a cripple – is purely functional: it is 
Razumov’s way of committing suicide and assuming the identity Nathalie’s gaze 
ascribes to him. It is that of Haldin – the dead Haldin. Ironically, Nathalie gives 
the diary to the professor, offering Razumov’s story for his possession instead of 
her own (person). 
Inverting the Gaze: Clashing Fantasies 
I have tried to illustrate how Conrad’s text represents Russian identity as a shaky 
ideological construct sustained by the opposition of East and West, spectacularly 
present in the Enlightenment ethos of Western culture and the Slavophil 
discourse of Russianness. Trying to detect the gazes determining the subject’s 
identification with these discourses, however, has revealed the impossibility of 
the opposition. The very concepts of “Eastern” and “Western” have proved to be 
pure signifiers of difference, which, in Conrad’s critique of both discourses, 
simply collapse into each other. The reasons and process of this collapse have 
already thrown light on the central fantasies sustaining the ideological construct 
of Russianness from both sides. As for the West, the Enlightenment ethos and its 
legacy of positivism entail a vision of universal humanity that is an object of 
scientific enquiry and rational understanding. To what extent it is a utopia is 
illustrated by the narrator’s fantasy of being “in possession” of that “admirable 
Russian girl”. But the failure is already coded in the discourse: Russianness, 
much to the analogy of the Orient, is constructed in the ideology as a concept 
involving irrationality and passion – causes of the rational Western mind’s 
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inevitable failure to grasp it. As for the Slavophil discourse, it is the union with 
the motherland, the soil as saving grace which is the major target of Conrad’s 
criticism. The fantasy of establishing identity, subjecthood through this union is 
sustained by the image of the wanderer, the in-built safety-belt of the discourse. 
In Slavophil ideology the Westernised intellectual’s identity crisis is caused by 
the failure to return to the soil, and it is his otherness that obstructs the utopian 
formation of a united Russian nation, also a self-sacrificing saviour of the world. 
Conrad also inverts cause-and-effect relationships here: in his novel it is the 
realisation of this union that leads to the irreversible crisis and annihilation of the 
individual. If the intrusion of Western thought is an obstacle to this union, it is 
just as necessary as the Name of the Father. Without it Russian passion for the 
motherland inevitable turns into a futile Passion. 
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HUXLEY’S “LITTLE STAVROGIN” – 
FIGHTING DOSTOEVSKY’S DEVILS IN POINT 
COUNTER POINT1 
“The monks of Thebaid […] got to the stage of being devils. 
Self-torture, destruction of everything decent and beautiful 
and living. That was their programme. They tried to obey 
Jesus and be more than men; and all they succeeded in doing 
was to become the incarnation of pure diabolic 
destructiveness. They could have been perfectly decent 
human beings if they’d just gone about behaving naturally, 
in accordance with their instincts. But no, they wanted to be 
more than human. So they just became devils.” (Huxley, 
Point Counter Point 416, emphasis added)
2
 
It is an accepted assumption in literary criticism that one of the major characters 
in Aldous Huxley’s Point Counter Point (1928), Maurice Spandrell, was 
modelled on Dostoevsky’s Stavrogin (Baker 113). It is based on a direct 
reference, on a comment made in the novel: Spandrell is called derogatively “the 
little Stavrogin” (417). Far from wanting to ignore the manifold references 
inherent in Spandrell’s figure, I would like to point out that the implications of 
this connection with Dostoevsky’s Devils (1871) have not been thoroughly 
explored in Huxley criticism. Though comparisons of Point Counter Point with 
other novels abound (e.g. Firchow, “Mental Music” passim), it has not been 
interpreted from a most obvious perspective: as a systematic and polemical 
rewriting of Dostoevsky’s text. What seems to be only an emphatic parallel 
between two fictional characters, on closer inspection turns out to be a sustained 
similarity of genre, structure and plot. Despite these similarities Huxley’s 
approach to Dostoevsky seems to be rather ambivalent. While he apparently 
learns a lot from the Russian writer as far as the art of the novel is concerned, by 
rewriting Stavrogin as Spandrell he harshly criticises Dostoevsky’s insistence on 
spiritual quest. This overt rejection of Dostoevky’s ideological/philosophical 
stance is, however, subverted by the power of Huxley’s Dostoevskian character, 
since Spandrell’s role and representation also reinforce and actualise Stavrogin’s 
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 First published as “Huxley’s ‘Little Stavrogin’ – Fighting Dostoevsky’s Devils in Point Counter 
Point,” Slavica XXXVII (2008), 133–52. Special thanks for his careful linguistic editing to 
Charles Somerville. 
2
 All quotations from the novel are based on (Huxley, Point Counter Point) and will be indicated 
only by the page numbers in parenthetical notes. 
104 
significance as a foreshadowing or even embodiment of the twentieth-century 
human condition. Consequently, Huxley’s rewriting – maybe against the explicit 
intent of the text – balances critical irony with unquestionable reverence for the 
obsessively powerful original. 
Competing Ideals: Dostoevsky vs. D. H. Lawrence 
Huxley’s ambivalent approach to Dostoevsky’s art might be better understood in 
the context of the English writer’s lifelong fascination with his novels and his 
relatively brief, but very intense relationship with D. H. Lawrence. Dostoevsky 
was one of Huxley’s favourites and his art was a model for the English writer. 
Nevertheless, the publication of Point Counter Point coincides with the writing 
of Huxley’s most passionate attack against the Russian novelist in his non-
fiction – and with his closest association with D. H. Lawrence. 
Though Dostoevsky is hardly ever mentioned in Huxley criticism, even the 
sporadic evidence testifies to Huxley’s lifelong admiration for the Russian 
novelist: he regarded Dostoevsky as an embodiment of true modernity, 
obsessively reread his novels, and produced texts which show curious 
similarities with Dostoevsky’s works. Huxley shared the interest of most major 
English Modernist writers in Dostoevsky’s art, which was fostered by the 
publication of Constance Garnett’s translations of his major novels in the decade 
following 1912 (P. Kaye 18)
3
. Peter Firchow points out how in the heyday of 
this “cult-like” popularity (P. Kaye 19) Huxley in his essay “What, Exactly, is 
Modern?” defines his sense of modernity through Dostoevsky’s example: “What 
was really modern, what was really new, were intelligence, sensitivity, 
spirituality, tolerance. Hence, for him the most modern novelist was not Joyce or 
Gide or Cocteau, but Dostoevsky” (Aldous Huxley 39). On the evidence of his 
reading habits, Huxley’s fascination seems to have lasted till the end of his life: 
his recent biographer, Nicholas Murray recalls that The Brothers Karamazov 
was among the books he liked to reread all through his life (370). Though one 
would imagine that such admiration could not pass without leaving some 
palpable traces in Huxley’s own work, the question seems to be almost 
untouched in Huxley criticism. Significantly, Peter Kaye, who maps the attitude 
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 Constance Garnett’s translation of Devils was first published in 1914 with the better-known, but 
slightly misleading English title The Possessed. Most of the quotations from Dostoevsky’s novel 
are based on this translation, now available as a searchable e-text. Therefore, the references to 
this source as (Dostoevsky, The Possessed) will not contain page numbers. This version, 
however, did not include “Stavrogin’s Confession”, which was first published in English in 1922 
as a separate volume. For this reason quotes from that section will be indicated as (Dostoevsky, 
Stavrogin’s Confession), with the relevant page numbers. The reason for using these translations 
is purely philological: Huxley was obviously familiar with these versions of the text, and he also 
mentions the novel as The Possessed. I myself will refer to Dostoevsky’s novel by the more 
appropriate title Devils, which was used in Katz’s 1958 translation (cf. Dostoevsky, Devils). 
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of all major English Modernist writers to Dostoevsky in his excellent monograph 
Dostoevsky and English Modernism 1900–1930, does not even mention 
Huxley’s name. It is only Firchow who, after the tongue in cheek remark that 
“Huxley, to be sure, never did become a Dostoevsky”, goes into some length to 
point out a number of general similarities in the two authors’ works. Most 
importantly, he mentions the reflection of their spiritual quest, which shows the 
same pattern: “Like the great Russian novelist, Huxley went through a period of 
doubt and search, and came out at the other end with a great urge to proselytize”. 
He also puts down to Dostoevsky’s influence the “notorious focussing on 
gruesome details” in Huxley’s writing, just like the appearance of the double in his 
early fiction (Aldous Huxley 39–40). Apart from these similarities and Stavrogin’s 
rewriting in Point Counter Point the other well-known and obvious intertextual 
relationship between the two authors’ works is the “revision” of the Grand 
Inquisitor episode in Brave New World (e.g. Firchow, Aldous Huxley 126–7). 
As opposed to this very positive approach to Dostoevsky, Huxley’s opinion 
at the time of writing Point Counter Point is dramatically different: summed up 
in his essay on Baudelaire, it is both a rude attack against the Russian writer and 
an obvious misreading of his works. Huxley’s “Baudelaire” was originally 
published in 1929, in the collection of essays entitled Do What You Will. Since 
this volume was written parallel to Point Counter Point, it is usually read 
together with the novel as an important set of intertexts reflecting Huxley’s 
philosophical stance at the time. From the perspective of this study the first most 
significant point is a curious common trait of the fictional and non-fictional 
texts: in both of them Dostoevsky is inseparably connected with Baudelaire. 
Drawing on the biographical elements of the French poet and the fictional 
characters (!) of the Russian writer Huxley practically identifies the two artists in 
the single type of the Satanist, the “looking-glass Christian” (On Art and Artists 
183) in both writings.  
Because of its particularly aggressive attitude and tone it is worth expanding 
on the argumentation of the essay at some length. For Huxley Dostoevsky’s 
whole art, his major characters – whom he obviously identifies with the author – 
and more specifically the “extraordinary and horrible” Devils demonstrate 
“[w]hat happens when the intellect and imagination are allowed to break away 
completely from the wholesome control of the body and the instincts”. He 
claims that the Russians, as “parvenus of intelligence and consciousness”, are 
simply too new to European culture to be able to control their intellect – which 
he clearly treats as a synonym of the spirit – therefore, “[u]nrestrained by the 
body, their intellect and imagination have become at once licentious and 
monomaniacal”. As a result, any “decent physical relationship” with nature or 
with other human beings has become impossible for them. Locked up in their 
private worlds, they are for Huxley “self-made madmen”, “emotional onanists” 
engaged in endless “masturbations”. When they attempt to break out from their 
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solipsism and establish a relationship with their environment, the consequences 
are tragic: they only realise their “wild” and “monomaniac imaginings” and “go 
and commit suicide, or murder, or rape”. For Huxley, however, these tragedies 
seem to be both “stupid and grotesque” and “ludicrous and idiotic”, even 
“absurd”. The reason for this is that in his view they could be avoided by the 
establishment of normal – and not perverted – (sexual) relationships with women 
(with special reference to Stavrogin’s masochistic intercourses with “women he 
detested”) and/or with nature. He concludes by claiming that “[t]he horrors that 
darken The Possessed and the other novels of Dostoevsky are tragedies of 
mental licentiousness. [...] these tragedies are nothing but stupid farces that have 
been carried too far” (On Art 178–9). In the rest of the essay Baudelaire, 
Dostoevsky, ascetic Christians, all Platonics and the Marquis de Sade come to be 
parts of the same logical sequence – a group showing striking similarities with 
the list of characters representing ‘modern’ romanticism in Huxley’s philosophy 
by the end of the 1920s (cf. Baker 25). In Robert Baker’s analysis it is exactly a 
“sustained attack” on this romanticism that “governs Huxley’s social satire” in 
his major works (4). 
The same charges are repeated ad verbatim in Point Counter Point by Mark 
Rampion, addressed to intellectuals and ascetic Christians in the same breath:  
‘You and your intellectual, scientific friends. You’ve killed just as 
much of yourselves as the Christian maniacs. Shall I read your 
programme? [...] No body, no contact with the material world, no 
contact with human beings except through the intellect, no love [...]. 
You stick to your conscious will. [...] And the connections must be 
purely mental. And life must be lived [...] as though it were solitary 
recollection and fancy and meditation. An endless masturbation, like 
Proust’s horrible great book.’ (412) 
The final conclusion of this tirade, however, is directed singularly against 
Spandrell – and Dostoevsky:  
‘Pardon my saying so, Spandrell; but you really are the most colossal 
fool. [...] Smiling like all the tragic characters of fiction rolled into one! 
[...] Laugh away, old Dostoievsky! But let me tell you, it’s Stavrogin 
who ought to have been called the Idiot, not Mishkin. He was 
incomparably the bigger fool, the completer pervert.’ (417) 
Both texts verbalise the same charges and use practically the same images: that 
of psychopathology (perversion, abjection, masochism, solipsism/narcissism and 
monomania) and theatricality (tragedy vs. farce). 
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The comparison of Huxley’s Dostoevsky critique with D. H. Lawrence’s 
opinion about the Russian writer suggests a close relationship between the 
Laurentian influence on Point Counter Point and its harsh attack against the 
Dostoevskian spiritual quest. The facts that Huxley’s bitter outburst against 
Dostoevsky seems to be a temporal phenomenon and that it is formulated by 
Rampion in Point Counter Point call attention to its possible relationship with D. 
H. Lawrence. Rampion is obviously a fictional representation of Lawrence and 
endorses a simplified version of his philosophical ideas (Ferns 39; Bowering, 
Aldous Huxley 78). As for example Keith Cushman’s detailed analysis of the two 
English writers’ relationship (passim) shows, Huxley was most deeply influenced 
by Lawrence’s ideas about sexuality and “blood consciousness” and by his 
consequent rejection of spirituality at the end of the 1920s, when their relationship 
was at its closest – until Lawrence’s death in 1930. It is customary to allude to this 
period only as a “passing phase” (Bowering, Aldous Huxley 20) in Huxley’s own 
spiritual quest, a phase which is obviously incongruous with Huxley’s own 
attitude, as a “way station on his journey to mysticism and spirituality” (Cushman 
19). C. S. Ferns also points out that the temporary acceptance of Lawrence’s 
theories resulted in bitter outbursts against writers whom Huxley followed in his 
own art as his masters but who were not compatible with Laurentian philosophy, 
for example against Swift (39; cf. Huxley, On Art 168–76). The joint attack 
against Baudelaire and Dostoevsky – two authors Huxley was deeply influenced 
by – might be parts of the same campaign. 
In fact, Huxley’s critique of Dostoevsky cited above contains definite echoes 
of Lawrence’s views about the Russian writer. Quite tellingly, Kaye sums up 
Lawrence’s “misreading” of Dostoevky in terms of “prophetic rage and rivalry”. 
As he points out, “Lawrence viewed Dostoevsky as a victim and carrier of the 
modern disease of ‘mental consciousness’”, which is “the characteristic disease 
of the modern age”. The dominance of “mental consciousness” – intellectual 
capacities not differentiated from spiritual aspirations – becomes a disease, in 
Lawrence’s opinion, when “it separates man from [...] ‘pure blood 
consciousness’”, in other words, when it dictates an abnormal repression of the 
body and its instincts. All in all, Lawrence – just like Huxley, and most of their 
English contemporaries – washes away the boundaries between Dostoevsky and 
his fictitious characters and comes to the conclusion that both “were mind-
obsessed”. For him, “Dostoevsky [...] represents the entire hospital of modernity, 
with its wards of Christian enthusiasts and murderers, ostrich-philosophers and 
fallen sensualists: all diseases gather in his name” (44–5). The key term of 
Lawrence’s interpretation, “mental disease” caused by and reflected in the 
complete rejection of the body and its instincts, is clearly echoed in Huxley’s 
insistence on reading Devils in terms of psychopathology resulting from the 
unhealthy liberty and dominance of intelligence.  
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In conclusion, even on the basis of his non-fiction Huxley’s assessment of 
Dostoevsky reflects a strange ambivalence. The assertion of Dostoevsky’s 
modernity seems to be a double-edged sword. Dostoevsky is modern because of 
his intellect, sensitivity and spirituality. But because of his intellect, sensitivity 
and spirituality he also embodies all the diseases of modern man summed up for 
Huxley in the terms of “romanticism” and “new” or “inverted romanticism”, and 
associated, among others, with the characters of Baudelaire and the Marquis de 
Sade. At the time of writing Point Counter Point this ambivalence seems to be 
temporarily resolved in open antagonism under Lawrence’s influence, at least as 
far as Huxley’s non-fiction is concerned. The case of the novel, however, 
appears to be more complicated. 
Rewriting Devils: Historical Characters, Clashing Ideas, 
Musical Analogues and Political Murders 
In the Baudelaire essay Huxley’s attack is concentrated on Devils, as a novel 
embodying all the maladies of Dostoevsky’s works and of modern man. 
Nevertheless, in Point Counter Point he creates a text which shows striking 
similarities with that particularly “hateful” novel, as far as genre, structure and 
plot are concerned. Together with the direct reference to Stavrogin they imply a 
systematic rewriting of Dostoevsky’s text. 
The first generic similarity is that both novels are romans à clef
4
. Yet the 
historical characters and/or events function differently in the two texts. While 
Devils models some of its major characters and events on historical facts – and 
probably it is needless to relate all the details of the Nechaev case and Ivanov’s 
murder here (cf. Сараскина 435–9) – Point Counter Point relies on the characters 
of Huxley’s intellectual circle rather than on concrete events associated with them. 
Apart from depicting Lawrence as Rampion, it is worth pointing out that Huxley 
himself appears in the novel through the two highly autobiographical characters of 
Philip Quarles and Walter Bidlake (Firchow, “Mental Music” 530). A number of 
the other characters have also been identified with some of Huxley’s 
contemporaries (cf. Roston 383; Firchow, “Mental Music” 530), notably Denis 
Burlap with John Middleton Murry (Roston 381) and the leader of the British 
Freemen, Everard Webley with the English fascist Oswald Mosley (Cushman 3). 
As a result, while in Dostoevsky’s novel the real political events in the background 
supply the basic plot and give opportunity for occasional attacks on contemporary 
literary life, the situation is exactly the opposite in Huxley’s text, since he focuses 
                                                     
4
 This fact is a commonplace in literature on Dostoevsky and Huxley, cf. (Сараскина 435–9) and 
(Firchow, “Mental Music” 531; Cushman passim). 
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on the characters of artists and intellectuals
5
, and launches only occasional attacks 
on contemporary politics. 
More significantly, as far as their genre is concerned, both Devils and Point 
Counter Point are satirical novels of ideas
6
. An often-cited metafictional section 
of Point Counter Point, in which the writer Quarles outlines the plan of his novel 
– recognisably the novel one is reading –, locates Huxley’s text in the tradition 
of the novel of ideas:  
Novel of ideas. The character of each personage must be implied, as 
far as possible, in the ideas of which he is the mouthpiece. In so far as 
theories are rationalizations of sentiments, instincts, dispositions of 
soul, this is feasible. [...] The great defect of the novel of ideas is that 
it’s a made-up affair. Necessarily; for people who can reel off neatly 
formulated notions aren’t quite real; they’re slightly monstrous. Living 
with monsters becomes rather tiresome in the long run. (303) 
The difficulties of the genre pointed out here evoke Peter Kaye’s comment on 
the assessment of the master of the novel of ideas, Dostoevsky, as an 
“exhilarating monster” in English Modernism (6). The tradition of the genre was 
represented in Britain by the half-forgotten and somewhat outdated novels of 
Peacock – the writer whose influence is usually emphasised in Huxley 
monographs (e.g. Bowering, Aldous Huxley 2). One of Huxley’s personal letters 
also testifies to the fact that he regarded Dostoevsky as a master of the genre – in 
fact, that he found it difficult to write a good novel of ideas without the 
“elevated genius” of a Dostoevsky (Murray 377).  
Devils and Point Counter Point not only belong to the same generic tradition, 
but also show the clash of conspicuously similar ideas, though with a definite 
shift in emphasis. It is relatively easy to draw a parallel between the nihilistic 
ideas informing the reading of Dostoevsky’s novel (cf. Смирнов, 
Психодиахронологика 120–30) and the same tendencies embodied in Spandrell; 
between the political anarchism of Pyotr Verkhovensky and its small-scale 
representation in the clownish Illidge; between the Nietzschean ideas of Kirillov 
and their twentieth-century fascist revival in Huxley’s “tinpot Mussolini” (46), 
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 In fact, though Huxley’s text apparently shows encyclopaediac pretentions with its multiplicity 
of aspects and “human fugue”, it has been repeatedly criticised as elitist in its depiction of “a 
small intellectual circle” (Bowering, Aldous Huxley 6; Grosvenor 13). 
6
 As Mikhail Bakhtin connects the Dostoevskian novel to the Menippean satire in the long run 
(Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 121–2), Northrop Frye also ascribes Point Counter Point to 
this tradition (Anatomy of Criticism 308–9). No detailed analysis of the novel as a Menippean 
satire has been formulated yet. Peter Bowering emphasizes the satirical potentials of the novel of 
ideas as a genre, since it is “traditionally a vehicle for satire; and this occurs when the 
predominating idea becomes obsessional” (Aldous Huxley 9). 
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Everard Webley. Shatov’s Slavophil ideas and the voice of Dostoevsky’s holy 
fools can be partly regarded as the victims of an unsuccessful cultural transfer: 
they are not relevant in the British context. Moreover, Christianity is one of the 
most important targets of satire in the novel, therefore the seriously modified 
revival of these voices can be recognised in the caricature of the good Christian 
(Burlap) and the figure of the “inverse” Christian (Spandrell). With the addition 
of the focus on intellectuals and artist figures (Quarles, Walter and John Bidlake) 
and the hedonism of the aristocratic Lucy Tantamount, the difference in the 
emphasis of the two novels becomes obvious. The most important dissimilarity, 
however, is the presence of a detailed and positively – almost prophetically – 
advocated philosophy in Huxley’s novel: Tikhon’s tentative direction is 
substituted by the harsh “gospel” and authoritative voice of Rampion’s 
Laurentian preaching (cf. Firchow, Aldous Huxley 108–9). To return to one of 
the starting points of this study, this is probably one of the features which make 
Dostoevsky in fact “more modern” than Huxley. As Harold H. Watts points out, 
“It is not the particular message, not Huxley’s particular gospel in this novel, 
that would lead many modern readers to be sceptical of its claim on our 
attention. [...] What is objectionable in Point Counter Point, what precludes full 
modernity for it, is the fact that confident admonition is indeed offered” (415).
7
 
The structure of the two novels is traditionally characterised with two 
strikingly similar musical analogues, those of polyphony and counterpoint. 
However, Mikhail Bakhtin’s post factum musical analogy implies in many ways 
much less and much more than Huxley’s self-conscious “musicalization of 
fiction” (301). It implies less, because – according to the testimony of another 
metafictional excerpt from Philip Quarles’s notebook – Huxley consciously uses 
the musical analogy as the fundamental principle of formulating his characters, 
ideas, themes and episodes:  
Musicalization of fiction [...] in the construction. Meditate on 
Beethoven. The changes of moods, the abrupt transitions. [...] More 
interesting still the modulations, not merely from one key to another, 
but from mood to mood. The theme is stated, then developed, pushed 
out of shape, imperceptibly deformed, until, though still recognizably 
the same, it has become quite different. (301–2) 
These ideas, allegedly inspired by Gide’s Counterfeiters (Firchow, Aldous 
Huxley 115–16), once put into practice, result in Huxley’s probably most 
ambitious and genuinely Modernist formal experiment (cf. Hobby 13–17)
8
. On 
                                                     
7
 Firchow, on the other hand, evaluates the phenomenon positively, pointing out that with this 
novel Huxley turns toward writing “predominantly constructive satire” (Aldous Huxley 117). 
8
 For detailed analyses of the musical structure of Huxley’s novel see for example (Bowen, 
“Allusions to Musical Works in Point Counter Point” passim; Watt passim). 
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the one hand this experiment involves a very conscious and artistic organisation 
of several variations on a fairly limited number of themes (cf. Firchow, Aldous 
Huxley 97). In fact, Firchow highlights three such subjects – love, death and 
religion (Aldous Huxley 98) – while Donald Watt even contends that only two of 
these, love and death formulate the “subject” and “countersubject” of Huxley’s 
“fugue” (511). On the other hand, Huxley’s musical organisation – similarly to 
Dostoevsky’s polyphony – means the inclusion of several perspectives, voices, 
even styles. The impersonal narrator enters the consciousness of several 
characters and the overall effect of Huxley’s narrative is somewhat similar to the 
Jamesian point-of-view technique. Apart from this, there are not only characters 
discussing their ideas in the novel, but their “authentic” pieces, together with a 
lot of other “texts” characterised by a great stylistic variety, are also inserted in 
their own right. To give but a few examples, Point Counter Point includes 
Quarles’s metafictional notebook, Lucy’s letters, excerpts from Baudelaire 
poems in French, numerous cases of ekphrasis (cf. Bowering, “’The Source of 
Light’” passim) and an almost independent semiotic subsystem of references to 
musical pieces (cf. Bowen, “Allusions to Musical Works in Point Counter 
Point”passim). Nevertheless, Huxley’s counterpoint still implies less than 
polyphony, because not only is the hypothetical equality of the voices overtly 
shattered by the didactically propagated Laurentian “gospel”, a voice which 
seems to be the mouthpiece of the (implied) author, but thereby the independent 
subject status of the other characters is also endangered (cf. Bakhtin, Problems 
of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 21–2). For the same reason it is also very difficult to 
speak about the interaction or dialogic relationship of the ideas/characters in the 
Bakhtinian sense (cf. Problems 40). 
The most convincing similarity of the two novels, nevertheless, resides in 
their plot. Point Counter Point does not abound in events, but whatever actually 
happens in the novel is by and large a repetition of Devils. Since Huxley draws 
on his contemporary society for character rather than for plot, and he is mostly 
concerned with ideas and their modifications in his rather numerous characters’ 
mind, he seems to be left with only a sparse sequence of events for action. This 
is true to such an extent that one of his monographers, Laurence Brander was 
inspired to give a parodistic retelling of the novel with an emphasis on the 
abundance of characters and lack of events by way of analysis (31–8). With 
some necessary simplification one can claim that the story includes a ball, a 
political murder and the suicide of the murderer, Spandrell, masquerading as 
another political murder. The ball itself is a sequence of snapshots and episodes, 
but because of its obvious satirical take on contemporary society it is still 
reminiscent of the memorable social gatherings in Devils: the meeting of 
Verkhovensky’s political associates, and of course the fatal ball at the end of the 
novel. The murder combines elements of Kirillov’s forced and farcical suicide 
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with Shatov’s killing, while Spandrell’s suicide clearly corresponds to 
Stavrogin’s death by his own hand.  
The possibility of giving a mythical interpretation to the events in Point 
Counter Point and their obvious apocalyptic bent gives further emphasis to the 
similarity of the two plots. In Dostoevsky’s text Stavrogin’s return is 
metaphorically associated with Palm Sunday, which relates the events to Easter 
and activates the solar hero’s myth (cf. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism 187), with 
special emphasis on death (pathos), disappearance (sparagmos) and potential 
reappearance (anagnorisis) (cf. Frye, Anatomy 192). The chaotic and 
apocalyptic ball, the fires, the murders and Stavrogin’s death shatter all hopes 
for rebirth, however. The time of action in Huxley’s novel is set somewhat later, 
but evokes the same myth: it takes place “between Easter and Whitsun” (230). 
There is not much hope that resurrection might come at the end – as Rampion 
points out, “Different kinds of death – the only alternatives” (138). Nevertheless, 
the reference to Easter – as if time progressed backwards – is repeated at the end 
of the novel, when a glimpse of hope is given that little Philip Quarles, dying of 
meningitis, might recover: “Luncheon that day was like a festival of 
resurrection, an Easter sacrament” (431). This hope of resurrection is soon 
shattered, and the novel ends – similarly to Devils, which includes the death of 
thirteen people (Сараскина 453) – with a number of actual or impeding deaths: 
Webley is murdered, just like Spandrell, Ethel Cobbett commits suicide, little 
Phil suffers a most painful and cruel death, and Sidney Quarles pretends to be 
dying while John Bidlake is dying of cancer in good earnest. Though with the 
exception of Phil’s death, which is “a particularly gratuitous horror” (435), none 
of them are as horrible as the deaths depicted in Devils [Webley’s turns into a 
“clownery” (403), Spandrell’s is overshadowed by his sublime experience], the 
quiet everyday horror they suggest is none the less terrifying. The actors of the 
story, just like those of Dostoevsky’s novel, are devils – at least if one can give 
credit to Rampion’s statement quoted above that men wanting to be more than 
human become subhuman and inhuman, that is, devils (416). Their rightful 
location – the metaphorical setting of Devils as hell – is indicated in Rampion’s 
prophetic remarks about all the political parties leading people equally to hell 
(307). Similarly, the apocalyptic implications of the end of Devils are repeated in 
Rampion’s prophecy about the impending world war and the end of the present 
political and social constitution within a decade (323). All in all, the 
downplaying of the significance of the central Christian myth seems to be a part 
of the general demythologising strategy of the novel, which, nevertheless, is 
counteracted by the inevitably apocalyptic bent of the plot and the mythologising 
nature of Rampion’s – Lawrence’s – “authoritative” reading of events and 
characters. 
It can be concluded that the major generic and structural qualities of the two 
novels allow for a reading of Huxley’s Point Counter Point as a systematic 
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rewriting of Dostoevsky’s Devils. Huxley, by the very fact of using some of the 
formal devices of Dostoevsky’s novel, and notably by reproducing its plot 
testifies to its actuality and relevance in the Britain – and Europe – of the late 
1920s and in the context of Modernist art.  
Rewriting Stavrogin: A not so Stupid Tragedy 
The recreation of Stavrogin as Maurice Spandrell is the major device of criticism 
against what Huxley perceives as Dostoevsky’s ideological stance in Point 
Counter Point. There are, in fact, two references to their relationship in the 
novel, both given by Rampion. Chronologically the second, more simplistic and 
direct comment, containing the key phrase of “the little Stavrogin”, explained as 
a “morality-philosophy pervert” and an “idiot” (417), has been quoted above. In 
an earlier, indirect, more detailed and sophisticated but nonetheless equally 
derogative remark Rampion characterises Spandrell as  
…a permanent adolescent. […] He’s Peter Pan à la Dostoevsky-cum-
de Musset-cum-the-Nineties-cum-Bunyan-cum-Byron and the Marquis 
de Sade. Really deplorable. The more so as he’s potentially a very 
decent human being. (139) 
This self-explanatory list of literary sources for Spandrell’s character is 
completed by his recital of Baudelaire’s poetry during his first appearance in the 
novel (137) and thus unanimously points to an easy dismissal of Stavrogin’s 
(Dostoevsky’s) figure as pathological and (romantically) theatrical – to a 
verbatim repetion of Huxley’s critical stance in his essay. Stavrogin’s and 
Spandrell’s detailed comparison, however, shows a much more desperate fight 
with Dostoevsky’s spirit and an ambivalence of feelings. Huxley’s strategy of 
rewriting includes two slightly different procedures. On the one hand, his text 
reproduces some iconic features of Stavrogin’s character without significant 
modifications, which set the context for interpreting Spandrell in the light of 
Devils right from the beginning, even without the help of Rampion’s clues. On 
the other hand, some of Stavrogin’s features appear in a still recognisable, but 
seriously modified – not to say distorted – form in Spandrell, much in 
accordance with the Baudelaire study. Huxley’s critical reading of Devils is 
embodied in these explicit changes, whereas his text also contains significant 
elements which implicitly counter their effects. Strangely enough, after all these 
manoeuvrings Spandrell – just like Stavrogin – remains the most memorable 
character of the novel, whose spiritual quest and pathetic failure seem to be more 
human than Rampion’s dated and didactic Laurentian gospel.  
As far as the “unmodified” repetition of features is concerned, Spandrell’s 
appearance clearly evokes key metaphors associated with Stavrogin. The central 
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elements of his first description through Mary Rampion’s eyes parallel the 
dominant features of Stavrogin’s depiction. The demonism suggested by the 
“particularly intense black” of Stavrogin’s hair and by its sharp contrast with his 
“peculiarly light” eyes and “peculiarly soft and white” face; the “mask”-like 
quality of his complexion, which evokes in the Russian context notions of the 
theatre, the carnivalesque and of the demonic (Szilárd 21); the deathlike look 
inherent in the famous “lifeless wax figure”(Dostoevksy, The Possessed) 
metaphor, even the special focus on his sensuous lips are all apparent in 
Spandrell’s portrait:  
Like a gargoyle [...] in a pink boudoir. There was one on Notre Dame 
in just that attitude, leaning forward with his demon’s face between his 
claws. Only the gargoyle was a comic devil, so extravagantly 
diabolical that you couldn’t take his devilishness very seriously. 
Spandrell was a real person, not a caricature; that was why his face was 
so much more sinister and tragical. It was a gaunt face. [...] The grey 
eyes were deeply set. In the cadaverous mask only the mouth was 
fleshy – a wide mouth, with lips that stood out from the skin like two 
thick weals. (101) 
Similarly, the most important elements of Spandrell’s narrative correspond to 
those of Stavrogin’s. First of all, he introduces himself by telling an anecdote of 
his “regular technique with the young [women]” (102), i.e. with a braggingly 
magnified version of his single adventure with a young girl called Harriet 
Watkins (cf. 121–2), which repeats a central theme of “Stavrogin’s Confession”, 
that of emotional experimentation through the sadistic abuse of women. The 
story is later retold through Spandrell’s consciousness as a much less 
vainglorious affair – in fact, as a baffling combination of sadism and masochistic 
self-torture, a source of disappointment and self-hatred (226–7). Though Harriet 
is a young adult who does physically survive Spandrell’s “education” (102), 
because of his insistence on the corruption of innocence and (self)torture the 
story is still clearly reminiscent of the Matryosha episode (Dostoevsky, 
Stavrogin’s Confession 40–61). What gradually evolves as Spandrell’s narrative 
after this overture is a restaging of Stavrogin’s life in Petersburg: he sponges off 
his mother and devotes himself to debauchery, but all this in a nihilistic stupor of 
self-destruction, which is ultimately aimed at provoking God to reveal Himself. 
This spiritual quest (cf. Bowering, Aldous Huxley 91) is also the central motive 
behind Stavrogin’s experimentation, journeys to Mount Athos and Göttingen 
(Dostoevsky, Stavrogin’s Confession 62), his visit paid to Tikhon and his futile 
attempts to reform his life. Even the metaphors of the two characters’ emotional 
state and self-destruction are similar. Just like Stavrogin, who is repeatedly 
associated with the images of the “invalid” or “crippled creature” in need of a 
115 
“nurse” (Dostoevsky, The Possessed), Spandrell is also disabled by a strange 
emotional “paralysis” (227). The outcome of Spandrell’s quest, his suicide 
intertwined with political motifs and literally staged at the very end of the novel, 
also parallels the closing scene of Dostoevsky’s novel. 
Huxley’s criticism, embodied in the simplification, peripherisation, 
demystification and further demonisation of Stavrogin’s character in Spandrell, 
does not result in the easily dismissible, farcical image that his Baudelaire essay 
suggests. If anything, it highlights the compromise involved in giving up the 
spiritual dimension of human existence and situates Dostoevsky’s more 
equivocal and less didactic novel as a more modern text. 
The first major modification is that Huxley emphasises the Oedipal 
implications of Stavrogin’s character, which results in a relatively simplified 
rewriting: Stavrogin is reduced to a Freudian case study in Spandrell. 
Stavrogin’s narrative contains only implicit references to an unresolved Oedipal 
crisis: his inability to establish a working heterosexual relationship and his 
improportionate reaction to Tikhon’s remark about his similarity to his mother 
(Dostoevsky, Stavrogin’s Confession 26–7). Though a “case study” of clinical 
narcissism seems to be feasible, and the sense of abjection permeating the novel 
also suggests an unresolved traumatic moment (Kristeva, Powers of Horror 18–
20), psychology and, indeed, psychopathology are rejected as irrelevant 
simplifications of Stavrogin’s metaphysical quest in the novel. While Devils 
rather calls for a Lacanian analysis focussing on language and the subject than a 
classical Freudian one, it is exactly the latter which is overtly carried out in 
Huxley’s novel (224–7). The gaps in Stavrogin’s “case study” are filled in with 
Charles Baudelaire’s biographical elements (Brander 39), and the resultant 
narrative, as R. S. Baker convincingly demonstrates, is a diagnostically exact 
repetition of the so-called “prostitute complex” outlined by Sigmund Freud and 
Wilhelm Stekel (112–19). Though there is nothing in this biography that would 
not fit Stavrogin’s actual or potential features, the insistence in Huxley’s text on 
explaining away the whole problem as a fixation leads to a conspicuous 
reduction. 
This simplification is the more obvious because an individual’s neurosis 
cannot explain away the sense of abjection, the permanent narcissistic crisis 
which, similarly to the world of Devils, actually dominates not only Spandrell’s 
character, but the whole of Point Counter Point. Abjection, embodied most 
obviously in the hatred of the (female) body, and forming the basis of all 
patriarchal cultures (Kristeva, Powers 99–100), is Rampion’s explanation of 
Spandrell’s sexual experimentation and fundamental charge against him:  
’And above all [...] it’s a vengeance. It’s a way of getting one’s own 
back on women [...], it’s a way of expressing one’s hatred of them and 
of what they represent, it’s a way of expressing one’s hatred of oneself. 
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The trouble with you, Spandrell, [...] is that you really hate yourself. 
You hate the very source of your life, its ultimate basis – for there’s no 
denying it, sex is fundamental. And you hate it, hate it. (122) 
Spandrell, when defending his point by claiming that “We feel spontaneously 
ashamed of the body and its activities. That’s a sign of the body’s absolute and 
natural inferiority” (123), actually accepts this explanation. What it does not 
account for is “the distaste for physical experience which [...] is transformed into 
an exaggerated revulsion” (Ferns 100) in Point Counter Point. Angus Wilson 
even spoke about Huxley’s “pathological wallowing in physical disgust” (qtd. in 
Atkins 70) embodied in his failure to represent any pleasurable scenes of basic 
physical activities, notably of having sex and eating. Rampion is allegedly the 
only character in the novel who is beyond abjection – at the cost of rejecting all 
spirituality. Allegedly. Just like the tubercular Lawrence, Rampion is also in 
very poor health – and tellingly becomes “disgusted” with himself when he 
catches a cold (109). What is more, one of his final arguments against 
Spandrell’s assertion that Beethoven’s music is an evidence for the existence of 
God, “a beatific vision [...], a heaven” (441) is that “It’s the art of a man who’s 
lost his body” (440), more exactly has been castrated and become an “eunuch” 
(441). In other words, he rephrases his rejection of spirituality as a fear of 
castration – ultimately, a fear of becoming one with the maternal body (Эткинд 
402), or a fear of having to distrust the Symbolic and to face the epistemological 
and ontological uncertainties of human existence (Weber 1111–12). While the 
universality of abjection plays a major role in Huxley’s criticism against modern 
society – and Dostoevsky – it also questions the validity of his explanation 
through individual neurosis. 
The second major difference between Stavrogin’s and Spandrell’s character 
lies in the relatively peripherical position of the latter. Stavrogin’s unmitigated 
central position is the consequence of his key role in the plot of Devils, but more 
importantly of the fact that, as Léna Szilárd emphasises, he “focuses the most 
intimate unconscious desires of his environment” (31). In this sense, Point 
Counter Point does not have a central character at all. Nevertheless, Huxley 
criticism usually presents three candidates for this position: as Peter Grosvenor 
points out, the interpretation of the novel depends to a great extent on whether 
Quarles, Rampion or Spandrell is considered to be its protagonist (1–2). 
Arguments for and against each proposition abound, including Baker’s 
seemingly very convincing theory that Spandrell is the central character of the 
novel because he is the epitome of everything that Huxley’s satirical attack is 
directed against: “it is Spandrell who embodies in his own life and in particular 
in the ending of that life the corruption of ‘the whole man’ that Huxley saw as 
endemic in a ‘collapsing’ society” (121). He adds that Spandrell, “the violent 
nihilist overshadows both Webley and Illidge, murdering the fascist and 
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psychologically dominating the communist” (103). In comparison with 
Stavrogin, however, the downplaying of his character’s influence and role is 
rather obvious. Spandrell is a solitary figure, just like Stavrogin, but there is no 
one in the novel who would want to break his isolation. No loving women 
surround him, who would want him to embody their dreams, no disciples, who 
would look at him as an ideal, and no political anarchists, who would want him 
to be their charismatic leader. The vectors of emotional relationships are 
dramatically reversed: it is Spandrell, who needs a “murderee” to be able to 
fulfil the role of the murderer, and it is only accidental that he chooses the 
communist as a collaborator and as the victim of another emotional experiment. 
The effect of Spandrell’s relatively peripheral position is counteracted by the 
creation of at least three other characters in Point Counter Point who share some 
of his qualities – and Stavrogin’s. The first of them is Lucy Tantamount, who is 
Spandrell’s female double. Her appearance, just like Spandrell’s, is reminiscent 
of Stavrogin’s – if possible, even more so: 
She was of middle height and slim [...], with short dark hair, oiled to 
complete blackness and brushed back from her forehead. Naturally 
pale, she wore no rouge. Only her thin lips were painted and there was 
a little blue round the eyes. A black dress emphasized the whiteness of 
her arms and shoulders. [...] Black suited her so well. (49) 
To the familiar contrast of blackness (associated with death, because she is a 
widow) and paleness, the iconic mask-like quality is also added: her face is “a 
pale mask that had seen everything before” (96). In addition, she is an even 
greater expert of emotional experimentation than Spandrell. She carries it out on 
a small scale through comic “deliberate social blunders” (88) and on a large 
scale by playing a sadistic game with Walter Bidlake, who is deeply in love with 
her. Their story, unfolding throughout the novel, is the inverse of Harriet and 
Spandrell’s affair. Furthermore, on a metaphorical level, just like Stavrogin, she 
is a predatory animal: according to Rampion Walter is “Like a rabbit in front of 
a weasel” when with her, then he produces the classic snake metaphor so often 
used for describing Stavrogin when he adds that “You might as well like cobras” 
(139). She is also like a “siren” or “crocodile” in Quarles’s eyes (301). Her 
similarity to Spandrell is emphasised by the fact that their brief affair could not 
last because they are too much alike, as both of them are “murderers”, that is, 
sadistic victimisers (cf. Baker 109–10) of their lovers:  
’As a matter of fact you weren’t enough of a murderee for my taste.’ 
There was nothing of the victim about Lucy; not much even, 
[Spandrell] had often reflected, of the ordinary woman. She could 
pursue her pleasure as a man pursues his [...]. Spandrell didn’t like to 
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be used and exploited for someone else’s entertainment. He wanted to 
be the user. But with Lucy there was no possibility of slave-holding. 
‘I’m like you,’ he added. ‘I need victims’. (158) 
The second such character is Philip Quarles. First of all, he seems to realise 
another set of central metaphors related to Stavrogin and also evoked by 
Spandrell’s “emotional paralysis”: that of being a cripple. Philip is not only 
physically disabled, having a maimed leg, but also emotionally, because his 
intellectual life stifles his human relationships. Again, Rampion’s judgment at 
the end of the novel, after following Elinor Quarles’s vain attempts to force any 
emotional response from her husband, rather states the obvious: “But the other 
High-Lifers [intellectuals], the ones who haven’t any physical defect – they are 
not so forgivable. They’ve maimed themselves deliberately, for fun. It’s a pity 
they don’t develop visible hunch-backs or wall-eyes. One would know better 
who one was dealing with” (413). Philip is the realised metaphor of the disease 
of “mental consciousness”, physical disability – his recognition of himself in 
Rampion’s words is clearly implied by his “affectation of amusement that was 
meant to cover the embarrassment he felt” (413). Secondly, his character seems 
to have a special fluidity (Roston 383); it is not fixed, it is always impressed by 
new experiences – he makes even efforts not to remember his past and not to 
think of his future. This feature seems to be a positive embracement of the tragic 
condition that partly leads to Stavrogin’s suicide, namely that the inability of 
Narcissus to find his identity, to become one with his mirror image is the 
emblematic story of the Western subject and it implies a fluidity of identity 
inherent in its narrative nature and in the nature of the linguistic sign. 
The third such character is Everard Webley, who embodies the role of the 
charismatic political leader obviously missing from Spandrell’s repertoire and 
dreams – but significant as one of the roles offered to Stavrogin. Firstly, his 
Nietzschean figure evokes Kirillov, one of Stavrogin’s doubles. This reference is 
somewhat reinforced by the farcical elements of his death, which repeats motifs of 
Kirillov’s forced suicide. Secondly, Stavrogin’s role as a leader is embodied in the 
legend of Ivan Tsarevich, which Pyotr Verkhovensky wants to use to establish his 
authority. Unmasking the political practice of relying on national myth – and 
therefore on unconscious forces – to achieve power, Webley activates the legend 
of Robin Hood in a similar, but somewhat comic manner (344).  
The appearance of these characters might be evaluated – to return to Baker’s 
theory – as a result of the fact that Spandrell is the fullest embodiment of the 
“disease of modern man,” which implies that many of the characters in the 
novels share a certain number of his features. From another perspective, they 
counteract Spandrell’s peripherisation by multiplying his somewhat distorted 
images and creating a claustrophobic novelistic universe of mirrors facing each 
other – a universe which is strikingly similar to that of Devils. 
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Thirdly, Huxley demystifies the enigmatic Stavrogin by rewriting him as a 
garrulous story-teller, which also makes Stavrogin’s implicit narcissism an 
explicit and dominant trait in Spandrell. Stavrogin’s enigmatic identity is one of 
the central problems of Devils, primarily because his verbal attempts at self-
definition are restricted to his confession, while his dialogues with his disciples 
all result in his refusal of his earlier narrative identities now embodied in them. 
The confession itself is far from being a definite text of his identity, firstly 
because of its mythical, therefore metaphorical and polysemous nature, secondly 
because of the presence of two contradictory mythic narratives in it: those of the 
Golden Age and Narcissus. While the epiphanic vision of the Golden Age 
evokes the solar hero’s myth as a possibly authentic narrative and foreshadows 
the completion of his spiritual quest, the Narcissus myth implies a tragic 
outcome including futile desires, a problematic entry into the Symbolic and 
heightened self-reflexion as a prerequisite of subjectivity. Narcissistic as he is, 
Stavrogin – as Szilárd convincingly demonstrates – still tries to resist the 
numerous roles that the fundamentally theatrical (and therefore demonic) world 
of Devils prescribes for him. In fact, she interprets Stavrogin’s gratuitous acts – 
including his suicide – as revolts against this theatricality and attempts to assert 
his own identity (20–5; 34). As opposed to this, Spandrell keeps talking about 
himself, obviously trying to define himself through his narrative, which, 
however, is represented as constant affectation. It is Quarles who emphasises his 
willingness to speak about himself: “the man was prepared to talk about himself 
without demanding any personalities in return, [...] and was boastful rather than 
reticent about his weaknesses” (228). The most conspicuous example for such 
boasting is the above-mentioned “anecdote” of Harriet’s moral corruption, 
which can be read as a theatrical restaging of Stavrogin’s confession with the 
Rampions as audience. In this context Rampion’s comment about the 
“theatricality” of Spandrell’s behaviour, which was “as though the man were 
overacting to convince himself he was there at all” (102), can be interpreted as a 
comment on Spandrell’s attempts to assert his identity through narrating and 
narcissistic role-playing – on the abject confession of a “hero” without any trace 
of originality (cf. Girard 1–15; Bernstein 17–22, 105–8; P. Brooks, Troubling 
Confessions 46–60).  
Huxley’s demystification also seems to become a demythologisation because 
the story of the “confession” is retold in a light-hearted manner and any parallel 
with the epiphanic moment of Stavrogin’s vision is missing. Spandrell’s last 
scene, however, clearly fulfils this function and Rampion’s comments on it 
reinforce the power of myth as an interpretative context. In fact, Spandrell’s 
“beatific vision” shared with the Rampions – again – can be read as the “second 
half” of his confession and a modified rewriting of Stavrogin’s key text, 
including the whole confessional situation. This is indicated partly by the central 
role of a work of art in both visions: while Stavrogin’s dream is inspired by 
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Claude Lorrain’s Acis and Galatea, Spandrell becomes convinced of God’s 
existence by listening to Beethoven’s A minor quartet. The two works of art are 
interpreted in the novels as references to the same myth: the Golden Age or the 
vision of paradise. The other important connecting element is the similarity of 
Tikhon’s and Rampion’s role in the two scenes. Mark Rampion, though 
negatively, associates himself with Spandrell’s “father confessor” (438) during 
their invitation to visit Spandrell. This parallel is further emphasised by 
Rampion’s most sudden and incongruous, maybe even ironic turn to the sacred 
text of the Bible in the argument about Spandrell’s vision. When Spandrell 
(almost) convinces him
9
, he replies with a Biblical quote, “Almost thou 
persuadest me” (442), which is Agrippa’s answer to Saint Paul, and ends in the 
phrase “to be a Christian” (Acts 26.28). Immediately after this comment, he 
looks at the metamorphosed Spandrell and claims that “He refuses to be human 
– either a demon or a dead angel. Now he is dead” (442). Rampion’s voice, 
which throughout the novel most obviously opposes and attacks Spandrell’s 
spiritual quest, at this point not only turns to the sacred mythical text so as to be 
able to verbalise the inexplicable, but also reveals the fundamental mythic 
paradigm formulating his vision of Spandrell – and the core of his ideology.  
One of the major ironies of the novel is that the vision itself is set in the 
context of Spandrell’s most conspicuous narcissistic role-playing: he invites the 
Rampions not only to listen to Beethoven but to be the audience of his suicide 
“staged” as political murder (Cushman 13). As if he was a forerunner of 
psychoanalytic literary criticism á la Peter Brooks, he realises his idea that “it’s 
only in the light of ends that you can judge beginnings and middles” (151) and 
consciously manipulates his own “death-bed scene” (151) by prefabricating an 
ending that would place him in the position of the hero/victim and would end his 
life at the top of his own spiritual ascent. His willingness to stage his own death, 
the feeling of counterfeit and sham surrounding it deprive it of the sense of 
martyrdom and potential to authenticate his life narrative as a fulfilled quest
10
. 
As opposed to Stavrogin, Spandrell not only accepts the rules of a theatrical 
world but thrives on being theatrical. This feature clearly corresponds to 
Huxley’s emphasis on theatricality in his essay and contributes to the “easy” 
dismissal of the Dostoevkian ideological stance.  
                                                     
 
9
 Characteristically, there is no critical consensus on the reading of this most crucial scene: some 
readers argue that Spandrell’s vision is meant to be taken seriously, or that it can be taken only 
seriously, whether it was meant to or not, while others contend that it should be read with ironic 
distance (cf. May 420–21; Bowering, Aldous Huxley 227; Bowen, “Allusions” 502–8; Firchow, 
“Mental Music” 534). 
10
 He is not the only “comedian” in the novel: Spandrell’s constant acting is also part and parcel of 
the narcissistic and theatrical world of Point Counter Point, so similar to that of Devils. As 
Zack Bowen points out, “The linking of the phoney and the contrived [...] and the undercurrent 
of stage managing and counterfeit are a secondary leitmotif which accompanies the main theme 
of God and eternal truth manifested in science, music and the novel” (“Allusions” 500). 
121 
While the ambivalence of Spandrell’s suicide scene is clearly reminiscent of 
Devils, the postponement of Spandrell’s vision until the very end of Point 
Counter Point deprives his figure of most ambiguities and internal tensions 
characterising Stavrogin, and creates a relatively one-dimensional and more 
demonic version of his narrative. Stavrogin’s vision in Devils leads to an attempt 
to reform his life, which is often interpreted as a realisation of the metaphor of 
the “cross” inherent in his name and as a metaphorical upward movement, a 
spiritual ascent culminating in his suicide in the “loft” (Dostoevsky, The 
Possessed)
11
. This somewhat more optimistic reading of his death utilises the 
ambiguities and polyvalence of his character, and is also clearly reflected in 
Huxley’s formulation of Spandrell’s last scene. However, since the moment of 
his epiphanic vision is postponed until the very end, all the elements in 
Stavrogin’s narrative which are motivated by it, and therefore do not fit into 
Spandrell’s demonic card-game with God, are eliminated from his narrative or 
incorporated with an inverted cast and motivation. The best example is the 
political murder, which Stavrogin does everything in his power to prevent, while 
Spandrell uses it only as an excuse in a desperate attempt to provoke God to 
reveal Himself. His crime is the functional equivalent of the Matryosha case: 
Spandrell hopes to experience an epiphany (cf. Frye, Anatomy 223) by 
committing it and therefore to obtain a notion of his authentic self. This 
“weeding out” of ambiguities from Stavrogin’s narrative leads to Spandrell’s 
rather schematic demonism – an easy target for criticism – and is further 
emphasised by the above-mentioned theatricality of his last scene.  
 
In conclusion, Huxley’s reading of Devils in his Point Counter Point has 
proved to involve a combination of diametrically opposed factors. On the one 
hand, it testifies to a very critical approach to Dostoevsky’s text, embodied in 
Spandrell as a character modelled on Stavrogin. Through this rewriting, the 
whole metaphysical problematic of Dostoevsky’s novel seems to be dismissed as 
a psychopathological phenomenon, an extreme individual case (of gratuitous 
criminality) and a bad actor’s inauthentic farce. On the other hand, the fact itself 
that Huxley rewrote Devils in 1928 in Britain, as in the case of every rewriting, 
points to the actuality and obsessive power of the intertext. Dostoevsky’s novel 
is a major representative of the artistic tradition that Huxley continues and 
should be able to overcome in his rewriting. From this perspective, the creation 
of a “little Stavrogin” – instead of facing the “real one” – seems to be a set of 
manipulations that “fixes the fight” before the match is actually started: 
Spandrell embodies a schematic reading that should make it possible to get 
                                                     
11
 This reading is formulated by Szilárd (35–6), but Katalin Kroó arrives at similar conclusions 
through the analysis of the intertextual and metatextual levels of Stavrogin’s dialogues with his 
disciples (Кроо 227–61). 
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easily beyond the predecessor’s ideological stance. Huxley’s interpretation, 
however, is subverted in Point Counter Point by several factors, which 
ultimately raises doubts about the major points of his critical reading. Thus the 
demystification and demythologisation of Stavrogin’s story, which is a 
significant point of Huxley’s rejection of spirituality, is subverted in the closing 
scene both by the power of Beethoven’s music (and Spandrell’s ability to share 
the artist’s vision) and Rampion’s recourse to the authority of the numinous and 
mythic in interpreting Spandrell – and in formulating his own, equally mythical 
explanation for the ailments of humanity. From the perspective of the 
metaphysical guarantees of the individual, by moving Stavrogin’s narcissism 
into the foreground and asserting Spandrell’s constant need for an audience, 
Huxley does not get much further than restating the Dostoevskian claim about 
the necessity of the other (the Other?) for the subject to come into being. To 
carry on Huxley’s medical metaphor, his reading proves that Dostoevsky’s text 
represents modern man’s disease, but only to highlight that the Russian writer is 
the more subtle diagnostician of the two: Huxley’s simplistic psychological 
dismissal does not make his Laurentian therapy more convincing. 
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READING WOLF SOLENT READING1 
“My own life on earth has resembled Solent’s in being 
dominated by Books.” (Powys, “Preface” 11) 
Reading. Reading cheap stories and pornography. Reading the scandalous 
history of Dorset. Reading the story of the dead father in the landscape of his 
homeland. Reading the metaphor of the Name of the Father. Reading – and 
rewriting – classics of the carnivalesque tradition in European literature. To a 
great extent, John Cowper Powys’s Wolf Solent is – just like Dostoevsky’s 
Devils – about reading as a way of defining and understanding identity. Its 
representation plays the most significant role in the novel because it draws 
attention to a problematic aspect of narration by highlighting “the division in 
[Wolf Solent’s] narrative consciousness” (Nordius 6). Though third-person 
narration is used in the novel, the story is told exclusively from one point of 
view, that of the main character and “[o]utside this consciousness ‘[t]here is no 
author’s voice with knowledge of objective truth. There is no final authority’” 
(C. A. Coates qtd. in Nordius 46). What the reader receives is the story in Wolf 
Solent’s reading(s) and thus the identity of this first – and ultimate – reader is a 
major determining factor in producing readings of Wolf Solent.  
And here a vicious circle is apparently closed: the text is generated by the 
narrative consciousness, but Wolf Solent’s identity is generated by the text itself. 
So much so, that for example Janina Nordius’s interpretation of the novel as the 
expression of Powys’s philosophy of solitude in the making (45) shows it as the 
“plotting out” of the central metaphor of the “lone wolf” (46) inherent in the 
main character’s name (cf. P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 10–24). Wolf Solent 
as a subject seems to be unambiguously definable by one metaphor, by his name 
– which appears as a clearly readable sign. However, the reader might realise 
that the word “solent”, revealing a fundamental feature of both character and 
text, can actually be read as a play on words, combining sole/solitary and silent. 
The ambiguity inherent in his name is only one example of the multitude of 
carnivalesque ambiguities (cf. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’ Poetics 126) 
characteristic of the novel. Through the character of Wolf Solent as the 
archetypal reader, reading itself is represented in the text as a form of 
transgression, which, instead of creating coherent and unquestionable ultimate 
discourses, rather opens up new gaps in the already existing ones by maintaining 
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 First published as “Reading Wolf Solent Reading,” Eger Journal of English Studies 4 (2004), 




 of text and reader. The acceptance of these bitter-sweet 
qualities of reading with the major ironies making them possible and the solitary 
celebration of the joys given by the openness of the reading procedure identify it 
as a “reduced” form of carnivalesque laughter
3
 – probably the only form 
possible in the 20
th
 century. 
The function of reading as a central determiner of Wolf Solent’s identity is 
established by its metonymical/metaphorical connection with his metaphor for 
the core of his consciousness, his ‘mythology’. The latter is a concept that 
conspicuously resists further interpretation in itself, taken out of its context. On 
the one hand, Wolf “use[s] it entirely in a private sense of his own” (Powys, 
Wolf Solent 19)
4
. On the other hand, it is most often represented in further 
images which usually undermine each other. In other words, it is a metaphor 
leading only to other metaphors, for example his ‘mythology’ as “hushed, 
expanding leaves”, “secret vegetation – the roots of whose being hid themselves 
beneath the dark waters of his consciousness” (WS 20–21). The “roots” 
evidently lead from the conscious to the unconscious, in Lacanian terms Wolf’s 
‘mythology’ covers his ‘true’ identity, it screens “the adulterated chapter” of his 
history, which can be read most conspicuously in the transference neurosis, in 
the compulsively repeated symptoms surrounding the gap in the story (The 
Language of the Self 20–24). Wolf introduces his ‘mythology’ in the following 
manner: 
This was a certain trick he had of doing what he called ‘sinking into his 
soul’. This trick had been a furtive custom with him from very early 
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 I use the word “dialogue” in the Bakhtinian sense here (cf. Kristeva, Desire in Language 64–91; 
Томсон passim). Clive Thomson claims that Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogue is a much 
debated one and his contemporary interpreters often emphasise such aspects of his ideas which 
are not sufficiently detailed and elaborated to settle the issue. He himself suggests taking it as a 
“strategy” of polemics which Bakhtin himself usually applied when he, without any intention to 
nivellate them, let the ideas of his opponents speak for themselves in his writings. Thomson, 
relying on Ken Hirschkop’s opinion, treats this “strategy” as a “kind of populist deconstruction” 
(313), which clearly relates Bakhtin’s critical wrtings with poststructuralist, rather than 
structuralist reading strategies. Peter Brooks in his short study, “The Idea of a Psychoanalytic 
Literary Criticism” also connects Bakhtinian dialogue with Lacanian psychoanalysis and his 
own psychoanalytic literary criticism, more concretely with textual analysis through the 
application of the Freudian concept of transference to literary analysis (11). 
3
 Cf. Bakhtin’s description of the changes of the grotesque, a phenomenon belonging to the core of 
the carnivalesque. He claims that in the Romantic period the grotesque and thus the carnivalesque 
became relevant only to the personal sphere of the individual, their universal character gradually 
diminished and finally disappeared. The original carnivalesque laughter also changed its nature, its 
regenerative power was brought to the minimum, which resulted in the dominance of its “reduced” 
forms: humour, irony and sarcasm (Rabelais and His World 46–44). 
4
 In the rest of the text quotations from Wolf Solent will be identified only with the abbreviation 
WS and page numbers in the parenthetical notes. 
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days. In his childhood his mother had often rallied him about it in her 
light-hearted way, and had applied to these trances, or these fits of 
absent-mindedness, an amusing but rather indecent nursery name. His 
father, on the other hand, had encouraged him in these moods, taking 
them very gravely, and treating him, when under their spell, as if he 
were a sort of infant magician. (WS 19, emphasis added) 
The exact circumstances of the generation of Wolf’s ‘mythology’, as it suits any 
screen memory covering a traumatic experience, remain hidden (cf. Freud, 
“Screen Memories” passim). However, its relationship with early childhood, the 
antithetical reaction of the two parents, the “indecency” attached to it by the 
mother and the imaginary power position implied by the “infant magician” 
practically cry for a psychoanalytic interpretation. Wolf Solent’s ‘mythology’ is 
a classic case of infantile regression to wish fulfilment in daydreaming (cf. 
Freud, “The Creative Writer and Daydreaming” passim); instead of the core of 
his consciousness it is a symptom, a (false) construction (cf. Wilden 166; Žižek, 
“The Truth Arises from Misrecognition” passim) with the function of hiding the 
seemingly forgotten traumatic knot in the unconscious, which must be read and 
reread to form a more authentic story of Wolf Solent’s identity. 
For this reason the readable links which connect the “censored chapter” of 
the unconscious to this ominous gap give extremely useful help for the analyst. 
If Wolf Solent’s ‘mythology’ is a case of daydreaming, it is directed at the 
repetition of an idealistic situation in which the wish-fulfilment was granted in 
his childhood. For Wolf Solent the perfect situation that is to be repeated is 
sitting at the bow-window of his grandmother’s house – a re-enactment of the 
circumstances of finding the word ‘mythology’ for his special habit – thus 
supplying the first useful links to the “public” and “untouched” chapters of his 
identity: 
It was, however, when staying in his grandmother’s house at 
Weymouth that the word had come to him which he now always used 
in his own mind to describe these obsessions. It was the word 
‘mythology’; and he used it entirely in a private sense of his own. He 
could remember very well where he first came upon the word. It was in 
a curious room, called ‘the ante-room’, which was connected by 
folding-doors with his grandmother’s drawing-room […]. The window 
of his grandmother’s room opened upon the sea; and Wolf, carrying 
the word ‘mythology’ into this bow-window, allowed it to become his 
own secret name for his own secret habit. (WS 19–20, emphasis added) 
As it turns out, the central element which dominates the scene is the  
(bow-)window, an image which returns several times later in the text always 
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associated with the pleasurable place where Wolf Solent likes or would like to 
be. At the beginning of the story the thirty-five-year-old Solent is shown 
travelling home to his birthplace in Dorset after a twenty-five-year absence, 
sitting at the window of an otherwise empty railway compartment, deeply 
submerged in “an orgy of concentrated thought” (WS 13), in his personal 
‘mythology’ (WS 19). He characterises his mental state in the following manner: 
Outward things […] were to him like faintly-limned images in a 
mirror, the true reality of which lay all the while in his mind […]. 
What he experienced now was a vague wonder as to whether the 
events that awaited him – these new scenes – these unknown people – 
would be able to do what no outward events had done – break up this 
mirror of half-reality and drop great stones of real reality – drop them 
and lodge them – hard, brutal, material stones – down there among 
those dark waters and that mental foliage. (WS 21, emphasis added) 
The overall image of Wolf Solent represented here is fundamentally reminiscent 
of “The Lady of Shallot”. He is locked up in the ivory tower of his own 
consciousness, intentionally separating and defending himself from outside 
events, which appear as mere reflections and shadows (cf. Tennyson 51–5). As a 
result, the last twenty-five years of his life have been monotonous and 
uneventful; “he has lived peacefully under the despotic affection of his mother, 
with whom, when he was only a child of ten, he had left Dorsetshire, and along 
with Dorsetshire, all the agitating memories of his dead father” (WS 14). The 
same surface of consciousness also seems to protect him from himself: since all 
the events of his ‘real’ life take place on a mental plane, in his ‘mythology’, his 
being locked up in a state of utter passivity in the shell of his consciousness 
hinders him from any actual action.  
However, “the condition of narratability [is] to enter a state of deviance and 
detour (ambition, quest, the pose of a mask) […] before returning to the 
quiescence of the nonnarratable” (P. Brooks, Reading 108). It is exactly Wolf 
Solent’s ‘mythology’ that makes it impossible for him to become the hero of his 
own story and thus to have an identity (P. Brooks, Reading 33) of his own. His 
story – the novel – can only start when he is willy-nilly pushed out of this 
passivity, and ends with shattering his ‘mythology’ as a shelter from “reality”, 
but his ultimate desire is to return to the ideal situation of sitting at the window 
and submerging in his ‘mythology’. For example on returning to Dorset his wish 
to live in one of the little cottages is embodied in his attempt “to fancy what it 
would be like to sit in the bow-window of any one of these, drinking tea and 
eating bread-and-honey, while the spring afternoon slowly darkened towards 
twilight” (WS 66–7). When trying to imagine what it will be like to work for Mr 
Urquhart, he has a “dream of [a] writing-table by a mullioned window ‘blushing 
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with the blood of kings and queens’ [which] turns out to be a literal 
presentiment” (WS 61). When he feels that Miss Gault’s drawing-room has “the 
Penn House atmosphere” it means that “there was something about this room 
which made him recall that old bow-window in Brunswick Terrace, Weymouth, 
where in his childhood he used to indulge in these queer, secretive pleasures” 
(WS 132). And finally, when Christie moves to Weymouth, he flatters himself 
with the idea that their relationship will not end and “[sees] himself as an old 
grey-headed schoolmaster […] walking with Christie on one arm and Olwen 
[…] on the other, past the bow windows of Brunswick Terrace!” (WS 619) 
The second link to the “adulterated chapter” is supplied by the metonymical 
connection of the grandmother’s house, and more specifically the bow-window, 
which is the location of the only pleasant memories of Wolf Solent’s childhood, 
with reading: 
He recalled various agitating and shameful scenes between his high-
spirited mother and his drifting, unscrupulous father. He summoned 
up, as opposed to these, his own delicious memories of long, 
irresponsible holidays, lovely uninterrupted weeks of idleness, by the 
sea at Weymouth, when he read so many thrilling books in the sunlit 
bow-window at Brunswick Terrace. (WS 37, emphasis added) 
Thus reading in the literal sense of the word and “sinking into his soul” become 
metonymically connected by being attached to the same location, the bow-
window in the house of Wolf’s grandmother in Weymouth. The location itself, 
as a scene of his infantile daydreaming, becomes subject to many-layered 
interpretation via its connection with the symptom that covers the traumatic 
event. In classic Freudian analysis houses are symbolic of the body and rooms 
are especially associated with women (The Interpretation of Dreams 354–5). In 
Wolf’s case the female body represented by the house and its rooms is most 
probably his mother’s, substituted with the slightly veiled corresponding element 
of the grandmother’s figure. Thus Wolf’s wish to return to his passive and 
pleasurable stay in Weymouth, where he was “irresponsible”, that is, free from 
any moral obligations to act, becomes an embodiment of the return to the 
maternal womb in the symbolic sense as a combination of libido and desire for 
the ideal conditions before birth in the death-wish (cf. Freud, Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle 46–76). The bow-window as an opening might be symbolic 
of his ambiguous position: he is inside but would like to enjoy the pleasures of 
being a spectator, or to use a word with even more obvious sexual connotations, 
a voyeour (cf. Barthes 17). Conspicuously, the view of the sea from the window 
implies a very similar imagery to that of the “dark waters of [Wolf’s] 
consciousness”, which is more than reminiscent of the imagery of the oceanic 
feeling (cf. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents 9–21) related to the Freudian 
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concept of the death wish. This symbolism is deepened by the relationship of the 
location with Wolf’s ‘mythology’ and reading, which also seem to be 
metaphorically related to each other in their turn by sharing a number of 
common qualities. They lack any practical value according to the social norms 
and make Wolf, who indulges in them, an outsider and a transgressor; they yield 
solitary autoerotic pleasure; and they serve as an escape from the traumatic 
experience of his parents’ stormy marriage, the “shameful scenes” which might 
correspond to the “page of shame” (Lacan, The Language 24) that seems to be 
forgotten but must return; and finally, they become the sublimation of his 
frustrated (incestuous) sexual desire (cf. Freud, Civilization 35–40). Thereby, 
Wolf’s ‘mythology’, as it is also implied by the expression “secret vice” that he 
uses for it, turns out to be a metaphor for the “short circuit” of incest which 
closes narratives – and reading – prematurely and finally (P. Brooks, Reading 
109). It is the de(con)struction of this closed narrative – the story of Wolf Solent 
as a mythic hero in his own imagination – which he experiences as the tragic 
death of his ‘mythology’ and the annihilation of his identity. Significantly, the 
story does not end here. 
The third link to the unconscious is a metaphorical connection between 
looking out of the window and reading in the more general sense of the word, 
established here and developed in the rest of the text. Windows and words, 
language, seem to function in a very similar way for Wolf Solent, both providing 
frames that not only limit his vision and thereby slice out a portion of the world 
that is perceivable, but actually create signs from otherwise meaningless objects 
by the continuously changing and often surprising perspective they determine. 
He verbalises this similarity in the following way: 
These glimpses of certain fixed objects, seen daily, yet always 
differently, through bedroom-windows, scullery-windows, privy 
windows, had, from his childhood, possessed a curious interest for 
him. It was as if he got from them a sort of runic handwriting, the 
‘little language’ of Chance itself, commenting upon what was, and is, 
and is to come. (WS 232, emphasis added) 
The implication is that windows present writing, a sign that must be read. In this 
excerpt Wolf Solent associates his vision through the window with textuality in 
general, and implies that life is practically nothing else but trying to read the 
cryptogram it presents.  
This circle of associations reaches its full scope in a dialogue with Christie 
when Solent directly connects the image of the window as a frame with reading 
and daydreaming: 
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Philosophy to you, and to me, too, isn’t science at all! It’s life 
winnowed and heightened. It’s the essence of life caught on the wing. 
It’s life framed… framed in room-windows… in carriage-windows… 
in mirrors… in our ‘brown studies’, when we look up from absorbing 
books… in waking dreams… (WS 91) 
In this excerpt “framing” becomes a metaphor for contextualising or 
conceptualising and thus interpretation, while the means that make it possible 
are the “window” or “mirror” of a philosophical text – or literary text, for that 
matter. This “framed life”, the narrative, seems actually to take the place of life 
itself for Wolf Solent, so much so, that he even “frames” the most elemental 
phenomena of nature into stories that he knows from the literary tradition. 
Everything is symbolic for him, for example “a great yellowish fragment of sky” 
becomes a centaur drinking from the fountain of a willow (WS 151). Thus Wolf 
definitely seems to embody a kind of neurotic reader (cf. Barthes 63). Since the 
window as a frame in itself is most conspicuously a hole, Wolf Solent becomes a 
reader of gaps with all the postmodernist/poststructuralist implications of the 
word concerning the nature of language and of the human unconscious (cf. 
Lacan, “The Insistence of the Letter” passim)
5
. Looking out of the window – or 
peeping in through windows, for that matter – becomes a metaphor for reading 
which highlights its inherently paradoxical nature, since the window, which is 
both a border and a frame, simultaneously encloses and opens up space. 
Thus the identification of Wolf Solent’s ‘mythology’ as a case of infantile 
regression to daydreaming, of leading to an ultimate closure of the text so 
characteristic of psychoanalytic literary criticism applied to fictional characters 
(cf. P. Brooks, Psychoanalysis and Storytelling 21), actually reveals that Wolf 
Solent can as easily be the subject of a “more formalist” psychoanalytic criticism 
outlined by Peter Brooks (“The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Criticism” passim). It 
reads the returns of the text itself, in the given case the instances of reading 
itself, which turn out to be attempts to reconstruct the “false constructions” of 
the textual conscious for the fundamental gap in the text, Wolf Solent’s identity 
itself as a narrative consciousness, the supposed “master” of the text (P. Brooks, 
“The Idea” 11–12). This is the point where the text recoils on itself: Wolf Solent, 
in his obsessively repeated attempts to read the missing chapter of his own 
unconscious, actually acts out the archetypal situation of the reader who both 
tries to master the text by analysing it and becomes mastered by the text as the 
                                                     
5
 On Powys and postmodernist concerns see (Boulter, Postmodern Powys – New Essays on John 
Cowper Powys). Joe Boulter uses “some of the analogies between Powys’s themes and 
techniques and the themes and techniques of postmodernist theorists as the basis for 
interpretation of some of Powys’s novels” to “interpret him in the context of postmodernist 
theory” and claims that the most important connecting element between postmodernist theorists 
and Powys is that they “are all, in a loose sense, pluralists” (5). 
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analysand (P. Brooks, “The Idea” 11–12). These instances reveal reading itself 
as transgression, a basically carnivalesque element. Just like the screen memory 
of Wolf’s ‘mythology’, reading is exposed as an autoerotic activity (cf. Barthes 
10) in the scenes of acquiring forbidden knowledge by gaining (perverse) sexual 
pleasure from reading pornography, of substituting the fulfilment of desire with 
reading and thereby sublimating it, of Wolf’s voyeurism, and finally of his 
narcissistic obsession with his own images in actual and symbolic windows and 
mirrors. By the end of the novel Wolf Solent’s constant readings and rereadings 
of himself dissolve the closed narrative of his ‘mythology’: his mythic image as 
a fighter in a cosmic battle against evil proves to be incompatible with his other 
parallel readings of his identity, which turn out to be unavoidably carnivalesque. 
Of course, only the exchange of one “false construction” with another can take 
place. However, since it consists in continuous reading, which leaves room for 
ambiguities and can cope with the constantly shifting nature of the signifier with 
the help of self-ironic laughter, it results in Wolf’s symbolic rebirth after the 
seemingly fatal death of his mythology
6
. Consequently, reading, as it is 
represented in Wolf Solent, reveals itself as “truly” carnivalesque in the 
Bakhtinian sense of the word. 
 
                                                     
6
 My reading of Wolf Solent thus partly corresponds to the one given by Ian Hughes in his “The 
Genre of John Cowper Powys’s Major Novels”. While I agree with him that “Powys finally 
succeeds admirably in his attempt to dramatise the philosophic education of a central figure” 
(46) in Wolf Solent, and reading the novel as a “philosophic romance” (37) elaborating the 
“philosophy of sensationalism” (40) does not exclude a carnivalesque reading, I still think that it 
implies a closure and a finite nature that do not characterise the novel. 
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CONFESSING DEFIANCE – DEFYING 
CONFESSION: DOSTOEVSKIAN ALLUSION IN 
WOLF SOLENT1 
In my study entitled “Dostoevsky in Wessex: John Cowper Powys after Bakhtin 
and Kristeva”, following Professor Charles Lock’s groundbreaking studies on 
Mikhail Dostoevsky and Powys (“Polyphonic Powys” passim), I suggest that a 
systematic comparative analysis of the two writers’ works is more than overdue. 
Accordingly, I outline there a research plan that is focussed on four points of 
intersection between the Dostoevsky canon – that is, as formulated by Powys: 
Dostoevsky’s four major novels and Notes from the Underground
2
 – and 
Powys’s ‘Wessex novels’: their approach to realism, the carnivalesque and its 
discourses, the intertextual nature of narrative identity, and the use of the 
confessional mode (Reichmann 67–8). In the present paper I would like to 
continue this train of thought with a case study of The Brothers Karamazov, 
Devils and Wolf Solent. In my reading, Powys’s novel revisits fundamental 
Dostoevskian dilemmas as far as the issues of narrative identity and the use of 
the confessional mode are concerned. Powys revises the bleak Dostoevskian 
vision of narcissistic subjectivity by evoking two intertextually-coded 
confessional scenes: by using “The Great Inquisitor” as a reference point, and 
rewriting in an emphatically Rabelaisian manner the vision of the Golden Age 
associated with “Stavrogin’s Confession”.  
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 First published as “Confessing Defiance – Defying Confession: Dostoevskian Allusion in Wolf 
Solent/Confessant de Défi – Défiant la Confession: La Allusion dostoïevskienne dans Wolf 
Solent,” la lettre powysienne 15 (Autumn 2010), 24–38. Special thanks for the French translation 
and the careful editing of the English text to Jacqueline and Max Peltier.  
 I first wrote on Wolf Solent and The Brothers Karamazov more than ten years ago (cf. “What 
Made Ivan Karamazov ‘Return the Ticket’? – John Cowper Powys’s Rabelaisian Reading of The 
Brothers Karamazov in Wolf Solent,” Slavica XXXII [2003], 261–281) and the present article is 
the product of much rethinking and thorough reworking of that original text. None of the earlier 
versions include the parallels with Devils, which is a major theme of my doctoral thesis 
submitted in 2005 and entitled A szándék allegóriái – Az identitás mítoszai Dosztojevszkij 
örökében (Allegories of Intent – Myths of Identity in the Wake of Dostoevsky), and my article 
“Aranykor, karnevál és megvetés – Weymouth transzformációi két Powys-regényben,” Aranykor 
– Árkádia: Jelentés és irodalmi hagyományozódás, Párbeszéd-kötetek 3, ed. Kroó Katalin and 
Ferenczi Attila (Budapest, L'Harmattan, 2007), 232–260. 
2
 Cf. John Cowper Powys’s insistence on reading ‘the four novels as one novel’ and his 
Dostoevsky canon (Dostoievsky 42; 79).  
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Raising the Dilemma: The Brothers Karamazov 
Wolf Solent contains two obvious allusions to The Brothers Karamazov at 
crucially important textual junctures which concern the eponymous protagonist’s 
self-definition and are related to confession and forgiving. The first of these is a 
very Powysian anticlimactic moment: in the chapter “Mr Malakite in 
Weymouth” Wolf himself openly alludes to Dostoyevsky’s novel in his dialogue 
with Christie Malakite after their failed attempt to make love: 
‘The day I left London, from Waterloo Station, I saw a tramp on the 
steps there.’ […] ‘It was a man, […] and the look on his face was 
terrible in its misery. It must have been a look of that kind on the face 
of someone – though his sufferers were children, weren’t they? – that 
made Ivan Karamazov “return the ticket”. But all this time down here 
– that was March the third – ten months of my life, I have remembered 
that look. It has become to me like a sort of conscience, a sort of test 
for everything I –’ He stopped abruptly; for a spasm of ice-cold 
integrity in his mind whispered suddenly, ‘Don’t be dramatic now’. 
(Powys, Wolf Solent 464)
3
 
Let me quote the parallel place from The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan’s words to 
Alyosha in the chapter tellingly entitled “Rebellion”: 
‘And if that is so, if they have no right to forgive him, what becomes of 
the harmony? […] I don’t want harmony. I don’t want it; out of the 
love I bear to mankind. I want to remain with my suffering unavenged. 
I’d rather remain with my suffering unavenged and my indignation 
unapeased, even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price has been 
placed on harmony. We cannot afford to pay so much for admission. 
And therefore I hasten to return my ticket of admission. And indeed, if 
I am an honest man, I’m bound to hand it back as soon as possible. 
This I am doing. It is not God that I do not accept, Alyosha. I merely 




The second, indirect reference appears much later in the novel, in Wolf’s silent 
musing, which forms a part of the narrative’s resolution. Concerning its content, 
it is evidently a continuation – and solution – of the dilemmas explicated in his 
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 All the references to Wolf Solent will be indicated as WS in parenthetical notes in the rest of the 
paper. 
4 All the references to The Brothers Karamazov will be indicated as BK in parenthetical notes in 
the rest of the paper. 
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dialogue with Christie. Therefore, it is quite fitting that Wolf should echo Ivan 
Karamazov here again:  
’But to forgive for oneself is one thing,’ he thought. ‘To forgive for 
others… for innocents… for animals… is another thing? Barge is an 
innocent; so it may be permitted to him to forgive. I am not an 
innocent. […] I know too much.’ (WS 617) 
For the sake of comparison, let us see Ivan’s words, which directly precede the 
quote above: 
‘I want to forgive. I want to embrace. […] and, finally, I do not want a 
mother to embrace the torturer who had her child torn to pieces by his 
dogs! She has no right to forgive him! If she likes, she can forgive him 
for herself, she can forgive the torturer for the immeasurable suffering 
he has inflicted upon her as a mother; but she has no right to forgive 
him for the sufferings of her tortured child. She has no right to forgive 
the torturer for that, even if her child were to forgive him! And if that 
is so, if they have no right to forgive him, what becomes of the 
harmony?’ (BK 287, emphasis added) 
How do these excerpts relate to narrative identity and the confessional mode? 
On the one hand, in The Brothers Karamazov the crucial claim about “returning 
the ticket” is uttered in a confessional dialogue, which is centred on the issue of 
personal integrity, intertwined with the themes of the subject, story-telling and 
morality. On the other hand – as I will illustrate later – the issues of narrative 
identity and confession are brought forward in Wolf Solent not only by the 
allusion to Dostoevsky, but also by the context of the reference, which reinforces 
them. Ivan Karamazov’s words are uttered in the second one of the three 
inseparably intertwined and probably most hotly debated crucial chapters of the 
whole novel, “The Brothers Get Acquainted”, “Rebellion” and “The Grand 
Inquisitor”
5
. The three chapters include Ivan and Alyosha’s confession-like 
dialogue the day before Ivan actually takes the fatal step that indirectly leads to 
his breakdown at the end of the novel: leaving “for Chermashnya” he provides 
an opportunity for his father’s murder. It is at this critical moment that he makes 
an attempt to introduce himself to his unknown young novice of a brother – in 
other words, to define himself through story-telling, in a dialogue with the other. 
Ivan’s words of defiance actually serve as a preamble for his definition of the 
self realised in his “poem,” “The Grand Inquisitor”. The story that he tells, his 
narrative of self-definition is nothing but the assertion of his integrity through a 
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 For a detailed analysis of these chapters, especially interpretations of “The Grand Inquisitor” see 
also (Kovács 59–104).  
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metaphysical rebellion against God and the Christian ethic centred on the 
concepts of love and forgiving. The reason is a paradox: these notions seem to 
be incompatible with the amount of human suffering, and the position of the 
subject turns out to be untenable in the face of such an irreducible opposition – 
even if it means self-annihilation. Thus, his self-definition is inevitably also a 
sin, which needs to be confessed to Alyosha in a heartbreaking cry for 
absolution – in a cry for the very love and forgiving he rejects. 
Thus Ivan Karamazov’s “returning the ticket” is shorthand not only for 
defiance – as is obvious in Powys’s non-fiction (e. g. The Meaning of Culture 
16) – but also for the definition of the self through a confessional narrative. And 
an intertextual one, at that. But also one that leaves the individual in untenable 
uncertainty despite all its apparent finality. First and foremost, Ivan’s story is 
essentially intertextual, feeding on the text of the Bible (cf. Kroó, Dosztojevszkij: 
A Karamazov testvérek 49–55). If anyone should miss it, Ivan calls Alyosha’s 
silent kiss – a repetition of Jesus’ kiss in “The Grand Inquisitor” – a 
“plagiarism” (BK 309), thereby also evoking a form of intertextuality. Secondly, 
the identity Ivan creates in this narrative fails to supply a solution for his 
metaphysical uncertainties and clearly foreshadows his ultimate breakdown. 
Ivan identifies himself with the Grand Inquisitor, which is emphasised by 
Alyosha’s kiss – a perfect reply to the hidden rhetoric of any confession (cf. de 
Man, Allegories of Reading 279–302; P. Brooks, Troubling Confessions 48–52): 
the craving for absolution (and love). This yearning is expressed in both the 
Grand Inquisitor’s and Ivan’s words, however much forgiving and compassion 
are the central concepts of the metaphysical discourse they are just rebelling 
against. Nevertheless, as Katalin Kroó points out, instead of providing the so-
much desired integrity of the self, the character of the Grand Inquisitor and the 
whole poem as such become the embodiments of the irreducible oppositions 
inherent in the ambivalent nature of the human condition. Thus Ivan’s 
identification with the Grand Inquisitor – who both identifies himself with 
Christ, having to speak for him, in the course of their one-sided dialogue, and 
distances himself from him – becomes nothing else but the affirmation of his 
own inherent division and dilemmas (Dosztojevszkij 49–55). As the Elder 
Zossima’s prophetic words point out at the beginning of the novel: 
‘If you can’t answer [this question] in the affirmative, you will 
never be able to answer it in the negative. You know that peculiarity of 
your heart yourself – and all its agony is due to that alone. […] God 
grant that your heart’s answer will find you still on earth, and may God 
bless your path!’ (BK 78–79) 
Accordingly, throughout the novel Ivan keeps oscillating between extremes, 
hesitating and acting too late, which ultimately wears out his strength and leads 
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to his breakdown. The untenable nature of his narrative identity – the intertextual 
story of the Grand Inquisitor who can define himself only through appropriating 
the story of another, Jesus – brings him on the verge of psychosis, indicated by 
his vision of his demonic double
6
, the devil. 
Thus the reference to Ivan Karamazov could be enough to read Wolf Solent’s 
words to Christie in the context of confession and narrative identity; 
nevertheless, it is worth paying attention to the context of the allusion, which 
equally justifies this approach. On the one hand, it is in the knowledge of having 
hurt Christie – having committed a sin – that Wolf pronounces the words quoted 
above. As is well known, in the course of their intimate love scene Wolf gets so 
shocked at the idea that by committing adultery he may finally destroy his 
’mythology’, the secret narrative of his identity, the core of his integrity, that in 
the last moment he changes his mind and refuses to make love to Christie. He 
immediately realises that he “ha[s] hurt her feelings […] in the one 
unpardonable way” (WS 461) – has caused her suffering; consciously in the 
name of the Christian ethic that forbids adultery and causing suffering to his 
wife, Gerda; unconsciously in a desperate, irrational and rather selfish attempt at 
defending his personal integrity. Thus he needs to confess, to tell a story partly 
to gain absolution for his “unpardonable sin”, partly to re-establish his deeply 
shaken integrity of the self. The reference to “returning the ticket” – just like in 
the Dostoevskian original – is meant to serve as a preamble for a confession, for 
the revelation of his ’mythology’. That, however, never actually takes place. In 
the last moment Wolf regains his ironic distance from the situation (‘Don’t be 
dramatic now’) and consistently with the literal reading of the Dostoevskian text 
– forgiving is rejected – he refuses to produce a confession, a rhetoric aiming for 
absolution. 
On the other hand, the same discrediting of the oral confession is underscored 
by Christie’s own situation, with an additional shift towards the written 
confession – a dialogue with the solitary self, whose sole aim is enjoyment, 
pleasure, maybe Lacanian jouissance (cf. Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts 183–5; Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology 68–9). Before and after 
the unfortunate incident Wolf and Christie talk of the girl’s own “confessional” 
self-definition, her book entitled Slate. Characteristically, first she openly 
discusses with him how she wants it to be “real” and how she was inspired to 
write it because male writers do not dare “to enjoy writing outrageous things”, 
they write about them only “from artistic duty”, which is “disgusting” (WS 454). 
It reveals that whereas Wolf considers writing the “Rabelaisian” History of 
Dorset immoral, Christie chooses this perspective because in her opinion that is 
the only acceptable one for grasping a sense of reality (WS 454). In the following 
chapter, which is emphatically entitled Slate, Wolf actually manages to peep into 
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 On clinical cases of autoscopia cf. (Dolar 11). 
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the book, which Christie decides never to show him after their failed attempt at 
making love, realising that the man she has considered her soul-mate does not 
have the faintest idea about who she really is – or if he has, that identity would 
be unacceptable for him. The single page he can read before the girl discovers 
him describes a barely veiled incestuous scene between father and daughter – 
another “unpardonable sin” which is in need of forgiveness (or forgetting). 
Another scene which is a transgression of the Law of the Father, a pure moment 
of jouissance, to which, paradoxically, only the Father is entitled – therefore a 
scene of rebellion, which defies language. Or at least, as the case shows, spoken 
language. 
Facing the impossibility of Wolf’s confession, his formulating a spoken 
version of his narrative identity, readers must content themselves with bywords 
for his self-definition – and written texts. Many of which, like the Dostoevskian 
allusion, are intertextual references evoking other narrative identities. Though 
Wolf Solent, similarly to Ivan Karamazov, conspicuously identifies himself with 
split selves, he avoids a final breakdown. This goes hand in hand with the fact 
that he rather evokes than creates other narratives and contentedly lets them 
speak for themselves. It is characteristic of both the “only written text” he 
produces in the novel, The History of Dorset, which is a compilation, and the 
heavily intertextual text of the whole novel, which is narrated exclusively 
through his consciousness. The latter abounds in allusions; Wolf keeps thinking 
in terms of literary texts, as if they were “life framed” in windows, mirrors, 
minds drunk on book-reading (WS 91). In the text he generates he regards only 
the style as his own:  
This style had been his own contribution to the book; and though it had 
been evoked under external pressure, and in a sense had been a tour de 
force, it was in its essence the expression of Wolf’s own soul – the 
only purely aesthetic expression that Destiny had ever permitted to his 
deeper nature. (WS 330) 
Through an intricate mechanism of doubling and identification, this History, 
however, is clearly revealed as the written confessional narrative of Wolf’s own 
identity. In the course of the novel Wolf has to realise that on the one hand he 
and his father could have a more than rightful place in The History because of 
their scandalous and immoral life. On the other hand, while writing the book he 
has to identify himself to a great extent with Mr Urquhart, his commissioner, for 
whom The History is a thinly veiled apology for his homosexual attraction to his 
previous secretary. Still, as it turns out from Wolf’s words above, he actually 
comes to enjoy writing the book. Consequently, the book becomes Wolf’s own 
story to a certain degree, just as Slate is a story of self-definition for Christie. As 
a result, story-telling in the novel is represented as basically a carnivalesque, 
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subversive act and a rebellion against accepted norms. It becomes synonymous 
with confessing sins, characterised by the inherently ambiguous double rhetoric 
of all confessional writing: it is both the enjoyable exposure of the hidden self 
(shameful events, unconscious desires, repressed memories, such as incest, 
homosexuality, adultery and fathering bastards) and a plea for absolution (cf. de 
Man, Allegories of Reading 279–302; P. Brooks Troubling 48–52). In that sense, 
Wolf’s words about Ivan Karamazov really serve as a preamble to a confession, 
aimed at nothing else but gaining forgiveness for the “unpardonable sin” 
committed against Christie. But this confession is not realised in an intercourse, 
like in Dostoevsky’s confessional dialogues – it remains a written discourse of 
the solitary self. The reference to the literary figure (Ivan Karamazov) appears 
instead of the revelation of Wolf’s “mythology” to another character in Powys’s 
fictional world. 
Resolution: The Golden Age Revisited 
Powys’s concern with narrative identity and the limitations of confessional 
discourse for establishing personal integrity echo not only The Brothers 
Karamazov, but also Devils. Most obviously so because the insecure integrity of 
both Ivan Karamazov and Stavrogin is highlighted in an intricate confessional 
scene, and because the motif of the Golden Age, emblematic of Stavrogin’s 
narrative identity “defined” in his confession (cf. Dostoevsky, Stavrogin’s 
Confession 64–5
7
; Kroó, “From Plato’s Myth of the Golden Age” passim; S. 
Horváth passim), is a recurrent element in Wolf Solent. The collapse of Wolf’s 
“mythology”, originally associated with the Golden Age of his childhood days in 
Weymouth, is just as severe a narcissistic crisis as Ivan Karamazov’s and 
Stavrogin’s failure to come to a compromise with the Law of the Father in their 
confessional dialogues. It is just fitting that the resolution of this crisis should be 
associated with a solitary vision of the Golden Age – a rewriting of the 
Dostoevskian theme in the combined context of the Romantic enchantment with 
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 In the present article quotations from Dostoevsky’s novel will be based Constance Garnett’s 
translation of Devils, first published in 1914 with the better-known, but slightly misleading 
English title The Possessed. This translation is now available as a searchable e-text; therefore, 
the references to this source as (Dostoevsky, The Possessed) will not contain page numbers. This 
version, however, did not include “Stavrogin’s Confession”, which was first published in 
English in 1922 as a separate volume. For this reason quotes from that section will be indicated 
as (Dostoevsky, Stavrogin’s Confession), with the relevant page numbers. The reason for using 
these translations is purely philological: Powys was obviously familiar with these versions of the 
text, and he also mentions the novel as The Possessed. As, among others, Ned Lukacher points 
out, on the evidence of Powys’s repeated allusions to central motifs of the surpressed chapter it 
is simply impossible that he should have been unacquainted with it (21). I myself will refer to 
Dostoevsky’s novel by the more appropriate title Devils, which was used in Katz’s 1958 
translation (cf. Dostoevsky, Devils). 
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the self and its transcendental insights inspired by nature, and Rabelaisian 
humanism. The fact that this vision, however, does not become the initiator or 
subject of a confessional dialogue is in itself a statement on the limitations of 
such a discourse for defining identity. In other words, Powys tries to re-inscribe 
nature, as the stabilising third element into the discourse of the narcissistic – and 
solipsistic – self (cf. Kochhar-Lindgren 2–18) by turning the aesthetics of the 
sublime and the grotesque (abject [cf. Kristeva, Powers of Horror 2–18; Kiss 
19–20]) into a non-exclusive opposition. At the same time this combination 
implies a negotiation between the Law of the Father (revised as the carnivalesque) 
and the abject of the maternal body (revised as nature). It is this revised vision of 
the Dostoevskian Golden Age that enables Wolf Solent to carry on and look at his 
personal integrity not as a fixed narrative, which can be only shattered in moments 
of crisis, but as a continuously written – and rewritten – work in progress. 
Though the vision of the Golden Age appears at the end of the novel, its 
motifs are present in the text from the very beginning. They are associated with 
Weymouth, the idyllic moments of Wolf’s early childhood and therefore a sense 
of personal integrity: 
He summoned up, […] his own delicious memories of long, 
irresponsible holidays, lovely uninterrupted weeks of idleness, by the 
sea at Weymouth, when he read so many thrilling books in the sunlit 
bow-window at Brunswick Terrace. (WS 37, emphasis added) 
Wolf’s memories clearly evoke the idylls of the mythical Golden Age (cf. 
Hesiod, Works and Days 106–68) through the topos of the sunlit seaside and the 
undisturbed pleasure of his “idleness” – his immersion in the dream-world of 
reading. The vision of the sunlit sea is later directly associated with the motif of 
gold, when Wolf, staring “at the great orb of the horizontal sun” recalls “the 
sight of the dancing ripples of the wide bay turned into liquid gold by the straight 
sun-path” (WS 630) on a spring day in Weymouth – a sight that caused his 
“extraordinary ecstasy” (WS 630). Wolf finds the metaphor of his ‘mythology’ – 
the image that defines his ‘life-illusion’, that is, his consciousness and identity – in 
the self-same “sunlit bow-window” of his childhood idyll (cf. WS 19–20). In short, 
the mythical motif of the Golden Age of Wolf’s childhood in Weymouth becomes 
the signifier of his personal integrity through its connection with his 
‘mythology’. 
Though Wolf likes to associate this core of his identity with the paternal – 
Language, the Law of the Symbolic Father – its gradual crumbling is caused by 
the revelation of its direct relationship with the abject, the grotesque maternal 
body. This is why Wolf Solent’s quest for the Name of the Father turns into a 
desperate attempt to redefine his relationship with his mother in the knowledge 
that his separation from the maternal body is a key to his personal integrity. The 
139 
two principles are united in the final negotiation of his vision, which still 
involves a highly sexualised union with mother nature, though without the 
paternal sanction of the grotesque body as abject. 
Wolf’s ‘mythology’ is present in his consciousness as a paternal defence 
against the abject – his own mother, whose grotesque body he must experience 
as one with his own. This imagery is most obviously represented in the first 
major conflict of mother and son: on the figurative level it involves the 
fragmentation of the maternal body, its vision in its animalistic – subhuman – 
corporeal reality and therefore its rejection; and a reunion with it. In this scene of 
jealousy, which is full of Oedipal overtones and is provoked by Wolf’s marriage, 
Mrs Solent is first represented as an almighty power figure – the mother who 
reserves all authority for herself and consequently fails to prepare a place for the 
Name of the Father (cf. Füzesséry 52): 
She towered above him there with that grand convulsed face and those 
expanded breasts; while her fine hands, clutching at her belt, seemed to 
display a wild desire to strip herself naked before him, to overwhelm 
him with the wrath of her naked maternal body, bare to the outrage of 
his impiety. (WS 302, emphasis added) 
The phallic metaphor of the tower, just like the images of her grandiosity and her 
(Biblical?) “wrath” at his (not less Biblical) “impiety” much rather evoke an 
omnipotent divine father figure, than a female parent. Her representation, which 
is dominated by Wolf’s perspective, nevertheless already makes the impression 
of the blazoning of bodily parts.  
This proves to be a foreshadowing of her consequent total fragmentation in 
Wolf’s eyes, which evokes abjection (of the self): 
Wolf surveyed her form as she lay there, one strong leg exposed as 
high as the knee, and one disarranged tress of wavy hair hanging 
across her cheek. And it came over him with a wave of remorseful 
shame that this formidable being, so grotesquely reduced, was the 
actual human animal out of whose entrails he had been dragged into 
light and air. […] The physical shamelessness, too, of her 
abandonment shocked something in him, some vein of fastidious 
reverence. […] as he now contemplated those grey hairs, and that 
exposed knee, he felt a more poignant consciousness of what she was 
than he had ever felt at the times when he admired her most and loved 
her most. (WS 303, emphasis added). 
This “grotesquely reduced” and emphatically corporeal maternal body is both 
associated with death, with the dangerous intent of swallowing up the (male) 
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beholder, and with the inevitable remembrance of birth – the production of life 
from a subhuman (“animal”, “entrails”) creature – whose sight fills the 
“fastidious” Wolf with disgust. Mrs Solent turns here into the image of the 
carnivalesque “pregnant death” (Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World 25), to whom 
Wolf can react only with abjection. This, in turn, also means the abjection of the 
self, since he cannot avoid the consciousness of being born (“torn”) from the 
same cadaverous (falling) body (cf. Kristeva, Powers 3–4) – being one with it. 
Both the horror of this oneness and its incestuous pleasure are emphasised in 
the closing image of the scene – a picture of reunion evoking the prenatal 
oneness of mother and son: 
He fell on his knees in front of her and she let her tousled forehead 
sink down till it rested against his; […]. Wolf was conscious of 
abandoning himself to a vast undisturbed peace without thought, aim, 
or desire – a peace that flowed over him from the dim reservoirs of 
prenatal life, lulling him, touching him, hypnotising him – obliterating 
everything from his consciousness except a faint delicious feeling that 
everything had been obliterated. […] his mother […] broke the spell 
[…] finally kissing him with a hot, intense, tyrannous kiss. (WS 304) 
The description of this scene is dominated by the images of the return to the 
maternal body, accompanied by the euphemistic forms of death – prenatal 
existence, sleep and unconsciousness. On the level of metaphors, the momentary 
re-establishment of mother and son’s dyadic union means the annihilation of the 
subject’s boundaries resulting from the fulfilment of desire – both as libido and 
death-wish (cf. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle 46–76). These figures of 
oceanic feeling (cf. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents 9–21) most 
shockingly correspond to the watery and vegetable imagery of Wolf’s 
‘mythology’, thereby undermining its alleged function of defending his integrity 
from destruction through being “swallowed up” by insatiable maternal desire (cf. 
Füzesséry 52): 
Outward things [...] were to him like faintly-limned images in a mirror, 
the true reality of which lay all the while in his mind – in these hushed, 
expanding leaves – in this secret vegetation – the roots of whose being 
hid themselves beneath the dark waters of his consciousness. (WS 20–
21) 
No wonder, that Wolf’s ‘mythology’ – allegedly a discourse of paternal Law, in 
reality a sublimating discourse of the abject working less and less efficiently as 
the narrative progresses – is both the cause and victim of Solent’s narcissistic 
crisis. Consequently, a major aspect of the resolution of this crisis concerns a re-
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channeling and sublimation of his unspeakable desire for the abject, the maternal 
body: the re-definition of his attitude to nature. The function of nature is re-
established, on the one hand, as being a source of transcendental experiences
8
, 
and on the other as the embodiment of the successful negotiation of Wolf’s 
desire for a union with the mother and the paternal prohibition of that 
fulfillment. The key to this successful compromise is a modified repetition of the 
tropes of the forbidden union, which, at the same time, is also reminiscent of 
Wolf’s already “dead” ‘mythology’ as the (paternal) discourse of his personal 
integrity. It occurs as a fundamental rewriting of the Golden Age associated with 
the narrative of his identity – and therefore as a powerful echo of “Stavrogin’s 
Confession”. 
The redefinition of Wolf’s attitude to nature offers itself as a solution because 
it is represented from the very beginning as a highly sexualized sublimation of 
his desire for the maternal body. In representing nature as a maternal figure and 
a mediator between different realities Powys obviously relies very heavily on the 
Romantic tradition (cf. Homans 12–41)
9
 (not the least by evoking William 
Wordsworth’s “Immortality Ode” [cf. C. Brooks 124–50]), although he is much 
more explicit about the sexual nature of this desire for union than the Romantics. 
Similarly, Wolf Solent himself seems to be highly conscious of it:  
With a desperate straining of all the energy of his spirit, he struggled to 
merge his identity in the subaquaeous landscape. He had, at that 
moment, a strange feeling, as if he were seeking to embrace in the very 
act of love the maternal earth herself! (WS 429, emphasis added) 
In general, his walks are characterised by two metaphorical actions: his prodding 
the earth with his stick and his penchant to leave the straight road and try to find 
his way by climbing through the gaps of hedges. Both can be interpreted as the 
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 This experience is the basis for the types of “transcendental solitude” in Janina Nordius’s 
analysis of Powys’s fiction (38–43). 
9
 In her analysis, Nordius also connects the exploration of the relationship between the I and the 
Not-I (nature) in Powys’s works to the Romantic tradition. For her it is also problematic to 
decide whether in the moments of transcendental (epiphanic) experiences, which are also 
instances of the heroes’ self-definition, one can speak about a union with nature or the 
preservation of personal integrity. She finally resolves this dilemma by the differentiation of 
“self-abandoned” and “self-assertive” transcendental solitude (25–43). Jeremy Robinson also 
points out that in Powys, similarly to Symbolist poetry, one can speak about the “integration of 
the I and nature”. He analyses the role of nature (landscape) in Powys’s Wessex novels, among 
them in Wolf Solent, in this context. He claims that Powys goes beyond the Romantic and 
Symbolist approaches: he is not concerned with pantheism, a discovery of God in nature, but is 
characterised by a sensualism which combines elements of the mystical, the elemental, the 
mythic and the psychological (Sensualism 3–5). 
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figurative fulfilment of the desire verbalised above
10
, although – depending on 
the perspective – the latter can also be read as a representation of the moment of 
birth, the separation from the maternal body.  
Nevertheless, Wolf’s attitude to nature is characterised by the same 
ambivalences as his relationship with his mother. It is particularly obvious in 
those cases when Wolf, having got already lost among the hedges, strives to find 
(or force) his way through them (e.g. WS 402–3). One of these incidents occurs 
at the moment when his ‘mythology’ “dies” and he is horrified at the threat of 
his merging with the surrounding – abject – material world. He perceives the 
space around him as a closed, labyrinthine sphere and tries to escape the 
imprisoning terrain of abjection by finding an opening – a gap: 
There was no ‘I am I’ to worry about; no Wolf Solent, with a mystical 
philosophy, to look like a cowardly fool! [...] What was left of 
consciousness within him flapped like a tired bird against the whole 
dark rondure of the material universe. If only he could find a crack, a 
cranny in that thick rotundity. But the thickness was his very self! He 
was no longer Wolf Solent. He was just earth, water, and little, 
glittering specks of fire! (WS 561) 
Wolf’s irresistible desire is intermingled with the horror of self-annihilation 
through union, the fear of mythic – and by committing suicide, drowning 
himself, far too material – death. This end is made only the more disgusting by 
the images of fragmentation and dissolution associated with both maternal 
bodies.  
The horror of the union with the maternal body – of both Mrs Solent and 
mother nature – is written over by the closing image of the novel, the vision of 
the Golden Age announcing Wolf’s spiritual and psychological rebirth. The 
abject corporeal presence of nature is embodied in Wolf’s experience “behind 
the pigsty” (WS 633) – an excremental vision of human nature which induces 
him to shortlist all his failures and fiascos over the last year, all the events that 
have rendered his life meaningless, his former concept of himself untenable. 
Similarly to the scene above, the experience is claustrophobic for him: being 
imprisoned in an abject natural space as an image for his spiritual and 
psychological dead-end, he is desperately searching for a way out. But the 
resolution is totally different here, since Wolf finds a gap, a way out, which 
results in a transcendental experience that renews his spiritual strength: 
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 Cf. Robinson’s opinion, according to whom in Powys’s novels “it is not the world, that is 
permeated by sexuality, but the characters’ relationship with it” (Sensualism 12). 
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As his eyes fixed themselves upon the green hedge opposite him, he 
became aware, through a small children-made gap, of the amazing gold 
of the meadow beyond. Why, the field was full to the very brim of 
golden buttercups! It was literally a floating sea of liquid, shining gold! 
[...] Nothing at that moment short of physical force could have 
prevented him from climbing through the gap and entering that field. 
[...] Once in the field, it was just as if he were wading through golden 
waves. [...] He couldn’t resist the distraction of fumbling about at 
random with his stick among the buttercup-stalks. [...] He began 
walking to and fro now, with a firmer step, across that field. [...] 
Buttercup-petals clung to his legs, clung to the sides of his stick; 
buttercup-dust covered his boots. The plenitude of gold [...] surrounded 
him... (WS 629–30) 
The scene serves as a counterpoint to Wolf’s excremental, abject vision of 
nature, humanity, the maternal body and himself. It makes it possible for him to 
handle the two experiences as non-exclusive oppositions – in fact, as phenomena 
which depend on each other for their full significance and therefore should be 
interpreted together. As he has insisted earlier, “Moments as perfect as this 
required death as their inevitable counterpoise” (WS 456). This insight brings 
along with it the promise of a more carnivalesque vision which is able to look at 
the material aspects of life – even death and dissolution – with playful irony, 
recognising the sublime and the grotesque as the two sides of the same coin. 
Since the imagery of the scene is also reminiscent of the tropes dominating both 
the paternal and the maternal versions of Wolf’s narrative identity, it brings them 
to a hypothetically successful compromise.  
And not only that: the novel establishes a dialogue with Dostoevsky’s Devils 
at its very commencement by evoking Stavrogin’s vision through the sight of the 
rays of “the horizontal sun pouring through the coloured windows” (WS 32) of 
the Abbey in Ramsgard (cf. Dostoevsky, Stavrogin’s Confession 65; Lukacher 
21). This dialogue, continued through the consistent evocation of the myth of the 
Golden Age, also culminates in a carnivalesque resolution here. While 
Stavrogin’s narrative, similarly to Ivan’s story, is fraught with ambiguities and is 
therefore (self-)destructive, Powys accepts these ambiguities as an inevitable 
concomitant of narcissistic, solipsistic subjectivity and tries to make the best of 
them by returning to the carnivalesque Rabelaisan tradition, on the one hand, 
and to the Romantic vision of nature, on the other. Part and parcel of this attempt 
is the turning away from the confessional mode, which is indicated here by the 
acting out, the “realisation” of the vision structuring Stavrogin’s confessional 
narrative instead of rewriting it as a dialogue. 
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The intertextual relationship between The Brothers Karamazov, Devils and 
Wolf Solent most probably demands further research. In the present article I have 
tried to discover only one aspect of this relationship: the way both Dostoevsky 
and Powys disclose the intertextual nature of narrative identity in the context of 
the confessional mode. One major conclusion is that their reactions to a lack of 
originality, or a failure of identity, and the sense of belatedness that it implies, 
seem to be radically different. Whereas, according to Michael André Bernstein, 
the typical Dostoevskian hero is outraged at his own belatedness, his lack of 
originality and his inability to break out from the already existing literary 
scenarios and motifs (17–22), with some necessary simplification one can claim 
that Powys actually advocates the reading and narrative practices that cause the 
Dostoevskian hero’s often catastrophic predicament. This difference in the two 
writers’ attitudes is clearly palpable, in my opinion, in Wolf Solent’s 
identification with Ivan Karamazov in a crucial moment of self-definition: it is 
an exemplary case of creating his narrative identity via the appropriation of the 
story/stories of his fictional doubles. The same phenomenon appears on a larger 
scale in his writing of The History of Dorset – that is, in the formulation of his 
narrative identity as a compilation or metatext. A further difference between the 
two authors can be found in the structure of their texts. Among others, both 
Bernstein (93) and Peter Brooks (Troubling 46–60) point out how the (often 
abject) confession is a dominant element in Dostoevskian writing. In Wolf 
Solent, however, the opposite seems to be true: Powys’s representation of the 
confessional discourse reveals his distrust of oral communication as a means of 
achieving authentic subjecthood. A prominent example for this distrust – for me 
– seems to be Wolf Solent’s inability to reveal his ‘mythology’ to Christie 
Malakite and the concomitant shift of emphasis on the written confessional 
discourse. Powys’s acceptance of solipsistic, narcissistic subjectivity seems to 
entail this – just like the alternative solution of revisiting the Dostoevskian 
version of the Golden Age and representing unshared transcendental experience, 
a solitary vision in and through nature that allows for the coexistence of multiple 
versions of reality as a key to personal integrity in a (post)modern world. 
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THE HISTORY OF DORSET: WRITING AS 
READING IN JOHN COWPER POWYS’S WOLF 
SOLENT1 
For a reader interested in comparative literary studies John Cowper Powys’s 
Wolf Solent seems to be a goldmine: Powys sends his readers rambling in 
libraries to detect the source of his numerous more or less explicit allusions. 
However, the anxious reader might realise quite soon that s/he has undertaken a 
hopeless mission: similarly to the Joycean texts, s/he would have to be well-
versed in the whole of the Western European literary tradition – let alone 
knowing the history of fine arts and Eastern philosophies – only to end up with a 
pile of controversial, often mutually exclusive references. Instead of contributing 
to anything even faintly resembling a coherent interpretation, they rather make 
the reader “lost in the funhouse” of intertextuality, hunting for possibly 
unnoticed references in a futile and almost paranoid manner. This is what has led 
me to posing the question in a different manner: instead of finding and 
interpreting the possibly relevant aspects of the individual intertextual references 
I would like to examine how they function in the text in general. This issue is 
closely intertwined with some aspects of narration, such as perspective and tone, 
and with the “only” written text the main character, Wolf Solent, produces in the 
novel: his book, The History of Dorset. In my opinion, the compilation of this 
History, which represents writing as basically reading and interpretation, mirrors 
the generation of texts in the narrative consciousness and for this reason sets a 
possible interpretative framework for the richly intertextual texture of the whole 
novel. This, in turn, is reminiscent of the metafictional segment and its 
functioning in Dostoevsky’s Devils which proposes an alternative, unofficial and 
in many ways carnivalesque discourse for the writing of history. 
Let us see first why narration is problematic in Wolf Solent. Though third-
person narration is used in the novel, the story is told exclusively from one point 
of view, that of the main character. Ideally, it should provide a unified 
perspective, but this is far from the truth. As Janina Nordius points out in her 
study of Powys’s major fiction: 
A general poststructuralist awareness may also be useful in dealing 
with Powys’s portrayal of the divided selves […] in examining the 
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 First published as “The History of Dorset – Writing as Reading in John Cowper Powys’s Wolf 
Solent,” Romanian Journal of English Studies 1 (2004), 304–13. Special thanks to Don Wilcox 
for his careful linguistic editing. 
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division in the narrative consciousness itself which is apparent in for 
instance Wolf Solent. (6)
2
 
Nordius’s insight directs the reader’s attention to the main character’s identity 
itself, which, of course, is generated by the text. As Jacques Lacan points out, 
the subject is constructed by the entry into the Symbolic, that is, in Language: 
What we teach the subject to recognise as his unconscious is his 
history – that is to say, we help him to perfect the contemporary 
historisation of the facts which have already determined a certain 
number of historical “turning points” in his existence. (Lacan, The 
Language of the Self 23) 
However, Wolf Solent’s silence, his inability to tell “a significant version of his 
life story” (P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 54) and thus to establish his identity 
becomes apparent in the first sections of the novel. The last twenty-five years of 
his life have been monotonous and uneventful; “he has lived peacefully under 
the despotic affection of his mother, with whom, when he was only a child of 
ten, he had left Dorsetshire, and along with Dorsetshire, all the agitating 
memories of his dead father” (Powys, Wolf Solent 14)
3
. He also seems to protect 
himself from his own hidden self, repressing traumatic experiences below the 
surface of his consciousness as uninterpreted metaphors. No wonder he has no 
history of his own to tell; as he himself points out, though he has worked for ten 
years as a history teacher, he has “never made any historical researches in [his] 
life. [He’s] only compiled wretched summaries from books that every one can 
get” (WS 36).  
By the end of the novel, however, he is forced to enter the Symbolic, to put 
together at least one story of his life: to write a book, The History of Dorset, 
which becomes his own story for several reasons. On the one hand, at the very 
beginning of the novel a metonymical relationship is established between Dorset 
and his dead father. Simultaneously with writing the History, Wolf, like a 
detective, tries to find out the hidden and “forgotten” story of his father “through 
actively repeating and reworking [the] story in and by discourse” (P. Brooks, 
Reading 25). His return to Dorset becomes a journey back in time, a tedious 
procedure of remembering and rediscovering his own origins. In Lacanian terms, 
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 Charles Lock compares the narrative method of Wolf Solent to the Jamesian point-of-view 
technique (“Wolf Solent: Myth and Narrative” 120). The similarities are quite obvious, but 
taking into consideration Janina Nordius’s suggestion might reveal why Powys’s narrative seems 
to be more ambiguous and intriguing than James’s stories narrated through one central vessel of 
consciousness. 
3
 In the rest of the paper references to Wolf Solent will be indicated by WS and the page numbers 
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the aim of his return seems to be a quest for the metaphor of the Name of the 
Father, to serve as the place where he could fly from his mother (cf. Füzesséry 
51). As Wolf claims: “He had come to Dorset … he knew it well enough now … 
to escape from her, to mix with the spirit of his father in his own land” (WS 543). 
However, the quest leads to a paradox. According to Lacan, “It is in the name of 
the father that we must recognise the support of the symbolic function which, 
from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law” 
(The Language 41). Nevertheless, the story of the father, inseparably intertwined 
with Wolf’s double, Redfern’s, once deciphered, turns out to be nothing else but 
breaking the law: its reading involves adultery, homosexual desires, suicidal urges 
and via the connection with an important minor character, Mr Malakite, incest – 
the most fundamental transgression the Name of the Father as law is supposed to 
protect from, probably the transgression Wolf is actually trying to escape. 
On the other hand, partly in the course of working through his father’s and 
double’s story by repetition, Wolf is forced to come out of his Lady of Shallot-
like ivory tower and act. He becomes Mr Urquhart’s secretary and finishes his 
book, which Redfern, his dead predecessor, failed to do. He tries to take care of 
his mother, his newly discovered step-sister and the eccentric poet Jason Otter 
by actively intervening in their lives for the first time. He marries a woman to 
whom he is primarily attracted sexually, and (almost) commits adultery with a 
woman who is not exactly feminine but very intellectual. Under the burden of all 
this pressure he finally contemplates committing suicide. Since Mr Urquhart 
plans the History to be a “Diary of the Dead” (WS 62) from a “perspective on 
human occurrences that the bedposts in brothels must come to possess – and the 
counters of bar-rooms – and the butlers’ pantries in old houses – and the muddy 
ditches in long-frequented lovers’ lanes” (WS 45–46), Wolf’s comment in the 
middle of the novel seems to be totally justified: “We might all be in Mr 
Urquhart’s book!” (WS 282) Both Wolf and his father would be “eligible” for 
featuring in The History of Dorset, because, as Peter Brooks claims, it is only 
through their “deviance and transgression” that their stories become “narratable” 
(Reading 86). Thus The History of Dorset becomes Wolf’s story in more than 
one sense: it is an image of his father’s story – and thus the story of his origin – 
and his own story, and since he compiles it, it becomes a model for how he 
generates texts and how he attempts to establish his identity. 
The creation of a carnivalesque history within the framework of the novel as 
a model for the generation of texts born from unavowable desires and 
formulated as a compilation – obviously also serving as a metafictional 
exploration of the entire novel’s mechanisms – clearly parallels the functioning 
of Liza’s “literary scheme” in Dostoevsky’s Devils
4
. The literary ambitions Liza 
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 Lock sees a similar connection between The History of Dorset and Wolf Solent (“Wolf Solent” 
124). 
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wants to realise with Shatov’s help gain special significance because they 
actually outline the chronicler’s ars poetica: as the consistent use of the genre of 
the chronicle shows, both Liza and the narrator of Devils aim to rewrite the 
(already discredited?) Grand Narrative of History (Cobley 187–9, 232) through 
their alternative historiography. The documentary nature of Liza’s project is 
rooted in the proposed technique: her annuals would be compiled from 
newspaper articles, i.e. they would be written in a manner which, similarly to the 
incorporation of generically fundamentally different texts in Menippean satire 
(cf. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 13), which would result in 
heterogeneous, “polyphonic” texts. The avoidance of any “political tendency” 
and insistence on complete “impartiality” (Dostoevsky, The Possessed)
5
 would 
vouchsafe for the equality of the individual “parts” or voices, though, as Shatov 
quite rightly points out, selection in itself is almost impossible without the 
suggestion of some tendency (Dostoevsky, The Possessed).  
The aim of both Liza’s proposed historiography and that of Devils is 
characterisation, the establishment of identity: those of Russia and Stavrogin, 
which turn out to be the same. All along, the aims of the “literary scheme” are 
set in the terms characterisation
6
: it would “reflect the characteristics of Russian 
life”, narrate “events [...] characteristic of the moral life of the people, of the 
personal character of the Russian people”, and it would be “a presentation of 
the spiritual, moral, inner life of Russia for a whole year” (Dostoevsky, The 
Possessed, emphasis added). This picture of Russia is actually embodied in the 
narrative of Devils as the picture of a typical – and therefore nameless – Russian 
small town, more particularly as Stavrogin’s personal portrait. Since the 
thematic scope of the novel practically corresponds to the one that Liza outlines 
– it includes “strange incidents, fires, public subscriptions, anything good or bad, 
every speech or word, perhaps even floodings of the rivers” (Dostoevsky, The 
Possessed) – Devils functions like a realisation of her plans.  
In contrast with official – scientific and objective – historiography the 
impelling power of story-telling for both Liza and the chronicler seems to be 
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  Here and in the rest of the paper quotations from Dostoevsky’s novel will be based Constance 
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6
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metaphors of portrayal, image-drawing. Cf. (Достоевский, Бесы 82). 
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desire itself. Liza’s “literary scheme” may be only an excuse to approach Marya 
Timofeevna through Shatov. This, in turn, is obviously motivated by her desire 
to discover Stavrogin’s mysterious past, to test the “feasibility” of her own wish-
fulfilment fantasies centred on him, and ultimately to put together the image of a 
coherent identity – both for him and herself. Similar motives might be hidden 
behind the chronicler’s enterprise, who tries to decipher and arrange into a 
meaningful story the mysterious events of the recent past to “work through” the 
unspeakable experience of the beloved woman’s death – and maybe even more 
significantly, to come to terms with the figure of his “victorious” rival after a major 
blow to his narcissism. The narrative of History is rewritten in Devils both as a 
compilation of journalistic pieces composed by a chronicler always lagging behind 
the events
7
, and as a fundamentally narcissistic project, a personal history focused 
on the “historisation” of the unconscious (Lacan, The Language 23) and desire. 
As for The History of Dorset as a similar model for the generation of texts, 
there are three important aspects of Wolf’s writing procedure that seem to be 
highly relevant here. First of all, The History of Dorset is a compilation. Mr 
Urquhart describes it in the following way: 
‘Our History will be an entirely new genre, […] What I want to do is to 
isolate the particular portion of the earth’s surface called “Dorset”; as 
if it were possible to decipher there a palimpsest of successive strata, 
one inscribed below another, of human impression’. (WS 45) 
According to this, on the one hand the text will be put together out of the 
fragments of already existing texts, layered on each other, like in the case of a 
palimpsest. Thus it implies first of all the deciphering – the reading and 
interpreting – of probably blurred and partly damaged inscriptions covering (and 
thus modifying) each other. The impossibility of a “perfect” and “total” reading 
is emphasised by the tentative “as if”. On the other hand, the phrase “human 
impression” also implies utter subjectivity – as if it were the human 
(un)conscious that was to be read. Thus the writing procedure is based on a 
complicated reading procedure similar to that of psychoanalysis, while its aim is 
to “isolate” Dorset like a human individual by establishing its identity through 
its history. The History of Dorset has nothing to do with “objective” or scientific 
truth. It gives necessarily controversial and partial impressions of “the ebb and 
flow of events” (WS 45), which may discredit and undermine each other, and 
since the deepest stratum is unreachable, it, “like analyses, may in essence be 
interminable” (P. Brooks, Reading 212). 
                                                     
7
 The parallel between the chronicler and a journalist is most convincingly established in 
(Карякин 243–319).  
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Secondly, a compilation implies the selection of relevant material – a choice 
of similar elements from the greater paradigm of events that have taken place in 
Dorset. Since this selection is based on similarity, it can be associated with the 
metaphoric pole of language, to use Roman Jakobson’s term, and is one of “the 
aspects [in which] an individual exhibits his personal style” (1114). In the case 
of The History of Dorset, however, it is not Wolf who carries out the task of 
selection, but Mr Urquhart. On the one hand, he decides on the nature of the 
material to be included and he defines it in terms of a certain perspective that 
Wolf identifies as “Rabelaisian” (WS 46). It is characterised by a Protean nature, 
involving carnivalesque laughter, following the logic of inversion and giving a 
“bottom-view”, which is fundamentally opposed to the serious and officially 
accepted (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 129–30; Rabelais and His 
World 10). It gives an outlet to such desires that must be repressed according to 
the norms of civilisation. On the other hand, Mr Urquhart actually prepares notes 
for Wolf about the material that should be included. As a result, Wolf has to 
acquire a perspective that is not his own, has to deal with metaphors that he has 
intentionally excluded from his life, just like the Name of the Father, but 
metaphors, which forcefully return like the repressed. He has to face the 
inevitable presence of already written texts which are parts of his own text that is 
just being written, independently from his will or acceptance.  
The third important aspect of the writing procedure is closely connected to 
this method of selection: since “the spiteful commentaries and floating 
fragments of wicked gossip gathered together by his employer” (WS 329) are 
given in note form, Wolf Solent has to provide the missing links in the text. 
There is only one concrete example in the novel to show the steps of this 
transformation. The original notes are the following: 
Cerne Giant – real virginity unknown in Dorset – ‘cold maids’; a 
contradiction – Sir Walter’s disgust – His erudition – His platonic 
tastes – How he was misunderstood by a lewd person – . (WS 330) 
Wolf’s task is to restore the logic and continuity of the text by adding mostly 
syntactic elements, in Jakobson’s terms (1114) to combine the already given 
elements with the help of supplying the missing metonymical links. His writing 
procedure seems to demonstrate what Peter Brooks identifies as the main point 
in any story-telling: he “order[s] the inexplicable and impossible situation as 
narrative […] by taking the apparently meaningless metaphor […] and 
unpacking it as metonymy […] so that we accept the necessity of what cannot 
logically be understood” (Reading 10–24). However, Wolf himself realises that 
he is not totally free in doing so: even these broken fragments imply a certain 
tone, reveal the basically rhetorical nature of all writing. As he exclaims, “‘Good 
Lord! […] I must be careful what I’m doing just here. The old demon has 
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changed his tune. This isn’t garrulous history. This is special pleading” (WS 330, 
emphasis added). And the events that follow seem to justify him: Mr Urquhart 
feels haunted by Redfern, the previous secretary’s ghost and cannot find peace 
till he unearths and reburies his body to check whether he really lies in his grave. 
Though Redfern, an extremely handsome man, died of pneumonia, Mr Urquhart 
has pangs of conscience because of his death: he was homosexually attracted to 
the young man, who fled his service and house in an apparently suicidal mood 
shortly before his death. His enigmatic story has to be put together by Wolf 
Solent, till it finally reveals the rhetorical purpose of the History: it is the 
narcissistic exposure of Mr Urquhart’s shame and his pleading for forgiveness 
(cf. de Man, Allegories of Reading 283–5). Thus Wolf Solent becomes both 
confessor and analyst to Mr Urquhart through writing his story, while he cannot 
escape the need of identification with the narrative and thus with the analysand 
at the same time, since he has to enter the story to be able to unify it by creating 
its style. As he says: 
This style had been his own contribution to the book; and though it had 
been evoked under external pressure, and in a sense had been a tour de 
force, it was in its essence the expression of Wolf’s own soul – the 
only purely aesthetic expression that Destiny had ever permitted to his 
deeper nature. (WS 330) 
Thus The History of Dorset as a model for generating the text of the novel, 
shows the birth of narrative consciousness through writing, which is 
fundamentally the infinite reading and interpretation of already given texts. In 
the case of the History, the Rabelaisian perspective which Wolf Solent has to 
adopt and which determines the principle of selection, is not Wolf’s own. It is 
set by a different consciousness and indirectly – as the term implies – by a 
literary work of art, François Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel. Thus the 
writing of the History becomes the reading of already existing texts in the 
interpretive context of a literary text. This fact leads back to the issue of 
narration, perspective, the narrator as a subject, and their possible relationship 
with the phenomenon of intertextuality. 
What are the implications of such a writing procedure concerning the 
generation of the text of the whole novel? Wolf Solent “compiles” the story of 
his life in a very similar manner, by “framing” (WS 91) every event in the 
context of already written texts, reading his own self through already existing 
stories – the stories of fictional characters and characters in the novel whom he 
recognises as his own doubles. The interconnection between textuality, 
frames/mirrors and doubles (the Doppelgänger) has been pointed out and 
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interpreted by both cultural semiotics and psychoanalysis
8
. Thus it can be 
claimed that both the intertextual references and Wolf Solent’s doubles function 
as mirror images in the Lacanian concept: he enters Landguage, the Symbolic 
through identification with them.  
However, just like there are many strata in the “palimpsest” from which he 
compiles The History of Dorset, there is a chaotic abundance of fictional 
characters and doubles he identifies with. The novel is full his misreadings, his 
“visions and revisions”, dramatic reinterpretations of events, characters and his 
own identity, in the course of which Wolf usually manages to distance himself 
from them spatially and temporally, which is shown in a shift from pathetic and 
tragic to ironic. But the interpretative framework is always supplied by 
intertextuality. Wolf’s own “Protean” self undergoes an infinite series of 
transformations: his explicit metamorphoses include Greek mythological 
characters, such as Deucalion and Orion, the Biblical figures of both the snake 
and Christ, a Greek tragic or comic hero in general, Dante descending into 
Inferno, both the ghost and Hamlet from Shakespeare’s play to be followed by a 
“comic King Lear”, let alone Tristam Shandy, Ivan Karamazov, the writer Swift 
himself – alternatively Gulliver as a Yahoo. Equally important is his implicit 
evocation of the mythological Narcissus, most conspicuous in the centrality of 
the mirror and watery reflection among the metaphors of his ‘mythology’ and in 
the bleak scene of his suicidal longing to drown himself in Lenty Pond (cf. WS 
561). He is surrounded by an abundance of ([inter]textual and personal) mirrors 
in the novel – some of them, like The History of Dorset, obviously showing an 
inverted image –, which create a sense of infinity in space by their mutual 
reflection. Wolf himself expresses this notion in the following way: 
There is nothing but a mirror opposite a mirror, and a round crystal 
opposite a round crystal, and a sky in water opposite water in a sky. 
(WS 325) 
The endless interplay of reflections – intertexts, images in mirrors and doubles – 
form in the novel what Nordius calls “a pluralistic ‘multiverse,’ with as many 
centres as there are individual consciousnesses, and where each consciousness 
[…] creates its own particular and individual reality” (31). In this case, however, 
the individual consciousness which should form the centre of at least its own 
                                                     
8
 On the one hand, Yury Lotman points out how the text-within-the-text in literature, the mirror in 
fine arts and architecture and the appearance of doubles in fiction have a very similar function 
and effect: by adding an inverted perspective and reflection they undermine the distinction 
between “reality” and “fiction” in an extremely playful manner (Лотман 112–117). On the other 
hand, Jacque Lacan in his concept of the “mirror stage” ascribes outstanding importance to 
identification with the image and connects it with entering the Symbolic, that is, Language in the 
development of the individual (Lacan, „The Mirror Stage” passim; Wilden 167–8; Sarup 62–6). 
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“reality”, seems to be structured like this “pluralistic ‘multiverse’”, it is divided 
in itself because it is surrounded by a multitude of mirrors. Wolf Solent’s 
perspective and consciousness could be most easily represented by a cracked 
mirror moving around and facing several mirrors simultaneously which also 
reflect each other. 
His existence as a subject seems to be constantly endangered, which is 
reflected by Wolf’s classic Gothic fear of losing his identity (cf. Botting 111) 
and maybe losing his mind – it is not by chance that most of his literary alter 
egos share the feature of (feigned or real) mental disturbances. An excellent 
example for the clash of two mutually exclusive experiences and how he 
“finally” comes to terms with them is given on the very last pages of the novel: 
going home at sunset, he first sees a field which becomes a “floating sea of 
liquid, shining gold” (WS 629) and then passes “behind the pigsty” (WS 633). He 
would like to believe that the first one, this visionary “epiphanic moment” of 
“self-abandoned transcendental solitude”, to use Nordius’s terms (41), is really 
his “ultimate vision” (WS 630), the image that closes the tedious procedure of 
(mis)reading and rereading with a final word. However, the Rabelaisian inverted 
perspective provided by the angle of vision from behind the pigsty makes him 
realise that he has to resign himself to the basically paradoxical nature of his 
own consciousness and the “multiverse” he lives in. The image of the identity 
that might be able to cope with this situation is supplied in the text by the 
metaphor of the river: 
…how different a thing the personality of a river is from the 
personality of a sea. […] the water of a river is at every succeeding 
moment a completely different body. […] Wolf tried to visualise the 
whole course of the Lunt, so as to win for it some sort of coherent 
personality. By thinking of all its waters together, […] this unity could 
by achieved; for between the actual water before him now, […] and the 
water of that tiny streamlet among the mid-Dorset hills from which it 
sprang, there was no spatial gap. The one flowed continuously into the 
other. They were as completely united as the head and tail of a snake! 
(WS 109) 
Personality and river. One of the possible meanings of Wolf Solent’s name 
actually connects him to this very important image: The Solent, usually referred 
to as a river, is a channel between the Isle of Wight and the mainland. The 
metaphor seems to suggest an identity constantly in flight, on the flow, which is 
made possible by the nature of the linguistic sign itself and of the Symbolic 
order in which the subject is located (Lacan, “The Insistence of the Letter in the 
Unconscious” passim). It does not exclude other possible readings of the name 
“Solent” but rather includes them, suggesting that there might be an infinite 
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number of metaphors hidden behind it. Applied to the interpretation of the novel 
it denies the possibility of a definitive closure – however much desirable it 
seems (cf. Gould 44–5) –, since the river does not actually “end”, it simply flows 
into the sea. This reading of Solent’s name points toward a much more playful – 
and probably ironical – approach to the novel, suggesting not only the 
acceptance of the infinite play of signifiers as inevitable, but even faintly 
reminding the reader that it is actually enjoyable. Wolf realises it for the first 
time while he is writing The History of Dorset: ‘I must play with it, just as [Mr 
Urquhart is] playing with it’ (WS 62).  
This outcome reflects an approach to the intertextual nature of narrative 
identity which is in sharp contrast with that of Devils – the text on which Wolf’s 
carnivalesque history is partly modelled. According to Michael André Bernstein, 
the typical Dostoevskian hero is outraged at his own belatedness, his lack of 
originality and his inability to break out from the already existing literary 
scenarios and motifs (17–22). This plight has a major role in Stavrogin’s 
collapse: his whole life, and consequently its narrative(s) turn out to be an 
infinite sequence of literary allusions, similarly to the compilation implied in 
Liza’s “literary scheme” and its realisation, the text of Devils. Therefore, lacking 
any sense of authenticity, Stavrogin puts a forceful stop to his interminable 
narrative by committing suicide. With some necessary simplification one can 
claim that Powys actually advocates the narrative practices which cause the 
Dostoevskian hero’s catastrophic predicament, as is most conspicuous in Wolf 
Solent’s writing of The History of Dorset – that is, in the formulation of his 
narrative identity as an interminable compilation or metatext. 
 
At the beginning of my paper I claimed that the compilation of The History of 
Dorset mirrors the generation of texts in the narrative consciousness and for this 
reason sets a possible interpretative framework for the richly intertextual texture 
of the whole novel. If it really does so, it is by representing the writing procedure 
as basically an infinite succession of misreadings and an inevitably endless 
attempt of self-assertion in the course of which the already written text functions 
as a mirror image. But The History of Dorset is only one of them – a most 
conspicuous one, though, and thus an apparently easy target for analysis. The 
situation becomes much more complicated when the reader has to realise that 
this is only one of the mirrors in the text, an intricate texture of intertextual 
references and a number of doubles functioning in a similar way, and their 
mutual reflections actually make the analyst run almost the same circles. The 
time structure of the novel is completely cyclical, suggesting a possibility for 
infinite (compulsive) repetition (cf. P. Brooks, Reading 113–42). The last page 
of the novel – what with elevated epiphanic moments of transcendental visions – 
leaves Wolf Solent standing at the gate of his house and with a sentence simply 
implying that the story must go on: “Well, I shall have a cup of tea” (WS 634). 
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‘PURE ROMANCE’: NARCISSUS IN THE 
TOWN OF MIRRORS1 
“I am an incorrigible bookworm with a desperate mania for 
trying to write the sort of long romances I have always loved 
so intensely to read.” (Powys, “Preface to the New Edition” 
xv) 
A Glastonbury Romance, John Cowper Powys’s only consistent rewriting of 
Devils (cf. Lock, “Polyphonic Powys” passim) as a major comment on 
narcissistic subjectivity, quite fittingly starts with the meeting and happy union 
of Narcissus and his one and only love: himself, his own mirror image (cf. Ovid 
III 339–508). That is, John Crow, who temporarily appears to be the main 
character of the novel, is happily reunited with his androgynous cousin, Mary 
Crow, and they decide to become a couple (cf. Kochhar-Lindgren 2–44; Lacan, 
“The Mirror Stage” passim; Boothby 21–46)
2
. Their belonging together is 
expressed by one of the most beautifully drawn scenes of the novel, when they 
take a boat down the River Wissey
3
. John Crow names this surrogate or oblique 
                                                     
1
 Special thanks to Professor Charles Lock for his editing the first two sections of this article, 
which are to be published with the same title, but a slightly different text in the 2012 volume of 
The Powys Journal. 
2
 On Powys’s own opinion about the narcissistic nature of all subjectivity see (Psychonalysis and 
Morality 33–4), especially: “The inherent Narcissism of our identity-lust can easily be tested in a 
thousand interesting and curious ways”. 
3
 Cf. the description of the scene: 
The prolonged struggle of these two with the boat and with the water became in a very 
intimate sense their marriage day upon earth. By his salt-tasting sweat and b her 
wrought-up passion of guiding, these two ‘run-down adventurers’ plighted their troth for 
the rest of their days. They plighted it in defiance of the whole universe and of whatever 
was beyond the universe; and they were aware of no idealization of each other. They 
clung to each other with a grim, vicious, indignant resolve to enjoy a sensuality of 
oneness; a sensuality of unity snatched out of the drifting flood of space and time. It was 
not directed to anything beyond itself, this desire of theirs. It was innocent of any idea of 
offspring. It was an absolute, fortified and consecrated by the furious effort they were 
making, by the diamond-bright sparkles upon the broken water, by the sullen clicking of 
the rowlocks. (Powys, A Glastonbury Romance 80–1, emphasis added) 
 In the rest of my paper I will use only the abbreviation GR for A Glastonbury Romance in 
parenthetical references.  
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homosexual relationship, which is also incestuous
4
, a “pure Romance” (GR 39)
5
. 
It is tempting to see this union of the almost same, this short-circuiting of desire 
that makes narrative impossible
6
 as the romance to which the novel’s title 
alludes. Since this most narcissistic of desires is consummated on the opening 
pages, the story might as well end here. But it does not: it flows on for over a 
thousand more pages, and it takes a proper flood to stop it – but not to bring it to 
an end. The critical question for me is what, once desire has been satisfied, keeps 
the story going. 
It might be useful in this context to recall Powys’s own often-quoted words 
in his preface to the 1955 edition of the Romance: the novel’s “heroine is the 
Grail. Its hero is the Life poured into the Grail. Its message is that no one 
Receptacle of Life and no one Fountain of Life poured into that Receptacle can 
contain or explain what the world offers us” (“Preface to the New Edition” xiii). 
The last sentence of this passage, as Charles Lock has aptly pointed out, warns 
                                                     
4
 The Crows’ penchant for incest is later on marked out by the narrator in the particular context of 
looking for the same in the different and stopping time by keeping things the same – maybe also 
with a faint echo of doubling as a protection of the ego against death à la Sigmund Freud (The 
Uncanny 233–4):  
There is doubtless in certain old, indurated families a deep ineradicable strain of what 
might be called centripetal eroticism. A tendency to inbreeding is not always a sign of 
degeneracy in a race. It is often an instinct of ethos-preservation, suspicious of the 
menace of mixed bloods. Doubtless something of the inordinate individuality of the 
Crows was due to a constant inter-marriage between cousins among them, doubling and 
redoubling the peculiarities of their ‘Gens’. (GR 671) 
 As this passage suggests, neither incest, nor homosexuality are prerogatives of John Crow alone: 
Philip Crow’s “only passionate love-affair before he met his cousin again, after a long 
separation, had been with a boy at school, whose figure, girlish for that of a youth, was almost 
identical with Percy’s” (GR 671).  
5
 In the description of their first love scene John experiences Mary as a mirror image of himself, 
including even reversal as a peculiarity of looking-glass reflections:  
She was feeling exactly as he was feeling – only, as was right and proper, the reverse 
way. Oh, what magical expressions for the only things in love that really counted, were 
those old ballad phrases. Mary was not pretty. She was not beautiful. She had what the 
old ballads had. Yes, that was the thing. The best love was not lust; nor was it passion. 
Still less was it any ideal. It was pure Romance! But pure Romance was harsh and grim 
and stoical and a man must be grim to embrace it. Yes, it went well with cold March 
wind and cold rain and long chilly grass. (GR 39, emphasis added, except for ideal).  
Notice the overall echo of the Keatsian “cold pastoral” in the standstill of love-making in nature, 
perceived through the mirror of the literary text implicated by “old ballad phrases”.  
6
 Cf. „Now that I’ve found Mary, let me want nothing else!” (GR 73, emphasis added) On desire as 
the “engine” of story-telling cf. (P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 37-61); on incest as a form of 
“short-circuiting desire” cf. (P. Brooks, Reading 103-9). 
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against what in Bakhtinian terms would be called “monologic” readings of the 
text (“«’Multiverse’... language which makes language impossible»” 64; cf. 
Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 9–11). Powys insists later in the 
same preface (though these words are seldom quoted) that the Grail’s “essential 
nature [...] is only the nature of a symbol. It refers us to things beyond itself and 
to things beyond words” (xv, emphasis added). Though New Criticism long ago 
warned us against “intentional fallacy”, I think we should take seriously Powys’s 
emphasis on the nature of the major organising element of the text as both 
figurative and extralinguistic. This is no less important than the equally authorial 
claim on the impossibility of forming any absolute vision of a single truth. The 
authorially-voiced words in the “Preface” seem to be in accordance with the 
self-reflexive narratorial comments within the novel itself. Thus, at one point 
readers are informed that “The psychic history of a place like Glastonbury is not 
an easy thing to write down in set terms, for not only does chance play an 
enormous part in it, but there are many forces at work for which human 
language has at present no fit terms” (GR 747, emphasis added). The word term 
in the narrower sense implies the exact language of natural sciences, but in a 
wider sense it is a synonym for word in general. Thus, the last clause puts the 
whole issue of representation hopelessly beyond the limits of language as such. 
Or, as Lock argues, it leaves the narrator with the task of doing the impossible, 
and venturing an imaginative and figurative representation with whatever terms 
are available (“«’Multiverse’»” 69). In other words, terms can be made fit for 
representation only if they are taken out of their normal setting, if they are upset 
and become, in turn, unsettling. 
It is in this light that I will try to reinterpret those readings of the Romance 
which assign the role of its motive force to the “Saturnian quest”
7
. Indeed, on the 
shore – or solid-looking island – of the novel’s textual stream one can see a 
revivalist-communist utopia emerging in Glastonbury, and then– after a short 
flourish – meeting its untimely end by the flood. Since the commune is headed 
by mystic John Geard as the newly elected mayor of the town, it is easy to read 
this narrative as the return of Cronos/Gwyn-up-Nudd/King Arthur/Merlin, as a 
transposition of the Isles of the Blessed into Wessex; in short, as the realised 
mytheme of the Golden Age. There are plenty of readings of the novel of this 
kind
8
. What I would like to call attention to is that the rise and fall of the 
                                                     
7
 For the description of the Golden Age during the reign of Cronos (Saturn) cf. (Hesiod, Works 
and Days 109–20 and 156–68). As is well known, Hesiod identifies the Golden Age both with a 
distant period in the past and with an eternal present, in which heroes live on the Isles of the 
Blessed under the rule of Cronos at the edge of the known world. These are also seen as part of 
the underworld.  
8
 In fact, the Romance seems to be a case study of the two alternative reading strategies dividing 
major Powysians. On the one hand, it has been interpreted – approvingly by Morine Krissdottir 
(John Cowper Powys the Magical Quest 80–99; Descents of Memory 251–62), with more 
158 
commune occurs on the periphery, as if it was not totally but almost irrelevant: it 
is a pluralist utopia which hardly scratches the surface of the characters’ self-
absorbed subjectivity. It is that subjectivity which nonetheless remains the major 
concern throughout the novel. The Saturnian quest is a narratological necessity, 
just as the myth of the Golden Age is a necessary illusion: the latter is the 
object-cause of desire which makes narrative possible. The goal of the quest 
must remain unreachable: no story starts with “and they lived happily ever 
after”. In the light of the narcissistic overture of the Romance this perpetual 
deferral and frustration is doubly necessary: once Narcissus enters the scene, 
passivity, stasis and death also make their appearance. And this means that the 
narrative has to work out an apparently impossible compromise between 
movement and stasis to be able to proceed. 
It is this challenge that determines the direction of the flow of desire in A 
Glastonbury Romance: seemingly progressing in a straightforward manner, it 
actually starts to wander, as if on purpose, lest it reach its goal and meet its 
object, thus ending the story. What happens to the Grail as object-cause of desire 
when it enters this narcissistic field of power? It has to be displaced, since the 
quest for the Grail turns into Narcissus’s desire for the impossible union with his 
own image in the water (cf. Wilden 166). The main attraction of this image is its 
totality and perfection: these are qualities that the Grail, as the central symbol of a 
version of the universal myth of the Golden Age, certainly embodies
9
. Thus it can 
                                                                                                                                   
scepticism by Carole Coates (90–118) – as a text imbued with mysticism, one of the numerous 
but none the less suspicious Modernist answers to ontological and metaphysical queries tainted 
by the occult. In short, both Geard and Sam Dekker have been interpreted as Powys’s 
mouthpieces. In my view, this approach equals classifying the text as an esoteric Modernist 
version of the Grail myth, which is of moderate interest today. One is tempted to feel that Harold 
H. Watts’s comment on Aldous Huxley’s Point Counter Point is fully applicable to the novel: “It 
is not the particular message, not [the] particular gospel in this novel, that would lead many 
modern readers to be sceptical of its claim on our attention. [...] What is objectionable [...], what 
precludes full modernity for [the novel], is the fact that confident admonition is indeed offered” 
(415). The dead-end of the critical approach above is clearly illustrated by Krissdottir’s 
denunciation of Powys as a creator of mazes (Descents 17–8, 38–9, 423–7), because he fails to 
offer unambiguous – shall I say prophetic? – enough solutions to the problems he raises.  
 On the other hand, Powys’s texts engender much more fascinating interpretations once they are 
brought into dialogue with more current critical discourses. This is most obvious in the other 
major trend of the Romance’s readings, which involves for example Harald Fawkner’s 
phenomenological interpretations and Lock’s Bakhtinian reading of the novel (“Polyphonic 
Powys” passim). Not to mention Ned Lukacher’s somewhat accidental deconstruction of the 
mytheme of the Golden Age in the Romance (passim) – and thus of the master trope of Powys 
criticism ever since the 1964 publication of Wilson Knight’s seminal The Saturnian Quest (cf. 
especially 19–21, 38–41). To this only Joe Boulter’s highlighting of postmodernist concerns in 
Powys’s writing (passim) needs to be added to convince readers that the Romance might have 
something to say in a post-Derridean world. 
9
 On mythic syncretism that handles the Grail myth as a version of the mytheme of the Golden 
Age in the Romance cf. (Lukacher 18). 
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easily take the place of Narcissus’s own reflection as the desired object which 
promises the establishment of subjectivity and integrity through union with it.  
Looking at the Grail in this light leads to several conclusions. 1) Since the 
Grail appears as the looking-glass image of Narcissus, there can be as many 
personal Grails as there are figures of Narcissus gazing into the mirror. All the 
Grail visions in A Glastonbury Romance are distinct. 2) In this context, finding 
the Grail, achieving union with one’s own image is both a moment of self-
recognition and a harbinger of death. As such, it is Narcissus’s greatest desire, 
even though its fulfilment would bring about his death. 3) Therefore, a realised 
Golden Age is always an unacceptable closure for Narcissus. The more so, 
because the moment of union reveals the true nature of the sublime myth: it is a 
cover outlining the borders of the abject, the grotesque bodily flow that defies 
but also holds together symbolisation (cf. Žižek,
 
“The Truth Arises from 
Misrecognition” 210–12) and threatens the integrity of the subject. What 
Narcissus will do is to approach this object/abject of irresistible attraction as 
closely as possible and then remove or reject it, thereby redrawing the limits of 
his own subjectivity and the coastlines of the infinite flow of the text. This is, in 
short, what Julia Kristeva calls abjection, the crisis of narcissistic subjectivity 
giving birth to the uncontrollable proliferation of texts that is a characteristic of 
Modernist literature,
10
 camouflaged as a quest for the Grail in the Romance.  
In that sense, A Glastonbury Romance is a comment on the paradox inherent 
in narcissistic subjectivity – the only kind of subjectivity accessible after the end 
of absolute truths in Western thought (cf. Kochhar-Lindgren 5): it is the very 
fact of the realisation of the Golden Age that makes any of its forms 
unacceptable. Powys, with a supremely ironical gesture, turns his own favourite 
Rabelaisian, pluralistic form of the myth into a realised utopia for a while
11
. 
Thus, the compulsive repetition of the novel’s “primal scene” (union in a boat) 
triggers off infinite doubling in the text, and turns practically all characters into 
likenesses of John Crow/Narcissus, the hero of a “pure Romance.” Their 
narratives, like his, involve an apparent union of the self-same, since a real 
                                                     
10
 On the dynamics of abjection, the oscillation of attraction and repulsion, and the spatial 
redefinition of the wandering subject (Where am I? instead of Who am I?) see (Kristeva, 
Powers of Horror 2–18). For an interpretation of the mytheme of the Golden Age as a totality, 
a synthesis of otherwise mutually exclusive binary oppositions see (Kroó, “From Plato’s Myth 
of the Golden Age” 355–70). On the interpenetration of the narcissistic model and the mytheme 
of the Golden Age in the pastoral tradition see (S. Horváth passim).  
11
 Cf. “Only those who have caught the secret which Rabelais more than anyone else reveals to us, 
the secret of the conjunction of the particular and extreme grossness of our excremental 
functions in connection with our sexual functions are on the right track to encompass this 
receding horizon where the beyond-thought loses itself in the beyond-words” (Powys, “Preface 
to the New Edition” xv). Powys’s 1948 Rabelais is an obvious reference point here. On the 
earlier development of Powys’s Rabelais image cf. (Peltier, “François Rabelais and John 
Cowper Powys” passim). 
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union of that sort would make any romance impossible. Where else could “pure 
Romance” take place, but in a town of mirrors, and what else could its events be, 
but pretences? Camouflaged to bridge the gulf between the subject and the 
object of its desire, these pretences serve to bring about the anthithesis of their 
declared end, as they create gaps to sustain desire and keep the narrative 
moving. The most prominent example of this acting in bad faith is “The 
Pageant”: functioning as the mise en abyme of the novel, it makes a rather 
Derridean comment on the absence/presence of the transcendental signified 
(myth as the stabilising force of fluid, narcissistic subjectivity, cf. Kochhar-
Lindgren 5) and only stages the impossibility of re(-)presentation. It forms a 
conspicuous hole or vortex in the middle of the text, around which the more or 
less “operatic boats” ( Dostoevsky, The Possessed) keep drifting, together with 
such Grail reminiscences as female bodies, golden christening cups, punch 
bowls, aquariums and chamber pots – like floating signifiers. 
All Rowing in the Same Boat 
“Modernist mythopoeia is the recognition that this edifice of 
the human world is not a building resting on the ground, but 
a boat; and if all men dwell in one it is not necessarily the 
same one. There is a multiplicity of possible worlds. 
Furthermore, [...] a boat [...] has the advantage of not being 
fixed to a single horizon.” (Bell 37, emphasis added) 
One way to prevent the short-circuiting of desire is to shift the focus of the 
novel: to ignore characters whose desire has (seemingly) been fulfilled in a 
“pure Romance” and to turn to others who are still questing. This is one of the 
clear strategies of the Romance: the focus of the narrative shifts from John Crow 
to Sam Dekker, then to Geard, then to Owen Evans, and so on. It makes readers 
insecure about who the actual main character is (if there is one at all) in the 
Romance, on the one hand, but it also makes them realise that many of the 
figures are doubles, on the other. This Doppelgänger-effect would allow for the 
reading of practically all the major characters as self-absorbed Narcissuses, even 
if they did not compulsively repeat John Crow’s act of union with himself. 
Indeed, each event of utmost importance repeats the ‘primal scene’ of the 
Romance by staging some kind of merging or fusion in, or in sight of, a floating 
boat. People have long-awaited epiphanies and orgasms in drifting boats, only a 
boat afloat with a woman can serve as a muse and inspire literary creativity, and 
only joint work in a life-boat can bring about reconciliation between a 
quarrelling father and son. Geard (like King Arthur) can set off for his last 
journey only in a boat, and he can die only in the most archetypally narcissistic 
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way: by drowning himself. Thus fulfilling Narcissus’ dream, he reunites with the 
motherly – creative but chaotic – element of water.  
The scene of Geard’s death is also an emblem of the other most obvious 
strategy to avoid one’s object of desire in the novel: once closure threatens, 
characters become desperate to get out of the boat they are in. They know well 
to be cautious: meeting the object of one’s desire does bring death in the 
Romance. This is why Tom Barter has to die in a moment of perfect happiness, 
and this is why Owen Evans joins the living dead after seeing Tom’s crushed 
brains (cf. GR 1054–6) – a segment of the Real, his own abject, that lack of the 
lack which should have remained hidden and lacking (cf. Dolar 8). The most 
emblematic figure of free-floating narcissistic desire is Persephone Spear in the 
Romance: she goes through a sequence of temporarily successful unions and 
breaks out of them as if she knew that this is the key to sustaining desire, even if 
it also entails the compulsive repetition of the same quest.  
That John Crow is an impossible protagonist is clear in the first chapter of the 
novel: his desire is narcissistic. His longing for Mary is a desire for the self-same 
in several ways. He and Mary are almost identical because they are close 
relatives and they actually resemble each other: Mary is just as unfeminine as 
John is effeminate. The swapping of traditional gender roles is encoded even in 
the scene of their union: Mary has to row the boat because the physically weak 
and probably tubercular John is already exhausted. His desire for Mary is not 
only an attempt to close the spatial gap between self and other – actually a 
mirror-image of the self – but also to bridge the temporal gulf between his 
current and his younger self. His desire is a reminiscence of an earlier scene of 
fulfilled desire – lovemaking in a boat as a child – whose object, however, must 
remain uncertain: it is either Mary or Tom Barter. The latter option adds another 
twist to John’s desire for Mary: it mixes it with homosexual attraction as yet 
another form of desire for the same. John’s bisexuality, the “protean fluidity” of 
his identity (GR 102) and the image of his consciousness as a mirror (GR 370) 
also reinforce the image of Narcissus. 
Yet, paradoxically, John Crow is also the archetypal desiring machine of the 
Romance, precisely because of his narcissism: incapable of union, he sees in 
each apparent fulfilment the opening up of a new gap. In fact, this is what 
qualifies objects of desire as eligible: the lack they reveal enables him to keep on 
oscillating between self and other (self), wanting both – or at least wanting 
always the other. Thus, in the middle of the Wissey idyll John remembers – all 







. The identity of the original object is left pending for a while: Mary’s lack 
of memory about the scene is suggestive (GR 40), but the issue is finally settled 
only when Tom’s memory confirms the matter (GR 143). The bisexual nature of 
John’s desire is what always guarantees that something will be missing from any 
kind of fulfilment; that his romance – pure or otherwise – should never be 
brought to a close. This lack is encoded in the non-penetrative sex that he and 
Mary enjoy, and in the pronounced infertility of their relationship (cf. GR 80–1 
qtd. in fn. 3). What is secured by Tom’s death is the annihilation of their ménage 
à trois and the loss of John’s masculine other
13
. When he and Mary are leaving 
Glastonbury “they [are] carrying [...] with them [...] not only the corpse of Tom 
Barter but the corpse of their stillborn never-returning opportunity of touching 
the Eternal in the enchanted soil where the Eternal once sank down into time!” 
(GR 1063, emphasis added) The chance is lost, but only because they never 
wanted to take it in the first place. 
It is in view of John’s narcissism that I would like to suggest a somewhat 
impertinent reading of his most perplexing vision. It is, first of all, undeserved: if 
there is one character in the novel who definitely is not questing for the Grail it 
is John Crow. Even more confusing is the fact that this most sceptical of all 
figures is willing to accept the vision at face value as both supernatural and 
prophetic: “But that it was a definite and perhaps a dangerous sign from the 
supernatural and that it was directed towards himself alone, he never had any 
doubt” (GR 361). Since he is “the human norm, the Powys hero” (Knight 36), 
his vision brings the Grail as close to being an objective reality in the novel’s 
world as it is possible in a polyphonic text of incompatible subjective realities 
(cf. Lock, “Polyphonic Powys” passim). That John’s reading is an absolute 
necessity is clear: the phallic imagery of King Arthur’s sword reveals the 
paternal severing of all dyadic unions, and the separating of untimely narcissistic 
closures through the introduction of desire and lack as an aspect of the Grail. It 
is so because the image in his vision is actually a combination of two contrasting 
states: that of the clearly demarcated phallic cutting edge and the whiteness of an 
empty surface of indeterminate (deathly and maternal) shape: 
                                                     
12
 Cf. his dialogue with Mary:  
’I’ve been wanting all the time to ask you, Mary,’ he recommenced, ‘whether you 
remember that day we couldn’t get the boat past the dam – the dam between the big river 
and the little river? You said just now that you’d never been made love to. Why! my 
dear, I’ve had a feeling of longing to see you again all my life since that day I hugged 
you and so on in the bottom of that boat. Do you remember that too, the way the boat 
leaked, and how fishy it smelt and the way I held you?” The queer thing was that once 
more, even as he said these words, the image of the boy Tom Barter rose up. (GR 36). 
13
 Both the basic dilemma and its resolution deserve comparison with the Birkin—Gerald Crich—
Ursula relationship in D. H. Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920). 
163 
John was struck, there, leaning as he was against the sun-warmed 
parapet, by a sudden rending and blinding shock. […] at this second, in 
the blaze of Something that afterward seemed to him to resemble what 
he had heard of the so-called Cosmic Rays, he distinctly saw... literally 
shearing the sun-lit air with a whiteness like milk, like snow, like 
birch-bark, like maiden’s flesh, like chalk, like paper, like a dead fish’s 
eye, like Italian marble,... an object, resembling a sword, falling into 
the mud of the river! When it struck the mud it disappeared. Nor was 
there any trace... when John looked later... to show where it had 
disappeared. (GR 361) 
The fall of the sword is thus a cut that reintroduces emptiness – a lack – 
which makes desire and story-telling possible. It is the cut that both generates 
and confirms desires in John beyond the sphere of his union with either Mary, or 
Tom, for that matter
14
. One of them is the decision to ruin the pageant by making 
a comedy out of it: “in my Midsummer pageant I will mock the Grail; for 
Arthur’s sword is tin!” (GR 372) John then formulates the prophetic wish of 
apocalyptic destruction, which, as if by (word)magic, will be realised : 
Oh, it would please him, oh, it would satisfy him, if a great wild salt 
wave coming out of the dark heathen sea, were to sweep over this 
whole morbid place and wash the earth clean of all these phantasms! 
[...] ‘There must be destruction [...] before any fresh wind from the 
gods can put new life into a place like this!’ (GR 371–2) 
John’s vision is an act of self-defence which protects the Grail and preserves the 
narrative. While it saves (his) narrative from an untimely end, it also saves the 
Grail from being pinned down to any image – theatrical or other – as its absolute 
representation. It is always the lack, the cut that must be sutured up in language 
– and it is only through the gaps inherent in language that subjectivity, the 
discourse of desire can emerge. The utopia of living in the presence of the found 
Grail must come to an end even before it is realised; it is only this lack of 
realisation that makes possible both the quest and its writing. John’s vision 
reveals this fact as an essential aspect of the Grail itself. In that sense, Powys’s 
comment on myth parallels the theories of Paul Riceour, Eric Gould and others: 
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 John is actually saved from the physical consequences of the shock with the help of the classic 
phallic accessory of Powys heroes: his stick. Cf. “He would certainly have fallen on his side if 
he had not been clutching the root-handle of his hazel-stick, with which, automatically stabbing 
the surface of the road as he stumbled, he just saved himself” (GR 361). It is tempting to see it 
as a gesture that identifies John with the phallic aspect of the vision. In this reading the scene 
would mark his entry into the paternal realm of language as opposed to the engulfing maternal 
flow. His ensuing focus on his “literary” activities, at least, supports this view. 
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if myth is par excellence the interpretative discourse of the subject trying to 
define its place in the world, if myth is an attempt to close an ontological gap, 
all it can demonstrate at each attempt is the absolute necessity and impossibility 
of that closure (Riceour 5–6; Gould 6–34; cf. Kochhar-Lindgren 10–11). 
To further narcissistic oscillation between the same and other, Sam Dekker 
and Owen Evans, two characters who most obviously are on a Grail quest, are 
established as John Crow’s doubles early on, when the three men sit together on 
top of Glastonbury Tor: 
Together these three men represented – in Remorse, in Renunciation, 
in Roguery – everything that separates our race from nature. Their 
three intelligences floated there, on that hilltop, above their clothed and 
crouching skeletons, like wild demented birds that had escaped from 
all normal restraints.” (GR 259) 
In the scene John, Evans and Sam are revealed as three aspects of the same – 
humanity – which defines itself in opposition to nature (the body). The common 
denominator of their position is the abject: it is the indefinite limits of the 
grotesque body and its fluids that lie at the core of abjection and the narcissistic 
crisis it means. John’s “Rougery” entails narcissism: he must carefully rearrange 
the limits of his self each time he comes too close to a union with himself. There 
is no sense of crisis here: John’s “pure Romance” is the only one that survives 
the end of the novel, which suggests that narcissistic subjectivity and the 
abjection it entails may be our ineradicable human condition in the 20
th 
century. 
Central to that condition is a constant sense of lack. 
Sam Dekker’s narrative is, though less obviously, maintained by the same 
tricks as John’s. His romance with Nell is consummated at the very beginning of 
the novel. Yet he is thereafter obsessed with the idea of leaving Nell in order to 
become “Holy Sam.” He thus tests the dominant sublimating discourse of 
abjection in Western culture, that of Christian asceticism (cf. Kristeva, Powers 
of Horror 56–112). This leads Sam to a dead end because it allows him to accept 
and fulfil everyone else’s desires, though not his own or Nell’s. As long as Nell 
does not renounce him, he is constantly torn between his woman and his Christ, 
while only looking for himself. One of the most sophisticated ironies of the text 
is that it is Crummie Geard who opens his eyes to both what his Grail vision 
means and what he is actually doing. Yet she is the one and only character who 
is explicitly associated with “narcissism” in the novel (GR 152). Sam’s romance 
with Nell fails because not all acts of egoism can be redeemed. Or because to 
remain alone with his Grail vision is Sam’s only chance to have it both ways. 
Owen Evans’ narrative also moves along similar lines. He is obsessed with 
his sadistic fantasies: abjection, just like clinical cases of narcissism, often 
moves in the terrain of perversion (cf. Kristeva, Powers 15–6). His desperate 
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quest for the Grail is to find a power that could liberate him from this almost 
demonic possession
15
. The crux is that despite this explicit longing, he knows all 
too well that he does not want to see the Grail (GR 151): he insists on holding on 
to his symptom, as if he feared something worse should he be deprived of it. 
This worse state he recognises in Mad Bet as his double (GR 253). His horror is 
well-founded: when the fantasy as symptom (be it a myth of the Golden Age or 
the hell of tortured bodies) is traversed, the subject is left alone with the 
unbearable sight of the Real to save him from madness and to hold together 
symbolisation (Žižek, “The Truth Arises” 208–12). Accordingly, meeting the 
object of his desire is fateful for Evans: it is a shock therapy that relieves him of 
one disease (his vomiting purifies him from his perversion), but ushers in 
another. Killing his desire, it is also the commencement of his untimely second 
childhood: he becomes Cordelia’s surrogate child and thus realises the 
impossible dream of Narcissus by escaping back into the dyadic union with the 
mother; the stage of absolute mirroring. 
Having run the full gamut of abjection, it is with Evans that we return to the 
starting point: the boat, the river and the woman. According to Roland Barthes 
writing is the one socially acceptable form of autoerotic pleasure and fantasy (cf. 
10). Only in writing can fantasy be legitimated as therapeutic. And this is what 
Evans is left alone with for the rest of his life: his one activity to prove his 
sanity, or to keep it. His writing process is a repetition of the “primal scene” of 
the novel, with all its sham fulfilments and deceptive closures. Evans draws 
inspiration from a picture lacking any artistic qualities: it is an image of a river, a 
boat and a woman reading, which is “almost sacred” for him because it evokes 
another picture in his parents’ house (GR 1001). His writing is based on a sham 
union with his muse – “in a boat” – which in fact only reminds him of a lack: the 
lack of the original picture, and the loss of his childhood idyll and self. His 
writing is also a reading, of course: not only because he is looking at a woman 
reading and is himself reading his own memories, but because Vita Merlini is a 
work based on compilation. Both reading and writing focus on one particular 
word: Esplumeoir. This is the word for whose real meaning he keeps rereading 
Morte d’Artur, although he knows he will not find it there (cf. GR 1055–6). 
Writing (and reading) is the one therapeutic activity for the soul wandering in 
the terrain of abjection because it opens up untimely closures. Narcissus’s ‘pure 
Romance’ allows for sublimation only in the infinite flow of the text, in creative 
writing as an act of survival (cf. Kristeva, Powers 15–6; Kochhar-Lindgren 44). 
But for Powys this mark of presumed originality inevitably equals Narcissus’s 
gazing at himself in the (inter)textual mirror of already written (hi)stories. 
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 As it has been pointed out, Evans is a Stavrogin-figure from Dostoevsky’s The Possessed 
(Lukacher 20), so his narrative moves in the intertextual space marked out by the Dostoevskian 
vision of narcissistic subjectivity – just like all of his doubles’. 
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Geard’s mystical revival seems to move beyond the dead ends outlined 
above. It relies on a Rabelaisian attitude: an acceptance and rehabilitation of the 
grotesque body that opens up both the Christian closure of renunciation and the 
psychological closure of fixation (Remorse). His personal myth pretends to 
achieve universality both in the microcosm of the novel and in its extratextual 
space: he wants to establish a new world-religion. And it is a pretence, indeed: 
his becoming a mayor means that a discourse of plurality and tolerance comes to 
power, but in a paradoxical way. Because of its pluralistic nature, such a holder 
of power cannot maintain its sovereign authority. Geard’s mystical revival is 
anyway based on yet another romance, which breaks the laws of nature by 
reversing time: the Gothic plot of usurpation concerns the perverted desire of the 
father to live longer than his accorded time and to resist the resignation of his 
power (cf. Kilgour 18–9). When Geard receives Canon Crow’s legacy, he usurps 
the place of the lawful heirs, all of whom – with the exception of Philip – are 
young enough to be his own children. He takes the place of the (dead) father 
between grandfather and grandchildren, restraining the latter from reaching their 
full potential – just as Uranus did with Cronos and his siblings by keeping them 
in the womb of the earth (Hesiod, Theogony 147–63), and just as Cronos did 
with his own children, in turn, by simply eating them (Hesiod, Theogony 453–
92). Metaphorically, Geard becomes the Cronos/Crow father by repeating the 
legendary family crime
16
. Eating one’s offspring is, like incest, another way to 
short-circuit desire. Not surprisingly, this other Crow family vice also appears 
with relation to Geard. There is an incestuous aura around his relations with 
Lady Rachel, while his own daughter, Crummie explicitly talks about her 
father’s sexual approaches (GR 979). Geard’s quest has been fulfilled, the utopia 
has been realised – but only at the cost of overturning the laws of nature in ways 
that entail futility and sterility. To stop time is to reveal and keep Glastonbury as 
what has always been its reputation: the land of the dead, the Waste Land, the 
“Terre Gastee of the medieval romances” (GR 319). The Golden Age always has 
to be somewhere else – no nation sees its own land as the Isles of the Blessed, 
because no nation would like to think of his own country as the underworld 
(Trencsényi-Waldapfel 124–6). When Geard’s boat and Powys’s novel reach 
that closure – the one recorded and opened up in T. S. Eliot’s poem, which 
Powys knew by heart – it is really time to get out. 
Apart from the Crow couple and Geard there is one more person who takes 
that hint – in fact, who is unable to take any other: Persephone. The woman who 
has slept with almost every available man (Dave Spear, Philip Crow, Owen 
Evans, Will Zoyland) and woman (Angela Beere) and looked only for herself all 
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 Cf. “Some man of old time, amidst ‘en, must have done summat turble ... eaten his own 
offspring like enough, in want of kindlier meat... summat o’ that... and ever since such doings 
they all outlive their sons. ‘Tis a kind of Divine Dispensation, I reckon” (GR 32). For a reading 
of the Crow family as descendants of Cronos cf. (Lukacher 19). 
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the while. She is the first to leave Glastonbury. Persephone clearly senses her 
life as a chain of endless repetition, the prime mover of which is her desire to 
feel desire for the other
17
 – the one thing Narcissus cannot do: 
‘How queer it is, in my life [...] the very same situation keeps repeating 
itself! Is it possible that Bristol Warf’ – she was thinking of her early 
encounters with Dave – ‘and Wookey Hole, and Saint Mary’s Ruin,’ – 
she was thinking of one particular meeting with Angela Beere – ‘and 
that room in the hospital’ – she was thinking of the last of her morbid 
visits to Mr. Evans – ‘were all rehearsals of this breaking of the ice 
with Will? When a person’s life repeats itself – from that shore of 
Phil’s to this boat of Will’s! – there’s a doom of some sort in it. [...] So 
long as you [Will Zoyland] show her where it is – poor Percy’s lost 
treacherous heart – that she can never, never, never find!’ (GR 853) 
Her insatiable search for sexual pleasure is thus her impossible quest for herself. 
Evoking the primal scene of the novel again, her quest runs from “shore” to 
“boat”. Another one of Powys’s androgynes, she is narcissistic desire embodied. 
Even her name evokes a connection between seduction and autoerotic desire: 
Persephone, daughter of the harvest-goddess Demeter and thus representative of 
fertility, was abducted by Hades to remain in the underworld as its queen half 
the year. Evoking the story of fatal self-love, she was seduced by Hades with the 
help of a fragile golden flower – a narcissus (Homeric Hymn to Demeter 405–
34). Percy’s seduction in the subterranean cave by Philip (GR 240) is an obvious 
allusion and is itself the type from which all subsequent love-makings, including 
the time when she is in the boat with Will Zoyland (GR 852–3), must appear 
only as repetitions. She leaves Glastonbury – a goddess of fertility cannot be 
stuck in the land of the dead – maybe to channel her desires into ideological 
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 The text is very explicit about both her inability to enjoy sexual intercourse and her exquisite 
pleasure at being desired: 
 
Artemis-like, she had found that by far the worst part of her affair with Philip – and 
it had been just the same with Dave – was the fact that she had to undress and be mad 
love to without the defence of her sweet-smelling Harris-tweed jacket and skirt.[...] 
‘Do other women feel what I feel? Is there some deep, secret conspiracy among us to 
be silent about this loathing of skin to skin, this disgust of the way they are when they 
have their will of us? Am I betraying some tragic silence that Nature form the beginning 
has imposed in dark whispers upon her daughters? [...] Is this shrinking, this loathing, 
something that every girl feels?’ (GR 314–5) 
 
 No less explicitly we are told of her desire to be desired when she is with Will Zoyland: “Her 
only desire now – and even that was a languid one – was to put off her final yielding to the 
bearded man until she had enjoyed to the extreme limit the excited tension of his craving” (GR 
852, emphasis added). 
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streams in communist Russia, but judging by her compulsion to repeat the same 
quest all over again more probably simply to look for new hunting grounds.  
If Powys’s narrative is a romance of Narcissus and his doubles and 
reflections, it is just fitting that it should be set in a town of glass – of infinite 
mirroring. That is what Glastonbury is according to folk etymology, as the 
narrator shrewdly highlights by listing different names of the place which reflect 
this supposed meaning in several languages: „Ynys Witrin, Insula Vitrea […] 
Isle de Viorre, yr Echwyd, Glast, Glastenic, Glastonia, Glaston” (GR 573). It is 
in this manifold refracted light that John Geard’s vision of Glastonbury as “his 
New Jerusalem” deserves rereading. It might be nothing else but the realisation 
of the trope inherent in the town’s name: a trope of infinite, bedazzling, 
unsettling plurality:  
Castles of crystal, islands of glass, mirrors and mirages of the invisible, 
hiding-places of Merlin, horns and urns and wells and cauldrons – 
hilltops of magic – stones – of mystery – all these seemed to Bloody 
Johnny’s brain at that moment no mere fluctuation, undulating mind-
pictures, but real things [...]. (GR 163) 
The sequence suggests that the easily recognisable synonyms of the Grail are 
nothing else but mirrors, which, in turn, become the watery flow of human 
consciousness – it is well-known how fascinated Powys was with William James 
(cf. Peltier, “Two Multiverses, ’One Dizzy Symphonic Polyphony’” 8–9). He 
obviously applies a very Jamesian imagery here. 
It is repetition – whether occasioned by recurrent events or related to doubles 
– and the watery imagery of the locale that deprive every seeming closure of its 
status as a “final word”. First and foremost, reading is a process that 
paradoxically proceeds from the end: it is the resolution that makes a story 
meaningful (P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 10–24; cf. Žižek, “The Truth 
Arises” passim). But in this case each and every closure is written over by the 
following one: every new “end” necessitates the reinterpretation of all preceding 
events, and every apparently fulfilled romance demands a re-reading of the 
whole of the Romance. This infinite mirroring creates an impression similar to 
the timelessness of repetition as symptom. The “final words” supplied by each 
closure do not cancel out each other, rather become intermingled and seem to 
show the different sides of the same malady – and the same remedy. The 
Romance, like the unconscious, knows no past: all the layers of writing and 
overwriting are present in it simultaneously, like a palimpsest (cf. Lacan, The 
Language of the Self 20–4). What transpires from under it is the predicament of 
narcissistic subjectivity: for it the Grail must remain what it essentially is – a 
vessel, a receptacle, a female body, the object-cause of desire. Ultimately, a 
lack. 
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“The Pageant” – Myth and Re(-)presentation 18 
This lack at the core of the Romance is exactly what becomes conspicuous in 
“The Pageant”. Featuring the staging of a small-town pageant-play in its 
“central” chapter in a manner that clearly underpins a polyphonic reading, the 
novel thematises the issue of presence and/or absence, inseparable from that of 
re(-)presentation. Since “The Pageant” is the mise en abyme per se of the entire 
novel, it posits the whole text as a self-reflexive case-study of the ambiguous 
functioning of myth in (Late) Modernist writing. Taking into consideration the 
facts that the Romance also shares the political concerns typical for the literature 
of the 1930s and that its utilisation of the pageant clearly parallels other major 
Modernists’ work at the time, one can only wonder how far claims for Powys’s 
eccentricity, peripheral quality, and inaccessibility for current critical idioms can 
be maintained. 
The chapter entitled “The Pageant” offers itself for a reading as the mise en 
abyme of the entire novel at least for three reasons. First and foremost, the 
classic device of the text-within-the-text usually underscores the main themes of 
the text it is embedded in. Secondly, placed approximately in the middle of the 
text, the chapter forms a kind of structural “centre” – used in need of a better 
word here, because the application of the term to Powys’s diffuse writing is 
highly problematic. The preparations for the show unite the otherwise loosely 
attached chapters of the novel’s first part, whose plot actually culminates in a 
characteristically Powysian bathetic (Robinson, “Introduction” v) realisation – or 
rather non-realisation – of the pageant. Thematically, the originally three-act 
show with its sections devoted to the Arthurian Legend, the Passion, and the 
Cymric, heathen Grail, respectively, comprises in a nutshell the mythic concerns 
of the Romance.  
A closer look at the genre of the pageant-play in the culture and literature of 
English Modernism, however, brings into relief the fact that the chapter also 
serves as a mise en abyme in more sophisticated ways. Let me give a quick 
survey of the relevant features relying on Joshua D. Esty recent study with the 
challenging title “Amnesia in the Fields: Late Modernism, Late Imperialism and 
the English Pageant Play”
19
. The first of these is related to the immediate 
forerunner of the pageant-play in Modernist literature, the modern pageant play 
as a cultural phenomenon, dating back to 1905. As Esty points out, following 
that year there was a “pageant boom,” during which a pageant town often went 
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 This section of the article was originally presented as “Myth, Mystery and Representation – 
John Cowper Powys, A Glastonbury Romance” at the Presence and/or Absence conference, at 
the Catholic University of Ruzomberok, Slovakia, on the 24th of August, 2011. 
19
 The article deals with three major Modernists, T. S. Eliot, E. M. Forster and Virginia Woolf, 
who turn to the pageant-play as a genre in the 1930s. Notably, Woolf applies it in Between the 
Acts as a narrative device and a play-within-the-novel (Esty 246), similarly to Powys.  
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through “substantial economic revival” owing to the tourist industry related to 
the shows (273). Involving a large number of local amateurs from all kinds of 
vocations, the Edwardian pageant-play also shared an impression of “interclass 
harmony” with its Elizabethan forerunner and created a strong sense of 
community (246–9). Let me make only passing mention of a curious platitude 
here: what seems to be the most unrealistic improbability of the Romance, the 
establishment of a new community and an economically successful commune 
through the realisation of a pageant-play, in this light perfectly fits the utopistic 
overtones culturally connected to the genre
20
. It also reveals that the pageant-
play as a mise en abyme repeats the combination of mythic and political 
concerns the entire novel deals with. 
From the perspective of the present reading, the most valuable among Esty’s 
insights concerns the attitude of the modern pageant-play to representation. 
Originally a mixture of the passion play and the court masque, the Edwardian 
pageant-play was characterised by a high degree of “local authenticity”. It means 
that it was usually committed to the presentation of the local history and the 
legends of the place where it was performed, often involving the actual 
descendants of the characters represented on stage. That is, it came close to the 
“literal re-enactment,” the re-presentation of the events instead of their 
“representation” to “project the absence of historical time” (246–9). According 
to the impossible aesthetic ideal of the modern pageant, a time of plenty is re-
presented and during the performance actors and audience – hardly separable 
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 Not to mention that this most unrealistic-looking element is part and parcel of the novel’s 
topicality (Rands passim). 
21
 Esty’s study might also shed new light on the apparent generic contrast between the pageant-
play and the romance, allegedly the genre of Powys’s Glastonbury text. Esty interprets the 
curious interest in the pageant-play in the 1930s as a forerunner of the post-war 
“anthropological turn,” that is, a concern with English culture as an object for anthropological 
realism. This turn ushered in “neo-realist genres in the wake of modernism,” which, however, 
were concerned with “generating romances of [...] the countryside, of national character” (246). 
Apart from the fact that such a contextualisation reclaims Powys from the margins of English 
Modernism and places him in the eminent company of Eliot, Forster and Woolf, it points to a 
potentially organic connection between the pageant-play and the romance in Powys’s text. 
Existing analyses of the text as a romance either approach the issue from a phenomenological 
perspective (cf. Fawkner, “The Manifestation of Affectivity: John Cowper Powys and Pure 
Romance” passim), explore the relationship of the allegedly non-realistic romance and 
naturalism (Barrett passim), or place it in the context of the philosophical romance (Hughes 
passim). I find these approaches dissatisfactory in themselves, first and foremost because 
Powys obviously plays with overlayering different types of romance: medieval, modern, 
philosophical, even romance as pulp fiction. To this only the specifically Powysian ’pure 
Romance’ (GR 39) needs to be added to imply the full complexity of the issue. 
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However, Powys’s fictional pageant and especially its polyphonic 
representation problematise exactly the subtle boundaries of representation and 
re-presentation, putting the pageant itself and ultimately presence under erasure. 
Geard’s revivalist attempts follow exactly the same logic as the genre of the 
pageant: if the location is authentic (Glastonbury is a the place where Joseph of 
Arimathea hid the Holy Grail), if the characters are authentic (he himself is in 
daily communion with Jesus, but by hint also a reincarnation of Merlin) then 
representation (his deeds and words) can achieve the status of re-presentation (a 
new Gospel, a New Revelation, a new world religion, logos authentically rooted 
in presence). If... It is the conditional, the ambiguity in the entire novel that is 
brought into prominence by the powerful comment on representation inherent in 
the chapter “The Pageant”. 
Thus, the fictional pageant as a representation in Powys’s novel highlights 
the problematic of representation as such, first of all because it glaringly 
illustrates the logic of the supplement (cf. Derrida 141–64). Rooted in a 
revivalist intent it is supplementary to the Word with its pretensions to substitute 
it. The pageant is meant to be the first power-demonstration of John Geard’s 
new religion, which is to “bring back an Age of Faith to the Western World” 
(GR 286). By definition, it is germinated in the metaphysics of presence: it is 
John Geard’s brain-child, who conceives of himself as a “new out-spurt […] of 
the Real Presence” (GR 286). By re-enacting the Passion, the pageant is to re-
present in sacred ritual the transcendental signified behind the Word on which 
the whole of Western culture is based, and which, to follow Derrida’s axiom, is 
“a lack at the origin”, a presence that is “always already absent” (Spivak xvii). 
But this representation does not complete, it does not fill in a lack – as far as its 
aims are concerned, the pageant can be only a substitution: John Geard’s 
“singular Gospel” of a “new Revelation” at Glastonbury (GR 1073) by definition 
cannot be added to the Word of the Scriptures and cannot complete the discourse 
Western culture is founded on.  
Yet, following the logic of the supplement, it is also an addition as far as 
Glastonbury is concerned – what is more, an addition to what is not only 
complete but actually is in excess. In Glastonbury, every spot is – often doubly 
or trebly – linked to myth and the numenous. Why would the town need a 
representation of the sacred when it is a sacred place and its inhabitants live in 
the sacred? Or, as John Crow mentally puts it, “the land reek[s] with the honey 
lotus of all the superstitions of the world!” (GR 122) and its inhabitants seem to 
be a special species imbued with mysticism. So much so, that the land itself 
becomes a thickly overwritten palimpsest of sacred stories: as the list of the 
names quoted above illustrates, naming the territory borders on the impossible, 
because it equals listing a host of names replacing each other in an endless 
metaphorical chain of signifiers. The town is not only Avalon, the “Isle of 
Apples” of Arthurian romance, or yr Echwyd, the Celtic underworld, but also the 
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Isle of Glass, as noted above. The scene of the pageant, a text-within-the-text 
which by definition doubles and mirrors the whole, in this sense is writing added 
to an already overwritten text, an addition to an already unsettling excess of 
representation, to the innumerable mirrors of the (looking-)glass town. 
While its original function posits the fictional pageant as a supplement, its 
realisation and representation is a textbook case of what Derrida has termed 
presence under erasure (cf. 23): never really presented in the text, first running 
amok and then interrupted, the play is first and foremost a conspicuous gap right 
in the middle of the Romance. For a start, there is literally no text-within-the-
text, that is, no sections of the libretto are given for the reader – neither is 
anything audible for the fictional audience. The only ad verbatim quote is not a 
quote from the play (as a matter of fact, it is not a quote at all in the sense of a 
conscious repetition): it is the “Eloi, Eloi, Lama, Sabachthani!” of the crucified 
Christ, to which I would like to return later.  
Secondly, very few scenes are actually described; instead, the audience’s 
comments are given – a vertiginous multitude of contradictory perspectives 
without any narratorial or authorial fixed point of reference. One would at least 
take the words of a narrator who introducing a passion play casually speaks of 
“the blood of a mad demigod” (GR 562) with some reservation on issues of 
religion and the sacred. This sets the tone for numerous alternative visions of the 
play: strikers carry banners with the word “Mummery” (GR 563), a value 
judgment opposed by “the waving of Miss Drew’s green parasol” and brothel 
manageress Mother Legge’s “Rabelaisian tongue” (GR 568). The pageant is 
“like a magnified Punch-and-Judy show” (GR 587) for Will Zoyland, while it is 
“a ghastly parody upon the death of [...] God” for Sam Dekker, which is able to 
cast “terrible doubt [on] the ascetic ideal of his whole life” (GR 588). Not 
surprisingly, the play is “a silly, frivolous blasphemy” (GR 588) for local priest 
Mat Dekker. Once another spectator claims that “Tis like Saturday afternoon in 
private bar and yet ‘tis like Good Friday in Church” (GR 591) readers are almost 
convinced that a strong case could be made for the carnivalesque nature of the 
show. And yet it turns out that of all the viewers, surprisingly, it is the one 
potential authority on issues of the sacred, the Greek Orthodox priest Father 
Paleologue, who is absolutely enchanted by the play. He finds a theological 
justification even for the rudest blunders of the presenters, so much so, that he 
provokes the following comment from Mary Crow: “Father, I believe you’re 
laughing at us all the time!” (GR 600) The priest’s exaggerated exculpations (“If 
I did that, dear daughter [...] I’d deserve to be unfrocked. I’d deserve to be cut in 
pieces like your last abbot” [GR 600]) are better suited to inspire doubt in his 
priesthood than to prove his seriousness.  
And indeed, this clearly polyphonic representation – a diametrical opposite of 
the reassuring, utopistic pastoral idyll associated with the genre of the pageant-
play – is combined with a third factor to leave readers in absolute doubt about 
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what exactly happens on that beautiful pageant day: in contrast to these faint 
traces of the theatrical events, the real “show” seems to take place off-stage. 
While the first part of the pageant, based on the Arthurian Cycle, is almost 
totally ignored by the narrative, a most vivid representation of the Marquis of 
P’s simultaneous mobbing by the strikers is given. The second part of the play 
slowly but surely transforms into “reality”: Evans, the “actor” playing Christ, 
masochistically insists on being really tied to the cross. Thus literally tortured, 
he has a vision of Christ, presumably bursts a blood vessel, faints, and then cries 
out the above quoted words of the dying Christ unconsciously. The last part of 
the pageant has to be cancelled because of the ensuing mass hysteria, and the 
comic scenes of gaining control over the terrified crowd seem to contend for the 
role of the third part of the drama with the retrospect narrative of Evans’s vision, 
which actually closes the chapter. A pretentious supplement, the fictional 
pageant is conspicuous in its absence in the text. 
Thus the only effective achievement of this bathetic representation under 
erasure seems to be that it ultimately blurs the limits between stage and off-stage 
in the narrative: not only are all the events of any interest taking place off-stage, 
but the representation of stage characters’ movement to an fro between the world 
of the stage and “reality” suggests an actual undermining of the difference 
between representation and re-presentation. A comic version of this blurring is 
given in the outrageously hilarious scene of quieting the frightened audience. Its 
comic effect is clearly rooted in playing with the real and stage identity of its 
central figures: an anachronistic “King Arthur,” who is both a natural leader and 
an impotent actor in sore need of a prompter, and an unnaturally verbose and 
self-confident, actually resurrected “Lady of Shalott”. 
Mr. Geard’s daughter looked round. The Middlezoy foreman, still 
dressed up as King Arthur, was standing nearby, quietly lighting his 
pipe. She called the man by name and he slouched up to them. “Take 
this,” said Crummie. “Run over to Pilate’s what-do-you-call-it, will 
you? Shout out to them that the Mayor bids them good-bye, and tell 
them to go home quietly, and that Mr Evans has only fainted!” 
King Arthur lost no time in obeying to the letter this clear command 
of the resuscitated Lady of Shalott. [...] Everybody stood still and 
listened. It was as if the real Rex Arturus himself had suddenly appeared 
to restore peace upon earth and fulfil his magician’s prophecy. 
[...] “The Mayor –“ There was a pause at this point while King 
Arthur bent his head to catch his prompter’s words. Then raising the 
megaphone again – “The Mayor give ye all the Blessing of the Living 
Christ!” The foreman came carefully down the creaking wooden steps 
with the megaphone under his arm. (GR 604–5) 
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However, the chapter continues with a much more serious subversion: with the 
retelling of Evans’s visionary dialogue on the cross with Christ. Evans is 
obviously not Christ, but neither is he acting: his unconscious repetition of 
Christ’s words has the uncanny effect of representing and re-presenting the 
Word at the same time, inseparably. Read in Freudian terms, the source of the 
exclamation is Evans’s personal unconscious – it might be a memory from one 
of the rehearsals. In this case, the Word is repeated as his personal word, devoid 
of the authenticating presence of God. In Jungian terms, the source of the 
exclamation might be the collective unconscious (cf. Jung 59–69): it is an 
objectively existing, impersonal symbol – the Word of authority. If it is so, this 
authoritative presence is evoked only to record the prime condition of the free 
play of signifiers: the presence of a transcendental signifier always already 
absent. The word of authority can present itself only to declare its own absence: 
“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Mat 27:46) 
 
Taking all this into consideration, one might be tempted to read the entire 
novel in the terms of a pageant-play, at least as far as the issue of  
re(-)presentation is concerned. The predilection of the genre for washing away 
the boundaries between stage and off-stage, between actors and audience, 
between representation and re-enactment is not only ritualistic, but also probes 
into the limits of the power of myth to “give a shape to [...] the immense 
panorama of futility and anarchy”, to quote T. S. Eliot’s Modernist axiom (177–
8). Geard’s attempt at the re-enactment of the Grail myth undergoes the same 
subversion as the socially, politically and spiritually compromised pageant-play. 
In the Romance, there is an excess of mythological figures Geard can be an 
avatar of, there is an excess of Grails and Grail visions, an excess of characters 
doubling each other and having an excess of mythological parallels at the same 
time, to allow for an unambiguous reading and stop the free play of signifiers. 
What else would one expect from a novel whose central chapter is – similarly to 
Forster’s A Passage to India – a metaphorical hole? What else would one expect 
from a romance in which characters wander in the deathly field of power 
surrounding their abject/object, the Grail, like so many mystified Narcissuses? 
To survive at all and to keep narrative going, they – just like Powys himself – 
must stick to their desire, stick to their personal Grail as lack, and become, with 
a slight modification of Kazuo Ishiguro’s phrase, the walking “artists of a 
floating world”. 
175 
IN LOVE WITH THE ABJECT: JOHN COWPER 
POWYS’S WEYMOUTH SANDS1 
“the man who hung there, like a cadaver in a straight 
waistcoat, was analysing Lucinda as if he were embracing a 




Jeremy Robinson remarks that “[o]ne could imagine essays on the Kristevan 
abject in Powys’s use of vivisection in Weymouth Sands” (“Introduction” iv). At 
first sight his comment seems rather provocative and fanciful: vivisection, 
though a recurrent motif in the novel, is apparently located at its periphery. No 
wonder that, for example, Janina Nordius pushes aside the whole issue with one 
passing remark, which relegates it to other images of “universal suffering” (52–3) 
in John Cowper Powys’s works: “But the more specific images of suffering 
seem to have been replaced by the frequent but fairly general references to 
vivisection said to go on in the Brush asylum” (132). For others vivisection is 
even a target for criticism as one of the weaknesses of Weymouth Sands. Thus, 
John A. Brebner claims that it “is never successfully integrated into the novel’s 
total statement” (133), while Carole Coates complains about its “triviality” and 
“naivety” as “a symbol of evil” (126). In contrast, Jorg Therstappen reads the 
novel as a text focused on Hell’s Museum and the suffering of animals as its 
“leit-motiv” (21–3). Nevertheless, he remains within the same frame of 
reference as Brebner and Coates, with the sole difference that he actually accepts 
vivisection as a working symbol of evil. Inspired by Robinson’s suggestion, I 
would also like to argue that on closer inspection vivisection in Weymouth Sands 
proves to have a central function, but for a different reason. It is a highly 
significant metaphor for psychoanalysis and, by analogy, science, which 
underlies Powys’s vision of humanity in the novel. This, in turn, reveals a 
curious – perverted? – fascination with the abject, which might be regarded as 
                                                     
1
 First published as “In Love with the Abject – John Cowper Powys’s Weymouth Sands,” Eger 
Journal of English Studies 6 (2006), 97–120, then reprinted in a considerably revised form as “In 
Love with the Abject – John Cowper Powys’s Weymouth Sands,” The Powys Journal XIX 
(2009), 79–106. Let me express special thanks to late Richard Maxwell for his editorial work, 
and to Mme Jacqueline Peltier and Professor Charles Lock for their invaluable help in obtaining 
literature on Powys and for their kindness and encouragement. 
Research for the present article was carried out with the assistance of the Eötvös Scholarship 
supplemented by a grant from the Hungarian Ministry of Education (OM).  
2
 From now on all quotes from Weymouth Sands will be indicated by WES and the page numbers 
in parenthetical notes. 
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the dominant shaping factor of Powys’s choice of characters, structuring of plot 
and narrative technique in Weymouth Sands.  
Vivisection and Psychoanalysis – Images of the Abject 
Though it has been pointed out repeatedly that in Weymouth Sands vivisection is 
Powys’s central image for the morally unjustifiable approach of modern science 
to humanity (Brebner 133; Therstappen 23–4), the intermediary step, the 
metaphorical identification of vivisection with psychoanalysis as a particular 
branch of science, has not been studied thoroughly. It becomes a firmly 
established metaphor in the novel only gradually: the originally – questionably – 
metonymic relationship of the two concepts acquires its metaphorical quality 
through the repeated comparison of the vivisected animals with the human 
patients of the Brush Asylum, while the vivisector and the analyst are actually 
the same person, Dr. Brush. To indicate the proper weight of the implications of 
this metaphor in terms of the Kristevan abject, first let me contextualise 
vivisection and psychoanalysis in Powysian art and highlight their relationship 
with thematic and narrative concerns in his texts.  
Vivisection is an obsessively recurring image of “Powys’s worst evil – 
scientific cruelty” (Knight 99–100), against which he launches an obstinate fight 
and formulates his Rabelaisian philosophy. It features as a more or less emphatic 
motif in three of his other novels (Morwyn – Knight 63; The Inmates – Knight 
82; Up and Out – Knight 108) apart from Weymouth Sands as a form of the 
sadistic and thus the physically repellent in mankind (Knight 21). Notably, 
vivisection also appears in his book-length essay  Rabelais, first published in 
1948, fourteen years after Weymouth Sands: it is in Rabelais’ attitude to nature, 
including the most excremental aspects of human existence, that Powys detects 
an approach “diametrically opposed to the unphilosophical inhumanity of 
Vivisection” (42). In Powys’s reading of Rabelais this is the basis of 
“Pantagruelism”, the philosophy formulated in the books of Gargantua and 
Pantagruel, which he rather likes to read as a new ‘Gospel’.  
Though Powys’s treatment of the French writer, with special reference to 
such chapters as “Rabelais as a Prophet”, must be taken with certain 
reservations, his understanding of the Renaissance text, though far from being so 
academic, bears comparison with Mikhail Bakhtin’s interpretation. Powys 
identifies roughly nine major components of Rabelaisian philosophy, namely 
“the ataraxia of the Stoics”, parody, “farcical and sardonic humour”, 
“considerate humanity and pity”, “shameless realism and gross bawdiness”, a 
“Christian element”, a “magical and almost occult hero-worship”, “endurance, 
enjoyment, and unlimited toleration” and “a metaphysical element” (Rabelais 




, equally emphasise some of the poetic dimensions of Rabelais’ 
works. For example parody appears in both writers’ readings (e.g. Bakhtin, 
Rabelais and His World 12–15, 21–2; Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics 127–8, 141–2, 193–4), but it is also easy to see the parallel between such 
features as Powys’s (grotesque) realism versus Bakhtin’s materialism, Powys’s 
sardonic humour and bawdiness versus Bakhtin’s emphasis on the comic 
treatment of the excremental and sexual, or carnivalesque laughter (Bakhtin, 
Rabelais 18–24). Tolerance might be just another name for the suspension of 
official hierarchy Bakhtin highlights (Rabelais 7–10, 21–7). The recognition of 
these features gains special significance in view of the fact that Bakhtin used 
them as points of reference for his concept of polyphony formulated in his 
interpretation of Dostoevsky’s poetics (Bakhtin, Problems 6–7, 127–8, 193–4). 
In Bakhtinian terms, Powys, expressing a distrust in science typical of 
mythologically-oriented Modernists
4
, poses against the monological “truth” of 
reason a dialogic or polyphonic vision of his Rabelaisian “Multiverse” (Powys, 
Rabelais 370). On the one hand, Powys’s personal Rabelaisian philosophy is 
formulated in opposition to a crudely scientific approach manifested in such 
horrors as vivisection; on the other hand, it results in a pluralistic vision of the 
world (Knight 85; cf. Boulter passim). 
Like the image of vivisection in his art, Powys’s idea of psychoanalysis is 
also inseparably intertwined with his notions of ethics and his personal 
philosophy. Psychoanalysis and Morality, a short text first published in 1923, 
and Weymouth Sands can be easily interpreted as two stages in Powys’s concept 
of psychoanalysis – in fact, as two diametrically opposed opinions about it. In 
the essay Powys hails psychoanalysis (including the theories of Freud, Jung and 
Adler, 9) as the new science which is to liberate mankind from the burden of 
having to think of socially stigmatised sexual practices, such as homosexuality 
and incest, in terms of sin (10–11), or having to reject our inherent narcissism, as 
a key to individuality (33–4)
5
. There is also a strong metaphysical strain in his 
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 Jacqueline Peltier in her comprehensive study comparing Powys’s different interpretations of 
Rabelais, also emphasises that Bakhtin’s and Powys’s works were written approximately at the 
same time and that Powys would probably have been highly interested in the Russian critic’s 
interpretation, finding a kindred spirit in him. Though she follows the developments of Powys’s 
interpretation only in his non-belletristic works, she also takes it for granted that Rabelais’ 
extremely deep influence on Powys’s personal philosophy similarly surfaces in his novels 
(Peltier, “François Rabelais and John Cowper Powys” passim). 
4
 Cf. Morine Krissdottir’s claim that “Powys’s career was one long battle against the scientific 
view of life”, though she also concedes that “Ironically, Powys was attracted again and again to 
the camp of the enemy” (John Cowper Powys and the Magical Quest 23). 
5
 Cf. “Powys stresses the extraordinary liberation psychoanalysis is going to bring to man by 
ridding him of injunctions, hardships and the moral gravity imposed by tradition and religion” 
(Peltier, “And What about Psychoanalysis and Morality?” 35). Peltier also emphasises the 
transitory nature of this optimistic approach to psychoanalysis and the move away from it in 
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argument: in a rather Blakean turn he connects “ethical austerity in the matter of 
sex” with “philosophical austerity in the matter of the cosmic mystery” – that is 
with a restriction on the freedom of individual thought in the domain of the 
sacred (23). By opening up the unfathomable depths of the human soul, 
psychoanalysis seems to be liberating in this respect, as well: it facilitates 
pluralism, ironic criticism and “humorous indulgence” (23–32). Powys even 
comes to define art and literature in psychoanalytic terms when he claims that 
not only the creation of texts and their reception are erotic in nature (31), but 
also the individual’s attitude to the world (33). In fact, Psychoanalysis and 
Morality suggests that psychoanalysis – and literature, being both its forerunner 
and the user of its achievements – facilitates an intrusion of the pluralistic 
(Rabelaisian?) vision of the world into such hostile territories as science, 
Christian ethics and metaphysics. By the time Weymouth Sands was published in 
1934, this optimism was obviously gone, as the representation of psychoanalysis 
through the image of vivisection analysed below clearly shows, while the 
liberating aspects earlier associated with it are gradually transferred to 
“Rabelaisian” discourses proper. 
Far from reading Weymouth Sands as a direct realisation of Powys’s 
theoretical notions, let me use Rabelais and Psychoanalysis and Morality to 
throw into relief the subtleties of its metaphorical identification of vivisection 
and psychoanalysis. The metaphor evolves into a network of motifs which finely 
interlace the whole texture of the novel, encouraging a reading which strives to 
go behind or beyond the two essayistic texts partly containing Powys’s own 
interpretation of his writing practice via his personal philosophy. In Weymouth 
Sands both vivisection and psychoanalysis are instances of the abject, 
metaphorically linked to most characters in the novel and thus drawing into their 
field of force almost the entire text. Let me explore this network of images and 
characters to demonstrate how Powys’s “multiverse” is built on a simultaneous 
repulsion from and fascination with several aspects of human existence depicted 
as abject, not by any chance restricted to such particular phenomena as 
vivisection – or psychoanalysis, for that matter. Powys’s metaphor evokes Julia 
Kristeva’s (not so rhetorical) question about the analyst: ”Would he then be 
capable of […] displaying the abject without confusing himself for it? Probably 
not” (Powers of Horror 210). Going beyond the platitude of repeating the 
Kristevan idea that if not all literature (Powers 207) then at least “[g]reat modern 
literature unfolds over [the] terrain [of the abject]” (Powers 18), one can claim 
that Powys’s position turns out to be a very special one in Modernist literature. 
His constant fight with “the repellent”, culminating in his Rabelaisian 
philosophy, means consciously posing the carnivalesque spirit against abjection 
                                                                                                                                   
Powys’s later philosophy: “But at the time of this essay [Psychoanalysis and Morality], there is 
no question yet of ‘hard crystal’ or core or of the life techniques which would allow us to live as 
well as possible with our contradictions” (35). 
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– two notions which are hardly separable, as Kristeva’s exposition of Céline’s 
oeuvre also indicates (Powers 138–95). How far such a division is practicable 
remains one of the major dilemmas of Weymouth Sands. 
To demonstrate how the abject seems to appropriate the whole texture of the 
novel, let me start with the core of the metaphorical network related to it, that is, 
with the identification of vivisection and psychoanalysis revealing that both 
belong to the domain of the Kristevan abject. For the sake of clarity two aspects 
of these phenomena can be differentiated and treated separately: the 
representation of the analyst as a vivisector and the analysand as a vivisected 
animal, with interwoven remarks on the relationship of the two. The related 
metaphors feature some of the motifs prioritised by Kristeva as appearances of 
the abject, such as the corpse (Powers 3–4), the living dead, the ghost (cf. 
Cristian passim) and the ambiguous border (Powers 4)
6
, and lead on to more 
general issues, such as abjection of the self (Powers 5–6), the ambiguous 
feelings attached to the abject (9–10), the ethics of psychoanalysis, the location 
of the speaking subject (Powers 11–12), the structuring of plot and the specific 
aspects of narrative consciousness in the novel. 
Dr. Brush, the analyst and vivisector, who is repeatedly described as a corpse, 
who despises himself, his own science and the whole of humanity, who feels 
unsurpassable pleasure while interminably experimenting with his patients 
without the faintest hope of cure, readily lends himself to interpretation as the 
psychoanalyst who – to refer back to Kristeva quoted above – does not simply 
“confuse himself” with the abject he displays in his patients (Powers 210) but in 
fact is abject. The first aspect of this complex phenomenon to be mentioned is 
that Daniel Brush is apostrophised as a corpse in various ways: he is a “corpse-
man”, “a cadaver” and he is compared to a hanged man making love to a half-
dead panther (WES 448–9). Kristeva assigns a definitive role to the corpse 
(cadaver) as the embodiment of the border (death) against which the subject 
defines itself and to which all other forms of waste are related: 
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 Charles Lock in “Weymouth Sands and the Matter of Representation: Live Dogs, Stuffed 
Animals and Unsealed Stones” treats the problem of representation in the novel in the context of 
ambiguous borders/boundaries. In his opinion, Powys undermines the “modern schema of 
representation” which is “a triumph of humanism” by making basic oppositions, such as those of 
the human and the inhuman, the animate and the inanimate, the subject and the object, etc., 
“indistinct” and “interchangeable” (29–31). He connects this with the “framed” nature of the text 
– with the function of the puppet-show in it, which defines the carnivalesque “model” of 
Weymouth Sands as an “unending sequence of stages, each separated from the others by 
proscenium arches, these arches being, as it were, reversible” (35). His insights into the 
interrelationship of ambiguous boundaries, representation (signification), carnival and 
vivisection could be easily translated into Kristevan terms as a concern with the representation of 
the abject, i.e. something that defies representation in the Symbolic. 
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The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to fall), that which has irremediably 
come a cropper, a cesspool, and death; it upsets even more violently 
the one who confronts it as fragile and fallacious chance. […] If dung 
signifies the other side of the border, the place where I am not and 
which permits me to be, the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a 
border that has encroached upon everything. […] the corpse, seen 
without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is 
death infecting life. Abject. It is something rejected from which one 
does not part. Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us 
and ends up engulfing us. (Powers 3–4) 
Powys assigns to vivisection and the psychologist the role of the very border 
mentioned here that defines not only the individual human being, but, in the case 
of Weymouth Sands, humanity as such. It gains force partly through the spatial 
symbolism of the novel, partly through the more than questionable ethical stance 
embodied by Dr. Brush. 
While the location of the institution clearly situates it as a metaphorical 
border, the characters’ emotional reaction to the building, a metonymy for 
vivisection and psychological treatment, interprets it more specifically as a 
psychological border – of horror, madness and death – against which the subject 
defines himself. Since “[w]hat was now the Brush Home was hidden away in so 
out of the world spot, that very few among what Homer calls ‘articulately-
speaking men’ who lived in Weymouth had ever been near it, though most 
people had heard of it” (WES 109–110), the institution is figuratively placed at 
the border of the (known) human world – in a horizontal dimension, it is like a 
terra ingcognita, in a vertical one it is like the underworld. Later the Brush Home 
is actually compared to Hades (WES 518). This is the psychological Hell’s 
Museum (WES 86) against which characters in the novel, by rejecting 
vivisection and madness, can define themselves as live, sane and moral, thereby 
establishing their own identity and humanity. This is the case with such 
relatively uncomplicated minor characters as Marret (WES 401), Chant (WES 
111–12) or even the neurotic child Benny Cattistock, who makes his first 
appearance in the novel with a dog in his arms just rescued from vivisection 
(WES 100). In fact, it is popular wisdom that has given the place the name 
“Hell’s Museum” (WES 111–12), which thus expresses the self-definition of the 
community of the people living in its vicinity through rejecting it and placing it 
beyond, or rather below the limits of the human world. It is only Dogberry 
Cattistock, “the man of action” (Knight 46), a representative of a spirit totally alien 
from Weymouth, who appreciates the scientific practices of Dr. Brush to the 
extent that he finances his “experimental laboratory”. Even he finds vivisection 
“devilish queer” (WES 437), though, when on his wedding day he ends up 
watching the doctor the whole day instead of making his appearance at church.  
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However, in the exemplary cases of Magnus Muir and Sylvanus Cobbold 
vivisection, though clearly forming a border, also exposes something unbearable 
within the human psyche that actually threatens identity. Magnus Muir’s 
impressions play a definitive role in establishing the function of vivisection as 
border. Just as he finds it difficult even to look at Daniel Brush “without an 
obscure horror” (WES 102), at the thought that “[t]his man is a vivisector […] a 
sickening sensation of anger and disgust [takes] possession of him” (WES 101). 
The sight of the very building also provokes “sick aversion and distaste” (WES 
110) in him. His emphatic bodily reaction is a perfect example of the “loathing” 
and “repugnance” one feels for the abject (cf. Kristeva, Powers 2). His aversion 
soon takes on the form of the fear of death – he senses “an atmosphere of such 
horror that he fidgeted in his seat and felt sick in his stomach as if he were going 
to see an execution” (WES 110) – and the fear of losing his sanity. The latter, 
however, becomes intertwined with his desire for Curly, so that the two affects 
are intermixed in the same bodily sensation: 
‘How can any one of us have a single moment of happiness […] 
when there’s such a thing as vivisection in the world? And yet would I, 
to stop it once and for all, and to burn all their operating tables and all 
their straps and all their instruments, be prepared to sacrifice Curly?’ 
The coming together of these two electrified nerves in Magnus’ 
nature, his erotic passion and his sickening twinge over vivisection, 
threw him […] into a series of jumpy contortions. He kept 
experiencing a twitching in his long legs, and every now and then with 
a muscular contraction that corresponded to what he visioned was 
happening under Mr. Murphy’s devotion to science he would draw up 
one of his heels along the floor of the car. 
‘I suppose […] the only thing to do is to assume that life contains 
cruelties so unspeakable that if you think about them you go mad! 
That’s what it is! To think about Murphy and Dr. Brush’s dogs brings 
you into the care of Dr. Brush!’ (WES 306) 
It is in combination with sexuality and unavowable pleasure that vivisection – 
and psychoanalysis – play the threatening role of the abject
7
, which is “[o]n the 
edge of non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, 
annihilates me” (Kristeva, Powers 2). 
Sylvanus Cobbold undergoes a much more amplified version of a similar 
experience during his “analysis” in the asylum. When forcibly hospitalised in the 
Brush Home for the alleged seduction of young girls – a crude simplification of 
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 Cf. Linda Pashka’s rather similar interpretation, according to which Magnus “experiences the 
sympathetic pain contortions of a torture victim, and these are much like orgasm” (48) here.  
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his relationship with women probably best explained as a form of “erotic 
mysticism” (Krissdottir, John Cowper Powys 105–7) – he undertakes something 
like a crusade against vivisection and to stop it he figuratively loses his life and 
becomes a Christ-like figure. Grotesquely, his reaching out to the Absolute via 
an embodiment of the feminine is replaced by the perverted eroticism of the 
analytical situation: the impersonalised, passive personality of the analyst makes 
the impression of his ideal listener, a woman, on Sylvanus and he is “seized with 
a mysterious spasm of turbulent erotic emotion” (WES 537), which he 
consciously rejects as perverted. Desire, the need to fill in a lack, whether 
physical or metaphysical, and rejection are mixed in the characters’ attitude to 
vivisection and psychoanalysis, in their “fascinated start that leads them toward it 
and separates them from it” (Kristeva, Powers 2); it becomes an ambiguous, ever-
moving border that forces the subject to keep “straying” (Kristeva, Powers 8). 
The intrapersonal tensions of such a “straying” subject reach a culmination in 
Dr. Brush’s abjection of the self, generalised as misanthropy in Weymouth 
Sands: fully aware of the fact that his medical practices – both vivisectional and 
psychoanalytic – are morally unacceptable, he also admits to finding his only 
pleasure in them, that is, he finds the abject, “the impossible within” (Kristeva, 
Powers 5), as the core of his very integrity. His notion of psychoanalysis – 
actually a crude version of Freudism – is briefly outlined at the moment of its 
dramatic change during his “treatment” of Sylvanus Cobbold: 
The grand difference between his old system and his new one lay in 
the hypotheses they respectively assumed with regard to the locality of 
all those dark, disturbing impulses, manias, shock-bruises, neuroses, 
complexes that he regarded as both the causes and the symptoms of 
human derangement. In his old system these volcanic neuroses were 
resident in an entirely subliminal region, a permanent underworld of the 
human ego from which they broke forth to cause unhappiness and 
anguish. This region was out of reach, and possessed locked, adamantine 
gates, as far as our ordinary processes of mental introspection went. To 
isolate and analyse these peculiarities as aberrations it was necessary to 
assume some kind of well-balanced norm, some measure of well-
constituted functioning, from which all such “complexes” could be 
regarded as lapses. (WES 513–14) 
In this concept of psychoanalysis the analyst identifies with the “norm”, the 
“measure” which “isolates” the abnormal from the normal. The full ironies of 
this stance can be realised through the representation of the self-same norm-
giver as a corpse, quoted above. In the openly sexualised game of analysis with 
the doctor sitting as if he was wearing a “straight waistcoat” and indulging 
himself in his perversion of “embracing a vivisected, half-anaesthetized, snarling 
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panther” (WES 448–9), the erotic desire of the analyst is satisfied by an object 
kept constantly on the verge of life and death and the analyst is totally 
interchangeable with the analysand, whom he defines as aberrant.  
In Dr. Brush’s fundamental revision of his earlier scientific theories under the 
impact of Sylvanus Cobbold’s analysis he actually comes to redefine the 
conscious and the unconscious along a continuum (WES 514)
8
. What he does – 
in fact, still adhering to his role as a “norm-giver” – is a redefinition of the 
human norm based on the analysis of a “borderline patient”, whose speech 
“constitute[s] propitious ground for a sublimating discourse [in this case rather 
‘mystic’ than ‘aesthetic’], since he “make[s] the conscious/unconscious 
distinction irrelevant” (Kristeva, Powers 7). However, the only result is that the 
vivisection of dogs becomes redundant (he actually gives it up for financial 
reasons) when he has found a human being to “vivisect” in the person of 
Sylvanus, the ideal analysand, who seems to be in constant communication with 
his unconscious: 
Sylvanus had been in Hell’s Museum now for over three months and 
[…] turned out to be a well-nigh perfect patient. He became so 
interested in Dr. Brush’s de-personalised personality that he was ready 
to humour it to the utmost. And since the essence of this man’s identity 
was to eliminate his identity and to become a pure, unblurred mirror in 
which reality could reflect itself, what Sylvanus constantly aimed at 
was to furnish the doctor with an increasing series of new layers, new 
levels, new strata of his precious objective truth. As a result of this, 
Daniel Brush had never known such persistent, unalloyed mental 
excitement as he experienced during these autumn months. The more 
he analysed Sylvanus the more he found to analyse. And what was so 
extremely satisfactory about it, from Brush’s point of view, was that 
the question of cure never emerged at all. The Doctor could in fact 
drop the “doctor” and give himself up to experiment with Sylvanus as 
he had never dared to experiment with anyone, no, not even with Mrs. 
Cobbold! (WES 512) 
The effect of the doctor’s analysis is rather similar to that of vivisection, since 
under the figurative knife of the doctor’s cold-blooded irony Sylvanus stops 
being human: it “made him howl like a famished wolf” (WES 540) and he “gave 
vent to a cry that seemed hardly human” (WES 540). His “analysis” produces 
similar results as Mrs. Cobbold's, whom, in Dr. Brush’s own words, he has 
“reduce[d] […] to a cold sepulchral pulp” (WES 440). The metaphor applied to 
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 Cf. J. S. Rodman’s very similar interpretation of this redefinition as a “rejection of Freudian 
psychology” (33–5).  
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her emphasises the condition of being in a limbo, stuck between life and death, 
but belonging more to the latter, like ghosts. The condition of these patients – 
metaphorically vivisected animals and living dead – is abject in itself because it 
represents an ambiguous, in-between situation, which “disturbs identity, system, 
order” and “does not respect borders, positions, rules” (Kristeva, Powers 4). 
Their cases imply that if the psychoanalyst represents a border or measure, it is 
rather in the sense that like death, he “has encroached upon everything” 
(Kristeva, Powers 4) and assimilates his patients – his objects – to himself to 
make them abject. 
If there is one person in the novel who faces vivisection and psychoanalysis 
as abject, it is Dr. Brush himself: 
‘When I hear my sweet hypocritical colleagues, […] like so many 
clever politicians, defending experimentation as a humane duty for the 
curing of disease, I feel that the human race is so contemptible that the 
sooner some totally different creation takes its place, the better for the 
universe! Man is a loathsome animal, prodigious in his capacity for a 
particular kind of disgusting cruelty, covered up with ideal excuses. If I 
were allowed – as no doubt we shall be in half-a-century – to vivisect 
men, I’d gladly let the dogs alone. Comical, comical! It’s comical but 
it’s also a little ghastly! I wonder if our sentimental devotees 
comprehend what we real scientists are like. Mad! That’s what we’re 
like. It’s a vice. I know what it is. And I know what I am. I am a 
madman with a vice for which I’d vivisect Jesus Christ.’ (WES 444–5) 
It is Dr. Brush's clear-sighted and disillusioned vision of himself that widens the 
scope of abjection: psychoanalysis becomes generalised as science, and the 
vivisector-analyst becomes an exemplary representative of the human species 
which is abject exactly because of its ability to carry out such practices. He also 
emphasises the ambiguous nature of this practice, since, as an excellent example 
of the abject, it cunningly covers its inhumanity with the interests of the human 
kind (cf. Kristeva, Powers 4). It questions the Enlightenment vision of the man 
of Reason, of which late nineteenth-century Positivism, defining the basic 
approach of even such sciences as psychoanalysis, was a logical continuation. 
Dr. Brush’s vision of psychoanalysis, thriving on the abject, and of mankind, 
loathsome for sanctioning it, is at the same time apocalyptic: full of pessimism, 
he predicts the well-deserved and unavoidable end of such a race. 
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The Promise of a New Discourse: A Glimpse of the Golden 
Age 
Nevertheless, as a counterpoint to the bleak image outlined above, Weymouth 
Sands – similarly to Wolf Solent – involves a vision of the Golden Age at a 
crucial juncture. It is also associated with the resolution of the dilemmas the 
novel poses, but the Dostoevskian allusion – the reminiscence of Stavrogin’s 
vision in Devils (cf. Dostoevsky, Stavrogin’s Confession 64–5) – seems to be 
much more prominent in this text. As a further parallel to Wolf Solent, it is also 
the fate of the Powys hero to gain a glimpse the Golden Age here, and formulate 
a vision which writes over Stavrogin’s, and even more particularly his 
“disciples’” monologic, ideologising readings of the mytheme. In Weymouth 
Sands the motif evolves into a carnivalesque acceptance of growing up, being 
imperfect, seeing the cosmos as recreated out of the chaos surrounding it with 
each new day, and being aware that temporary boundaries exist only to be 
washed away – and redrawn. As the elaboration of the motif and its association 
with Dr Mabon suggest, the tone of Weymouth Sands is defined by the spirit of 
this vision, which can be read both as the mise an abyme and a metatext of the 
entire novel. 
The Weymouth appearing in the Powys hero Magnus Muir’s consciousness 
in the course of his mythic vision, which is fundamentally the elaboration of the 
eponymous metaphor of the novel into a complex image of the Golden Age, is 
the model of the whole (fictional) universe. As such, it is a cosmos separated 
from the chaos of non-being only by fluid boundaries, which is able to contain 
simultaneously the carnivalesque and grotesque moments of buffoonery and the 
perfect harmony of Golden Age – or at least its promise. Before a closer analysis 
of Magnus’s vision and the exploration of the central figure of “Weymouth 
sands”, however, it is worth looking at the narrower and wider context of the 
image. The vision appears in the chapter entitled “Punch and Judy”, which 
creates suspense between the anticlimax of the plot and its resolution in the two 
final chapters, and makes the impression of a tableau, a standstill. The 
importance of the scene is highlighted by the fact that in the whole story 
covering the events of almost a year this chapter features the only sunlit summer 
day – Magnus’s birthday in August (WES 467). Consequently, the Weymouth 
beach appears – for once – as most fitting for the idyllic seaside resort. And the 
beach is unimaginable without a “Punch-and-Judy performance” (WES 4) – the 
comic show the non-fictional Weymouth is actually famous for
9
. This 
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 The puppet-show, which has been performed for centuries according to by and large the same 
scenario but with a half-improvised libretto, features Punch as its main character. He first throws 
his child out of the window, and then beats to death Judy, his understandably upset wife, with his 
stick. In the rest of the play he goes through a large number of adventures, all of which involve 
186 
carnivalesque performance and a sort of mythical perspective, which Magnus 
calls his own “Homeric religion”
10
, determine his emphatically phantasmagoric 
mental image of the small town: “It seemed an immaterial, an insubstantial thing 
to him just then, a thing made of the stuff of thought! It was as if in all its long 
nights and days an impalpable thought-image of it had been wrought, that on 
such an afternoon as this substituted itself for the solid reality” (WES 465). 
Weymouth appears as a subjective space, in the formation of which the 
carnivalesque and the Saturnian vision are inseparably intertwined.  
Seen in this context, the description of the beach with its sharp focus on the 
metaphor of “Weymouth sands” is fairly consistent with Magnus’s overall vision: 
it involves images of the Golden Age and the abject – seen as carnivalesque – 
simultaneously and depicts them as mutually dependent on each other: 
That difference, for instance, between the dry sand and the wet sand, 
which had remained in the memory of Magnus as a condensation of the 
divergent experiences of his life, heightened the way everything looked 
from the esplanade till it attained the symbolism of drama. On the dry 
sand sat, in little groups, the older people, reading, sewing, sleeping, 
talking to one another, while on the wet sand the children, building 
their castles and digging their canals were far too absorbed and content 
to exchange more than spasmodic shouts to one another. The free play 
of so many radiant bare limbs against the sparkling foreground-water 
and the bluer water of the distance gave to the whole scene a 
marvellous heathen glamour, that seemed to take it out of Time 
altogether, and lift it into some ideal region of everlasting holiday, 
where the burden of human toil and the weight of human responsibility 
no more lay heavy upon the heart. 
There, above, on the dry sand, there were forever limning and 
dislimning themselves groups and conclaves of a rich, mellow, 
Rabelaisian mortality, eating, drinking, love-making, philosophizing, 
full of racy quips, scandalous jibes, and every sort of earthy, care-
forgetting ribaldry. But as these mothers and these fathers, these uncles 
and these aunts from hundreds of Dorset villages [...] formed and 
reformed their groups of Gargantuan joviality and exchanged remarks 
upon the world that were “thick and slab” with the rich mischiefs of a 
thousand years, while, I say, the dry sands of Weymouth received the 
imprint of these mature glosses upon the life that went crying and 
weeping by, [...] the wet sands of Weymouth were imprinted by the 
                                                                                                                                   
beating up his enemies. In the end he is to be hanged, but he manages to escape even the gallows 
– what is more, he even kills Satan/Death. Cf. (Mayhew). 
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 Cf. “but I fancy I am the only one who accepts Homer’s philosophy as my own and Homer’s 
religion as my own” (WES 485). 
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“printless” feet, light, immortal, bare, of what might easily have been 
the purer spirits of an eternal classical childhood, happy and free, in 
some divine limbo of unassailable play-time. (WES 462–463) 
Since the introduction of this passage defines the atmosphere of the scene 
through ekphrasis – a comparison to Jean-Antoine Watteau’s painting entitled 
Embarkation for Cythera – the image evokes both the mytheme of the Golden 
Age, the Isle of the Blessed, and one of its most famous literary representations 
involving ekphrasis, Stavrogin’s confession (cf. Lukacher 20–21; Hyman 21). 
While Stavrogin’s version proves to be an ultimately failed attempt to redraw the 
subject’s boundaries through myth – the discourse of Law and the transcendental 
signified (cf. Bell 9–38; Riceour 5–6; Kristeva, Powers of Horror 7) – Powys 
seems to apply a fundamentally different strategy here. The cosmos of 
Weymouth is barely separated by a thin line of sand from the amazing primeval 
chaos of the sea – which appears in the novel as the archetypal metaphor of the 
unconscious, the abode of the sea serpent representing chaos (e.g. in the chapter 
“The Sea Serpent”, cf. Eliade 48) and the realm of death. The narrow line of 
sand – the space of the conscious and of earthly life – is nevertheless an 
ephemeral and insecure boundary, which has to be fought back from the sea 
each and every day. The Golden Age of childhood, this mythic, timeless world 
placed on the border of the universe of signs, which might as well never have 
existed, is inevitably replaced by adulthood. The latter is, in contrast, 
pronouncedly carnivalesque, somewhat obscene and grotesque, definitely 
corporeal and can assert itself with the help of signs. Nonetheless, it is also 
idyllic in its own way. Similarly to the border between the sand and the sea, the 
division line between childhood and adulthood also seems to be insecure and 
permeable. The description of the two kinds of sand can be interpreted both as a 
contrast of childhood – “the age of innocence” – and a carnevalesque, 
frolicsome, experienced adulthood in the context of individual development, and 
as a cosmology, in which the separation of chaos and cosmos is followed first by 
the mythic Golden Age of humanity, and then by a grotesque, Rabelaisian era. 
This Weymouth idyll contains both of the latter, but narrative, text and identity 
can be born only from the carnivalesque vortex – only facing the abject and 
overcoming the narcissistic crisis of encountering the body and its dissolution 
can lead to the emergence of the speaking subject. In the world of Weymouth 
Sands, speaking about or from another position is neither possible nor 
worthwhile.  
This carnivalesque vision slowly but surely appropriates the whole chapter – 
or rather the entire novel. “Punch and Judy” enumerates almost all the characters 
of Weymouth Sands, whom Magnus Muir interprets as figures in the ongoing 
Punch and Judy performance. In his words, “’There is something […] of Punch 
in me, in Gaul, in Jerry, in old Poxwell, in the Jobber! Punch must be the eternal 
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embodiment of what Rabelais calls the ‘Honest Cod’, the essential masculine 
element, in every living man’” (WES 465). In the same vein, as Linda Pashka 
also points out, the text of the entire novel can be read as a bitter Punch and 
Judy show (30). One of its first scenes involves the performance of the 
puppeteers on a cold winter beach, but the analogy does not end here. As if to 
emphasise the unstable boundaries of “stage” and “reality”, Marrett, “the Punch 
and Judy girl”, who is a spectral reminiscence of a puppet herself with her face 
evoking a “china doll” (WES 388) and her body resembling a clothed 
broomstick, leaves the puppet show and “comes alive”. She is in good company 
in crossing this insecure boundary – Jerry Cobbold, the “world-famous” clown 
(WES 8) also keeps playing a role without a break, even in his private life (cf. 
WES 204). Both the novelistic characters themselves and their personal 
relationships evoke a carnivalesque turmoil, since they form and re-form 
emotional ties in the most surprising combinations. This holds true for the 
Cobbold brothers – otherwise typical carnivalesque parodying doubles (cf. 
Bakhtin, Problems 127) – for Tissty and Tossty Clive, who seem to be 
interchangeable throughout most of the text; for Jobber Skald, who is simply a 
twentieth-century reincarnation of Gargantua (WES 54); and last but not least, 
for the abortionist Dr. Girodel, who is an embodiment of Panurge (WES 228). In 
the meantime, these figures gradually seem to become ghosts in the 
carnivalesque underworld of the novel – whether it means being an inhabitant of 
the “Homeric” underworld (WES 479), featuring as a grotesque “Holy Ghost” 
(WES 333), resembling a living dead recovering from a spiritual breakdown 
(WES 577), or feeling like the “moaning and gibbering” ghost of the Punch and 
Judy show (WES 465).  
All in all, though the emblematic image of the sunlit sea at dawn or sunset, 
which – just like in Wolf Solent – clearly associates the mytheme of the Golden 
Age, appears several times in Weymouth Sands (pl. WES 392, 497), the myth 
itself is reinterpreted on slightly different terms here. The Golden Age appears as 
a subversive discourse, which is able to present carnivalesque phenomena 
outside the concepts of sin and the abject (religious and ethical discourses) or 
disease (scientific discourse). In other words, it evades the discourse of the Law 
and the Father, and offers the alternative of a carnivalesque vision instead of the 
abjection of the self for the subject. It is for this reason that the promise of the 
Golden Age as an alternative discourse associated with one particular fictional 
character is written exactly into this vision, as a scene in the “Punch and Judy” 
chapter. 
In the light of Magnus’s vision, the promise of a new kind of science – and 
morality – heralded by the arrival of the new physician, which apparently offers 
an obvious but rather weak counterpoint to the dominant abject vision, gains 
much more weight. The tentative indication of a new approach to science and 
life represented by Dr. Mabon is linked to the Golden Fleece and a retrieval of 
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the Golden Age of mankind, though apart from Magnus’s intuitive attraction to 
the man there is not much else to support it. After the narrator’s introduction, 
claiming that “this day there did happen to be a sort of oracle delivered, though 
its utterer […] was a complete stranger to the town” (WES 499) it is the Latin 
tutor who, on their first meeting – and the new doctor’s last appearance in the 
novel – attaches outstanding importance to Dr. Mabon: “I’d like to know this 
chap’s philosophy. He’s in advance of all of us. He sees far. He’s like the Pilot 
of the Argo. God! I hope he stays here!” (WES 503) The doctor, the writer of a 
“purely biological” (WES 504) book on ethics, which he thinks is “barbarous” 
(WES 502), is also a conchologist, who looks “as if he would willingly have 
exchanged his present incarnation for the life of a Solen [a species of shells]” 
(WES 502). He “seemed to have a special look for everyone, with its own 
humorous commentary upon the world, but a different commentary for each 
separate person in a group” (WES 503). It is his short dialogue with Magnus 
which gives the promise of a new science beyond psychoanalysis: he explains 
that having “dropped psychoanalysis” he does “nothing but listen … and … 
move … perhaps … a few things that have got in the way!” while treating 
“neurotic cases”. The following narratorial comment identifies this particular 
statement as the “oracle” (WES 504–5) mentioned above and thus underpins the 
exceptional importance of Dr. Mabon’s rather general comment. His whole 
personality and approach poses a sharp contrast to Dr. Brush’s: a lover and 
admirer of nature, he is an advocate of non-intrusion and benevolent, humorous, 
tolerant passivity. His “dropping” of psychoanalysis together with the 
representation of its practice in Weymouth Sands as vivisection marks Powys’s 
disappointment in his extremely optimistic expectations concerning 
psychoanalysis. What he presents here seems to be nothing else but the 
Rabelaisian alternative – in the Powysian sense outlined in his Rabelais – to the 
experimental cruelty and jouissance of psychoanalysis as abject. 
The Lure of the Abject – the Speaking Subject, Characters 
and Plot 
If going beyond psychoanalysis as vivisection is represented directly in 
Weymouth Sands only as a passing glimpse of a Rabelaisian Golden Age, 
indirectly it permeates practically all the levels of the text, though inseparably 
tied to the abject. The tracking down of another facet of the original metaphor, 
the image of the ghost for the analysand reappearing throughout the text of the 
novel in a more generalised sense reveals that the fascination with the abject in 
the whole of Weymouth Sands is far from being restricted to Dr. Brush. In fact, 
abjection is the position from which the speaking subject seems to enunciate 
being – the only proper location worth writing about at all. The novel is teeming 
with abject characters and scenes – psychic health seems to be the exception that 
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proves the rule. Their treatment, however, is dominated by light-hearted 
indulgence and non-critical tolerance on the narrator’s part, resulting in a 
polyphonic multiverse of several colliding perspectives filtered through the 
narrative voice with equal power and “truth-value”. Last but not least, Powys’s 
fascination with the abject, this “’something’ that I do not recognize as a thing”, 
but which is “not nothing, either” (Kristeva, Powers 2) might shed light on the 
fundamentally bathetic nature of the plot of Weymouth Sands, the conspicuously 
empty centre of the novel. 
The metaphor of the ghost for the analysand mentioned above is merged in 
the text of the novel with the leitmotif of the “Homeric dead” applied to all the 
inhabitants of Weymouth – in fact, to the whole of mankind. While the patients 
of the Brush Home are, as mentioned above, associated with the vivisected dogs 
from the very beginning, the metaphorical parallel for the condition of the 
suffering animals, neither dead nor living, is that of the ghost. Ghosts, as an 
extension of the notion of the corpse, are by definition abject. The patients of the 
asylum, the “brain-tortured unresting ghosts who could neither realise their 
dolorous identities nor forget them” (WES 518) become more specifically 
associated with the inhabitants of the Homeric underworld when they are 
compared to Sylvanus Cobbold: “And like Teiresias in Hades it seemed to be the 
destiny of Sylvanus to find rational articulation, if nothing else, for the blind 
gibberings of these poor ghosts” (WES 518). The context implies a connection of 
the unconscious, language and identity exemplified by the image of the Homeric 
dead, which, though the idea allegedly comes from Magnus Muir, is elaborated 
on by Sylvanus Cobbold
11
: 
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 It is at this point that the acknowledged autobiographical nature of these two characters (WES 
“Note by Author”) becomes rather obvious. Powys himself was fascinated with the motif of the 
descent to the underworld represented in “Book XI” of The Odyssey. His conclusions about the 
“pessimistic” Homeric attitude to death, which is “a pitiful half-life”, are strikingly similar to the 
more mystically elaborated notions of Sylvanus Cobbold: 
Some would say, ‘Why should we try to realise and to appropriate to our imaginations 
this Homeric view, if it be so dark and tragic?’ Because it is not the tragedy of the 
general human fate that debases our spirit and lowers the temper of our lives; it is the 
burden of our private griefs, our private wrongs, and the weight of ills ‘that flesh is heir 
to’. […] 
Granting that the Homeric view of the fate of the dead is the darkest […] it remains 
that it saves a man from that irrational fear of vengeance of the Creator, which, while it 
has kept few cruel ones from their cruelty, has driven insane so many sensitive and 
gentle natures. 
And what most of us suffer from is our absorption in our own cares and worries and 
afflictions, not any indignant spiritual protest against the general fate of the human race. 
(The Pleasures of Literature 73–4) 
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‘That tragic half-life of the dead in Homer, that I heard Mr. Muir 
talk about once at High House, lies behind everything. […] If you […] 
take that half-life as if it were the bottom of the sea you give the sweet 
light of the sun its true meaning. Unhappiness comes from not 
realising that life is two-sided. The other side of life is always death. 
The dead in Homer are tragic and pitiful, but they are not nothing. 
Their muted half-life is like the watery light at the bottom of the sea. 
[…] That Homeric death-life is tragically sad, but it has a beauty like 
the dying away of music when instead of becoming nothing music 
carries us in its ebb-flow down to this sea-bottom of the world – […] – 
where it’s all echo and reflection, where it’s all memory and mirrors of 
memory and brooding upon what is and is not.” (WES 258–9) 
At this point the image of vivisection becomes related to the metaphysical 
dimensions of the novel: life and identity are defined and only definable against 
death, against nothing, while the Homeric dead become the image of the human 
condition of being in a limbo. It is not by chance that, as a “result of his 
metaphysical struggles” (WES 408), Sylvanus's face becomes comparable to that 
of the Homeric dead, “who, while they can remember and forget, are completely 
deprived of all the creative energy of the power of thought”. The rational 
language of science – the approach of the analyst comparable only to vivisection 
– is helpless in the face of the “ocean of human experience” (WES 514). Since 
the ocean, another leitmotif of the novel (Robinson, Sensualism 28), is also a 
metaphor for the psyche, Sylvanus’s mystical preaching can also be read as his 
definition of being – based on the constant awareness of nothing, of a lack, of 
death within.  
Thus, on the one hand, the metaphor of the ghost for the analysand is a 
perfect embodiment of the abject, since “all abjection is in fact recognition of the 
want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire is founded” (Kristeva, 
Powers 5). On the other hand, it is also an attempt to resolve the irresolvable 
dichotomy of life and death, being and nothing, and as such, it is positively 
opposed to the solution offered by psychoanalysis and science – the image of the 
vivisected animal. It is not Dr. Brush who can facilitate his patients’ (re)entrance 
into the Symbolic and self-definition but Sylvanus Cobbold, their “Teiresias”, 
“the ghost of the blind Theban prophet […] whose reason is still unshaken” 
(Homer). Sylvanus is different from the other patients, “the other ghosts [who] 
flit about aimlessly” (Homer), “the sad troops of the enfeebled Dead, who were 
sub-conscious, sub-sensitive, sub-normal, sub-substantial” (WES 479), exactly 
because of his ability to verbalise much deeper layers of his psyche and thereby 
to establish an identity of his own. In Weymouth Sands the hyper-consciousness 
of Sylvanus Cobbold – the “’mystical’ sublimating discourse” of the “borderline 
subject” (Kristeva, Powers 7) – embodies the most extreme potentials of the 
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ghostly/ghastly human condition, a self-analysis and self-definition opposed to 
psychoanalysis represented as vivisection while carrying on the implications of 
the same metaphor. 
While the motif of vivisection, as outlined above, leads to a fundamentally 
misanthropic approach to mankind seen as abject, Weymouth Sands actually 
abounds in “ghosts” and in “improper/unclean” characters (Kristeva, Powers 2) 
who transgress officially accepted social norms usually because of their more or 
less serious psychic disturbances and/or unusual sexual inclinations and who are 
treated neutrally, in a lightsome manner or even with fascination. Let me give 
only a few examples in a rather sketchy manner – relevant features are so 
abundant in Weymouth Sands that to do otherwise would amount to retelling the 
whole novel.  
Adam Skald is obsessed with killing Dog Cattistock, which he also sees as 
the only way to keep his personal integrity, as the core of his identity (WES 360–
61). This is exactly why his newly found love, Perdita, leaves him – she finds 
him abject. By the end of the novel the forsaken man is so devastated, both 
spiritually and bodily, that he becomes physically repulsive, looking as if “he 
had already joined the ranks of those Homeric […] of the enfeebled Dead” (WES 
479). When the lovers are reunited at the end of the novel, after Perdita’s long 
absence, presumable mental breakdown and physical illness – her own special 
descent to hell –, both of them are described as “skeletons”, his face is 
“positively ghastly in its disfigurement” and hers is “the face of the dead come 
to life” (WES 577).  
Magnus Muir is haunted by the ghost of his dead father to such an extent that 
he sometimes ceases to have a separate identity of his own. During the lifetime 
of the elder Muir it was Magnus’s “fear of his father […] that made his love-
affairs come to nothing” (WES 19). Weymouth Sands is partly about the forty-
five-year-old tutor’s attempt to wrestle himself free from this fear five years 
after his father’s death. The interiorised prohibition on bonding with women 
reappears in a slightly veiled form as his fear that his marriage with Curly will 
force him to leave the security of the maternal lap/womb associated with Miss 
Le Fleau’s house [its atmosphere dominated by the elder Muir’s furniture (WES 
95)] and push him into the horrors of a life described in terms of a (vivisectional) 
industrial torture-chamber: 
He felt it now as a menacing engine-house that he was entering – a 
place full of cogs and pistons and wheels and screws and prodding 
spikes – and full of people with bleeding limbs. A vague horror, like 
that of extreme physical pain, oppressed him. He felt as if all the 
hidden places where sensitive life was tortured had opened their back-
doors to him, and the moans from within were groping at his vitals. 
(WES 95) 
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Curly, standing for sexual relationship and the feminine, becomes the luring but 
also horrifying object of his desire. This contradiction surfaces in Magnus’s 
inability to consummate his desire and counteract Curly’s manoeuvres to 
postpone their wedding, and is sublimated in his positioning Curly against 
vivisection, as the sacrifice he could – or should? – make in the name of 
humanity to stop this unbearable cruelty (cf. the quote from WES 306 above). 
Ironically, this is what literally happens at the end of the novel: the expenses of 
Curly’s leaving for Italy with Dog Cattistock make the miser stop financing Dr. 
Brush’s laboratory and thereby bring vivisection to its end. Magnus goes on 
heartbroken, but not without a sense of relief. His narrative lends itself to 
interpretation most easily as a story of the feminine and sexuality treated as 
abject under the influence of the Law of the Father (cf. Kristeva, Powers 2). His 
sacred horror of the feminine, based on the incest taboo, the prohibition on the 
maternal (cf. Kristeva, Powers 71) might shed light on the conspicuous absence 
of mothers from the novel: Weymouth Sands is teeming with orphans (both 
infants and adults), childless mother-aged women and careless, malfunctioning 
mothers. Powys’s rejection of Christian morality is almost literally translated 
here into fictional terms, since his view of the punishing God with His ban on 
sexuality – “to each superego its abject” (Kristeva, Powers 2) – predestines the 
feminine as abject
12
. It also explains to a certain extent why he finds the 
Christian notion of sin totally unsatisfactory in coping with the abject (Kristeva, 
Powers 90–112) and tries to come up with alternative solutions represented as 
the philosophies of the individual characters in the novel. 
Most of the other characters can be also termed abject for one reason or 
another. Thus, Dog Cattistock is a miser to a pathological extent, which makes 
him unable to bond with women (WES 446–8). Captain Poxwell and his 
daughter Lucinda play out a scenario of incest which drives the father practically 
mad (WES 302) and leaves the daughter not much saner, either. James Loder 
puts his physical pain on show most perversely and tortures his children with his 
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 This aspect of Weymouth Sands – though without the application of Kristevan terminology – is 
clearly elaborated in Pashka’s analysis. She reads Weymouth Sands as a Punch and Judy show 
(30), which she interprets, in turn, “as fantasy, as a world in which Judy represents the 
attractive/repulsive object of desire” (34, emphasis added). She goes on to explore elements of 
the Punch and Judy show in the novel, including symbolic objects, characters and their 
relationships. She comes to the conclusion that the “Powysian attraction/repulsion pattern is 
common to not only Powys but also his several extensions – the Powys heroes, his Punch men. 
John Crow, Adrian Sorio, Wolf Solent and Magnus Muir all carry sticks, as Punch does […]. All 
use their sticks as phallic talismen, warding off or attacking desirable but evil and threatening 
female figures” (38). In other words, she sees “misogyny” in the core of the comic play and “at 
the heart of Weymouth Sands” (32). Her reading seems to support the relevance of my 
interpretation for two reasons: firstly, her insistence on the simultaneous attraction and repulsion 
inspired by female characters in Powys heroes points to a parallel with Kristeva’s description of 
the abject. Secondly, by basing her analysis on the Punch and Judy show, she also implies a 
curious relationship of the carnivalesque and the feminine/abject in Powys’s art. 
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illness (WES 297). Rodney Loder consciously wishes his father’s death and is 
afraid of going mad like his uncle (178). Daniel Brush is probably a latent 
homosexual (WES 537) and definitely an overt misanthrope. Larry Zed is a 
charming fugitive from the Brush Home and not without a good cause. The 
sisters Tissty and Tossty have a most curious Lesbian and incestuous 
relationship with each other (WES 472). Peg Frampton has nymphomaniac 
inclinations (WES 476). The only proper mother in the novel, Ellen Gadget, is 
reputed to live in an incestuous relationship with her husband, who is also her 
half-brother (WES 249). Last but not least, almost every old family in 
Weymouth has had some member who was, is, or could have been a patient in 
the Brush Home (WES 487), among them the Loders (WES 178) and the 
Cobbolds (WES 270).  
The most conspicuous examples of abjection are the brothers Jerry and 
Sylvanus Cobbold. “The world-famous clown” (WES 8) of a thousand masks 
and the “born prophet” (WES 6) function as a pair of – sometimes 
interchangeable – carnivalesque doubles whose identity is defined along the 
lines of forming two seemingly diametrically opposed versions of coping with 
the abject. What they share, though, is their obsession with the excremental 
aspects of life and a more or less morbid femininity – the abject.  
In Jerry’s case this fascination is overtly connected to a Rabelaisian – 
carnivalesque? – attitude that is much more complicated than “subsuming 
Rabelais’ sex/excrement reverence” (Robinson, Sensualism 18): 
Jerry had indeed something in him that went beyond 
Rabelaisianism, in that he not only could get an ecstasy of curious 
satisfaction from the most drab, ordinary, homely, realistic aspects of 
what might be called the excremental under-tides of existence but he 
could slough off his loathing for humanity in this contemplation and 
grow gay, child-like, guileless. (WES 217) 
His wife, Lucinda is one of Dr. Brush’s out-patients, the “vivisected, half-
anaesthetized, snarling panther” (WES 449), who has driven her father mad by 
making up a story – of course, with Powys one can never tell how fictitious – of 
their child born of incest. Jerry’s lover, Tossty, is fatally attracted to her own 
sister, the beautiful Tissty. The narrator’s comments place these relationships far 
beyond the limits of “normality”: “normal sex-appeals had not the least effect 
upon [Jerry]. What had drawn him to Lucinda […] was a queer pathological 
attraction; and the same was true […] of his interest in Tossty” (WES 218). At 
the end of the novel he establishes an adulterous – and in a sense incestuous – 
relationship with his sister-in-law. The tainted nature of this love is already 
predicted half-way through the plot, much before Hortensia Lily is actually jilted 
on her wedding-day by Cattistock, when Jerry imagines that he would respond to 
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her love for him only if “Cattistock ill-used her” and “if she were outraged and 
abject” (WES 219, emphasis added).  
Sylvanus Cobbold’s fascination with excrement is part of his ritualistic, 
mystical adoration of every aspect of nature, and is probably best exemplified by 
his kissing the prongs of a fork freshly taken from a dung heap (WES 529). 
Though women are mysteriously attracted by his preaching, and he even shares 
his house (and bed) with two of them in the course of the novel, he does not 
have a sexual relationship with them. His “friends” (WES 489) are queer figures 
themselves: social outcasts (Gipsy May and Marret, the Punch-and-Judy girl), 
neurotics (Peg Frampton, and the hysterical Gipsy, who symbolically castrates 
Sylvanus [WES 412, 416–7] by cutting off his moustaches in his sleep out of 
jealousy) or somehow even not totally human (Marret is like a puppet, a long 
broomstick in black with the head of a china doll). But while Jerry’s loathing is 
directed against others – he is a misanthrope – Sylvanus feels “spasmodic body-
shame” (WES 385) he is repelled only by his own body and sees himself as abject.  
Their abjection results in two different “sublimating discourses”. Though 
Nordius claims that “[Jerry Cobbold’s] misanthropy is not there to shield some 
precious thought-world; it is only cynical and full of contempt, devoid, it seems, 
of any redeeming features” (124), in the novel his abjection is sublimated in his 
clowning, his “artistic discourse” (Kristeva, Powers 7) that is not bound by the 
limits of the stage: 
[…] Jerry’s loathing for humanity was even deeper than that of Mr. 
Witchit […] and the only pleasure he got from his fellows was a 
monstrous Rabelaisian gusto for their grossest animalities, excesses, 
lapses, shames! These things it was, the beast-necessity in human life, 
that he exploited in the humours of his stage-fooling; and because he 
loathed his fellow-men he was able to throw into his treatment of their 
slavery to material filth an irresistible hilarity as well as a convincing 
realism, a combination that always enchanted the crowd. (WES 218) 
His “acting sans cesse” (WES 204), also continued in the conspicuously 
theatrical environment of his private life (WES 41), even seems to serve 
“humanitarian” purposes for example in Perdita’s eyes, who “saw the man as a 
sort of fragile Atlas, perpetually holding up the weight of other people’s 
destinies and aiming above all, as he did with Lucinda, at keeping people from 
going mad, by an everlasting process of distraction!” (WES 218)  
In contrast, Sylvanus Cobbold’s “mystical sublimating discourse” (Kristeva, 
Powers 7) is embodied in his rather vague philosophy of the Absolute. His 
efforts to come up with an acceptable version of the unbearable contradictions of 
the human condition demonstrate how death, cruelty and the repellent are just 
different facets of the abject against which the individual tries to enunciate his 
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identity in Powys’s art: “his mind gave up the struggle to reconcile his Absolute 
with the cruelty of things, for this began to seem beyond his power; and in place 
he wrestled with the Spirit in a frantic effort to make it include the Gross, the 
Repulsive, the Disgusting” (WES 384–5). His personal philosophy results in 
such grotesque phenomena, as his calling himself “Caput-anus” in his dialogues 
with the Absolute, while he carefully avoids any references to himself as “I” 
(WES 385). His idealisation of femininity – the sublimation of the abject he 
cannot handle – brings his relationships with both Gipsy May and Marret to a 
crisis since he manages to ignore their personal feelings totally. As opposed to 
the professional jester, it is, however, Sylvanus who can produce “a fit of 
Gargantuan laughter” when facing such an ironic twist of fate as Cattistock’s 
risking his life to rescue a probably empty cask in a storm at sea and thus to 
become the local hero instead of Adam Skald (WES 285–6). At the end of the 
novel both Rabelaisianism without indulgence and the vision of a carnivalesque 
Absolute without a proper incorporation of femininity – sexuality – fail to prove 
satisfactory alternatives: Jerry’s scheming is unmasked in the face of “authentic 
passion” (WES 570) and Sylvanus, locked up permanently in Hell’s Museum, is 
brought to such a breakdown by Dr. Brush’s cold-blooded irony and his final 
loss of Marret that his Absolute has to struggle back to life in a phoenix-like 
manner (WES 542). 
Even such a sketchy overview of the novel’s cast seems to justify A. N. 
Wilson’s ironic summary of the case of Weymouth Sands: the novel “had to be 
retitled Jobber Skald since the mayor and the good people of Weymouth 
threatened legal action at [Powys’s] depiction of the genteel seaside town as 
seething with evil, populated by brothel-keepers, vivisectionists and lunatics” 
(3). The new title is especially misleading because it veils a central feature of the 
novel: if Weymouth Sands has a main character at all, it is definitely not the 
Jobber – however “impressive” he is (Knight 43) – but Weymouth itself, with all 
its symbolic dimensions
13
. Though the novel has, by necessity, more or less 
elaborated and complex characters, the major ones – Magnus Muir, the Jobber, 
Dog Cattistock, Perdita Wane, Jerry and Sylvanus Cobbold, Richard Gaul, 
Rodney Loder, Daniel Brush etc. – are so numerous, that it is hardly possible to 
identify one main plot with a restricted number of major characters. What 
Weymouth Sands provides instead, is a collection of “imaginary portraits” 
(Brebner 136) – of personal philosophies and visions of the world, as if to 
demonstrate Powys’s utterly subjectivist
14
 standpoint that “the thing that 
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 The case of the two “versions”, of course, includes much more than a simple “retitling” (cf. 
Moran passim). As far as the centrality of the setting in Weymouth Sands is concerned, it seems 
to be a common assumption in Powys criticism (cf. Moran 23–24; Rodman 40; Brebner 124; 
Coates 120; Krissdottir, John Cowper Powys 108).  
14
 On subjectivist pluralism in Powys’s Porius cf. (Boulter 8–9). 
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conceives life and absorbs life, is nothing less than the mind itself; the mind and 
the imagination!” (Psychoanalysis 28)  
Though there is an omniscient third person narrator in the novel, his all-
knowing reveals itself rather in an ability to enter all the characters’ 
consciousness – and letting their different perspectives collide. It becomes most 
obvious in such instances when the same event is interpreted from two different 
characters’ viewpoint, but always without the intrusion of the narrator’s “final” 
judgment. For example in the above-mentioned case of Sylvanus Cobbold’s 
kissing the fork out of a dung heap, the narrator’s comments, dominated by 
Sylvanus’ perspective and permeated by his ritualistic and pathetic nature-
worship, are suddenly interrupted by the rather disillusioning remark that “it 
would have fatally lent itself to Perdita’s impression of him, as one who, even 
when alone, was forever acting and showing off. Perdita’s view of his character, 
and indeed the Jobber’s view, too, would have been accentuated had they 
witnessed the sequel” (WES 529). The more complex characters are introduced 
through each other’s perspectives, which often contrast with each other – most 
notably in Sylvanus’s case, but even the “villain” of the novel, Dog Cattistock is 
totally humanised through Magnus Muir’s vision of him and through a glimpse 
into his self-reflections on his disastrous wedding day. The result is a typical 
Powysian “multiverse” of different consciousnesses, which are in dialogic
15
 
relationship with each other – a “dehierarchised” (Boulter 13), polyphonic, 
amoral multiverse, in which the repellent, the abject is shown through an 
indulgent, humorous narrative voice, as if Dr. Mabon was listening with his own 
“humorous commentary upon the world” (WES 503) while his patients reveal 
themselves as abject. 
In comparison with this multiverse of subjective visions the relative 
insignificance of the plot is probably indicated by its bathetic nature, so 
characteristic of Powys (Robinson, “Introduction” v). The focus on characters 
and symbolic locations is well-reflected in the chapter titles: out of the fifteen all 
but one are nominal, containing mostly either simply a character’s name (5) or a 
place-name (4), as if nothing actually happened in the novel. The plot lines seem 
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 In Joe Boulter’s analysis of pluralism in Porius, whose many aspects and conclusions are also 
highly relevant in terms of Weymouth Sands (cf. the collision of different perspectives [32–3], 
the representation of different consciousnesses on equal footing as “many world versions” 
existing independently from each other [e.g. 28–30]), his philosophical conception of pluralism 
adopted from postmodernist theory for the purposes of analysis (7) actually excludes the notion 
of any dialogue (25–30). Probably for this reason he does not incorporate in his studies the 
Bakhtinian approach, though he makes a reference to his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics by 
applying the term “’double-voiced’ style” to Powys’s text (34) without any sense of running into 
a self-contradiction. He also discards “carnival” as a relevant term in his frame of reference 
relying on Juliet Mitchell – but not on Bakhtin – who associates it with simple inversion instead 
of dehierarchisation (13–14). My reading, moving in the frame of reference of Bakhtinian 
poetics rather than postmodernist on philosophy, obviously diverges from Boulter’s at this point. 
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to converge in Dog Cattistock and Mrs. Lily’s wedding day, the day when the 
Jobber intends to kill Cattistock. The description of the wedding, however, is 
replaced on the one hand by the stories of Sylvanus and Marret’s breaking up 
and of the man’s symbolic castration, on the other hand by the meeting of the 
old gossips of Weymouth, who try to puzzle together the story of Hortensia 
Lily’s jilting – an event none of them witnessed. It is only casually related that 
the Jobber could not carry out his murderous intentions because Cattistock, to 
run away from his bride in time, left his house at daybreak and the Jobber was 
simply too late – ironically, jilting Hortensia Lily maybe saved Cattistock’s life. 
The day, which Cattistock has spent watching vivisection instead of 
consummating his desire for Captain Poxwell’s younger daughter, culminates in 
the horribly shaken father’s “abject confession”
16
 of (fictitious?) incest with his 
other daughter and Lizzy Chant’s passing out allegedly at the sight of the late 
Mrs Cattistock’s ghost.  
The two chapters covering the day of the cancelled wedding thus actually 
abound in moments of castration in the epistemological sense of the word 
(Weber 1111–12): moments, when not exactly nothing happens, but something 
which fundamentally undermines the subject’s position by questioning the 
possibility of believing his eyes and revealing the gap between the signifier and 
the signified, thereby shaking forever his trust in signification. Sylvanus 
Cobbold experiences his symbolic castration as a moment of utter shame, after 
which he needs to redefine his identity (WES 418–9). Captain Poxwell’s 
madness is the result of his inability to decide whether his daughter really had a 
child fathered by him – a story that is tentatively represented through Lucinda’s 
consciousness as a malicious attack against her father’s masculinity (WES 144–5): 
castration. The Jobber’s inability to carry out the intended murder, talk of which 
has already come to be the narrative of his identity, results in his rapid physical 
and spiritual disintegration and calls for a fundamental redefinition of his 
identity which only becomes possible after his reunion with Perdita. And last but 
not least, the experience of the uncanny, exemplified by the appearance of Mrs. 
Cattistock’s ghost, is actually built on the moment of castration (Weber 1111–14).  
The anticlimactic structure of the plot opens up the epistemological and 
ontological uncertainties behind a Powysian multiverse abounding in ironic 
twists of fate. It is also inseparable from the problematic nature of the speaking 
subject clearly represented in Weymouth Sands as enunciating being from the 
ambiguous position of abjection. If the dynamics of plot are really structured by 
desire (cf. P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot 37–61), a plot structured around the 
ambiguous affects surrounding the abject – a simultaneous fascination and 
                                                     
16
 I have borrowed the expression form Peter Brooks, who uses it to describe Fyodor Pavlovich 
Karamazov’s “whole mode […] of both calculated and uncontrollable self-abasement” 
(Troubling Confessions 73). 
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repulsion – in fact, can hardly be anything else but bathetic: repeating the 
constant “placing and displacing [of] abjection” by laughter it does not really 
proceed, but rather “strays” (Kristeva, Powers 8) in permanent fear of and 




In conclusion, in Weymouth Sands the fascination with the abject has proved 
to be a dominant shaping factor of the novel’s extremely rich and complicated 
system of metaphors, its characters and themes, and its plot. It is not only Dr. 
Brush “embracing a vivisected, half-anaesthetized, snarling panther” (WES 448–
9) who seems to be “in love with the abject”, but the whole text that revolves 
around formulating sublimating discourses of the abject – the “artistic” 
sublimating discourse realised in the narrative of Weymouth Sands probably 
being the most successful one of them. Rabelaisianism and carnivalesque 
laughter – with or without the optimism both Bakhtin and Powys attach to them 
in their non-belletristic works – are unalienable elements in either the 
philosophical solutions or the narratological approach to the problem. 
Consequently, its representation in Weymouth Sands rather highlights the 
complexities of the issue instead of producing simplifying solutions. Janina 
Nordius points out the “divided response” to Weymouth Sands in this respect: 
“While some critics are anxious to state that they find this a predominantly 
‘happy’ book [among them Wilson Knight (47)], others, on the contrary, find it 
permeated with a sense of loss and failure” (105). Its ambiguities, however, can 
be easily linked with the fascination with the abject dominating the themes of the 
novel and Powys’s bias towards a Rabelaisian, carnivalesque approach to 
literature – and life. 
                                                     
17
 Lock expresses a similar opinion when he claims that Weymouth Sands is a “shaggy dog story” 
because Powys represents “desire [as] independent of duration”, as a “perpetual condition” 
which is denied fulfilment exactly to externalise the termination of the text (consummation of 
desire, death) from the text itself (“Weymouth Sands” 26–27). 
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